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THE CATHOLICIZING OF PHILOSOPHY

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The World and the Individual: 1st and 2nd Series, by Josiah Royce, Ph. D. LL. D., Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University.

Principia Ethica: by G. E. Moore, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

The Nature of Truth: an Essay, by Harold H. Joachim, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford.

That a truth is obvious is no reason for ignoring it. Yet it has often occurred that what was once generally known, is lost through being unnoticed. Its rediscovery so continually occurring, leads to the quaint concept that the body of truths cannot be increased because "old" truths can be found. And learning, puzzled by its own erudition, concludes that the particular authors to whom it chooses to refer, have all the knowledge that is worth knowing. So it was once possible to find all Science in "the Master of them that know."

It is therefore possible that we shall be supposed to be discussing the obvious, or discovering what is already well known, when we treat of the development of Philosophy. For all that we state to begin with is what has perhaps become a platitude in the History of Philosophy. It is this—that the development of Philosophy has, in fact, involved a continual widening of its conclusions, so as to contain within a new conclusion truths that seemed opposed before. But on this point, first, something must be said. For it is not long since a changed concept of Philosophy itself has appeared. If the spirit of the nineteenth century was scientific, that of the twentieth is likely to be historical. History has changed the perspective of our knowledge. And Philosophy is necessarily influenced by it, as the other portions of 'experience' have been or soon will be. The watchmen indeed tell us that the conflict of Religion and Science is as nothing if compared to the greater issue that waits on the conflict of Religion and History. And, in our present position, it may be well considered difficult to judge whether the majority will, in that conflict, be found on the side of Religion or of History. We understand, of course, that there can be no conflict between "truths;" but the question always remains as to what is true: for much seems true that is afterwards found false. And, as in the conflict with Science, much may be conceived historically essential to "Religion," which will be found afterwards to be outside its sphere. This much in passing. Our subject now is not Religion, but Philosophy. And of this, too, we may say, that History has done much and may yet do more to render its meaning clearer. It is indeed most deeply true that "the History of Philosophy is Philosophy itself, taking its time."[1] But if Philosophy can have a History, the History of Philosophy must be understood as a repeating in the individual of the thought of his race. A History of Philosophy that does not mean insight into the problem as stated by past thinkers, but is merely a list of terms, is of little account to Philosophy itself.

But what, in fact, has been the History of Philosophy? We know well enough that most of the Histories of Philosophy begin with Thales; such is the influence of a great man, for Aristotle began with Thales. But it is no longer sufficient for us to conceive as historically adequate this simple isolation of Western thought. For obviously we have but made an arbitrary beginning, and have attained to an abstract exactness "subtilitati naturæ longe impar." It is plain to all thinkers that Western thought is not all thought; and that civilization does not begin with Greece. But what we have so far called Philosophy has been nothing but the highest Western thought. And as the concepts of Science have made man no longer the most important figure on the stage of the Universe, so the concepts of History have dwarfed the importance of our civilization. A new Renaissance has opened to us the vistas of pre-Grecian history and extra-European Religion and Philosophy. The world for the thinkers of to-day does not move round Europe any more than the sun goes round the earth. We men are no longer "ants or frogs, dwelling around the pool," which is the Mediterranean.[2] Indeed, the change effected by History may be compared to that worked by Science, where "the floor of heaven inlaid with stars had sunk back into an infinite abyss of immeasurable space; and the firm earth itself, unfixed from its foundations, was seen to be but a small atom in the awful vastness of the universe. In the fabric of habit, which they had so laboriously built for themselves, mankind were no longer to remain."

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[1] D. Ritchie, *Philosophical Essays.*

This much we have learnt; but it would be false to conclude that we must straightway reject the ascertained data of the history of Western thought. For, even in the highest Science, the human point of view must remain for us central; so, in History, our civilization must remain the standard of comparison; although we need not suppose that to it all types must conform

For, in the first place, although History has thus lengthened the series in the development of thought, there are as yet no sufficient data for a more adequate concept of Philosophic development. And again, we shall be better able to study the particular aspect which is our present subject if we refer only to that which is conceived to be sufficiently understood. The historian is well aware that he can but trace single threads in the complex tapestry of life: the picture of the whole is only to be gained by a reconsidering of many abstractions. If therefore the course of history is here read in the light of one idea, it must not be supposed that the treatment of the facts is conceived to be adequate. But, however inadequate, it is true, if the precision, gained by adopting one aspect, be sufficient.

Taking then a designedly limited view, we may discuss the development of Philosophy as we know it. But at the very outset it is noticeable that the history begins in Ionia and not in Greece proper. Where the West met the East, there, even for Aristotle, Philosophy arose. And Thales appears to have solved the opposition between the prevalent cosmogonies by a cosmology which explained, and in truth (though not to him,) explained *away* what preceded it. However we are still here in the mists of history. The next step is clearer.

Following upon Thales, appears to have come a school of physicists, who explain the changing world by reference to an "underlying" permanence; with them, a material principle filled the place of a philosophic ideal. These were Ionians. And, as though in opposition to this school, appears Pythagoras. His school represented the West as compared to the Ionians of the East. To him the mathematical ideal became a material principle: and, because all things were numerable, he said all things were number. He and his school were Dorians. So were the early Philosophers, as compared to the school that was to follow them.

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[2] Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 109, B.

The external division is a sign of the facts of thought: for Ionia and Magna Grecia produced Athenian Philosophy. And even the earliest philosophers noted that the next great stage of thought-development is marked by Anaxagoras, who taught at Athens. The external placing of a philosophic school is, however, not so important as the nature of its conclusions. And here it is a trite thing to say that the glories of Greek thought, Plato and Aristotle, assimilated and reconciled what had been before thought opposing truths. This was the true refutation of Sophist Scepticism: the reply to the taunt that all philosophers disagree is best made by the appearance of a philosophy in which all that is true in "all philosophers" is shown to be but the partial truths which, put together in a true synthesis, will exclude the seeming disagreement by correcting the partiality of the truths. Aristotle knew this—that his philosophy was dependent, almost for its life-blood, on the conclusions of his predecessors. This is his reason for the History of Philosophy which he has given us in the first book of the Metaphysics.[3] And the last great word of Athens on Philosophy is Aristotle.

But once again the conflict of opposing schools, the practical wisdom of Stoic and Epicurean as opposed to the unpractical sublimity of Eastern thought, formed Neoplatonism. And Athens gave way to Alexandria. That this was a real stage in the upward course of thought can hardly be denied nowadays, though the precision of logical thinking is often lost by the Neoplatonists. The ideal Unity, of which they gained some glimpse from the vantage point of Greek thought, was rather an inspiration than a conclusion. Their chief Philosophers were more than half Priests.[4] In the light of the One Beautiful of Plotinus, the details of the world are blurred; and Plotinus himself speaks as one blinded.

Following upon these last efforts of the Ancient World in the region of thought, we read of a doubtful period during which no system was originated. Yet data were gradually accumulating which went much beyond the possible extension of Neoplatonic philosophy.

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[3] *Met.* A. *in fine.*

[4] Cf. Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* c. 14.

Life always comes before Logic. So the struggles of Christianity and the gradual attainment of an aristocratic leisure, at least for a few, preceded any logical formulation. But during this period of the "Dark Ages" properly so called, and the Eclectic period that preceded them, the process of synthesis is the same. The period may be barren of content for the history of abstract thought; but it is precisely in that time (as it were, of "embryo philosophy") that the greatest of the catholicizing efforts of philosophy was made. The Southern history of Western thought closed, and the Northern began.

When in the early Middle Ages the accumulated data were at last synthesized, the method adopted was in fact the last one that had lived in the southern world. Scotus Erigena attempted to set in order the data of philosophy, the highest experience of his day, in the language of Neoplatonism. This begins the history of abstract thought among the northern races of Europe. Scotus indeed thought he was referring to early Christianity when he deferred to "Dionysius;" and he erred, as all primitive philosophers do, by the hypostasizing of abstractions. But he fixed forever one part of the inheritance of the North, not Platonism but Neoplatonism. And such indeed appears to have been the "flavour" of all Western thought until the new clash of ideas when the Arabs met Christianity in Spain. Here indeed the still unsystematized thought of Christianity (which meant in those days the thought of Northern Europe) was at a distinct disadvantage. Apart from the graces of Arabian Literature, as compared to the crude latinity of half-civilized Goths and Teutons, the keenness of the Arabian thought was undeniable. It is traditionally said that "Aristotle" was introduced to Western Europe by the Arabs: but this is a misleading simplification. The Arabian (and the Jewish) Philosophy had had a long history before it began to influence Christianity: and "Aristotle," who stood for the "rationalistic" school of Arabian Philosophy, was not the Aristotle of Athens.

It is well known that the inspiring idea of Mohammedanism is the unity of God. It might be said that with this sole dogma the spirit of the Arabians was strong enough to overcome the effete civilizations with which it came in contact. But, as Greece educated Rome although conquered by it, so the Syrian Christians introduced logical thought to the soldier enthusiasts of Arabia. And, as soon as the Arabians began to form states, the latest results of Greek thought became of interest to them Thus it was they became acquainted, through Nestorian Syrians, with Neoplatonic speculation. But the growth of Arabian intellect led to a greater attention being paid to the masterly logic of Aristotle. It appears that Aristotle was, at first, of importance to them as a Scientist and a "Physician:" but the Aristotelian concept of ultimate unity (so splendidly expressed in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, for example) found a ready alliance with the Arabian concept of Allah.[5] The whole of Arabian thought thus became almost exclusively "monistic:" and Aristotle's authority was chiefly developed in the direction of the "monism" which is implicit in his writings. Alkendi, Alfarabi and Avicenna (Ibn Sina) represent the course of logical thought in the East, dealing with what is practically the "Absolute" of some types of modern monism. This was drawn to sceptical conclusions for Philosophy by Al-Ghazzali, that Religion might be based upon an almost Neoplatonic synthesis. After him the history of logical thought takes us to the West, where Avempace (Ibn Badja) and Averroes (Ibn Roschd) develop the "Aristotle" that had been handed on to them. Naturally, the preceding "monistic" developments could not be without influence on these Philosophers; and, in any case, the Arabian mind was always inclined to stress the absolute Unity. Thus it was that these great opponents of Christian thought in the twelfth century were known as Monists.[6] To them Aristotle appeared the great revealer of philosophic Unity, as Mohammed was the revealer of the One of Religion. For Mohammedanism and Aristotelianism were, in their respective spheres, perfect, precisely on account of their explicit Monism

In the Arabian Aristotle the "pantheistic" tendencies were accentuated (e. g. the stress laid upon the "intellectus agens" as one in all men). This meant that the Monism, which has always been prominent in Eastern as compared to Western thought, was first presented to Northern Europe by the Arabians. Of the influence of this monistic teaching we have the clearest evidence.[7] For instance "We are meeting together" says Alvar,[8] to study the sects of their (i. e. the Arabian) philosophers,—or rather philobraggers,—not for the purpose of refuting their errors, but for the exquisite charm and for the eloquence and beauty of their language." Once again the data are increased and a half-systematized thought was likely to be overburdened with the weight of unassimilated matter. In Albertus Magnus the erudition is more noticeable than the system; and although he, like many another "Scientist," appears to have kept his thoughts in "compartments," he was taunted by the controversialists of his day as "the Ape of Aristotle." For he grasped the postulate of all real systems, that, however extended, the whole of the data must be used. And the scholars of Albert learnt the first lesson of philosophy that truth from whatever source it comes, as true, is the only basis for philosophy. Such was the state of things when a man was found bold enough to attempt the synthesis of seeming opposities. St. Thomas of Aquin welded into a system the greatest of the opposing ideas of his day. From Albert he had learnt the highest of all faith—the faith in the reason. And with the strength of that philosophic faith he was able to grasp the erudition of his day and yet not be overcome by the multitude of details. And the force of his reasoning raised him above the controversies of his day, for he saw the truth of the future. He is well known indeed as having mediated between the falsehood of extremes in Realism and Nominalism. But that was an opposition within Western thought. He did more than this. He mediated between the Individualism of the West (which was indeed to become more prominent when Northern thought developed) and the Monism of the East. This is his great value in the history of Western thought. Thus he represents the process of the Catholicizing of philosophy. In him there are two elements, the first comes from his predecessors in the West. He owes much to the Neoplatonism of the pseudo-Dionysius, who came through Scotus Erigena: and the noticeable thing is that on this side he is mystical indeed but Individualist. And the second element is gained from the Arabian interpretation of Aristotle. On this side he is monistic, although definitely correcting the exaggerations of Monism. Thus in all his arguments as to God, he moves logically forward to the denial of all opposition or even proper "qualification" within the "idea of God." The source of the "Monist" side of St. Thomas' teaching is interesting and obscure. The threads are too tangled for any one theory to be adequate. But this much seems to be true: "Dionysius" and not "Aristotle" was the original source of the "pantheistic" neglect of the individual in Monism. It was for this that Scotus Erigena was ultimately disavowed. But, by St. Thomas' time, "Dionysius" had been so interpreted as to be reconciled with the individualism of Western thought, and thus represented orthodoxy in the philosophic sphere as opposed to Ibn Roschd and Aristotle.[9]

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[5] The first Arabian translations of Aristotle date from about 820 A. D.

[6] Averroes himself never seems to have identified the immediately real, however "one," with the ultimately real. Yet it was because of his exaggeration of the Aristotelian *Nous*, as one in all men and eternal, that St. Thomas corrected him. Cf. *Contra Gent.* LIX. etc.

[7] Cf. Migne. *Patr. Lat.* CI. p. 313. Even bishops become heretics through reading the Arabian philosophy.

[8] *Indic.* § 35.

As other philosophers have been, St. Thomas is more pluralist in Ethics, and in this he is almost Neoplatonic: his "visio beatifica" is remarkably like the "insight" of Plotinus,[10] it is the "end" of the individual as individual: and in Metaphysics he implies Monism, although it is Monism at its earliest stage, wherein it is always "transcendental." Thus his "actus purissimus" is in some way the Absolute of Monistic philosophies, but although he does imply the systematization of all types of "actus" in this "actus purissimus" it may be questioned whether he ever reached the concept of ἐνέργεια ἄνευ κινήσεως or of the *νόησις νοήσεως* of Aristotle, as we know him.

If, as Hegel has said, the condemnation which a great man lays upon the world is to force it to explain him, St. Thomas is proved great by his innumerable commentators. But the main stream of abstract thought never runs through commentary. St. Thomas had been twice condemned (in 1277: first by the Bishop of Paris, and then by the Archbishop of Canterbury). It is generally said that this was an anti-Aristotelian movement, although it is fairly clear that what was objectionable in the eyes of the authorities was the seeming destructiveness of a too rational Monism. It was the Arabian reading of "Aristotle" that was treated as "dangerous;" and St. Thomas was under condemnation in so far as he seemed to countenance this. By the very force of his thought, however, he showed that what he had gained from external sources was a new principle of life for Western thought; for he had not blindly adopted a Monistic system, but Catholicized philosophy by mediating between that system and the already established data. Yet that the new truth could be exaggerated was possible; and it was in fact, by opposition to the purely rational and monistic tendencies of the Monists that the later movement of Scholasticism arose. Duns Scotus stresses the Neoplatonic elements in the consciousness of his day. Hence the statement "voluntas est superior intellectu,"[11] and the consequent "amor" taking the place of the Thomistic "visio," for this latter has an "intellectualist" connection. But the Scotist is in the main stream of the history of abstract thought; he is not anti-rational: his conclusions may almost be put in this way: "a mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would, no doubt, be doomed. None ever went about to break logic, but in the end logic broke him. But there is a mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to postulate something beyond itself."[12] Duns Scotus himself confesses his indebtedness to Ibn Gabirol "ego ad positionem Avicembronis redeo:" that is to Gabirol.

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[9] The Neo-Platonic conclusion of an Absolute is obvious to anyone who reads the text of Dionysius; and this had an extreme influence in medieval times, through the exaggeration of mystics such as the Amalricians and the Joachimites.

[10] Of course through Porphyry and pseudo-Dionysius; but cf. *Ennead*, vi, 7, 35. "When one beholds Him who is far more lovely than any of His statues (i. e., in the palace which is his house) and worthy of true contemplation, he forgets the treasures and marks their lord alone. He looks and cannot remove his eyes, till by the persistence of his gaze he no longer sees an object, but blends his sight with the thing seen, so that what was object becomes sight, and he forgets all other spectacles." Cf. Dante. *Paradiso*, 33, 82.

> O abbondante grazia, ond' io presumei
> ficcar lo viso per la luce eterna
> tanto che la veduta vi consumei!
> Nel suo profondo vidi che s' interna,
> legato con amore in un volume,
> cio che per l' universo si squaderna.

The position of Philosophers at the time of the Schism of the West is difficult to decide. The age of great names had passed, and the ever-changing circumstances of the time drove abstract thinkers into the holes and corners of the world. Thus the thread of history no longer runs clear: and "practical politics" absorbed the best intellects. For when, at the birth of the new Nations of the modern world, the old unities were dissolved, the abstract systems which had been the statement of those unities were also dissolved. During the Renaissance as a movement of abstract thought, two tendencies were at work. One was the disintegrating force of new forms of National life; and the other was the assimilating of knowledge till then external to Western thought. Thus the data of possible philosophy were immensely increased, and no system was sufficient to weld them into a unity. The minds of the thinkers of this period seem to us to be a mere congeries of unconnected data, and erudition took the place of thought, as in Paracelsus or Pico della Mirandola; or men tried to grasp at a synthetic unity by avoiding the "fair journey through reality," that has always looked to "Platonic' minds like a wandering in the deserts. Thus it is that, in opposition to a formal erudition, there appears the "mystic" synthesis of such men as Eckhart in the North, and Ficino in the South.[13] The confusion of the time, and the inadequacy of any logical system to the congeries of new data, are well marked in the works generally attributed to Johann Andrea.[14] The excitement among the learned of Europe about the mythical "Christian Rosycross" is well known: occultism (that always follows upon a mysticism "that ignores the claims of the understanding") was likely to destroy the continuity of logical thought in the West. "Saeculo decimo sexto de Fraternitate Roseae Crucis fama percrebuit."[15] With this fame Descartes was connected (much to the delight of his opponents), although happily for abstract thought he shook himself free, for he says: "Il me paroit que tout ce que l'on a dit des Frères de la Croix de la Rose est une pure invention de quelque personne ingénieuse."[16] Meantime the true course of the history of logical thought was running underground. The Mechanism of Cartesian mathematics and the prophetic Science of Bacon[17] were to give new principles of synthesis, by which the new step towards the catholicizing of philosophy might be made.

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[11] This may be translated by Wundt's words: "All thinking is willing." It must, however, be remembered that the medieval "voluntas" includes two movements, one of will and one of emotion. It is the latter element, the quasi mystical, that is prominent in the use of the word by Duns Scotus.

[12] McTaggart. *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology.* p. 292.

Yet the impatience of the mind dealing with too great a number of data led both to an attempt to read the complexity of the world in a rigid system of materialistic (and mathematical) determinism, and (as in Descartes) to an illogical addition of data which are observed to have been omitted after the system has been completed. Thus it was that we have the mathematical Monism of Spinoza, and the "Deus ex machina" of the Deists. But we have learnt again to be patient with reality as Aristotle was, although certain types of mind would feel the effort of "Catholicizing" to be painful. Thus often the Philosopher regards Physical Science as a "slough of despond." "In front of us lies a valley which to him who seeks for God has but too often proved a very Valley of Humiliation. We have to descend from the open ground of the plain man to the more obscure and difficult region where the sciences reign. There we shall find ourselves confronted with serious hindrances, and the path barred by notions of reality which present more difficulties than any we have yet encountered; such notions as atoms, energy, force, molecules, the very hobgoblins of materialistic method."[18]

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[13] Of the influence of Ficino, Stewart says: "Ficino, the great Florentine Platonist, took the place of Thomas Aquinas, and is the authority the Cambridge Platonists are always found appealing to." *Myths of Plato*, p. 475.

[14] The *Confessio Roseæ Crucis ad Eruditos Europae* and the *Fama Fraternitatis.*

[15] Morhof, *Polyhist,* l. quoted in Bruchesi. *Hist. Crit. Phil. tr.* 735.

[16] *Otium Hanoveranum,* p. 222.

[17] Bacon thought himself anti-Aristotelian, and histories of Philosophy have continually adopted the fiction. We are in a position to judge more fairly of his ideas now than even Mill was. Cf. *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 1904; Bacon's *Method of Science,* by H. W. Blunt, where the new results are stated: "The *Instauratio* is a torso. . . the *Novum Organum* has its place among the Utopias which are nowhere and yet everywhere. It is the New Atlantis come from its isolation into the common world; a Platonic apologue. . . written by a knight-errant of the ideal, masquerading as a new Aristotle!" p. 16.

Now in the Renaissance we have a great complexity of data, and the idle hope of logical thought lay in their synthesis. Difficult and distasteful it may be—this Aristotelian attention to particulars, but through it thought must move. Thus Descartes, with his "inspiring assumption," attempted to catholicize,—to rise by a higher concept to a comprehensive view of the data. But the only positive concept possible at that time was a mathematical one,[19] and on this his synthesis was based. It was from the very first inadequate for its purpose and yet bore development into systems which far transcended the narrow outlook of its creator.

The Cartesian synthesis was carried to its ultimate absolutism on the one side by a philosopher of Eastern tendency, Spinoza: while it developed into the more Western individualism in the Monads of Leibnitz. Yet each of these movements represents a real attempt to catholicize philosophy, to lift it out of the regions of controversial oppositions nto some system which will assimilate and so explain all the data. The details are so near our own day and so well known to the historians of Philosophy that we need not discuss them. It is fairly clear that the pre-Kantian schools passed away, because on the one hand the system (that of Wolf for instance) was too formal and therefore really inadequate even to the data with which it dealt, and on the other hand, a large amount of data (represented in Kant's time by the phenomenalism of Hume) was still unsystematised. Kant's position is often considered to have been negative, but such was not his own concept. And in fact he was, in a sense, the Copernicus of Philosophy. He reduced the "independent reals" to that baseless fabric of a dream—"the thing in itself;" and thus made the Hegelian system possible.

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[18] Haldane, *The Pathway to Reality.* I, p. 164.

[19] Cf. Whetham. *The Recent Development of Physical Science*, p. 17. "...the conviction at one time prevalent, and even now by no means uncommon, that a complete mechanical explanation of every phenomenon is possible and fundamental, seems merely an unphilosophical fallacy. Its origin is to be sought in the historical fact that the section known as mechanics was the earliest of the physical sciences...."

For Hegel attempted once more to catholicize Philosophy by synthesizing all the data of experience. And, in so far as in the Hegelian system this truest principle of Philosophy became conscious, it has perhaps been one of the greatest stages in the modern history of Western thought. Further, in Hegel we find the groundwork of assimilation once more of the Monistic East with the Individualism of the West. The lines of division are of course not clear for the data are too immediate; we need much more of the perspective of history in order to judge of the position of Hegel. But it is noticeable that in and about his day the East was once more introduced into Western thought. The present interest in Buddhism, Brahmanism and Zoroaster is strikingly similar to the position of learned Europe in the early Middle Ages in contact with Arabian Philosophy. Goethe, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche[20] have only to be mentioned; and Hegel's "Philosophy of History" is an example in point.

But it remains to be said that Hegel and the Hegelians did not in fact, synthesize the data, as the lamentable failure of their "Naturphilosophie" proved. And further it is hard to understand how Hegel could persuade himself of the almost final nature of his own system. For the data have again accumulated: and Hegel must, of all men, have known that life precedes logic, and a new life will never fit an old logic. We may not yet be Super-men; but we are certainly Super-Hegelians (and in hope to be super-Bradleyans too). The Catholicizing of philosophy involves that no finite contradiction is final: and we go beyond Hegel, for we see that, although Hegel grasped the principle which lay half-speculatively (i. e. for a "mythical" insight) at the end of modern philosophy, he himself has by no means solved all contradictions; nor is there any reason to suspect that he has given us a final principle by which all contradictions can be solved. If a definite limitation is to be made, it may be said that the Hegelian system failed particularly in regard to the scientific data. But this deficiency was in some way overcome by Lotze. For this Philosopher marks once more a conscious development of the same principle of Catholicizing in Philosophy. That such was his ideal is obvious to any reader of the "Microcosmos," though the actual systematic statement of his chief results (in the "Metaphysic") may be less satisfactory.

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[20] In spite of his claims it is of course doubtful for the Philosopher whether Nietzsche can be taken as an Eastern prophet, however much he may be clothed in camel's hair. Cf. *Also Sprach Zarathustra*: "This is *my* way: where is yours? I answered unto those who asked me for 'the way': For *the* way existeth not." Is this subjective monism or individualism?

Such are the premises to be drawn from the Past. And, as we have said, the data have again accumulated. The mechanical systems of Mill and Spencer have fallen to pieces of themselves; and although they have gained much for the abstract thought of to-day, the principles of their synthesis are quite inadequate to the data even of Science, much more so of the Philosophy of the future.[21] We need only touch upon the two chief aspects in which new data appear to have accumulated. Physical Science has made strides within recent years of which it cannot itself estimate the surpassing value. Such books as Karl Pearson's[22] and Poincaré's[23] attempt the estimate, and are instructive in this regard. From these may be seen how far Science has travelled since Mill's *Logic*, and Jevon's *Principles*. In a more purely physical sphere Sir Norman Lockyer has been doing work of which Philosophy must take account. His *Inorganic Evolution* is remarkable.[24] "We are led" he says,[25] "to the conclusion that life in its various forms on this planet, now acknowledged to be the work of evolution, was an appendix, as it were, to the work of inorganic evolution, carried on in a perfectly different way. Although the way was different, still nature is so parsimonious in her methods—she never does a thing in two ways that can be as well done in one—[26]that I have no doubt that when these matters come to be considered as they are bound to be considered with the progress of our knowledge, we shall find a greater number of parallels." Or again, one may refer to the theory of Electrons,[27] with which philosophy may have to deal when it assumes a less mythological aspect.[28] That philosophy is awake to this may be seen in the work of Professor Ward.[29]Or once again, data are being added through the investigations of Prof. Loeb.[30] "Tropisms" may be of supreme importance for Philosophy.

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[21] Yet it may be noted that a bold attempt was made by W. G. Ward, in his lectures at Old Hall, to mediate between the non-mechanical data and even the hardly thorough system of Mill. Cf. *Nature and Grace*, p. 339. Thus he grasped the principle of all philosophic system, the synthesis of seeming opposites. Cf. his language as to "the immense intellectual work incumbent on us..." in a letter to Simpson: *Lord Acton and his Circle*, p. xxxvii.

[22] Karl Pearson. *Grammar of Science.*

[23] Poincaré. *Science and Hypothesis.*

[24] *Inorganic Evolution, as studied by Spectrum Analysis,* by Sir Norman Lockyer.

[25] *Ibid.* p. 168.

[26] Or, as the Scholastics would say, "entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem," and as Hegel would say, the necessity of nature is the necessity of spirit, "the real is the rational."

[27] Cf. Fourrier d' Albe. *The Electron Theory*, and the book in press by Sir Oliver Lodge, on the same subject.

[28] Cf. the speech of Sir W. Higgins, as chairman of the meeting of the Royal Society, on December 1, 1906. "Also recently another door of nature has been unlocked, giving us a vision of a totally unknown and unexpected world of exceedingly minute things which underlie and support the visible cosmos....Gross and

And, on another side, the Philosopher cannot afford to leave unsystematized the data of the Historical Sciences. Anthropology and the Science of Religions, not to speak of Archeology and Criticism have achieved results of which any philosophic synthesis must take account. Of the more scientific, one may name the books of Lester Ward[31] as at any rate, suggestive. "Throughout the eighteenth century men continued to thrash literary straw most vigorously," he says truly, and again: "The Scientific nature-worship which makes nature the model violates the canon of pure science—nil admirari." As an example of another type of data may be taken Max Müller's *Vedanta Philosophy*,[32] and the many editions of *Sacred Books*. Again another type, apart from the purely philosophical, is represented by the many Histories of Religion.[33] And further data for future synthesis are to be found in the many philosophic or quasi philosophic accounts of the Religious Consciousness.[34]

In face of this vast accumulation of data it is not without interest to observe the attitude of Philosophers. I have selected three books typical in their various ways of the mind of the time:[35]the authors themselves would not claim for them any unique importance in the long list of philosophical writings. And in many ways the efforts at Catholicizing philosophy, particularly as regards Scientific data, would be better exemplified by Professor Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosiicism* or Mr. Taylor's *Elements of Metaphysics*. But only the concluding portion of *Naturalism and Agnosticism* is definitely constructive; and the work of Mr. Taylor (*Elements*) is definitely restricted to a part only of the data of what is known now as "Philosophy."

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clumsy were these schoolmen's angels dancing on a needle's point as contrasted with the electrical fairies of Professor J. J. Thompson sweeping round in their hundreds within, for them, the immensely roomy hall space of a chemical atom. (Cheers)' Surely we are approaching once more Mr. Bradley's "ballet of bloodless categories

[29] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and the article on *Mechanism and Morals* in the *Hibbert* for October, 1905.

[30] *Studies in General Physiology*, by J. Loeb, and his book on *The Physiology of the Brain.*

[31] *Pure Sociology*, etc., 1903.

[32] *Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy*, 1894.

[33] E. g. *Prolegomena to Greek Religions.*

[34] A keen review of these is presented in the first chapter of Galloway's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, 1904.

[35] They represent Harvard, Oxford and Cambridge, in some way, though not proportionately nor quite adequately.

Such sketches as the usual "Introductions" to Philosophy[36] are limited in scope, and generally lack the detail essential to a real synthesis.

But in *The World and the Individual* Professor Royce has attempted to Catholicize philosophy, at any rate by treating as data to be synthesized the Monism of the East and the Individualism of the West. In the first of his two volumes he sketches in bold outline the idea of a system, which shall take up the valid ideas of the abstract reason and the "mystic" consciousness.[37] His attention to the monistic tendencies of even the non-rational mysticism (whether in *Neti, Neti* or in *Nescio, Nescio*) is suggestive. He attempts to correct the inadequacies of the former syntheses of the data of Philosophy. And in the second volume (*Nature, Man and the Moral Order*) the system is developed in view of the details involved in the truths of Individualism. In this we find the place of Nature and Self. The lines of the sketch are bold and masterly, and for the whole we can have nothing but praise. It is not, however, our present purpose to criticize. Whether or not the whole process and the results are valid, we have here an attempt at catholicizing philosophy that, as an attempt, is a confession of faith in the future of Philosophy. And he states conclusively the work of Philosophers who mediate between the past and the future: for the Philosopher acknowledging the data of experience, the knowledge of his day, goes forward, driven even in his weakness by the Spirit that leads him beyond controversy towards a more Catholic synthesis.

"Happy indeed are those who are content to live and to work only in regions where practical labors of civilization have cleared the land, and where the task of life is to till the fertile fields and to walk in the established ways. The philosopher, in the world of thought, is by destiny forever a frontiersman. He knows best himself how far he wanders, and how often he seems to be discovering only new barrenness in the lonely wilderness. . . . The truth of a philosophy is indeed a matter for the reason alone; but the justification of the pursuit of philosophy as one of the tasks to which a man's life may honestly be devoted, requires a recognition of the common interests of all men. The frontiersman may wander; but he must some day win what shall belong to the united empire of human truth. Those are wrong who ask him merely to stay at home. He wanders because he must; and God is to be found also in the wildernesses and in the solitary places of thought. But those are right who ask that the student of philosophy shall find, if he succeeds at all, a living truth; and that the God of the wilderness, if indeed he be the true God, shall show himself also as the keeper of the city. . . . Faith has its glories; but the hard toil of critical reflection brings its own rewards. None prize the home-coming more than those who wander farthest."[38]

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[36] E. g. those of Ladd or Marvin.

[37] As in the *Supplementary Essay* of his *Conception of God.*

In the essay on *The Nature of Truth*, Mr. Joachim does well the useful but preliminary work of discussing the data of the past. After passing in review the idea of truth as a correspondence, and the (doubtfully new) theory usually connected with the names of Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore, he passes on to the ideas of Truth that have held the field during the past generation. He ends, as Bradley (in the most brilliant book on Logic of modern days) says he does "in doubts and perplexities." But his conclusions do not concern us here. For our present purpose his book is remarkable as being viewed by the author himself as a preliminary to a future synthesis. It is confessedly an essay, whose object is to clear the ground for an adequate dealing with the present data of Philosophy. "If I am wrong," he says "I may at least have done some service, inasmuch as the failure of my present attempt may be used to warn those who like myself, are tempted to distrust the accepted maps. . . . A positive result may be bought at too great a cost; for it may be due to an abstraction which neglects the 'sting' of the problems."[39] Even Mathematics, that most abstract Science, suffers a like danger: as we have been told there is danger in "premature abstractions."[40]

Lastly, Mr. Moore claims to have written a "Prolegomena to all future Ethics." The more Aristotelian type of intellect, although aware that ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλοσοφός πώς ἐστιν,[41] is but slightly moved by the accents of prophecy. And unfortunately for any New Gospel, the history of how the Pragmatists blew their trumpets unavailingly around the walls of Jericho, is too recent. Yet once again the object in view is important. The greater part of *Principia Ethica* is negative, being a criticism of Utilitarian and Idealist Ethics. Yet the criticism is avowedly made in view of a leading principle which is conceived to be the basis of a future synthesis. The issues pass much beyond the immediate province of Ethics, and, of course, the leading principle of a logical system, which could catholicize philosophy by making it an explanation of all the data, would not be Ethical. And the author recognizes the problem, and the difficulty of its solution. "To search for 'unity' and 'system' at the expense of truth, is not, I take it, the proper business of philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers."[42]

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[38] *World and the Individual*, II, p. 4.

[39] Joachim. *loc. cit.*, p. 179.

[40] Bode. *Introduction to the Differential Calculus.*

[41] *Met.* L. 2. 982 b.

It is true indeed that the task is difficult for the data are innumerable to which attention has to be paid and yet "the philosopher is not a professor of things in general."[43] He is not a specialist in Science or History. These are his data, the conclusions of specialists. From these he moves. And the discipline of a real Philosophy, though sometimes arid, is always inspiring. It is true also that in some way every man is a Philosopher, for the data of experience are at all men's feet.

These conclusions therefore we may offer. The Philosophic Perspective to be gained from a history of Philosophy may be more truly a discipline of the intellect than any contemplation of Comtist or Haeckelist "clocks" marking the lapse of geological aeons. But if in the consideration of many systems the questions at issue remain external to the individual student, the result is not philosophical. It cannot be too often repeated: *Studium Philosophiæ non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum.*[44] The mist of names and terms confuses the issue sometimes when one system only is studied; for the student catches the symbol and misses the meaning. There is greater danger when the subject-matter is more complex; and a study of Philosophical History *from the outside* has more than once been the true origin of the sceptical conclusion that because no system is final, no system is true. Or, as Ferrier put it, the maker of a new synthesis is met by a quotation from Scripture, as St. Peter said to Sapphira,—Lo! the feet of them that buried the preceding systems are at the door, and they shall carry thine out. Yet neither taunts nor admitted danger must deter us from discussing the whole of the data: and the many "philosophies" of History are but data for Philosophy.

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[42] *Loc. cit.* p. 222.

[43] Hobhouse. *The Theory of Knowledge.* initium.

[44] St. Thomas. *In comm. de Coelo et M.* 1 lectio 22. The whole chapter is interesting in view of the usual false supposition that the schoolmen blindly followed authority, the *ipse dixit* of the past. Thus, following the first Historian of Philosophy, St. Thomas says: "Quando nos posuerimus opiniones aliorum,. . .inerit nobis quod non videamur condemnare dicta aliorum gratis, id est, sine debita ratione, sicut qui reprobant dicta aliorum solo odio, quod non convenit Philosophis, qui profitentur se inquisitores esse veritatis; oportet enim eos qui volunt sufficienter judicare de veritate quod non exhibeant seipsos sicut inimicos eorum de quorum dictis est judicandum, sed sicut arbitros et disquisitores pro utraque parte."

And if, in fact, the progress of Philosophy has been made by lifting it above controversies of a past into the catholicity of a future, what hope is there now? What man will dare to face the infinite complexity of modern knowledge? And perhaps also it may be asked why any man should dare.

I answer that neither Religion nor Politics nor Art—nor anything of worth, however valuable it may be, can be given *meaning* without the hard discipline of Metaphysics. But on the other hand, no Metaphysics or Philosophy can be adequate which has to be imposed from without upon the facts, for the system must arise from the data. And if on the one hand it is dangerous to go out into the deserts of Philosophy, where the old formulas hold no sway; and if it is worse than dangerous to change a Philosophy as a fashion changes: yet again it is impossible to make any Philosophy "wear well" that was not cut to suit the wearer. In the Middle Ages, historians say, men made their clothes last longer, but that was because they were made of leather. If therefore there is to be a real Philosophy, and a real Metaphysics, the system must arise, according to the lessons of History, not from "prayer values" and "notional assents" but from the stern logic of a "methodus sic et non."

If, on this basis, a system, that shall once more catholicize Philosophy, can arise, its only hope of reality lies in the ready acceptance of all that is proved true. And the prospects of its supporters are not inglorious. For in that cold and desert land in which lie the boundaries of the knowledge of to-day, the best men of every age are to be found. The man with clearer insight goes forth to prophesy in the desert, and few care to follow. But at least we have learnt from History that it is not among the generally accepted truths of the present that we shall find the higher Truth for which we strive, but in the lonely efforts of men who live upon the bitter desert-food of inacceptable work. To them and to their followers belong the future of Religion and Philosophy, as of everything that has value: *καλὸν τὸ ἆθλος καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη*. It may be indeed that some scapegoat will be found, some single man for all to execrate. Yet, for prophet or for scapegoat, though the desert is lonely—the air is bracing.

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THE JEWISH MILITARY COLONY OF ELEPHANTINE UNDER THE PERSIANS

M. F. Lagrange, O. P.

The majority of tourists who visit Egypt desire to ascend the Nile as far as Assouan. The first cataract is only a short distance above this city which is located near the southern boundary of Egypt. A peculiar circumstance had in antiquity lent a kind of scientific notoriety to this city which was called by the Greeks Syene, this being a transformation of an Egyptian name. It enjoyed namely the unique distinction of being situated on the tropic of Cancer. Its well was famous throughout the Roman Empire, for on the day of the summer solstice it was lighted completely by the rays of the sun.[1]

Very near to this city—separated from it only by an arm of the Nile which in its narrowest portion is only 92 metres wide—is the island of Elephantine whose ever verdant groves announce to him who descends the Nile from Nubia the far famed fertility of Egypt. This favored spot attracted forcibly the notice of the French savants who accompanied Napoleon Bonaparte on his Egyptian campaign.

> "The verdure and freshness of its fields form such an agreeable contrast with the arid tracts of soil by which it is surrounded that it was surnamed the Flowery Isle and the Garden of the Tropics. The traveller whose curiostiy is dulled, and who is exhausted by wearisome journeys ....experiences a lively feeling of joy on coming to this island which looms up suddenly before his gaze like an enchanted spot in the midst of the blackish peaks and shining sands which occupy and fill the horizon."[2]

Let us follow a little further this admirable *Description de l'Egypte*, all the more precious because Egypt was then, so to speak, a virgin soil.

> "This island marks the beginning of cultivation at this extremity of Egypt, and it is at this point that the Nile makes its entrance into the country after flowing over the ledge of granite and the innumerable shoals of the last cataract. This point was in antiquity the Key of Egypt on the southern boundary. 'Under the reign of Psammetichus,' says Herodotus, 'there was a garrison at Elephantine against the Ethiopians,

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[1] Tradunt in Syene oppido...solstitii die medio, nullam umbram jaci, puteumque ejus, experimenti gratia factum, totum illuminari. Pliny *Hist. Nat.* lib. II, c. 73.

[2] *Description de l' Egypte*, 2nd ed. tom. I, 175. This chapter is by Jomard.

at Daphnes of Pelusium against the Syrians and the Arabs and at Marea against the Lybians'. In the time also of this historian the Persians maintained a garrison at Elephantine.[3] According to Strabo a Roman cohort was stationed there,[4] and Pomponius Mela reckons Elephantine among the most famous cities of Egypt. 'Earum clarissimae procul e mari: Sais, Memphis, Syene, Bubastis, Elephantis et Thebae'. In relating the voyages of the great Germanicus, Tacitus calls this city one of the ancient bulwarks of the Roman Empire. 'Exin ventum Elephantinem ac Syenen, claustra olim romani imperii'.[5] Finally under the Lower Empire there was a cohort stationed at Elephantine".[6]

When Jomard thus grouped together[7] all that the ancients had said concerning the garrison of Elephantine, he did not suspect—indeed no one could at that time—that the garrison of the Persian period in the time of Herodotus who states that he visited the place in his travels, or rather the military colony installed in the island by the Persians, was made up in great part of Jews. This somewhat sensational discovery was reserved for our own times.

The first clue was furnished by an Aramaic papyrus bought at Luxor and published by Mr. Euting.[8] It is now in the Imperial Library of Strasburg whence the name "Strasburg papyrus" by which it is known. But although Mr. Euting diciphered it with his usual sagacity, he neither recognized the name Elephantine which it bore under its Egyptian form Yeb transcribed in Aramaic, nor the nationality of the authors of the papyrus. The credit of making this discovery is due to Clermont-Ganneau, whose interpretation has not been seriously modified though other documents bearing on the subject have since been discovered. His translation of the text which is very fragmentary, is as follows:

......"that the Egyptians have rebelled, we have not abandoned (the side) of our lord, and nothing has been found wherewith to reproach us. In the 14th year of the reign of the King Darius, when our lord Archam was on his way to see the King, behold the evil deed of the priests of Khnoub. They made a conspiracy (?) in the fortified city of Elephantine with Wi– –g (?)[9] who was there (in capacity of) [....];[10] they gave him money and riches. There is a part of the [....] of the King that [he has....?] [....] of the fortress, and he has [....] a wall in the breach

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[3] Herod. *Hist.* lib. II, c. 30.

[4] Strabo, *Geogr.* lib. xvii, p. 820.

[5] Tacitus, *Ann.* lib. ii.

[6] *Notitia utraque dignit. imperii*, p. 90.

[7] *Description* t. i, p. 177.

[8] *Notice sur un papyrus égypto-araméen...dans les Mémoirs présentés par divers savants a l' Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Premiere série.* t. xi, p. 297-311.

[9] At present we know that this name should be read Widrang (וידרנג).

[10] The untranslated name is פרתדך which appears also in other documents.

(?) of the fortress of Elephantine. And now he has built this wall in the breach (?) of the fortress. There is a well dug within the fortress which never lacks water for the use of the troops; even if they (the soldiers) numbered (one?) *handiz* they could all drink from this well.[11] The priests of Khnoub have stopped up this well. If an investigation be made by the judges, or the chiefs of the *auricularii* who are stationed in the province of the southern district, our lord will receive a confirmation of what we have said and exposed."[12]

There is no word indicating who the authors of the petition may be, yet M. Clermont-Gonneau recognized them without hesitation. It is an instance of marvelous sagacity which affords another proof of the trustworthiness of good critical methods. We shall see in the sequel to what extent new facts have confirmed the inductive intuitions of the French savant. He notices first of all the psychology of the authors of the petition.

"As to the revolt of the Egyptians," he says, "to which allusion is made, it figures here only as an occurrence incidentally mentioned, and not as belonging to the substance of the document. The authors of the petition merely recall it as an episode which had taken place prior to the one they have principally in view; it is a preliminary protestation of loyalty intended to dispose in their favor the authorities to whom the petition is addressed. When the revolt of the Egyptians took place, we remained faithfully attached to our master; consequently you have reason to believe that which we are about to set before you, and that same in the interests of the King and of his representatives—interests which from the military standpoint have been endangered by the priests of Khnoub acting in connivance with a certain official personage of Elephantine who has been corrupted by their copious *bakshish*."[13]

The denunciators, for such they must be considered, are not therefore of Egyptian nationality, but the field open to conjecture as to what nationality they do belong still remains very broad. It is here that the sagacity of M. Clermont-Ganneau borders on divination.

"There is in our payprus," he says, "a fact which strikes me: it is that when the authors of the petition speak of the God Khnoub they do not give him his title אלהא "God" which we should expect a priori, especially in a document of a quasi official character such as this in which the forms of the protocol both religious as well as civil should be carefully observed.... If the authors had been Egyptians they would scarcely have failed, it would seem, having to speak of the great deity of Elephantine, to give him the accustomed title. If even they belonged to another race, for instance, if they were Persians, Greeks, Nubians, Pagan Arameans or other Semites, they would probably, while denouncing his priests, have retained the conventional title of the deity that they mentioned, for in antiquity people generally showed respect to the gods of their neighbors, and especially to the gods of whom those who sojourned in the land were, so to speak, the guests. It must be allowed on the contrary, that if the authors of the petition were Jews, exclusive and intransigent worshippers of Yahweh and denying the existence of any divinity besides their own, this omission is easily accounted for."[14]

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[11] The rendering should rather be: "If rations were distributed they could all drink from this well".

[12] *Recueil d' Archéologie Orientale*, t. vi. p. 224.

[13] *Loc. cit. p.* 228.

I have purposely quoted these remarkable passages in extenso. Often such conjectures in the domain of criticism are looked upon as arbitrary and fanciful, and doubtless many in reading the above would have perceived nothing more than a bit of guesswork such as has so often been disproved. A conclusion as to the nationality of the authors of a document based on the absence of a single word would seem to many to be rather precarious, and even a passage of Jeremiah might be quoted against it, viz. where the prophet reproaches the Jews of Egypt for their religious syncretism. He informs us, in fact, that a great number of Jews having fled before Nabuchodonosor, had taken refuge in Egypt, not only in the Delta, but also as far as Patros which is well within southern Egypt. But instead of profiting by the severe lesson which Jerusalem had received, these fugitives gave themselves up to the worship of strange gods. To the objurgations of the prophet they answered: "But we will certainly perform every word that is gone forth out of our mouth, to burn incense to the queen of Heaven, and to pour out drink-offerings unto her as we have done, we and our fathers, our Kings and our princes in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem."[15] And Jeremiah waxing indignant, threatens them with a complete destruction. One might therefore conclude that there could have been no Jews in Egypt during the Persian period, or that if they had survived the consequences of the prophetical threat, they must have adopted the custom of worshipping other gods as well as Yahweh. But even so, the reign of Nabuchodonosor was long since past, and other Jews might have come after the conversion which followed upon the return from the Babylonian Captivity.

Fortunately another discovery was made which strikingly confirmed the inference of M. Clermont-Ganneau. As early as the winter of 1901 Prof. Sayce had found in Elephantine another Aramean papyrus signed by witnesses bearing Jewish names. Later a number of papyri were put on sale at Assouan. There were ten in all. Five of them and a fragment of another were purchased by Mr. Robert Mond; three and a fragment were bought by Lady William Cecil, while one was acquired by the British Museum. Mr. Howard Carter, the General Inspector of Antiquities, called the attention of Mr. Robert Mond to the fact that the Museum of Cairo was unfortunately without any Aramaic papyri, and added that if it could be put in possession of these newly found documents, they would form a precious acquisition. Mr. Mond and Lady Cecil responded most generously to this courteous invitation and bequeathed their papyri to the Cairo Museum where they still remain. That of the British Museum was not disturbed, but to Mr. Robert Mond is due the credit of having published at his own expense this as well as the other precious documents. The publication, the editing of which was entrusted to the care of Professor Sayce and Cowley, with the assistance of Mr. Spiegelberg and Mr. Seymour de Ricci for the appendices, appeared in September, 1906.[16]

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[14] *Loc. cit.* p. 229.

[15] Jer. xliv, 17.

When found, the papyri were still tied up and the seals unbroken. Apart from unimportant lacunae their preservation is perfect, and on the other hand, no suspicion can be cast on their genuineness, as the possibility of their being a clever forgery is, according to the opinion of experts, entirely excluded.

Turning to their contents, we find that they all refer to business transactions: they are drawn up by notaries and signed by witnesses. They cannot be called contracts in the strict sense of the term, for they do not exhibit, at least so far as the form is concerned, a bilateral character. In modern parlance we would say: Before so and so notary public and his colleague, such and such a party appeared who with such and such another party assumed the following mutual obligations. In these papyri it is one person alone who speaks and addressing another, recognizes the latter's right. The notary writes out the document and it is signed by the witnesses. These forms are therefore something like receipts, or legal renunciations or documents of which the purpose is to give birth to a legal claim. In this case they are binding on the two parties, but they have particularly for their object the settling of legal points which have been in litigation. The party speaking agrees to pay a fine in case he should break his engagement. All of these documents are dated by indication of the month and of the day as in the month system of the Babylonians (system which prevailed among the Hebrews after the Captivity), and they bear also the day of the Egyptian month together with the indication of the year of the reigning Persian King. They cover a period extending from 470 B. C. to the year 411, i. e. from the Medic wars to the war of the Peleponnesus. Let it be remarked before going further that the persons in whose favor the documents are drawn up are Jews, or rather one Jewish family—a grandfather, his daughter and his two grandsons. The documents themselves are analogous to title deeds deposited in the family archives, guarantees against possible disturbing claims either on the part of outsiders or of the members of the family among themselves.

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[16] *Aramaic Papyri discovered at Assouan. Edited by A. H. Sayce, with the assistance of A. E. Cowley and with appendices by W. Spiegelberg and Seymour de Ricci.* Alexander Moring, 1906.

It will be useful to give here a brief summary of their contents; later on we shall take up the discussion of certain obscure or particularly interesting expressions in endeavoring to outline the situation which they suppose. A certain Goniah, son of Sadoq, an Aramean of Syene belonging to the legion of Warizath, acknowledges in favor of Mahsiah who is also an Aramean belonging to the same legion, the owership of a yard or court situated between their respective dwellings, and of a wall which he (Goniah) has obtained permission to build. The construction of the wall by Goniah might have led to the presumption that he was the owner thereof; he recognizes therefore formally his neighbor's right to the yard and even to the wall, doubtless because the ownership of the ground entails the ownership of what is built upon it.

Pargman, a Khorazmian acknowledges in favor of Mahsiah the ownership of a piece of ground the title to which he had previously contested. But Mahsiah having sworn by the god Yahu that the ground belonged to him, and having sworn to that effect before the tribunal, not only himself but also his wife and his sons, Pargman relinquishes all his previous claims.

We find the same Mahsiah later on giving this piece of land to his daughter, Mibtahiah, probably at the time of her marriage. It is a donation *inter vivos* against which no testamentary disposition can prevail. Then Mahsiah allows his son-in-law to build on this ground. A difficulty might arise in case of divorce but it is forestalled in the document. If it be Mibtahiah who divorces Jesiniah, her husband, she shall have no right to dispose of this land which shall in that case belong to her children. If on the other hand, she is repudiated by her husband, he may retain half of the ground by way of compensation for what he has built, but all must finally be left to the grandchildren of the donor.

The lady Mibtahiah seems to have been more successful in business than her father. Being a *handy* i. e. probably a tradesman employed by the garrison of Elephantine, he finds himself short of money, and Mibtahiah makes him a loan which the father pays back by giving her another house that he had bought for cash from another Jew, Meshullam son of Zakkur. This property the limits of which are indicated by reference to the surrounding estates, extended on the north as far as the altar of the god Yahu.

Mibtahiah figures in another transaction, this time with an Egyptian. Pi', son of Pakhi, an architect who has brought a suit against her. The oath was administered to the Jewess who seems to have had no hesitation about taking it, in the name of Sati the Egyptian goddess of Elephantine. Perhaps she was rather indifferent in religious matters, or she may have been unscrupulous in matters of conscience, arguing that an oath in the name of a false deity could have no binding force. But be that as it may, the affair was thus settled to the satisfaction of Pi' who promises not to bring it up again in litigation under pain of a fine.

Was Mibtahiah afterwards divorced? We find that she contracted a new marriage with Ashor whose name indicates that he was a worshipper of the god Horus and an Egyptian by birth. He asks her in marriage from her father to whom also he gives a sum of money as a *mohar* which is precisely the biblical term for dowry.[17] Even to-day in Palestine and beyond the Jordan no marriage is contracted unless the future husband pays to his intended father-in-law a sum of money which in reality is the price of the girl, and this holds good even for a second marriage. Ashor adds thereto a double sum, ten shekels or a *Kebech* which he gives to his future wife for a dowry and for her trousseau, viz. a garment of new wool embroidered in colors on both sides, size eight cubits by five; another piece of new cloth seven cubits by five; another woolen garment with fringes, six cubits by four; a bronze mirror; a bronze salver with two bowls and cup of the same metal; a bed of papyrus with stone legs; a terra cotta vase; two urns and a box of cosmetics, made of ivory. This last is specified as being new, leaving it perhaps to be inferred that the objects in bronze were not. All these things are appreciated at their value in silver. They are not, it is easy to see, objects of great luxury, and if they should happen to be unearthed they could hardly deserve a place in the Museum of Cairo alongside of the costly jewels of Dashur. The bride and groom belong evidently to the middle classes. In case of death without issue, the husband and wife make over each to the other all their property. Ashor has declared solemnly—it was doubtless a consecrated formula—"She is my wife; I am her busband from to-day and forever." Still it was necessary to take some precautions in case of a divorce, not an impossible contingency, as is proved by the fact that a former husband of Mibtahiah, called Jezaniah son of Uriah signs the contract as one of the witnesses. The right to divorce belongs to the wife as well as to the husband It consists simply in a repudiation. She will only have to rise in the assembly (a circumstance showing that the Jews formed a legally recognized community) and say: "I hate my husband; I repudiate him." But in that case the belongings of the divorced party are returned to him; she shall give back the last thread! In this society so favorable to divorce, polygammy was more feared and guarded against. At all events, it seemed repugnant to Mibtahiah to have a rival in the house of Ashor, and the latter is obliged to stipulate that in case he takes another wife, or obtains issue from another woman, to pay to Mibtahiah the relatively large sum of twenty *Kebech.*

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[17] Gen. xxiv, 12; Exod. xxii, 16; I Sam. xviii, 25.

If we have devoted so much space to the discussion of this document it is because of its capital importance relative to the customs of this little community. Mibtahiah is careful to fix so well her domestic affairs with a view to being truly mistress in her home after the Egyptian fashion, that Ashor will have small opportunity to apply the too oft admitted principle that all the authority in the household belongs to the beard. His name is changed to Nathan, which being a Hebrew appellation, it has been inferred that Ashor embraced the Jewish faith. However, the form of the name is inconclusive, as it does not contain the element Yahweh. It may have been only one of those double names quite common among the Jews of that epoch, and it may have been given to the man in order to avoid the name Ashor. As to his two sons, they later receive respectively the names of their grandfather and great grandfather on the mother's side. Evidently it was the mother who gave these names and they were doubtless regarded as entirely Jewish.

Our information on these points is gathered from the later group of papyri. In the fourth year of Darius II. two Jews bring a lawsuit against the two sons of Ashor (Nathan) concerning a deposit confided by their grandfather to Ashor, viz. valuables, woolen and linen clothing, implements of bronze and iron, vases of wood and ivory, etc., etc. The case was brought before Widrang, commander of the garrison of Elephantine already known through the papyrus of Strasburg. In fact both the documents emanate from the reign of Darius II. The same sons of Ashor (Nathan) obtain afterwards from Jedoniah, son of Hochia and grandson of Uriah a renunciation of their rights over the house of Jezaniah son of Uriah. Probably the house had for a time been owned in common by the descendants of Uriah.

In the meantime Mibtahiah had died and her sons divide a part of the estate. There were among other things two slaves of Egyptian birth one of which was given to each of the two heirs. Jedoniah took Petasiris and Mahsiah (second of that name) took Pseto. Teba, the mother of these young slaves, continued to be owned in common together with her third son Lilou. Each of the two slaves who were distributed was marked on the arm with the letter *yod* in Aramaic writing, says the text, and the same was their mark of ownership in the time of Mibtahiah.

The editors have added to this choice lot of ten documents another Aramaic papyrus acquired in 1901 by Prof. Sayce, but of which the contents have remained very obscure. It is somewhat better understood at present in spite of the lacunae of the beginning. An unknown party makes an engagement with another personage whose name has also disappeared, a son of Iatma and very probably a Jew, to pay back a borrowed sum of money and to pay also by way of interest two *hallurin* per shekel each month which amounts to 60% per annum. The names of the witnesses are nearly all Jewish, and among them we have the satisfaction of finding again our Mahsiah, first of the name.

Let us now endeavor to sketch the historical situation of these personages according to the documents which bring them before us with their interests either in harmony or in conflict.

In the first place, there is no doubt that the facts narrated occurred in the island of Elephantine. Mention is made sometimes of *Yeb*, Elephantine, sometimes of *Soun*, Assouan or Syene, but it seems that the second is only a more general name for the island borrowed from the neighboring city located east of the branch of the Nile surrounding the islands. Whenever it is question of determining with precision the group of dwellings which are the object of transaction or litigation, *Yeb* is mentioned. It is there that Mahsiah the chief plaintiff has his domicile. The same persons can therefore belong to Syene only in so far as this name is applicable to the whole island; and in fact, the savants who accompanied Napoleon on his Egyptian campaign found that the island was called *Djizret Asouan*, the island of Asouan.[18] The name of *Yeb* belonged more specifically to the citadel, that perpetual fortress of which mention was made at the outset, and in which, according to Herodotus, the Persians maintained an important garrison. There is also in the documents another source of confusion, but it is more apparent than real. The persons mentioned are nearly all Jews, as is proved by their names which are formed exactly like many biblical names, by the addition of the ending *iah* standing for Yahweh, or rather *Yahu:* i. e. they are compounded with the name of the God of Israel as a token of the sentiments entertained with regard to him—v. g. he judges; he is my light, my refuge, my hope. Although this divine name may appear now and then among pagans, it is impossible to suppose that it could occur with such frequency outside of the chosen people. Moreover these personages are sometimes expressly designated as Jews (יהודי) though they are also called Arameans, nor does there appear any clear reason for this diversity of appellation. We can understand that they might be called Arameans by strangers, and Jews among themselves, but such does not seem to be the case. It may be remarked in passing that they are never called Jews of Syene, but Jews of Elephantine. It would seem therefore that now one name and now the other was applied to them. It should not be assumed that the purpose was to indicate the Aramean origin of the Israelites who in the Bible are assigned, at least through Jacob to the Aramean group, for there was little questoin at that time of these remote origins. The Arameans, though they never assumed an important political role, had nevertheless the peculiar fortune of being scattered nearly everywhere, even from the time of the Babylonian supremacy, so that their language and their writing having taken the place of the local dialects, like the Hebrew, had assumed under the Persians an official character in Western Asia, in southern Asia Minor, and as far East as the Euphrates. Jews living in Egypt would be called Arameans, as, in the Roman world they were later called Syrians.

It is for this reason that Aramean is the language of the contracts and we thus have an important indication as to the progress of that language among the Jews. The writing is no less characteristic. While the Phenicians preserved the Archaic forms of the Canaanitish alphabet aproximately as they are found to-day on the Hasmonean monuments, the Arameans who at first had used the same alphabet, soon changed its form bringing it finally to what is termed the square writing. In the Aramaic papyri which we are considering the transition is nearly completed, or at all events, the writing is nearer to the square than to that of the Mesa stone or of the canal of Litoé. Now as it is in this writing that the Old Testament was then transcribed and in part composed, it is easy to perceive the importance of these papyri from the point of view of biblical paleography. One sees thereby what were the letters that could have been easily confounded; also how the scribes, having omitted a clause, it would be afterwards inserted above the line without any precise indication as to where it belonged; and finally these documents bear witness to the fact that scribes and even official notaries would occasionally omit a few letters or a few lines.

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[18] We read also in Cook's *Handbook*, p. 641."Properly speaking, Syene was the island of Elephantine."

There is therefore no doubt as to the Jewish nationality of these "Arameans." But why were they in Egypt and what was their occupation? We have already stated that they were probably not the remains of those who had fled before the Chaldeans.

The Pseudo-Aristaeus in the famous letter in which he narrates the origin of the Greek version of the Pentateuch known as the Septuagint, speaks of the many Jews who came with, or were brought by the Persians into Egypt as colonists.[19] Little attention was paid by scholars to these references, especially as the writer is credited with so many strange inventions. Schuerer recalls them in his *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (1907. col. 6) and now they have acquired a historic significance, although they do not completely solve the question at issue. They leave us without an answer to the question as to the occupation of these Jews and why the Persians brought them to Egypt as colonists. Was it for the purpose of tilling the land? This was never a favorite occupation with the Jews. The native Egyptians accustomed to the peculiar conditions of the country would have proved more successful agriculturists than these foreigners. An answer may probably be suggested by a word contained in one of the texts—a word which does not seem to have been well rendered in the English translation, and which we have translated by troop (troupe). Because of the equivocal form of a letter which is sometimes read *d* and sometimes *r*, the word may be read either *degel* or *regel*. The English editors have preferred the latter which in my opinion gives no satisfactory meaning, and they have translated it "quarter," a sense which could more easily have been deduced from the form *degel* which signifies a standard, ensign or banner, and also troop or section of an army. Every time a Jew is mentioned in the texts, it is stated that he belongs, to the *degel* of the Warizath, or of Artaban, or of Athropadan, or of Haumadatha, or of Iddin-Nebo. With the exception of this last which is Babylonian, these names are all Persian. It would seem therefore that these Jews were attached to the standard or the group of officials belonging to the administration of the Persian government, i. e. that they were serving as soldiers under the great King.

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[19] See § 35.

To some doubtless this solution will appear strange. If they were soldiers how do we find them marrying, buying houses and in all probability engaged in commercial pursuits? It must be admitted that they do not appear to have been soldiers in the same conditions as others, and it would probably be more accurate to describe them as colonists bound to render military service. It is a peculiar situation touching which we have some information for the period of the Pharaohs and for that of the Ptolemies, and our papyri come in appositely to throw a simliar light on the Persian period.

> "In the Egypt of the time of the Pharaohs," writes M. Bouché-Leclercq,[20] "according to Herodotus and Diodorus, a third part of the land belonged to the military class (μάχιμοι) viz. of those who followed no profession other than that of arms, which had become hereditary in their families. Herodotus estimates their maximum number at 410,000 men, each one of whom was provided with a lot of twelve *arouris* of choice land (ἐξαίρετοι) free from taxation. This standing army furnished the King at all times with a guard of 2,000 men who were changed each year, and in time of war, with troops in numbers sufficient to meet the needs of the situation. Under the Persian rule an attempt must have been made to break up this organization of national defense; at all events, the Lagidi having come into power by conquest, and wishing to have in their service only Macedonians or foreign mercenaries, judged it imprudent to leave arms in the hands of the Egyptians. There is no longer mention of the μάχιμοι under the early Ptolemies, but the system followed by the Pharaohs was taken up by the rulers of the later dynasty when they in their turn thought of creating a standing army. They retained the services of the mercenaries by granting to each a piece of land sufficient for the foundation of a homestead, and the right of transmitting to their sons, together with their military obligations the property allotted to them.

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[20] *Histoire des Lagides,* (1906) t. iii. p. 230.

Thus was formed a middle category between the peasants or serfs and the free owners, if any such remained."

It will be noticed that in this passage the situation under the Persians is described only hypothetically. It is now clear that in Egypt where nothing changes, at least with abruptness, the system adopted by the Ptolemies is simply connected with that of the Pharaohs through that employed by the Persians. It is probable that the latter made no change in the system itself, the only difference being in the choice of other soldiers to make up the standing army. Even from a remote antiquity mercenaries were numerous in the Egyptian armies as is shown by the *Shardana* which appear in the texts sometimes as enemies and sometimes as forming a part of the Egyptian forces. In order to guard the important stronghold which was the Key to Southern Egypt, choice was made of Jews. There might perhaps have been some hesitation in assigning them to guard the northeast frontier near their own country; at Assouan they were sufficiently distant from the latter to remove doubt as to their fidelity. It is already known that the Jews, so impatient under the yoke of the Chaldeans, and who later revolted so justly against the religious oppression of Antiochus Epiphanes, were characterized during the Persian rule by an unflinching loyalty down to the conquest of Alexander. Satisfied with the religious liberty which they enjoyed, they kept aloof from the political intrigues of the Satrapes. We have noted in the Strasburg papyrus the affirmation that they had remained faithful subjects to the great King at a time when the Egyptians were in revolt, and how, having had the merit of this exhibition of loyalty, they were not slow in claiming its reward. The papyrus is remarkably intelligible if it be assumed that the Jews formed a part of the army, for in that case their faithful allegiance to the flag would be a matter of capital interest to the Persians.

However, as already stated, we must not too hastily conceive of them as passing their days in the performance of military exercises within the inclosure of the fortress. They were rather attached to certain divisions of the army to be called out in case of need. They were enlisted but rather in the capacity of reserve forces than of those who are stationed in garrisons. In the specifications of the civil status of Mahsiah he is designated, not as a soldier, but as a property holder.

Unfortunately when Egypt is in question it is hard to know just what is meant by property. The *dérouques* of the time of the Ptolemies were more than simple possessors; their property could be transmitted by inheritance, but it could not be sold, at least without the tacit consent of the civil authorities. The Jews here in question seem to enjoy a greater liberty since they have also the power of acquiring property. It is true that if they disposed of their real estate, it was for the benefit of their families, and thus the property always remained in the hands of those who were obliged to furnish the military service. In fine, the present writer is not of the opinion that they can be assimilated to the class of colonists in so far as the latter term is opposed to that of property holder such as were the colonists in the time of the Ptolemies and under the Romans when the condition of the colonists had degenerated into mere serfdom. The Persian administration seems to have been much less oppressive as regards the rights of individuals.

It is scarcely admissible, however, that this colony had its own judicial tribunals. The English editors opined in favor of the existence of a Hebrew court of justice; not indeed in the sense that it was proper to the Jews as such, but in the sense in which the Achaemenidae designated their provinces beyond the Euphrates as beyond the river (עבר׳נהרה), Ezr. iv, 10 etc.) and for greater convenience allowed them to have their courts. But this view becomes improbable in the light of a more accurate translation made by Noeldek .[21] In reality they appeared before a tribunal which was probably Persian, judging from the name of the presiding officer Demidath, or before Midraag, the governor of the fortress, who was their chief in all military affairs, and who was probably not much in sympathy with them for he is accused in the Strasburg papyrus of allowing himself to be bribed by the priests of Khnoub.

Nevertheless they had an assembly for the settlement of affairs proper to themselves, and it was only by the authority of this body that a decree of divorce could be legally granted.

A point which interests us still more than the political status of these Jewish colonists is the question of their religious situation. The Persians allowed them full liberty for the exercise of their practices of worship, and thus we see that they recognized as legally binding the oath taken in the name of Yahu the God of the Jews. Between Khnoub and Sati the Egyptian gods of Elephantine on the one hand,

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[21] על דינא זי עברן rendered "at the court of the Hebrews" (Text F, line 3) should be translated: "on the lawsuit that we have undertaken" עבדן with a *daleth* instead of a *resh*.

and Yahu the God of the Jews on the other, the Persians remained indifferent, and, if we are to believe the accusers in the Strasburg papyrus, their preference was on the side of the greater *bakshish.*

The Jews were therefore free to follow the religious prescriptions of the Law, but did they do so? We may charitably assume that they did on all points concerning which we have no positive information, but it so happens that in matters where evidence is available, we are forced to admit rather important departures from the regulations of the Pentateuch. In the first place, they had an altar to Yahu, a thing absolutely forbidden by the Law, outside of Jerusalem. The Aramean word *agora* has no other known signification. If the editors have translated it by the word "chapel" it is because they were loth to admit that an altar could serve as a dividing mark between two pieces of land. True, but the altar could well have been in the open air like that of Jerusalem, and within an inclosure which formed the dividing limit. In no case can the meaning be a synagogue. At a later date we find mention of synagogues of the Jews, not of Yahu. Besides, later still, Onias built a temple at Leontopolis near Heliopolis, and it now appears probable that the text of Isaias which alludes to it is aimed also at other like places of worship: "In that day there shall be five cities in the land of Egypt that speak the language of Canaan and swear to Yahweh of hosts; one shall be called the city of the sun (Heliopolis). In that shall there be an altar to Yahweh in the midst of the land of Egypt"... (Is. xix, 18 s). It is allowable to assume that Elephantine was one of these five cities. The prophet does not seem to blame this worship rendered to Yahweh in Egypt; it is viewed rather as a glorious diffusion of the religion of Israel. It is therefore probable that the Jewish colony of Elephantine deemed it preferable to infringe the law prescribing the unique altar than to omit the worship of Yahweh altogether where it was impossible to go to Jerusalem. It is only later that the texts are interpreted in their stricter sense.

The Law made explicit provision for the repudiation of the wife by her husband, but it is silent on the repudiation of the husband by the wife, a thing absolutely contrary to the laws and customs governing the Semitic nomad tribes. The Code of Hammurabi (art. 142) allowed to the wife also the power of divorce. The papyri under consideration provide for the contingency in which the husband might be repudiated by the wife without specified cause, as well as for the repudiation of the wife by the husband. This laxity so contrary to the Hebrew tradition was probably due to the influence of Egyptian customs. It is well known that the Law forbade a Hebrew to lend money at interest if the borrower was also an Israelite (Exod. xxii, 25) but it did not forbid the taking of interest if the loan were made to a gentile, nor did it in the latter case fix any limit to the amount of interest that might be demanded. We can hardly therefore pass a definite judgment on the legality of the transaction just cited where the interest charged is 60%, for though the lender is certainly a Jew, the nationality of the borrower remains unknown. The little that we do know shows then, that while the Jews of Elephantine remained true to their God, they were nevertheless not very scrupulous as to observances pertaining to the Law. It is evident that from such infractions we are not justified in inferring the non-existence of the Law, since the temple of Leontopolis was founded by Onias III towards the year 174 B. C. at a time when the Law had even been translated into Greek. We only observe that the Jews of Elephantine allowed themselves certain liberties with regard to the observances of the Law. Thus Mibtahiah swears by the goddess Sati before an Egyptian tribunal. Even at that date the spirit of the Jews of the Dispersion tended toward a differentiation from that of their brethren in Jerusalem.

We should nevertheless be exceedingly glad to discover in Egypt a copy of the Torah. We have become accustomed to expect almost anything from that soil which has the secret of preserving so well all objects confided to its keeping. The press has announced the departure of M. Clermont-Ganneau for Assouan on a mission for the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* in order to undertake new excavations. Who knows but he may bring back at least some fragments of the Mosaic Law?

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A STARTING POINT IN ETHICS

Charles Plater, S. J.

"As regards Catholic apologetics" says Dr. Barry in that admirable paper on 'The Terminology of Catholic Doctrine' which should be in the hands of every ecclesiastical student,—"As regards Catholic apologetics, we must deplore in many instances the fact that they do not *carry*, as a military man would say, into the enemies' ranks. They fall short of the mark; they convince only those who are already persuaded; they preach to the converted; and by the general reading public they are passed by as out of date, 'mediæval,' and mere assumptions....So long as comparison is impossible, argument will be ineffective. We cannot join battle with the enemy except in a field where he will meet us. And our temptation is to abide in an entrenched or impregnable camp while he is overrunning the world."

Much has happened in the ten years which have elapsed since Dr. Barry read these words to the International Scientific Congress of Catholics at Friburg. Catholic apologetic has, to a large extent, come out of its fortress and adopted guerilla methods of warfare with some success. Or perhaps it would be better to drop the militant metaphor and to say that Catholic apologists have taken to comparison with the result that their argument is becoming effective.

Sympathetic comparison is not a thing that comes naturally or easily to the ecclesiastical student. It is the prize of strenuous work. It demands much patience and humility, and a great measure of personal interest. It cannot be imparted in a text-book. It involves what may be called without disrespect, turning the text-book upside down. What we find in our text-books is a philosophical synthesis constructed in an order which is admirably suited for our own training. That order is determined by what may be termed the objective interrelation of the various branches of our subject,—logic, psychology, ethics, metaphysics, natural theology, and the rest. The determining of that order is a domestic matter, and need not here concern us, though it calls for serious consideration on the part of those who have the direction of ecclesiastical studies. But, at any rate, the student's presumed possession of the Catholic faith makes the arrangement of the syllabus chiefly a matter of pedagogical convenience.

But when it comes to presenting our synthesis to the outside world, the whole situation becomes changed. It is now extremely important to know where to begin. Some assumptions we must make; but which are they to be? We cannot present our system precisely as we have learned it, in all its nude verity. Our aim must be to set men where they may see the truth, rather than to demolish them with syllogisms based upon premisses which convey nothing to their minds. All falsehood is, as St. Augustine saw, a distortion of some right principle or misunderstood fact. We must watch the modern man at his devotions 'to the unknown God,' and then point out to him, sympathetically, that, after all, he may learn something about Him Whom he so ignorantly worships. We shall not convince by bludgeoning. We may do something by searching our storehouse for an olive-branch. Half a loaf is proverbially better than no bread. It is indisputably better than half a brick.

"Among the jangle of philosophies" it has been well said "there is surely in all something that is common heritage of the human mind, a unity which a little skill can detect lurking under that diversity of form which, unfortunately, it is the delight of most men to emphasise."

Few branches of Catholic philosophy offer a more promising starting-point for such sympathetic treatment than Ethics. The generality of non-Catholic thinkers distrust our metaphysics; they despise our psychology; our Natural Theology has no meaning for them; and our Epistemology fills them with dismay. In Ethics alone they admit the positive value of our results. "You have here come" they say "to much the same conclusions as ourselves, though your starting-point has been different." They often go further, and admit the superiority of the Catholic thinkers in the domain of Ethics, a superiority partly due to the working familiarity with the science demanded of priests.

This, then, is the first point to notice; in Ethics more than in other branches of philosophy we find ourselves on common ground with the followers of alien systems. Yet, as has been said, it is our conclusions that they accept rather than our premisses. If they chance to take up a Catholic text-book of Ethics they are likely to dissent with vigour from the opening chapters or theses which show that all morality is based upon man's relation to God. Perhaps they will read no more.

Now having secured one point of agreement with our adversaries, it would seem a pity not to utilize it. There is no question here of seeking a new basis for our Ethics; nor are we even considering the ideal sequence of treatment in the lecture-room. It is only a question of accustoming ourselves to present our Ethics, for the purpose of apologetic, in a different order from that in which we usually study them. Let us learn how to start with the moral facts as we find them, and to keep out, at least from our initial treatment, all reference to God, to a future life, to obligation, duty, conscience, sin. When we have finished with Ethics proper, with 'happiness,' with eudaimonism, we can go on to deontology (or the science of what *ought* to be done) and to that Natural Theology which furnishes the only explanation of the actual phenomena of conscience. We need not *begin* by working out the connexion between God's law and human conscience, or between conscience and conduct.

In this way we shall construct a Romeward path of which 'tired rationalists' will be glad to avail themselves. There is no compromise in such engineering. We do not propose to explain the idea of duty by Utilitarian lines of thought; that would be to explain it away. What we do is to take eudaimonism as far as it will carry us. It will bring us up against the phenomena of conscience, and it will prepare the minds of our hearers for the explanation of conscience which Christian philosophy affords. Thus they will not be asked to accept our Natural Theology before they have themselves felt the need for it. Hence they will welcome it, and give a real assent to it. We forget that the actual notion which they have hitherto formed of God may prove a frailer foundation for right conduct than is provided by eudaimonism. The word 'God' means so much to us that we fail to remember how little it may mean to others. Properly they should, as a witty writer remarks, put the term in inverted commas whenever they have occasion to use it.

It may be objected that we are limiting the science of Ethics in a manner which is not warranted by history or common sense; that this science must include such matters as duty, conscience, and the like, and employ them as its starting point. One may answer that the classical treatise on the subject, the *Nichomachean Ethics* of Aristotle does not include them. Yet Aristotle's *Ethics* supplies the main lines of nearly all modern expositions. It was accepted by St. Thomas, and it is, presumably, accepted by ourselves. We are justified, therefore, in restricting the term 'Ethics' to its classical meaning, and presenting a system of eudaimonism without deontological or theological implications, as a preliminary step to advance towards the other treatises. In this way we take a starting point which most men in their senses will accept.

I propose therefore to give a brief account of the scope and method of Aristotle's ethics. After that I shall offer some suggestions as to how his method of treatment might be utilized for purposes of apologetic. And finally I shall deal with some objections to my whole contention, or to various parts of it, which might possibly arise.

II.

Aristotle, then, limits himself to the consideration of *eudaimonia*, or rational 'well-being' or (to employ the current mistranslation) 'happiness.' He tells us what it consists in, and how to get it. He assumes that we want to get it (for *all* men want to get it) and he shows us that it is, above all other things, worth getting. But he does not say that it is our *duty* to get it, in the sense that it is what a personal God commands us to get. His 'must' is hypothetical: *if* we want to attain to 'rational well-being' we must follow his *régime*. He is like the doctor who says that *if* we want health we must swallow his concoctions, but who does not invoke the authority of the Government in administering them.

He does not proselytize; he does not condescend to argue with obstinate people who ask *why* they should develop their faculties and govern their animal nature. To an objicient who took up the hedonistic position, or sighed for the ring of Gyges, he would probably have said: "Read the Master's *Republic*, which I, for the most part, assume; and do not forget to read my *Politics* as well as my *Ethics*. Then if you disagree with my whole standpoint, well, I cannot help it. There must have been something radically wrong with your upbringing!" He would give a similarly short shrift to Utilitarians, in spite of the fact that some perverse-minded critics to-day are bent on making him the father of Utilitarianism.

He does not, then, hope to bully his auditors into right conduct. He states plainly at the outset that, if they have not got sound moral instincts and habits, and some desire to improve, they had better go away, for no amount of talking would do them any good. Of duty in our sense of the word he says little or nothing. This does not mean that he did not recognize the existence of any feeling of obligation. It means that such recognition was no formal part of his method.

Nor are we to suppose that he was indifferent as to whether his fellow citizens were moral or not. On the contrary, the whole purpose of his lectures was to improve the conduct of the city by raising up a band of enlightened and virtuous young men. "I will show you" he says to his pupils "how to do the best with your lives; how to set about in a thoughtful and systematic way to make your lives a success; and then, having got some insight into these matters, you will be able to frame laws and direct education to the best advantage." This, as we shall see, is not Utilitarianism, though the words just used might bear a utilitarian construction. It is far more like biology,—with a dash of mysticism.

Where, then, does he start? He starts by making a very reasonable assumption. All methodical thinking, he says, *goes* somewhere, makes for a purpose, whether that purpose be the mere thinking itself, or something beyond it. So of moral action. Whatever we do, we do it for a purpose,—to secure something that we call 'good. Sometimes our moral activities are ends in themselves; sometimes they aim at ends outside themselves But all ends must be subordinated to an ultimate end, a *summum bonum*. We cannot go on indefinitely choosing mere means. There must be somewhere an end desired for its own sake. We must allow, then, unless we are to stultify our reason, that there is a *summum bonum*, and that we, as rational beings, have some idea of it, and can take steps to attain to it.

The science of the knowledge of this end he calls (incongruously enough with modern notions) 'Politics.' Ethics, then, is a kind of Politics. It is not an exact science, for it deals with human nature, which, within limits, is variable. So, he warns us, it is foolish to expect rigid and mathematical demonstration in this matter.

What is this *summum bonum*? All men agree that it is *eudaimonia*, well-being. But they give very different accounts of what it consists in. Yet we need not ask them for their theories on the subject; we have only to watch their lives. Some, for instance, live for pleasure, some for social distinction. But these, as we shall presently see, cannot of themselves constitute the *summum bonum*.

Note that Aristotle does not begin by telling us in what the *summum bonum* consists. He does not tell us, for instance, that it is conformity with the will of God. He contents himself with noting that, whatever it is, it must have certain characteristics. It must have finality,—it must not point to anything beyond itself. And, again, it must be self-sufficient. It must, of itself, make life worth living. In fact it must *be* the best life. Having it we have all things, for it is not merely one among many good things. It is not so much a *thing* as the *use* of things.

For a more positive account of the *summum bonum* we must examine the function of man. Everything has its function, its '*ergon*,' its work to do,—that which other things could not do, or could not do so well. A handicraftsman has his function *as* a handicraftsman. He makes (to take a case) boots. The very parts of him have their function. His eye sees. Hence we are driven to suppose that man *as* man must have his function too. Aristotle does not say that man is created by God for a certain purpose. That would be to begin at the point where St. Ignatius begins his *Spiritual Exercises*,—which is, indeed, more or less where Aristotle finally lands us; or, at any rate, it is that to which he drives us. All he will commit himself to in the beginning is the statement that man as man has a work to do which he can do, and which no other being can do.

Where does this function of man *as* man reside? It must reside in that part of him in which he transcends plants and animals. In common with plants he grows and is nourished. His function as man cannot lie here. In this field he is no better than the cedar. In common with animals, besides growth and nutrition, he has sensation. His function as man is not here. The giraffe might conceivably give him points. (We need not confine ourselves to Aristotelian illustrations). His proper function lies in the rational part of him, not shared by tree or beast. It must be by doing something with his mind that he is to attain his end.

By *doing* something with his mind, observe; for *eudaimonia* is no passive state, no mere habit or potentiality. And this doing must be the highest and best of which the mind is capable. So we come at last to our positive account of well-being (if we call it 'happiness' we are nearly certain to lose the proper point of view). Well-being is the activity of the soul in accordance with what is best and highest in human nature.

Aristotle is now in a position to show how it is that popular notions about 'well-being' are inadequate, and to explain how 'well-being' may be secured.

From the second Book onward he discusses the matter of ἀρετή or goodness within a definite kind of being,—that which enables a thing to do its work well. "Virtue" we translate it, but here again we must beware of modern connotations,—though in such an expression as "the virtue of herbs" we are nearer to Aristotle's meaning. He has to treat the matter here, for he has just said that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul κατ᾽ἀρετήν, and he has to discover *how* the soul must act in order to be acting properly, acting at its best.

He accordingly discusses moral virtues and intellectual virtues in turn. In connexion with the former he gives us an excellent treatise on habits. He shows, too, that virtue lies "in the mean," *not* signifying by this that virtue is something merely relative. He treats of voluntary and involuntary actions, the former of which alone concern him, since voluntariness as well as knowledge is required to make an act moral.

And so he takes us on, in orderly course, driving broad roads through the tangled jungle of human conduct, and laying down principles which guide us in our own ethics to-day. His account of pleasure (of which something shall be said presently) has never been superseded, and scarcely improved upon. His analysis of friendship---an important matter in ethics—is unforgettable, and would appear to have made a deep impression upon subsequent thought. The present writer has never seen it pointed out that the sixth chapter of Ecclesiasticus contains parallels with Aristotelian teaching which are too remarkable to be merely coincidences.

About the tenth book there are some points to be noticed. Here Aristotle returns to his question "What is eudaimonia?" and gives more precision and exactness to his answer. He has said that it consists in the *activity of the soul in an excellent manner,*—of the highest part of the soul in the best manner. He now shows that the highest part of the soul is νοῦς, pure reason. The exercise of this (θεωρία) is that activity which is, of all activities, the highest, the most continuous, the most pleasant and the most self-sufficient, and it is loved for its own sake.

Now we must note that Aristotle is not giving the palm to mere intellectualism, but to intellectualism based on the moral virtues. The two cannot be divorced, he says. Though the moral virtues are only a condition of "celestial contemplation," yet they resemble the supports which are retained in a building rather than the temporary scaffolding used in its construction. They do not constitute the *summum bonum*: but they support it. Man's higher nature cannot attain its full development without reference to his lower nature. The virtuous man alone is truly sane. The final act of contemplation is a summing up of the whole man, rather than the independent functioning of a part of him. And it is a summing up, too, of all the incomplete ideals which most men cherish as to the nature of their last end. It is the perfect round; they are the broken arcs.

And this contemplation, says Aristotle in the last book, is Godlike. It makes us like to God and makes us dear to God. So he ends up with God after all; he makes us feel the necessity of passing on to consider the relation of man to God, just as our positive Psychology finally compels us to ask questions about the inner nature of the soul. But we do not start our psychology by asking questions about the inner nature of the soul.

In short, Aristotle's Ethics are *not* based on man's relation to God, and they prescind from the existence of feelings of moral obligation. Moreover they frankly limit their range to this life. Yet they lead to religion, and St. Thomas adopts them with approval, since they furnish us with at least a generally acceptable starting-point.

III.

Now let it be repeated once more that we are not concerned to prove that the Aristotelian order is the most profitable order in which ethics may be studied in Catholic seminaries. Still less are we advocating the adoption of that order in the instruction of Catholic children. Such a suggestion would be monstrous. One of the gravest perils which threaten Christianity at this moment is the growing tendency to sever morals from religion in the education of the young. The essential mischievousness of this tendency is sometimes disguised by the sincerity of those who promote it, and their genuine desire to improve the moral condition of the people. Yet the Catholic Church, knowing from nineteen centuries of experience how intimate is the connexion between revelation and morality, cannot but combat the new movement with all possible earnestness. She knows how imporant it is to give definiteness and strength to moral teaching by associating it with the whole scheme of Catholicism. She knows the moralizing value of the wonderful sacramental system which Christ has given her, and how a personal devotion to her divine Founder is the surest basis on which to build up character. She educates the whole child, and knows the folly of attempting to isolate any part of that education. In her hands all training converges to one end. Natural virtue she prizes: lower motives she employs; but to sever patriotism or benevolence or justice from the ultimate end of life is, as she knows, to fail in securing even subsidiary ends.

Her attitude, then, towards Ethical Societies, Moral Instruction Leagues, and other institutions which definitely prescind from the religious basis of morality is clear. For her own children she will have none of these things. She regards them as a very serious danger. She will resist any attempt made by such bodies to secure obligatory non-religious moral teaching in schools where there are Catholic children; and this not because she is indifferent to moral teaching, but because she believes that there can be no really effective moral teaching without a religious basis. Knowledge of good and evil must grow *pari passu* with knowledge of God and of His revelation to man.

But we are here concerned, not with Catholic children, but with those who are outside the fold. Here the case is different. We welcome the spread of moralizing agencies among those who otherwise would receive no moral lessons at all. Anything that will help to make children more orderly, more truthful, more generous, is, as far as it goes, a good thing. It is preparing men for the gospel. It is clearing away at least some of the obstacles which hinder the light and weaken the will.

So of adult non-Catholics. Many of them do admire the natural virtues, but they do not seem to feel the stress of God's will upon theirs. It is of little use saying to such as these, "Be good because God commands you to." But it may be highly profitable to say to them "Go on being as good as you can and trying to avoid making a mess of your life. I will show you how to be better. Look about at the best patterns you can find: study the personalities of Sir Thomas More and Cardinal Newman and Francis Xavier and Augustine and Paul of Tarsus and especially of Him whose goodness all these men reflected. Try to see what goodness means, αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ as Plato says,—what it is in the innermost heart of a man, apart from its rewards. Track out the image of the good wherever you find it; do not let prejudice or laziness stand in your way!" If a man will follow that advice (and the advice is neither unreasonable nor utilitarian) he ought, by the grace of God, to end in the Catholic Church. His striving after the *best* will awaken in him the desire for God. He will want God more and more. When at length he has used his natural powers of mind and body to live the best life he can,—then we shall tell him what Revelation tells us about God, and he will embrace our teaching, because it is the very thing he has been looking for.

IV.

The danger is, of course, that a man may rest upon a merely artistic level, and feel no inclination to rise into the higher regions.

He may cultivate a refined Epicureanism, or wrap himself about with philanthropy, or (deluding himself by the seeming completeness of his life) may become blind to the demands of God upon him. The type is only too common. Dr. Jowett, at a time when the reaction against the Catholic movement at Oxford had reached its height, produced a number of examples of it Its motto runs:

> I strove with none, for none was worth my strife;
> Nature I loved, and, next to Nature, Art.
> I warmed both hands before the fire of life;
> It sinks, and I am ready to depart.

It is sometimes labelled 'neo-paganism,' but perhaps it might better be called 'neo sophism.' For it recalls that sophistry against which Plato was ever protesting —not vice, necessarily, nor selfishness, nor unseemliness,—but a failure to respond to God's voice.

If we can but get men to advance, the pleasant lane of Epicureanism will lead them to the truth in spite of itself. It is only when they sit down to rest that their case is hopeless. In Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* the young Roman held consistently to his philosophy throughout,—till it led him beyond itself. "I must have the *best* pleasure" he cried; and he soon found himself discriminating between pleasures, and taking the higher which was not merely the greater. He soon found himself taking what was not primarily pleasure, but God's will; and he died in the arms of the Christians. It is so in all human progress which does not deliberately confine itself to a lower level. Initial impulses give little clue to full development. Thus society is formed for the sake of life; it is developed for the sake of a full and true life. And the prodigal was first prompted to return to his father by the pains of hunger: but in the course of return he satisfied deeper cravings, and passed from felt wants to known duties.

The task, then, of the Catholic apologist would seem to be the utilisation of such elements in modern culture and modern philosophies as may provide a road which will lead to Rome. M. Brunetière has done the work for Positivism; we need others who will deal similarly with Socialism and Hegelianism, music and literature. The work, as we have observed, is not easy; it demands a rare sympathy and an untiring patience. We shall need considerable detachment of mind if we are to make our appeal effective. A heavy fire of syllogisms from our own safe premisses may be of little use.

Now with regard to Ethics we find an admirable introduction in the Aristotelian system,—not, of course, for the Catholic child, but for the adult unbeliever. This system would appear to provide an excellent set of principles which, when once grasped, lead men to seek for a satisfactory Natural Theology. After all we must remember that the modern man of culture may have as little acquaintance or sympathy with Catholic dogma as the rudest savage. In both cases we may have to start with something which is quite undogmatic. The missionary approaches the savage with an unsectarian cornet; then may follow a course of undenominational agriculture. The catechism may have to wait. So with the modern man. It may be wise to get into his head the Aristotelian teleology before we speak of the authority of the Church. He must cease to believe that life is a kaleidoscope before he will see that authority is a necessity.

It may be objected that, since Christian ethics are based on man's relation to God, an enquirer who has started from Aristotle's postulates will have to retrace his steps and re-learn his ethics on being confronted with revelation. This is not quite the case. The man will have nothing to unlearn, though he will have something to complete,—something, indeed, that clamors for completion. As he progresses in Catholic knowledge he will find that his own principles stand out yet more clearly with the increase of light He will now hold that man is created for the service and love of God. This is more explicit than his former belief that man is made for the best that man can do. He had previously learned that there was such a thing as a function; he now realises that there is also such a thing as a duty. Light will stream in from above as the progress continues. He will learn to track out the image of the good wherever he may find it,—and that image will grow more and more distinct. He will no longer be tempted to explain away conscience by the laws of heredity. Conscience will be something which is so natural to man that to explain it away would be to leave man a kind of a monster. The Incarnation will be no longer a stumbling block. It will be something too good not to be true.

As the present writer was once lecturing on the *Nichomachean Ethics* to seminary students, it was suggested to him that a course of such lectures to non-Catholic working men would form an excellent introduction to a series of lectures on Catholic belief. The suggestion is not as academic as it might appear. A similar course of lectures by a Utilitarian philosopher upon his system could not have the same result. Utilitarianism is a definitely closed system; it does not lead to a higher standpoint. If men escape from it, it is in spite of their philosophy; it is because they have what Stevenson calls "an upright stock" in their own hearts. Hence it is well to emphasise the fact that Aristotle and Mill are different people. The suspicion and distrust with which Mill regarded Aristotle's philosophy could only be matched by the distrust and suspicion with which Aristotle would have regarded Mill's philosophy had he known it. Mill definitely shuts himself up in the realm of feeling,—a proceeding which Aristotle justly regards as suicidal. The older philosopher did not disregard pleasure; he elevated it and gave it a status and a metaphysical basis. But he looked primarily to function, and so laid foundations on which St. Thomas was glad enough to build. The notion of function can be enlarged so as to include Christian Ethics; the notion of pleasure, never. Aristotle himself, in the last book of his Ethics, was led to the frontiers of human reasoning. Had his theology given him a bridge, he would surely have stepped across it.

V.

It would appear, then, that some of the strictures which have been applied to teleological ethics require qualification. Critics have persisted in narrowing down the term teleology to mean purposiveness towards the single end "happiness." But, as has been said, Aristotelian ethics are as far as possible removed from modern Utilitarianism. The former looks to function, the latter to happiness. The confusion between the two may have been increased by the current mistranslation of the Aristotelian term "eudaimonia." It is necessary for us to have a clear idea of Aristotle's view as to the relations between pleasurable feeling and right action if we wish to avoid misunderstanding.

Aristotle sometimes speaks of pleasure in the tones of an ascetic:

> "In all cases" he says (*N. E.* II c. 9) "we must be especially on our guard against pleasant things and against pleasure; for we can scarce judge her impartially. And so, in our behaviour towards her, we should imitate the behaviour of the old counsellors towards Helen, and in all cases repeat their saying: if we dismiss her we shall be less likely to go wrong."

Yet, as the argument proceeds, we find that pleasure is by no means "dismissed", but on the contrary is given position and dignity. Pleasure, we come to see, though not the *summum bonum*, is so closely allied to the *summum bonum* as to be scarcely distinguishable from it. Yet if we fail to see the distinction we are lost men. The Hedonist is so completely wrong just because he is so nearly right.

Aristotle deals *ex professo* with the subject of pleasure in two distinct treatises (Books IV and VII of the *Nichomachean Ethics*) which at first sight appear to contradict one another. The former would seem to be frankly hedonistic, and the latter anti-hedonistic. But the contradiction is merely apparent. Both books have their place in the system. The fact is that Aristotle is so keenly alive to the importance of the subject, and to the elements of truth in the hedonistic position, that he begins by brushing aside some current antihedonistic arguments which he regards as worthless. "Pleasure" certain Platonic writers had said "cannot be the *summum bonum.*" "True" answers Aristotle "but your arguments do not prove that it cannot." It may be worth while to consider just one of these Platonic attacks upon pleasure which Aristotle here sets himself to discredit; we may thus get a clearer idea of his own positive belief on the subject.

The *summum bonum,* it had been said, must be something complete in itself. Hence it could not be pleasure, which was a mere process (κίνησις) or coming into being (γένεσις). To this Aristotle answers that pleasure is *not* a process. Hence, *a fortiori,* it is not a coming into being, which is a species of process. It is not a process because it is (or is bound up with) a perfect activity or ἐνέργεια. It is something complete, like seeing or understanding, which either takes place completely or not at all; οὐ γίνεται ἀλλ' ἐστί. At any moment of time I can say "I have seen: I see: I shall see" or "I have had, or have or shall have pleasure" denoting the same activity in each of the tenses. Such an activity does not involve time essentially in its definition. It is indivisible and perfect in every moment of time. We do not, of course, speak here of the underlying physiological processes, about which something shall be said presently.

The case is quite different in the process, say, of building a house. Here at every moment of time a *different kind of action* is being performed. Now the men are digging the foundations, now they are carrying the bricks, now they are putting on the slates, and now, it may be, they are taking liquid refreshment. The whole process only *tends* to completion γίνεται οὐκ ἐστί. It is only complete when the lightning conductor is finally added,—or the bill sent in. It is so, more or less, in all matters which fall under the senses. Their mode of existence is motion, and the saying of Heraclitus is justified. Moreover such processes essentially involve time,—they require a definite time in which to take place.

Apply this to the case of pleasure. Pleasure is one thing, the physiological process which underlies it is another. And the former is not merely the "result" of the latter. Pleasure cannot be constructed, for it is simple. If it seems to be fugitive, brief, fluctuating, that is only on account of the nature of the process which is a necessary condition for its existence. Of its own nature it is persistent, complete, perfect. It has the *ratio aeternitatis*. Aristotle will not let us disparage pleasure.

As for the demoralising effects of pleasure-hunting which we see around us, Aristotle has no difficulty in showing that they do not arise from any defects in the nature of pleasure as such. The whole trouble comes from the abuse of pleasure,—from resting in lower pleasures in such a way as to hinder higher activities. As a matter of fact the highest pleasure is practically indistinguishable from the highest activity. Aristotle speaks of God's life as being activity *or* pleasure. And the better a man is, the more the two will approximate. Utilitarianism would supply an excellent practical norm of morality in a perfect world. The end of life and the highest pleasure is, as we read in the *Eudemian Ethics*, to see God and to serve Him—*τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν*. As Professor Burnet writes:

> "It is clear, then, that we can hardly distinguish the pleasure of the highest life from the highest life itself, and in this sense it is true that pleasure is the highest good. But this is not Hedonism. Just because the pleasure and the activity which it completes are so closely bound up together that they can only be distinguished by an effort of thought, it follows that pleasures must differ specifically just as do the activities which they complete. There is, therefore, no sense in saying that pleasure in the abstract is the end. There is no such thing as pleasure in the abstract; but only pleasures that are inseparably bound up with certain activities. We must therefore continue to look for human good in some form of activity which will, of course, as we saw long ago, be essentially pleasant."

Aristotle, then, unlike Mill, looks primarily to the activity. To the highest activity and pleasure men tend as towards the unknown God. The "pleasure" (if we like to analyse the matter) is a complement of the activity, and, as such, is not that at which we primarily aim.

VI.

Some tendency to confuse Aristotelian Ethics with Utilitarianism is, we believe, to be found in Dr. Ryan's interesting paper on "The Method of Teleology in Ethics" in THE NEW YORK REVIEW for January 1907. With much of that paper we are in agreement; but we think that, though effective against the undue stress which is laid upon Utilitarian motives by some Catholic writers, Dr. Ryan's arguments scarcely touch the teleological method itself. Indeed we think that they point to the need of more Aristotelianism in Catholic Ethics. They are a protest, not against teleology, but against bad teleology.

For it cannot be repeated too often that in the teleological method we need not necessarily posit pleasure as our end. To do so would be to run counter to Aristotle's main principles. Aristotle, unlike Mill, does not ask whether a certain course of conduct will increase pleasure; he asks whether it will improve function. Of course by improving function it will, in the long run, increase pleasure. But we must not look upon pleasure as a sort of jam which is spread on activity to make it palatable. Each activity has its own pleasure, not merely a certain amount of a common quality "pleasure". For pleasure is not a quality.

Dr. Ryan wishes to limit the part played by teleology in Catholic Ethics. Thus, for instance, he will not allow that the consideration of our ultimate end can provide us with any guidance in actions that concern primarily ourselves and our neighbors. He says:

> "Mere consideration of the ultimate end cannot tell us whether veracity, justice, and chastity are more apt to move us towards that goal (i. e. man's ultimate end) than lying, theft, and impurity. . . Nor do they prevent the doer of them from knowing and loving God."

Now surely a consideration of our ultimate end can give us an insight into the value of these things as means. If I have some knowledge of what God is, and some knowledge of what my human nature is, I can readily perceive that my human nature cannot attain the end which God has set for it unless it abstains from lying, theft, and impurity. Even if I take my last end to be "the subjective condition called perfect happiness" I see that such happiness can only spring from perfect activity, and that these vices disorganise life and hinder progress towards perfect activity. Further, I perceive that they are not *conducive* to the love and knowledge of God. Aristotle, without any deontology, was able to see that. The good man is like to God, he says: he is loved by God. The influence of morality on the intellect was clearly recognised by him. He saw that wisdom was not mere "cuteness"; only a good man can love the good.

Dr. Ryan admits, of course, that the selfish or impure man cannot love God as well as the man who practises the opposite virtues; "but" he adds "he can love God to some extent; and the fact not the degree of love is all that can be proved obligatory from a consideration of the ultimate end." But surely it is not a question of "proving obligation", in the strict sense of the term, from the consideration of the ultimate end. The question is whether the end can show us which line of conduct is more conducive to the love of God. This it does show us, as Dr. Ryan admits.

Dr. Ryan justly finds fault with Catholic writers who lay too much stress on the external consequences, whether personal or social, of lying and immorality. But Aristotle's teleology is not limited to external consequences; it is quite as anxiously concerned with internal consequences. Aristotle's study of human nature leads him to see that the important question is not whether an action conduces to a man's enjoyment or health, or to the enjoyment or health of his neighbours, but whether it tends to advance him to that perfection for which nature herself shows him to be destined. Hence if acts of impurity or theft play havoc in a man's spirtiual being and impede his development towards his last end, such acts must be avoided. It is no answer to say that their normal evil effects on his own health or reputation or on society may, in a particular case, be counteracted. The chief harm has been done, even though it be checked from issuing into outward manifestation. Moreover it is not a question of the man's own peace of mind. Such acts are not less, but actually more harmful if he is living in a fool's paradise, and has, as Plato says, "the Lie in the Soul".

When Dr. Ryan tells us that the most satisfactory proximate norm of morality is man's rational nature, while the ultimate norm of morality is God's essence, he does not depart from the spirit of Aristotle's teaching. The application of such a norm is, of course, fatal to Utiitarianism. But it is very good teleology. If the proximate norm of all morality is man's rational nature, then we can only determine the goodness or badness of an act by reference to that rational nature. We must look and see what the act *does*,—not necessarily in the way of outward effects (though these may have to be considered) but at least what it does *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ*. To this Dr. Ryan would doubtless agree. But it is teleology all the same.

Dr. Ryan quotes with approval, as favouring his contention, some suggestive observations by Father Joseph Rickaby, S. J., who says that he has long been haunted by the thought of a certain "unconsidered ground of morality," and who continues thus:

> "Certain actions are wrong because in them some type is violated, some sacred symbolism outraged, and the dishonour done to the type redounds upon the anti-type or thing typified."

With Father Rickaby's suggestion we concur heartily. It is a protest against resting the whole malice of certain sins upon their hygienic effects. But it is not a protest against teleological ethics. Quite the contrary is the case. To avoid doing an action for fear of violating a type is as much a purposive act as to avoid doing it for fear of injuring our health.

And so when Dr. Ryan complains that in very many authors the ultimate end is made too important to the detriment of "rational nature", we suggest that, the ultimate end of man being (from one point of view) the perfection of his rational nature, the charge does not sound a very serious one. We should prefer to say that many authors lay too much stress on utilitarian motives with the result that (as Dr. Ryan so truly and forcibly points out) they are hard pressed to explain the absolute universality of moral laws, even in cases where a Utilitarian would be forced to allow an exception.

The "ultimate end," then, would appear to be a sufficient ground of morality if only it is properly envisaged; and its part in Ethics needs no restricting. Bare intuition into the goodness or badness of an act *apart from any consequences at all* is, if not unthinkable, at least unworkable. We should find ourselves with nothing on our hands save Kant's empty form. The fact is that the highest and the lowest moral motives alike have reference to the ultimate end. St. Paul acts as though he had no will save Christ's; the struggling sinner nerves himself by thinking of the pains of Hell. The former has a fuller idea of his end: all selfishness has gone out of it. The sinner has a lower idea of his end. Yet there is reference to God in his action; mere fear of pain would have no moral value; he must recognise, at least implicitly, that Hell means absence from God.

The question, as Dr. Ryan says, is no academic one. The current treatment of Ethics in Catholic text-books is not always satisfactory. But by way of remedy we suggest, not that teleology should be in any degree abandoned, but that it should be widened. We can surely give an intelligible account of man's last end which will explain the absolute universality of the moral law without emptying it of all its content. Aristotle's method, as St. Thomas saw, will suffice, though his results are inadequate. To have an adequate notion of man's end requires a sound Natural Theology. And men's notion of that end will be further broadened the more they can rise from the level of thought where "egoism" and "altruism" are regarded as sufficient but alternative principles of conduct, or where, again, we are asked to choose between an imperative without content, and a utility which has mere pleasure as its end. This does not mean that we shall ever be able to dispense with sanctions or with positive law. Nor will a growing realisation of man's end diminish the reference to the divine will which constitutes the formal obligation of the act. Obligation does not become hypothetical by becoming reasonable; nor, to sum up, does action become utilitarian by being teleological.

Charles Plater.

ASSYRO-BABYLONIAN ELEMENTS IN THE BIBLICAL ACCOUNT OF THE FALL

Francesco Mari, D. D.

The Assyro-Babylonian archeological researches which have thrown so much light on the opening narratives of the Book of Genesis, have thus far produced no monument or text which can be said with certainty to correspond with the biblical account of the Fall. A few years ago much was made of the discovery of a terra cotta seal, now preserved in the British Museum (89, 326,) and which was even labelled "Adam and Eve in Paradise." On this seal appears in the middle a tree with horizontal branches from which are hanging two pieces of fruit. Seated on opposite sides of the tree are two draped figures, each in the attitude of stretching forth the hand towards the fruit. Behind the figure on the left is traced a vertical, undulating line, which might be taken to represent a serpent. Doubtless this represents the scene of the fall of our first parents, was the conclusion jumped at by several enthusiastic scholars. However, a more careful examination of the monument soon showed that the identification of the scene with that of the biblical narrative had been premature. The tree in the center was recognized as the sacred tree of the Babylonians, and as regards the two figures, there is nothing to indicate that they represent a man and a woman rather than two men. Nor does anything appear to represent the seemingly essential element of the biblical scene, namely the giving of the fruit to the man by the woman. Furthermore, one of the figures—the one on the right—bears the characteristic symbol of the horns showing that it was intended to represent a divinity. True, the vertical undulating line behind the figure on the left is generally admitted to be meant for a serpent, but the association of the serpent with the sacred tree is not rare in Babylonian mythological representations as may be seen on some of the seals mentioned by Jeremias.[1] It appears that this association of the serpent with the sacred tree is simply the illustration of a scene belonging to the famous and extremely popular epic of Gilgamesh. For at the end of the eleventh tablet of this poem it is narrated that Ut Napishtim had promised to the hero of the story a mysterious plant bearing a name signifying "He who is old becomes young." After much labor and fatigue Gilgamesh obtains possession of the plant, but while he goes down into a cistern to wash himself, a serpent attracted by the odor of the plant approaches and carries it off. Gilgamesh perceiving his last hope thus extinguished, sits down and weeps. The figure in question has indeed little or no correspondence with this scene, but it may have been intended to recall it after a fashion. The question of the interpretation of the figure is not yet settled, for the presence therein of a serpent, at first denied by some, has been reaffirmed by Jeremias, who has made the seal the object of accurate critical examination. The presence of the horns in the tableau is not of itself decisive, since it is not improbable that the first man was deified in Babylonian legend—a process so easy in polytheistic religions—as in fact, it appears to have occurred in the case of Adapa, the first man created by Ea.[2] At all events, in either case, the serpent would symbolize a malignant genius—one envious of the happiness of mankind.

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[1] *Das Alte Testament,* p. 104-105.

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In the absence therefore of any Babylonian monument or text having an acknowledged direct reference to the biblical account of the Fall, it is worth while to seek out and examine certain traces and indications, which if taken separately, would afford no solution of the problem, but which when viewed in their *ensemble* and in their cumulative indirect bearing, throw an interesting light on the question at issue.

In the first place, it should be carefully noted that in the biblical narrative of the Fall, certain elements are essential, others only secondary. Among the essential factors of the story must certainly be placed first, the state of happiness anterior to the Fall, and in which man lived in familiar intercourse with God and in peace with the animals, and secondly, a fall or lapse of some kind which entailed the passage from that happy condition to an unhappy state of existence. These seem to constitute the essential elements of the episode; to the secondary ones belong the dramatic scene and setting as described in the narrative of the Yahwistic writer.

The idea of an epoch of primeval happiness, of a golden age when men lived in familiar converse with the gods, is to be met with in the traditions of well nigh all peoples, and it is therefore needless to insist upon it here. In the Bible this happy state is expressed by the picture of the garden of Eden in which Yahweh places the first man, and by the natural loveliness wherewith He adorns this beautiful abode. "And Yahweh God planted a garden eastward, in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed."[3] The remembrance of this happy abode appears in all the subsequent biblical literature, and while in the Old Testament it became the symbol of earthly felicity, in the New it was used to designate the realm of celestial bliss. Thus Lot compares the fertile and luxurious region extending along the banks of the Jordan to "the Garden of Yahweh"; the prophet Isaias when promising the restoration of Sion, says that "the Lord hath made her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of Yahweh," and Ezechiel finds no stronger image of returning felicity than "the garden of God."[4] The last named prophet gives us a vivid description of this garden in his account of the ruin of the King of Tyre. That proud monarch had said: "I am a god, I sit in the seat of God in the midst of the seas." But God commands the prophet to weep over his downfall, and Ezechiel responding as it were to the proud vauntings of the King, says: "Thou wast in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering.... Thou wast the anointed cherub that covereth....I have destroyed thee, O covering cherub, from the midst of the stones of fire." In this passage Ezechiel evidently compares by way of allusion the fall of the King of Tyre to the fall of primitive man, and recalls by the words "garden of God" the abode of original happiness. The description does not correspond in all particulars, for while in Genesis the cherubim were set to guard the approach of the garden and the tree of life after the expulsion of our first parents, in the prophetic description the cherub is represented as a friendly and protecting genius prior to the fall.

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[2] Lagrange. *Etudes sur les Religions Sémitiques.* Ed. I. p. 349.

Of this garden of delight we find among the Babylonians only a few reminiscences scattered and uncertain, but which when brought together suggest that the fundamental ideas concerning it were not very different from those of the Hebrews. Mention has already been made of the word *edium*, and some have claimed to find the very word Eden in the geographical name *Gu-edin-na*, which according to Hommel is the antique appellation of Chaldea. In the cuneiform inscriptions *Gu-edin-na* is situated in southern Babylonia, between Nippur and Uruk (Erech). The Bible in fact, tells us that Eden was situated towards the East at the parting of four great rivers, two of which are clearly designated as the Tigris and the Euphrates. However, another locality seems to correspond better with the Eden of Genesis, namely the rich and ancient region of *Esidu*, dwelling place and sanctuary of the God *Ea*, the sorcerer of the Gods, the King of *apsu* (the ocean),[5] and creator of the first man Adapa. It is situated on an island in the Persian gulf at the mouth of the two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which contribute to its fertility, making it a real terrestial paradise, where Adapa lived happily, as we shall see, in familiar intercourse with the God *Ea* until the day of his misfortune. So abundant and marvelous were the waters wherewith this region was irrigated that they obtained mention in the incantations and magical formulas.[6] In this island called the isle of the blessed, lived Ut-Napishtim, the grandfather of Gilgamesh, and the hero of the Babylonian deluge, together with his wife.

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[3] Gen. ii, 8. The Hebrew גן־בעדן signifies simply the garden of Eden, the latter word being nothing more than the name of a place situated towards the East, in which Yahweh had located the garden. The corresponding term in Assyrian seems to be *edium*, signifying a plain or desert. In later Hebrew the term came to signify *voluptas*, pleasure, as in Is. li, 3. Cf. also the Greek ἡδονή. The cognate equivalent of the word גן is found in the Assyrian *gannatu*, and in corresponding words of the other Semitic languages, with the signification of a garden with trees, like the Persian παράδεισος.

[4] Cf. Gen. xiii, 10; Is. li, 3; Ez. xxxi, 8, 9 (cf. xxxvi, 35.)

Yahweh also visits the garden of Eden to enjoy the coolness of the evening, and the sacred writer leaves it to be supposed that he is not a stranger to the society of man. There is perhaps no real connection between the biblical paradise and the mountain and the valley of Cedars, mentioned in the poem of Gilgamesh (Tablet v., col. 1), but this valley also is depicted as a place beautiful and enchanting, at the sight of which Gilgamesh and Eabani are beside themselves with joy and admiration. An immense cedar, affording a delicious shade, rises in front of the mountain where the gods have their abode, and where the goddess Fruina[7] has a sanctuary. Back and forth before the entrance of the grove walks as guardian the Elamite Hamubaba. The roads and by paths are carefully marked and well made, and the description of the great cedar with its forestlike shade resembles that of the allegorical cedar in Ezechiel (xxxi, 3, seqq.)

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[5] Cf. however the opinion of Dhorme concerning *apsu. op. cit.*, p. xx.

[6] Dhorme. *op. cit.*, p. 89; Jeremias. *Hoelle und Paradies*, p. 26.

[7] It appears that this goddess is the same as *Ishtar*, according to a prayer published by Martin. *Textes religieux* I. p. 244, line 23.

In the tenth tablet of the epic of Gilgamesh is mentioned also a garden, located by the sea and richly adorned with marvelous trees which bear delicious fruit hanging from branches formed of precious stones.

These fragments of Babylonian mythology, however varied and meagre, indicate at least the existence in the ancient land of Chaldea of a tradition relative to a garden of the gods in which man lived happily from the beginning in familiar intercourse with the deity.

In other Babylonian myths primitive man is conceived of as powerful and robust, but rough and uncultured, from which state of Herculean strength he afterwards fell because of having yielded to a temptation. Thus the epic of Gilgamesh describes Eabani, the friend of the hero, as having a head covered with hair like an animal, and as living in the forest where his occupation is the hunting of wild beasts. Eabani owed his creation to the goddess Aruru, who in creating him, had the intention of producing an image of the god Anu. After washing her hands by way of preparation, the goddess took some mud from which she formed Eabani.[8] The latter becomes a creature of gigantic strength; he eats grass together with the gazelles and goes to drink at the stream with the beasts of the field. He hinders the operations of the hunter, fills up the pits dug by him, breaks his traps and forces him to leave the wilderness where he is no longer able to pursue his calling.

The hunter is advised by his father to seek some means of driving Eabani from the forest and this counsel receives the approbation of Gilgamesh. Then by means of a cunning plan laid by the hunter, a woman from Esech falls in with Eabani, seduces him and for six days and seven nights takes away his thoughts and attention from his companions of the wilderness, the wild beasts. When he returns to the forest the animals flee from him, seeing which he follows the woman and is conducted by her to Esech. In the subsequent stages of the poem the same woman appears as the primary cause of his misfortune and his pains, and it appears that later on she is cursed by him. From this point begins his redemption; he becomes the companion and friend of Gilgamesh and later the patron and protector of hunters. It is here worthy of remark that it is the woman who induces man to abandon the simple frugal life of the primitive epoch, and introduces him into the luxury and the intellectual and commercial activities of city life. That woman was considered as a seducer even from the beginning may perhaps be inferred from a certain cuneiform text where mention is made of a woman the "mother of sins" who bursts into tears and who then, according to another doubtful text, throws herself in the dust, stricken by a wrathful glance of the deity.[9] It is not improbable that all these myths refer to the sin of primitive man, for although Eabani is not represented as the first specimen of our race, he is, however, directly created by divine activity and, in this respect, he may be assimilated to the first. Nor should this be matter for surprise. Practically all peoples have sought some kind of a solution of the tremendous problem involved in the existence of physical and moral evil in the world, and nearly all in reaching a conclusion through their religious consciousness, have formulated the notion of a primitive fall from a higher and more happy estate. The Zoroastrian legends, though possibly influenced by the Bible narrative, tell us that the first man passed the first days of his existence in a paradise, but later having transgressed, he was driven from that abode and given over to the serpent, who caused his death. Here, as in the Bible, the serpent plays the role of an evil genius, but of this more will be said further on.

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[8] Also in the narrative of Genesis man is created after the image of God, and from the slime of the earth.

The Babylonian myth which comes nearest, if not in form at least in its subject matter, to the biblical story of the Fall, is the legend of Adapa, the text of which was found at Tel-el-Amarna in Egypt, together with the tablets containing the correspondence of the Kings Amenophis III and Amenophis IV.[10] The place and the conditions in which the text was discovered, pointed to a redaction of the same as early as 1500 B. C. In the first fragment it is related that the god Ea created Adapa and constituted him the head of mankind, bestowing upon him a "great ear," i. e., a vast intelligence and great wisdom in order that he might make known the destiny of the country, but he did not receive the gift of immortality. He was placed by his creator in the city of Eridu, where he lived in the pursuit of various trades and avocations even of the humbler kind. Thus he baked bread in the ovens and went fishing, in order to obtain fish for the inhabitants of Eridu and for the house of his lord. One day, however, as Adapa was sailing on the high sea, *Shutu*, the south wind, blew with such violence that Adapa was thrown by it into the abyss and went down to the abode of the fish. In his anger he broke the wings of the monster,[11] and for seven days the south wind was silent. Then Anu, the lord of heaven, called his messenger, Habrat,[12] and said to him: "Why is it that for seven days the south wind has not blown upon the world?" "My lord," answered Habrat, "Adapa, the son of Ea, has broken the wings of *Shutu*, the south wind." Hearing this, Anu cries out and utters a threat which is not clear in the text, but the order appears to be given that the guilty Adapa be brought before him. Ea hearing the command of Anu is bent on saving his creature, and calling Adapu to himself, he causes him to be dressed in mourning garments and then addresses him as follows: "Adapa, thou shalt enter heaven and stand in the presence of the god Anu. At the gate of this celestial abode two gods stand on guard, Tammuz and Gishzida. On seeing thee, they will ask the reason of thine affliction. To whom thou shalt answer that the reason of thy grief is the death of two heroes who have departed from the earth, and their names are Tammuz and Gishzida. This will secure for thee their favor and they will speak a good word for thee to the god Anu." However, in order to forestall any treacherous action on the part of Anu, Ea cautions his protegé in the following terms: "There shall be presented to thee a deadly food; thou shalt not eat thereof. There shall be offered thee a deadly water; thou shalt not drink thereof. To thee shall be offered a garment, and thou shalt put it on. Oil shall be offered thee; anoint thyself therewith. Forget not the command I have given thee, remember the word I have spoken."

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[9] Cf. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[10] The different fragments of the legend have been recently published by Dhorme in a volume entitled *Choix des Textes Religieux Assyro-Babyloniens*, Paris, 1907, p. 148 seqq.

At this point the messenger of Anu arrives on the scene, and commands Adapa to present himself before the god of heaven Anu. Adapa having donned his mourning garments, starts on his way, and coming to the entrance of the abode of Anu, he finds the two gods, Tammuz and Gishzida. Then follows between them the dialogue foretold by Ea, after which Adapa is led into the presence of Anu, who, on seeing him, immediately reproaches him with having shattered the wings of *Shutu*. To this accusation Adapa makes the following answer: "My lord, I was fishing in the midst of the sea for the house of my master. The sea was like a mirror, but the south wind Shutu blew a hurricane, and I was submerged. Then rising in my anger I shattered the wings of Shutu." This statement being made, the two gods, Tammuz and Gishzida, intercede with Anu, who apparently at least, is appeased, and he even shows himself disposed to do something in favor of Adapa, after the example of Ea. The latter had bestowed upon him all the perfections proper to man, beginning with the gift of a vast intelligence, but had withheld the gift of immortality. Anu recalls the gifts of Ea, and then adds: "And we, what shall we do for him? Offer him the food of life that he may eat thereof." But Adapa remembering the warning words of his protector Ea, refuses to eat of the food of life or to drink of the water of life. Anu marvels at the conduct of Adapa and says: "Come, Adapa, why dost thou not eat or drink? Thou shalt not live." Adapa replies: "Ea, my lord, charged me, saying: 'Thou shalt not eat, thou shalt not drink.'" Whereupon Anu commands that Adapa be brought back again to the earth. The third fragment repeats a portion of the second. In the fourth Anu marvels at the conduct of Ea, and calls all the gods of heaven and earth to protest against his action. Finally, he curses Adapa, the seed of the human race, *zir-ameluti*. The fragment closes with a magical formula, which is certainly foreign to the primitive text of the legend.

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[11] The south wind, *Shutu*, is represented as a winged monster.

[12] Habrat (*ilu-abrati*) the god of wings, or the winged god, is the messenger of the celestial god Anu, as Mercury is that of Jupiter.

In the myth of Adapa we find, *mutatis mutandis*, several elements which appear also in the narrative of Genesis. To say nothing of the analogy of the name Adapa with the name Adam,[13] there appears at once a real coincidence in the fact that Adapa, like Adam, appears as the original head of the human race. Certain details of the myth which are of a naturalistic character, as for instance the conflict between Adapa and Shutu, the south wind, and the grief of the former at the disappearance from the earth of Tammuz and Gishzida, the gods of youth and of Springtime are not, it is true, represented in the biblical account, but alongside of these we find others which throw light on the narrative, due account being taken of the polytheistic character of the myth.

Thus in both accounts we behold man soon after his creation an object of contention on the part of two beings superior to himself, the one seeking his ruin and the other his salvation. Ea, like Yahweh, is the creator of mankind, and he protects the first representative of the race which he has brought into being. Adapa dwells in the holy city of Eridu, like Adam in Eden; he converses familiarly with his lord Ea, and for him he goes fishing. Ea has bestowed upon him all the gifts of wisdom and of science, but without immortality, because he (Ea) penetrating thoroughly the mysteries of heaven and its inhabitants, knows that man's destiny must be fulfilled here on earth, while immortality belongs exclusively to the gods. Adapa is happy, but his happiness is human. Adam likewise, in the garden of paradise, holds familiar intercourse with Yahweh, his creator; he is strong, beautiful and happy, but like Adapa in Eridu, he is placed in the garden in order that he may work (Gen. ii, 15).

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[13] The change from *p* to *m* falls within the range of philological possibilities. The etymology of the word Adam is still uncertain, though there is a tendency to make it cognate with the Assyrian *adamu* with the signification "to make, to produce." Cf. Delitzsch, *Handwoerterbuch*.

Ea knows the destiny of man, and thus he warns Adapa against eating and drinking, for that which Anu will call food and water of life are only the instruments of death. In this we may surely be allowed to doubt the sincerity of Anu, and it is likely that when he promises to the beautiful creature of Ea the gift of immortality his words are simply ironical.[14] Adapa does not yield to the temptation, and, faithful to the advice of his protector, he accepts only the garment and the oil, two necessaries for the journey. Anu wished to injure man's condition and the curse which he hurls at Adapa is but an evidence of his disappointment. The lesson contained in the myth seems to be that man was created mortal but in a state of happiness; that it was useless for him to aspire to immortality and that his condition was damaged through the malediction of a god.

To the present writer it seems that the dialogue between Anu and Adapa bears a striking resemblance to Genesis iii, 21-24. "And Yahweh-Elohim made for Adam and for his wife coats of skin and clothed them. And Yahweh-Elohim said: Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and (thus) live forever: therefore Yahweh-Elohim sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he was taken. So he drove out the man and caused him to dwell on the East of the garden of Eden." It will be noticed that mention is made in this passage of the garments with which Yahweh-Elohim clothed Adam as in the case of Adapa on the part of Anu. The words of Yahweh are ironical when he says: "And now lest he put forth his hand, and take also the tree of life, and live for ever," like those of Anu who, on the contrary, admiring the wisdom bestowed by Ea on Adapa invites the latter to eat of the food of life immortal. The expulsion from Eden corresponds to the curse and the command of Anu to bring Adapa back to the earth. In short we have here a god, jealous of the fair handiwork of one of his colleagues, while in the Bible we have the serpent symbolizing the adversary of God—Satan jealous of the most beautiful work of creation. However, the echo of this jealousy is wanting in the biblical account; on the contrary, there is a malicious insinuation on the part of the serpent that the jealousy is on the side of Yahweh (Gen. iii, 4, 5).

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[14] The respective attitudes of Ea and Anu in this myth find a parallel in the Babylonian account of the deluge where Ea appears as the protector of his favorite *Ut-Napishtim* against the hostile machinations of the god Bel, counseling him to build a ship and to take refuge therein on the bosom of the ocean.

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But what is the position occupied by Anu in the Babylonian myth, that of Yahweh or that of the serpent? The correspondence is never complete, nor should we expect any such exactness in legends that have passed through the modifying influence of so many ages. For the most part Anu seems to enact the role of the biblical serpent. Thus after the manner of the serpent addressing Eve, he says to Adapa: "Why dost thou not eat and drink?" Adapa replies, alleging like Eve the prohibition of Ea. Just as Yahweh had said that the eating of the forbidden fruit would be followed by death, so also Ea had warned Adapa not to eat of the proffered aliments for in reality, they were mortiferous. The serpent promises immortality, saying: "Ye shall not surely die. . .ye shall be as God," (and consequently immortal); so also does Anu hold out to Adapa the promise of immortality. It is true the denouement is different in the two cases, for while in the Bible story our first parents eat of the forbidden fruit, Adapa on the contrary, in the heaven of Anu, refuses to do so. Yet in both cases a malediction is incurred on the part of a deity because of an act of disobedience. It would appear that in substance, the two accounts have the same meaning—contain the same hidden lesson. The historical condition of the human race is one of pain and toil, and the gods have not deemed it wise to modify it. Man shall till the earth and eat bread in the sweat of his brow; woman shall in pain and labor fulfil the duties of motherhood, and the serpent and the other animals shall creep and walk upon the earth at man's discretion. The myths of ancient peoples are nothing but attempts to account for the actual conditions of mankind, and the conclusion of them all is that man expiate the original sin of the race and be resigned to his lot—this is for him the best philosophy.

Loisy in comparing the legends of Adapa with the biblical narrative, considers the attribution to Yahweh of the twofold rôle of Ea and Anu, to be a modification entailed by the passage of the story from a polytheistic to a monotheistic setting. This hypothesis, however, does not seem necessary since the serpent could well have represented one of the two. At bottom we have in both accounts, a kind of dualism in which one of the two elements acts in favor of man, the other for his ruin. In the biblical, as in the Babylonian account, man obtains between the two contending influences a middle condition appropriate to his being and to his destiny. If the serpent is conceived of as occupying the place of Anu, the correspondence is exact, since he knows as well as Anu that the forbidden fruit is fatal to man, that his suggestion contains a plot born of jealousy to ruin the beautiful work of Yahweh, just as Anu wished to destroy the creation of Ea. At all events, the ancient fundamental myth has doubtless undergone profound modifications and it would be useless to seek in the surviving dissociated elements a complete agreement.

As regards mental equipment, we see that Yahweh like Ea had bestowed upon man an intimate knowledge of things and probably taught him the beginnings of the arts (Gen. ii, 15), with this difference perhaps that the knowledge possessed by Adam is represented as more elementary, while that granted by Ea to Adapa embraced not only things human but also the heavenly secrets. All this is explained by the different religious atmospheres in which the legends took on their literary form and development. The moral teaching embodied in the Babylonian myth was well understood by ancient Israel, and thus it was taken up and adapted to the exigencies of a monotheistic religion. It is not the external form but the underlying substance that is of importance, and it is plain that when Israel wished to utilize certain myths and legends that were current among the neighboring peoples, or which belonged to the traditional patrimony of the Semitic race, her only concern was to safeguard the interests of monotheism and of her own moral doctrines.

Some recent critics (Budde, Bacon, etc.), claim that in the original Yahwistic account of the Fall, God did not place in the garden two trees but only one, viz., that of the knowledge of good and evil. Others (v. g. Loisy) on the contrary contend that in the original form the narrative made mention of only the tree of life which was the object of the divine prohibition, and that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is an addition due to a second redactor (J^2), who already begins to paraphrase and interpret the original account, and who thus adds to the notion of the tree of life the idea of a tree of knowledge. We are not here engaged in a discussion of biblical criticism, but from the Assyro-Babylonian point of view, the second hypothesis seems more acceptable, since the tree of life enjoyed a wide popularity in Babylonian literature. It would seem, however, that some kind of a symbolical representation of knowledge existed even among the Babylonians, for in the legend under discussion it is said that Ea gave unto Adapa knowledge, but immortality he gave not unto him. It is known that among the Babylonians trees were an object of worship, but at the same time, not every sacred tree should be taken for the tree of life. The principal documents which make mention of sacred trees or trees of life, offering a resemblance with the tree of life mentioned in Genesis, are the following, some of which have been touched upon already.

In the forest of Irnina, visited by the two heroes of the epic of Gilgamesh, is located an enchanting park or grove which, in a general way, recalls the garden of Eden, but the tree of life seems wanting, as the cedar which stands in front of the sacred mountain does not appear to have the power of renewing life. In this connection it may be noted that a cedar is the principal ornament in the "garden of God," described by Ezechiel (xxxi, 3 seqq.)

The sacred trees represented on the Babylonian cylinders and on the walls of the palaces, have generally the form of palms or coniferous plants, and their value is simply ornamental. This is not surprising, since the fruit of the palm tree constituted one of the chief alimentary resources of the Babylonians. In some specimens, two-winged figures are represented standing or kneeling,[15] one on each side of the tree, signifying that if the latter was not deified it was at least considered as extremely beneficial. Ezechiel also in the plan for the reconstruction of the Temple associates the cherubim with the palm tree: "and a palm tree was between cherub and cherub" (Ezechiel xli, 18); likewise in the Temple of Solomon, palm trees were carved beside the cherubim.[16]

In the epic of Gilgamesh the hero having arrived at the dwelling place of the young queen, Siduri Sabbita discovers other marvelous trees—the trees of the gods—growing by the sea (tablet ix). But still more interesting for us on account of its magical effects, is the plant described to Gilgamesh by his grandfather Ut-Napishtim. It is a plant prickly to the touch, but which when tasted produces extraordinary effects, and brings back youth to the aged. Gilgamesh seeks for it and finds it, but when he is about to carry it off, it is stolen from him by an envious serpent (Tablet xi, towards the end.) The gods alone are able to give to man this herb of life. Marduk is looked upon as the regular possessor of it, and when a King of Assyria wishes to invoke a sign of peace and prosperity he compares his reign to this life giving plant.[17] Finally in the worship of Ea, so closely connected, as we have seen, with the myth of Adapa, the sacred tree certainly found a place. We possess, in fact, a description of the sacred tree of Erida, embodied in a long magical formula, published by Dhorme.[18]

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[15] See the figures in Jeremias, *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 97.

[16] I Kings vi, 29; vii, 29.

> A black *Kishkanu* has grown in Erida; in a pure spot it was created.[19] Its aspect is brilliant like the stone of *ukun*; it extends its shadow towards the ocean. The place of promenade of Ea is in the luxuriant Erida; this is his dwelling place on the earth. His residence is a place of rest for Bau.[20] Into this pure abode, the shade of which extends like that of a forest, no more may enter. Within dwell Shamash and Tammuz between the mouths of the two rivers.

This description evidently refers to a sacred grove, which is at the same time the sanctuary of Ea, but which contains also temples and shrines of other deities. It was situated at the mouth of the Euphrates, and in its midst stood the tree of life.[21] By its geographical position, its destination and the presence therein of the tree of life, this grove seems to offer a point of contact with the garden of Eden, but as the legend has come down to us through a maze of magical literature, its evidential value is considerably lessened.

From what has been said thus far it may be concluded that a tradition concerning a tree of life capable of imparting the gift of immortality was current among the Babylonians, and there are some grounds for assuming that this tree is the same as that described in the biblical account of Eden. If this be granted, we may infer—lest our discussion be without any definite conclusion—that according to what we know of primitive Semitic tradition, the sin of the first man was one of pride, the origin of which should be sought in an inordinate desire of acquiring the attributes of the deity. The tree of life would have imparted the gift of immortality, had God permitted man to eat thereof, but such was not the case, and thus we see that the tree did not possess an inherent magical power but produced its effect subordinately to the will of God. This, though doubtless on other grounds, is the view taken by St. Thomas in the following passage: "Primum hominis peccatum fuit in hoc, quod appetiit quoddam spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, quod pertinet ad superbiam."[22] That the legend of the tree of life be found also in the traditions of other peoples is no reason to discredit what was intended to be conveyed by the story of Genesis. The latter appropriately symbolizes a very ancient truth—one which seems to have been in one form or another common to all the nations of antiquity.

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[17] Hymn to Marduk in Craig's *Rel. Text.* I, 59; cf. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[18] Dhorme. *Choix*, etc., p. 98.

[19] *Kishkanu* is properly the name of the sacred tree of Erida—a wonderful tree often mentioned in the magical formulas. Jeremias translates the word *Kishkanu* by "palm."

[20] *Bau* was the mother of Ea.

[21] See Sayce in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, I. p. 643 b.

Something remains to be said concerning the serpent and of the flaming sword. Of a seduction on the part of the serpent there is no mention in the Assyro-Babylonian monuments, but it should be recalled in this connection that among many ancient peoples the serpent was considered as something sacred, and thus held in special veneration. It was the emblem of Mercury and of Æsculapius, the god of medicine. In Egypt serpents were the symbols of several gods, especially among the popular deities, such as *Mer-Seker*,[23] and for that reason they received the distinction of being embalmed. Also among the Phenicians serpents were frequently an object of worship.

Moses raised the brazen serpent in the wilderness, and we read that, under the King Ezechias, this symbol was destroyed because "unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it," all of which would seem to indicate that in the early Hebrew traditions the serpent was the object of a certain veneration—a sentiment which in those days was closely allied to fear.[24] Beer and other scholars have conjectured that from the beginning the serpent may have been the official symbol of Yahweh, but the hypothesis has not met with much favor in critical circles. Again in Holy Writ the serpent is sometimes taken as a symbol of wisdom, or rather perhaps, of cunning and shrewdness, and thus we find the Savior recommending his disciples to unite with the simplicity of the dove, the prudence of the serpent.[25] Such are the favorable aspects of the serpent, but more often it stands for a symbol of evil, and it is under this aspect that it is ordinarily represented in the Scriptures, and that it has passed into Christian tradition. Besides, it figures in the fall of primitive man, according to the mythologies of some non-Semitic peoples. The Mexicans, for instance, possess a legend called "the woman and the serpent." The figured monuments referring to it show a woman loaded with utensils for work, while in front of her is a serpent with raised head, seemingly in the act of speaking to her. On one side appear two twins, who appear to be wrestling. This woman is venerated in Mexican legend as the spouse of the god of the celestial paradise.[26] Also among the Hindus we find the serpent associated with the original mother of the human race. According to a Chinese myth, wisdom was first taught by a serpent, and woman is the source of all evils. In the dualistic system of Zoroaster, the serpent Ahriman crept forth out of the earth and scattered evil among the works of creation. In the Babylonian traditions we find mention of many kinds of serpents, among others, of a serpent or monster with seven heads, like the dragon of the Apocalypse.[27]

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[22] *2a 2æ, Q.* 143. *art.* 2.

[23] Wiedemann in Hastings' *Dictionary, Extra vol.* p. 190.

[24] Numbers xxi, 8 s.; II Kings, xviii, 4.

[25] Matthew x, 16.

We have already noted that the serpent is associated with the tree of life, and that it was he who stole away from Gilgamesh the wonderful plant from which he had hoped to obtain a renewal of life. But Babylonian mythology reveals something more, viz. the existence and veneration of a god-serpent, *ilu-siru.* It would seem that originally this deity represented the monster of primitive chaos, and that later it found a place among the popular gods. In some instances, however, it appears under the name of lord, or mistress of life, and it was worshipped in the city of *Der*, of which it was the tutelary genius.[28]

Among the Arabs, serpents are accounted as maleficent because they incarnate in their bodies the malevolent spirit *Jinn.* It does not seem, however, that in the biblical account there is question of the indwelling of an evil or demonical spirit in the serpent of Eden. The reptile itself is rather represented as the malicious being, who is in itself a personification of jealousy, envy and cunning. In post-Exilic Judaism it is identified with the devil as appears from the Book of Wisdom[29], the Book of Enoch[30] and the New Testament.

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[26] Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 111 seq.

[27] Apocalypse, xii, 3; xiii, 1; xvii, 3.

[28] The god Anu was also worshipped in Der. Cf. Zimmeru, KAT 3, p. 504-505; Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 28 and 323.

[29] "By the envy of the devil, death came into the world." Wisdom ii, 24.

The malediction pronounced by God against the serpent covers three points: it shall henceforth crawl upon its belly, it shall eat dust, and it shall be at enmity with the woman. Taken literally this would seem to imply a belief that previously the serpent walked or moved in an erect position, and it is curious to note, though we do not deem the fact as having any important bearing on biblical exegesis, that in the antique Babylonian pictorial representations the serpent appears in a vertical position and hardly ever fully extended upon the ground. On a cylinder preserved in the National Library of Paris, appears a serpent, the head of which rising above the coils of the reptile is of human shape.

The expression, "dust shalt thou eat," has evidently a metaphorical meaning. We find the same expression in Isaias lxv, 25: "and dust shall be the serpent's food," and in Micheas vii, 17, it is said of the enemies that among other humiliating things, "they shall lick the dust like a serpent." Almost identical with this last passage is an expression found in one of the Tell-el-Amarna letters (L. xlii, 35), "May our enemies see this and eat dust." The expression "to eat the dust," indicates the lowest state of abjection and shameful slavery. Captives of war are often represented on the Assyrian monuments with their mouths to the earth. Jeremias assimilates this expression to another, "to eat mud" or filth, which according to the fragment relative to the descent of Ishtar to the infernal regions, is the food of the inhabitants of Hades. "Dust is their nourishment, their food is mud."[31]

Of the promised enmity between the woman and the serpent, we find no trace in the Assyrio-Babylonan literature, thus far brought to light.

Having driven out the man, Yahweh "placed at the east of the garden the cherubim with a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life." (Gen. iii, 24). The LXX reads somewhat differently: "And (the Lord) drove out Adam and made him dwell over against the paradise of delight, and he placed the cherubim and the flaming, turning (στρεφομένην) sword to guard the way of the tree of life." These cherubim are doubtless the same as those of Ezechiel, of which mention was made above. They were tutelary

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[30] *Book of Enoch*, xxxi, 3 seqq. In this document the demon which seduces Eve is called Gadriel. *En.* lxvi. 6.

[31] Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 114-115. Cf. article by the present writer on the Abode of the Dead, in the *Studi Religiosi.*

genii, probably identical with the great winged figures which the Assyrians were wont to place at the doors of their palaces and temples. They had the head of a man, or of an eagle, and in some cases they represented winged bulls or lions.[32] The cherubim of Genesis are evidently super-terrestrial beings, commissioned by Yahweh to keep guard over the entrance to the garden, and though they have the external form of the *genii* known to the surrounding peoples, they are distinguished by their office and destination.[33]

It is probable that the biblical text implies that two cherubim were placed to guard the way to the tree of life, and that the flaming sword appeared, as it were, gyrating between them. It does not appear to have been held or brandished by the cherubim, but was either planted in the ground or suspended in the air in front of the entrance.

What are we to understand by this flaming and turning sword? The explanation offered by the distinguished Orientalist Thureau-Dangin has been generally accepted. He gives to the Hebrew word sword (חרב) the etymological signification of *fulgur*, lightning flash. In fact, lightning in the Bible, is sometimes compared to the sword (Deut. xxxii, 41), and it is often represented as the weapon *par excellence* of Yahweh. The word להט rendered by "flaming" or better "flame," is naturally applicable to the phenomenon of lightning, as is also the Hebrew word המתהפכת rendered in the Vulgate by *versatilis*, and which would seem to express well the zigzag course of the thunderbolt. Lightning, on the Assyrian monuments, is represented under the form of a symbolical instrument or weapon with two or three branches. It seems that this figure can stand for nothing else than lightning, as it appears especially in the hands of Ramman (Adad), the god of thunder and of the tempest, and the same symbolical weapon appears in the hands of Marduk when he engages in combat with the monster Tiamat. The same conclusion may be drawn from the great inscription executed by order of the King Tiglath-Pileser I (1100 B. C.), and found at Kolah-Shergat. Herein the King after recording that he had captured and destroyed the city of Khunusa, adds: "I made a "lightning" of brass; I wrote thereon the account of the plunder I seized through the help of Assur, my god, and also the prohibition to occupy this city again or rebuild its walls. I built there a house of brick and I placed therein this "fulgur" of brass."[34] Jeremias calls attention to some figures of kings armed with radiating fascias, evidently intended to represent lightning.[35] It is therefore highly probable that the flaming sword before the entrance of Eden symbolizes the lightning of Yahweh.

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[32] Cf. Ezechiel i, 10.

[33] The meaning and origin of the word *cherub* are uncertain. The two more probable derivations are (1) from the Assyrian *kirubu*: great, ponderous, colossal, and (2) from the Greek γρύφ: griffe, etc. Persian *giriften*. Gesen-Buhl, *Handwoerterbuch*, s. v.

Such are, it seems to us, the Assyro-Babylonian elements which are recognizable in the biblical narrative of the Fall. If the religious teachers in Israel saw fit to make use of them in portraying to the people, the great and melancholy drama of the origin of evil in the world, it only proves that these symbolical elements were intelligible to the early Hebrews and familiar to them. These elements, however, in passing from a polytheistic to a monotheistic religion underwent a radical transformation. The religious teaching contained therein was raised and ennobled. In the domain of religious phenomena it is not the external or material element that counts but rather the internal spirit wherewith it is animated. The presence in the religion of Israel of so many elements which had originated and developed in pagan soil, is due to a historical necessity, since Israel as a people appeared rather late upon the scene, after so many centuries of successive Semitic civilizations. To those who are so fastidious as to take offence at the notion that God could without demeaning Himself and His religion make use of these childish elements of pagan origin, we would simply recall the words of the Apostle of the Gentiles: "Stulta mundi... infirma mundi... ignobilia mundi et contemptibilia elegit Deus... ut non glorietur omnis caro in conspectu ejus." (I Cor. i, 27).

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[34] Revue d' histoire et de littérature religieuse, 81, 147 seqq.

[35] Jeremias, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

STUDIES

STUDIES ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS*

Francis E. Gigot

VI. Jesus "taught as one having authority."

Literary Analysis of Mk. i, 21-22; Mt. viii, 28 b, 29; Lk. iv, 31-32.

When Christ began His public ministry there was no lack of religious teachers in Israel. The scribe was a familiar figure in Galilee as well as in Judea, and wherever he appeared, he was met with genuine respect. He was supposed to have made long studies in God's law, and to have been especially trained "at the feet" of some well-known teacher of the day. His words, however, even when listened to for the first time do not seem to have excited much curiosity. This was chiefly due to the fact that the then-received method of addressing the people gave the scribe but little chance for originality. Not only he taught the same doctrine in substance as that of his predecessors, but he even imparted it in their very words being satisfied with quoting their various comments upon a given passage of Holy Writ. Of course, this method of teaching suited well enough the professional scribe since it afforded him ample room to display his legal erudition. But, as can readily be seen, it was altogether out of keeping with Our Lord's character and mission. And in point of fact, throughout His public ministry Jesus discarded it and adopted a method which seemed to all, both new and striking, living and authoritative. Differently from the scribes He did not simply quote authorities, but He spoke with an authority distinctly His own. This was the universal verdict of the time concerning Christ's teaching, and we find it faithfully chronicled in our first three Gospels as will clearly appear from the following literary analysis of Mk. i, 21-22; Mt. vii, 28b, 29; Lk. iv, 31-32.[1]

I. Primitive Character of Mk. i, 21-22.

In the analysis of these Synoptic passages we naturally begin with St. Mark's record which here, as in the sections thus far examined, can easily be shown to be primitive, as compared with the other two Synoptic Gospels. In our second Evangelist the passage reads as follows

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* The series of Studies on Divorce in the New Testament will be resumed in our next issue.

[1] A direct translation of these passages from the original Greek will be found in parallel columns at the end of the present paper.

Mk. i.

21. And they enter into Capharnaum;
and straightway [on] the sabbath
into the synagogue He taught.[2]
22. And they were greatly struck with His teaching;
for He was teaching them as having authority
and not as the scribes.

In respect to both style and contents these two verses bear the distinct impress of Marcan simplicity and originality. Their opening line—like that of the preceding sections in our second Gospel— begins with the simple Hebrew conjunction ו καὶ (and). It contains the verb εἰσπορεύσθαι (to enter) the relative frequent use of which is justly regarded as characteristic of St. Mark's style,[3] and has it in the present (εἰσπορεύονται) which is the tense usual with that Evangelist when he introduces a new scene.[4] It mentions Capharnaum for the first time, and yet does not speak of it as "a city of *Galilee*," because St. Mark deemed this unnecessary in view of his references to that province in the two immediately preceding sections: in i, 14, he has spoken of Galilee as the general scene of Christ's preaching; and in i, 16, he has represented Jesus "passing by the Sea of *Galilee*" and calling the first disciples, with whom He now enters the city close by that sea, Capharnaum, which will from that time forth be the centre of His preaching.

The second line of Mk. i, 21 begins, like the first, with the simple Hebrew conjunction ו καὶ (and). It contains the adverb εὐθὺς "straightway," which, as coupled here with the phrase "on the sabbath" seems to imply a certain eagerness on Our Lord's part to teach in Capharnaum without delay, viz: on the very first synagogue day (the next sabbath)[5] after His arrival. Now, such an eagerness belongs naturally to a primitive account of Christ's words and deeds like our second Gospel, wherein certain rough features have not yet been toned down.[6]

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[2] For the reading admitted in Mk. i, 21c see the grounds stated in H. Alford, the Greek Testament, vol. i, p. 314 (Sixth edit.).

[3] Cfr. J. C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, p. 10; H. B. Swete, *the Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. xliii.

[4] Cfr. i, 12, 40; iii, 13, 20, 31; iv, 35; v, 22; vi, 30; vii, 1; viii, 22; ix, 2; x, 1, 46; xi, 1, 27; xii, 13, 18; xiv, 17, 32; xvi, 2; etc.

[5] Of course, the day on which Jesus called the first disciples was not a sabbath, since on that day they were pursuing their avocation of fishermen. Hence the adverb εὐθὺς is to be understood as explained in the text.

[6] Cfr. the NEW YORK REVIEW, vol. i, p. 347sq.

In the third line of Mk. i, 21 we likewise find traits of Mk's primitive simplicity and originality: the new subject (Jesus) is not expressed; the synagogue spoken of is simply mentioned, leaving it to the reader to infer that there was apparently only one in the city; the object of the verb ἐδίδασκεν (He taught) is not stated, any more than that of the verb ἀμφιβάλλειν in the preceding section (Mk. i, 16); and, in particular, the pregnant use of εἰς (*into* the synagogue He taught) is very primitive and after Mk's manner ((Cf. Mk. i, 39; x, 10; xiii, 9).

Mk's second verse (i, 22) tells at once of the astonishment of Christ's hearers at His new manner of teaching. It is certain that if St. Mark possessed a distinct information concerning Our Lord's actual teachings at this His first recorded appearance in Capharnaum, it behooved him to give them, at least in a summary way, before setting forth in this verse (22) the deep impression which the words of Jesus produced upon His hearers. His silence in this regard is all the more significant because he knew of sayings of Christ[7] which he might have quoted to illustrate the superiority of Our Lord's teaching over that of the Scribes and which, in fact, are used by St. Matthew for this purpose[8] together with many others in the Sermon on the Mount. Hence, by refraining from utilizing such sayings, St. Mark shows himself here, as in the sections of his Gospel which we have already studied, concerned with the simple reproduction of his sources, and therefore anterior to the other two Synoptics whose writings betray a distinct, and consequently later, reflection upon their documents. It has indeed been claimed[9] that our second Evangelist has not given Our Lord's teaching in the synagogue, because he was concerned here with a description of His activity and not with that of His first appearance in Capharnaum, and also because he had already set forth the chief object of Christ's message in i, 15. But these reasons are not strictly conclusive. In his section parallel to Mk. i, 21-22, St. Matthew was (as we will show in the course of the present paper) even more explicitly than our second Evangelist, concerned with a general description of Our Lord's activity; and in a passage clearly parallel to Mk. i, 15, our second Synoptic (cfr. Mt. iv, 17) had also stated the chief object of Jesus' message. And yet, St. Matthew did not consider himself dispensed thereby from quoting the words of Christ which could account for the deep impression which His teaching produced upon His hearers, and it is only after recording the whole Sermon on the Mount that he transcribed Mk. i, 22 wherein that impression is graphically described. It is plain, that Mk. i, 15 in particular ("The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom is at hand: repent, and believe in the Gospel"), practically amounted to a repetition of the message of John the Baptist, and could not be considered by St. Mark as accounting sufficiently for the overpowering sense of novelty and authority produced upon His hearers by Our Lord's words, or as suggesting to their minds such wide contrast with, and superiority over, the teaching of the scribes as is stated in Mk. i, 22.

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[7] Cfr. Mk. x, 4, 11; xi, 24, 25, 26. See also iv, 21; ix, 42sqq.

[8] Cfr. Mt. vii, 28, 29.

[9] Cfr. B. Weiss, *das Marcusevangelium und seine Synoptischen Parallelen*, p. 59.

Each line of Mk. i, 22 bears the distinct impress of Mark's peculiar style and primitive originality. The opening one: "And they were greatly struck with His teaching" begins with the simple Hebrew conjunction ו και (and). It contains also the very strong verb εκπλησσεσθαι (to be astounded) whose precise subject is left unmentioned, and the noun διδαχη (teaching): all of which are peculiar literary features of our second Gospel.[10] In the second line: "for He was teaching them as having authority," we notice the use of the substantive verb with a participle (He *was teaching*) to which we called attention in connection with Mk. i, 6, 13 in our preceding studies, and which occurs so often in St. Mark's narrative as to form one of its peculiarities of construction. If one adds to this that such a construction points back directly to Aramaic usage,[11] and that this is probably the case also with the way of expressing the manner of an action which is found in the immediately following words: "as having authority," he will readily see how this second line of Mk. i, 22 bears the impress of St. Mark's peculiar style and primitive originality. Again, the inelegant use of the verb διδασκειν in i, 22*b*), after the substantive διδαχη in the preceding line, points in exactly the same direction. With regard to the concluding line: "and not as the scribes," it is easy to realize its naturalness uder the pen of our second Evangelist: St. Mark has just represented Our Lord as "teaching with authority," that is in strikng contrast with the scribes, the professional expounders of Holy Writ; and further, it was this great contrast which had excited the astonishment of the hearers of Jesus "in the synagogue," for they were accustomed to listen in that same place to an altogether different kind of teaching on the part of the scribes.

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[10] Cfr. B. Weiss, loc. cit., p. 60; John C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, p. 10; etc.

[11] Cfr. Rich. Ad. Hoffmann, *das Marcusevangelium und seine Quellen*, p. 53.

It is plain therefore, that Mk's testimony concerning Our Lord's "teaching with authority" is a consistent whole. It is plain likewise, that it is one of the most primitive kind in respect to both what it states, and what it omits. It is evident also, that the most minute analysis of its literary features while disclosing repeatedly the distinct characteristics of Mk's style, detects absolutely nothing that should be ascribed to a comparatively late date. Hence it is only naturally to infer from its examination the primitive simplicity and originality which we have acknowledged in our study of the preceding sections of the second Gospel.

II. Mt. has utilized Mk. i. 22.

This primitive character of Mark's account appears still more manifest when we compare it with Mt's vii, 28b, 29, a passage where our first canonical Gospel tells also of the profound impression which Jesus' teaching produced upon His hearers. This passage reads as follows:

> Mt. vii.
>
> 28b. *the multitudes* were greatly struck with His teaching;
> 29. for He was teaching them as having authority,
> and not as *their* scribes.[12]

The simple reading of these lines of St. Matthew recalls forcibly to our minds Mk. i, 22:

> *And* they were greatly struck with His teaching;
> for He was teaching them as having authority,
> and not as the scribes.

In fact, the resemblances between the two passages are of the closest kind. In both Mt. and Mk. we notice the same ideas: the same great astonishment of Our Lord's hearers; the same cause of it, viz.: the fact that He taught with authority; and the same contrast between His teaching and that of the scribes of the time. In both records, these ideas are set forth in exactly the same order, and indeed in the very same words, the only differences in wording consisting in the addition of the distinct subject "the multitudes" to the verb "were greatly struck" at the beginning of the passage in Matthew, and in the coupling of the specifying pronoun "their" with the words "scribes" at its close. The literary connection between St. Matthew and St. Mark is therefore as unmistakable here, as in the sections common to these two Evangelists which we have examined in our preceding studies. And this fact renders it antecedently probable that the dependence in the present passage is on the side of Mt., since we have shown that such was actually the case in all the preceding sections which our first Gospel has in common with the second.

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[12] This is by far the most probable reading of the second line of Mt. vii, 29, as is admitted by Jos. Knabenbauer. S. J., *in Matthacum*, vol. i, p. 302.

The antecedent probability of the derived character of Mt. vii, 28b, 29, becomes a certainty when we examine more closely this passage of our first Evangelist. In St. Matthew's Gospel, all the words found in Mk. i, 22, are immediately preceded by, and indissolubly bound up with, a line (Mt. vii, 28a)) which is peculiar to our first Gospel:

Mt. vii.

28. *And it came to pass when Jesus had finished these words,*
the multitudes were greatly struck with His teaching;
29. for He was teaching them with authority,
and not as their scribes.

The opening line of Mt. vii, 28: "And it came to pass when Jesus had finished these words," is not found only here. It occurs in four other places (cfr. Mt. xi, 1a; xiii, 53a; xix, 1a; xxvi, 1a) of the first Gospel, where, as in Mt. vii, 28a, it is used as a concluding formula to each distinct group of sayings of Christ, and therefore bespeaks in all such places, the writer's actual reflection upon the sayings included in each individual group. Now, in the particular case under consideration, viz. in Mt. vii, 28, 29, the Evangelist makes this formula an integral part of a sentence which embodies the contents of Mk. i, 22, and thereby discloses to us his actual intention of connecting these contents also with the sayings of Christ which make up the group known under the name of "the Sermon on the Mount" (Mt. v, 3—vii, 27). Naturally enough, to carry this out, he had to modify the words of Mk. i, 22 so as to adapt them to his purpose. And it is this adaptation which accurately accounts for the three differences noticeable between Mt. vii, 28b, 29 and Mk. i, 22:

Mk. i.	Mt. vii.
22. *And* they were greatly struck with His teaching;	28b. *the multitudes* were greatly struck with His teaching;
for He was teaching them as having authority,	29. for He was teaching them as having authority,
and not as the scribes.	and not as *their* scribes.

The first difference consists in this: Mk's opening conjunction και (and) is not found in Mt. vii, 28b. Now this difference is due to Mt's method of redaction here. As our first Evangelist wished to use the contents of Mk. i, 22 to describe the astonishment of those who had listened to the Sermon on the Mount, he naturally tacked Mk. i, 22 on to his own concluding formula: "And it came to pass when Jesus had finished these words"; but this he could not do without omitting the conjunction from Mk. i, 22a: "*And* they were greatly struck at His teaching," because of the subordinate form of his own concluding formula. Plainly he could not write:

> Mt. viii, 28a. And it came to pass *when* Jesus had finished these words,
> Mk. i, 22a. *and* they were greatly struck with His teaching. . . . ;

but had to say:

> Mt. vii, 28a. And it came to pass when Jesus had finished these words,
> Mk. i, 22a. they were greatly struck with His teaching. . . .

The second difference between Mt. viii, 28b, 29, and Mk. i, 22, is also satisfactorily accounted for by Mt's use of Mk. i, 22 as a part of his conclusion to the Sermon on the Mount. It consists in Mt's supplying of a distant subject: "the multitudes" for Mk's single verb "were greatly struck" (in the Greek, Mt. has *εξεπλησσοντο οι οχλοι*, instead of Mk's reading: *και εξεπλησσοντο*). In St. Mark, the statement "[they] were greatly struck with His teaching," is immediately connected with the preceding line "entering into the synagogue He taught," so that all present in the synagogue could readily enough be understood as the unexpressed subject of the verb "[they] were greatly struck." But the case stood differently with that statement of St. Mark when used by St. Matthew to describe the great astonishment of those who had heard all the sayings of Our Lord which go to make up Mt. v, 3-vii, 27. Christ's long Sermon on the Mount was thus made to intervene between Mt's mention of the place and audience found in Mt. v, 1, and Mt's record of the deep impression produced by Jesus upon His hearers. In consequence, St. Matthew deemed it advisable to insert distinctly into Mk's statement the subject of "[they] were greatly struck with His teaching," and this he did by mentioning again "the multitudes" of which he had spoken in his introduction to the Sermon: "And seeing *the multitudes*, He went up into the mountain. . . . (Mt. v, 1).[13]

The third and last difference in wording between Mt. vii, 28b, 29, consists in the presence of the pronoun "their" at the end of Mt's record: while St. Mark has simply "and not as the scribes," St. Matthew reads "and not as *their* scribes" (*οι γραμματεις αυτων*). Whoever bears in mind Mt's manifest desire of using Mk. i, 22, as a conclusion to the Sermon on the Mount will readily see how our first Evangelist was induced to make this addition. In the course of that Sermon, he had recorded several sayings (Cfr. Mt. v, 20 sqq.) in which Our Lord had put Himself into express opposition not to all the scribes without exception, since this would have included even those "scribes" whom Jesus had promised to send (Cfr. Mt. xxiii, 34), and who were the Christian teachers of St. Matthew's time (Cfr. Mt. xiii, 53).[14] His doctrine was different only from that of the Jewish scribes whose traditional tenets He censured in Mt. v, 2, sqq. In view of this, St. Matthew thinks it best not to transcribe simply Mk's expression "and not as the scribes" which might be understood of all the scribes, Jewish and Christian, but to indicate by the addition of the single pronoun *αυτων* (and not as *their* scribes), the special class of official teachers from whose doctrine, that of Christ differed so much as to cause the greatest astonishment among His hearers.

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[13] A similar repetition of the subject "the multitudes" is found in Mt. viii, 1 where our first Evangelist introduces the narrative in St. Mark i, 40-44, after Jesus "had come down from the mountain."

A confirmation of the foregoing argument for the derived character of Mt. vii, 28b, 29, as compared with Mk. i, 22, is found in the fact that in the words and expressions actually common to both Evangelists here, the style and vocabulary are distinctly those not of Mt., but of Mk. This is the case, for instance, with the construction of the substantive verb with the participle (He *was teaching*); with the use of *εκπλησσεσθαι* which is found in Mt. only in passages which our first Evangelist has in common with St. Mark; with the word *διδαχη*, as we have stated already; with the noun *εξουσια*, found no less than 10 times in Mk., and in Mt. only in parallel passages.[15]

III. Mt's Substitute for Mk. i, 21.

The position just established that St. Matthew has used Mk. i, 22 as a part of his conclusion to the Sermon on the Mount and has manifestly modified it for this purpose, leads us to think that he was also acquainted with Mk. i, 21:

> And they enter into Capharnaum;
> and straightway on the sabbath
> into the synagogue He taught.

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[14] St. Matthew alone speaks of the early Christian teachers under the name of "scribes." This remarkable fact is in harmony with the peculiarly Jewish tone of the sections of our first Gospel which we have thus far examined.

[15] Cfr. B. Weiss, *loc. cit.*

This verse of St. Mark indicates the place and audience of a discourse of Christ which caused the great astonishment of all who heard Him, and thus forms a direct introduction to Mk. i, 22:

> And they were greatly struck with His teaching;
> for He was teaching them as having authority
> and no as the scribes.

Now as St. Matthew had coupled Mk. i, 22 with his own conclusion to the Sermon on the Mount: "And when Jesus had finished these words" (Mt. vii, 28a), we might naturally expect that he would have used Mk's immediately preceding verse (i, 21) as an introduction to that same Sermon. In thus acting, our first Evangelist would have simply inserted this discourse of Our Lord between the two consecutive verses of St. Mark, the second (Mk. i, 22) serving as a conclusion to the discourse and the first (Mk. i, 21) as its introduction. When we bear in mind that Mt's own immediate introduction to that discourse gives, like Mk. i, 21, indications of place and audience, we can hardly doubt that St. Matthew would have utilized these indications of Mk. i, 21 to frame his own introduction, if these had not appeared to him unsuitable for such purpose. He knew full well that the sayings of Jesus which he gathered into one Sermon had not all been delivered by Him on one single occasion in the synagogue of Capharnaum. He was well aware, from data found in St. Mark himself, that at least some of those sayings had been uttered in the open air, in the hearing of the multitudes which followed the Savior, and after He had long preached in the various synagogues of Galilee.[16] Again, for an apologetical purpose of his own, which has been pointed out in one of our preceding Studies,[17] our first Evangelist had already,—differently from St. Mark,—represented Jesus as settled in Capharnaum.[18] For these reasons, which can still be made out, St. Matthew could not simply adopt Mk's indications of place and audience (Mk. i, 21) for his own immediate introduction to the Sermon he was about to record. In fact, the circumstances he had to ascribe to the delivery of that discourse were so different from those stated here by St. Mark, that he had practically to give these up and to set forth others actually suited for the object which he had in view. This St. Matthew did by turning to another verse of our second Gospel, viz.: Mk. iii, 13 which reads as follows:

> And He goes up into the mountain,
> and calls unto Him whom He Himself would,
> and they went unto Him;

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[16] Cfr. Mt. v, 15, 29, 32; vi, 14, 15; vii, 2b, 7, with Mk. iv, 21; ix, 46; ;x, 11; x i 25, 26; iv, 24; xi, 24.

[17] Cfr. the New York Review, vol. i, no 5 pp. 645, 646.

[18] Cfr. Mt. iv, 13, 18.

and which he transformed into the first verse of his own immediate introduction to Our Lord's discourse

Mt. v.

1. And seeing the multitudes,
He went up into the mountain;
and when He had sat down,
His disciples came to Him.
2. And having opened His mouth,
He taught them, saying.

The dependence of Mt. v, 1 on Mk. iii, 13 can be easily proved. Both verses speak of Jesus "going up into the mountain;" but, of course Mk's peculiar present form *αναβαιναι* (goes up)[19] becomes a regular aorist under Mt's pen: *ανεβη* (went up). In his verse, St. Mark says that Jesus "called unto Him whom He would Himself," because he intends to give right afterwards the number and names of those whom He selected (Mk. iii, 14 sqq.). In his verse, St. Matthew drops indeed this reference to a call, because in his immediately preceding section (Cfr. Mt. iv, 18 sqq.) he has already described the call of the first disciples, and now intends to record Our Lord's discourse;[20] but as a kind of compensation for the line of Mk. which he has omitted, he inserts one: "and when He had sat down," whereby he describes the natural position which Jesus, as a Jewish teacher, would actually take when about to impart instruction. Finally, Mt's line: "His disciples came to Him," is plainly derived from Mk's parallel statement "and they went unto Him:" the subordinate form of Mt's preceding line: "*when* He had sat down," necessarily entailed the omission of the conjunction "and" in Mk's sentence: "*and* they went unto Him;" by prefixing his phrase "and seeing the multitudes" to Mk's entire verse, St. Matthew had introduced an expression which naturally required that he should now specify the subject, and therefore write "*His disciples* came to Him," instead of Mk's last line "and they went unto Him" (*και απηλθον προς αυτον*); lastly, Mt's use of the verb *προσερχομαι* (to come) instead of Mk's *απερχομαι* (to go from), is due to his preference for that compounded form (Mt. uses *προσερχομαι* 52 times, whereas Mk. employs it only 5 times).

It will be noticed that besides embodying Mk. iii, 13, Matthew's immediate introduction to the Sermon on the Mount contains three lines, one at the beginning, and two at the end, the presence of which must needs be accounted for. The two lines at the end from an additional verse which may be rendered as follows:

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[19] We have shown above that this use of the present tense is distinctly characteristic of our second Evangelist when he introduces a new scene.

[20] St. Matthew will give at x, 2-4 the number, powers, and names of the Twelve, in a style parallel to Mk. iii, 13b, sqq.

Mt. v, 2.
And having opened His mouth,
He taught them, saying.

It can be readily seen that our first Evangelist subjoined this verse to Mk. iii, 13 in order to introduce at once his record of the Sermon on the Mount. Its opening line: "and having opened His mouth" is a distinctly Aramaic formula in thorough harmony with the Jewish tone of our first Gospel, and describing the action of the Master beginning His speech. Its second line: "He taught them, saying," tells us that Jesus addressed all those present, and besides introducing the words which follow immediately, it contains the expression "He taught," which St. Matthew apparently preserved from Mk. i, 21:

And they enter into Capharnaum,
and straightway on the sabbath
into the synagogue *He taught.*

The reason for which St. Matthew placed the other line ("And seeing the multitudes") at the beginning of his immediate introduction to Our Lord's discourse on the mountain, can be partially made out, when Mt. v, 1-2 are considered in the light of the verses which precede them in our first Gospel:

Mt.
iv, 23. And He went about in all Galilee,
teaching in their synagogues,
and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom,
and healing all manner of sickness
and all manner of infirmity among the people.
24. And the report of Him went into all Syria,
and they brought to Him all that were sick,
taken with divers diseases and torments,
the demoniacs, lunatics, and paralytics.
and He healed them,
25. And there followed Him great multitudes
from Galilee, and Decapolis,
and Jerusalem and Judea,
and beyond the Jordan.
v, 1, *And seeing the multitudes,*
He went up into the mountain,
and when He had sat down,
His disciples came to Him.
2. And having opened His mouth
He taught them.

All these verses (Mt. iv, 23-v, 2) clearly go to make up the entire introduction of St. Matthew to his record of Our Lord's Sermon. Those which precede Mt. v, 1-2 describe in general terms the things which Jesus did in Galilee, and whereby He secured the following of the great multitudes spoken of in Mt. v, 1-2, as the hearers of His discourse on the mountain. Whence the writing of the line: "and seeing the multitudes" at the beginning of Mt. v, 1-2 was done in harmony with the mention of "great multitudes" as following Our Lord at the beginning of the immediately preceding verse:

Mt.

iv, 25. And there followed Him *great multitudes*
from Galilee, and Decapolis,
and Jerusalem and Judea,
and from beyond the Jordan.
v, 1. *And seeing the multitudes,*
He went into the mountain....

This fact, however, does not fully account for Mt's insertion of the line: "and seeing the multitudes," to open Mt. v, 1-2. Since *the multitudes* had been already mentioned in Mt. iv, 25a, the repetition of that expression might well be dispensed with at the beginning of the very next verse, viz.: in Mt. v, 1a. The complete reason of the repetition is suggested by the comparison of Mt. iv, 23-v, 1a with Mk. iii, 7c-13a.

Mk. iii.

7c. And *a great multitude* from Galilee
followed, and from Judea,
8. and from Jerusalem,
and from Idumea and beyond the Jordan,
and about Tyre and Sidon,
a great multitude, having heard the things He did, came to Him.
9. And He spoke to His disciples,
that a little boat should wait on Him
because of the multitude, lest they should throng Him,
10. for He healed many, so that they pressed upon Him
in order to touch Him, as many had plagues.
11. And the unclean spirits, when they saw Him,
fell down before Him, and cried, saying:
Thou art the Son of God.
12. And He charged them much
that they should not make Him known.
13. And He goes up into the mountain....

Briefly stated, the following are the principle results of this comparison.[21] Our first Evangelist has utilized Mk. iii, 7 sqq., to frame his own introduction in Mt. iv, 23-v, 1a. For this purpose, he has described in the general terms of Mt. iv, 23-24 the things which Jesus did and of which a great multitude heard, spoken of in the last line of Mk. iii, 8. This description he has prefixed to an enumeration of the countries and places from which crowds flocked to Jesus, for such order seemed rightly to him better than the one in St. Mark, where we find first the enumeration, and next the statement that "a great multitude, having heard the things which he did, came to Him." Mt's enumeration of countries in iv, 25, and his clause: "and seeing the multitudes" (v, 1a), are clearly parallel to Mk. iii, 7b-8:

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[21] The details of this comparison will be set forth in one of our forthcoming Studies.

Mk. iii.	Mt.
7b. and a great multitude from Galilee followed, and from Judea,	iv. 25. And there followed Him great multitudes
8. and from Jerusalem,	from Galilee, and Decapolis,
and from Idumea, and beyond the Jordan,	and Jerusalem and Judea, and beyond the Jordan.
and about Tyre and Sidon,	. . . .
a great multitude came to Him.[22]	v, 1. And seeing the multitudes . . .

The differences noticeable in this enumeration are certainly due to Mt's method of redaction, and so is also explained the absence in Mt's Gospel of Mk. iii, 9-12: our first Evangelist omitted these three verses, because he thought that their contents were already sufficiently represented in his own general description (Mt. iv, 23-24) of Our Lord's ministry in Galilee.[23] Lastly, after this omission, St. Matthew directly utilized Mk. iii, 13a: "And He goes up into the mountain," transforming it into his statement "He went up into the mountain" (Mt. v, 1b,) by a process which we have already described.

Since then, the first Gospel runs throughout this section (Mt. iv, 23-v, 1a) parallel to, and dependent on Mk. iii, 7b-13a, the reason for which our first Evangelist repeats at the beginning of v, 1, the expression "the multitudes" which he has used at the beginning of the immediately preceding verse (iv, 25: "and there followed Him great multitudes), becomes manifest. He does so because such repetition existed already in the parallel line of the source at his disposal: in his last line of iii, 8, St. Mark had written: "*a great multitude*... came to Him," although he had already said at iii, 7b: "and *a great multitude* followed from Galilee." In fact, Mk's reference to *the multitude* accompanying Jesus, is the only part of Mk. iii, 8d which St. Matthew has directly utilized in framing his parallel statement: "And seeing the multitudes," in v, 1, for the simple reason that he had already embodied in iv, 23-25, all the remainder of that line of St. Mark. Furthermore, he has preserved this reference, by coupling it directly" with the first line of Mk. iii, 13: "He goes up into the mountain,[24] because he wished to give in his immediate introduction to the Sermon on the Mount:

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[22] We have not transcribed the words "having heard what He did" in the last line of Mk. iii, 8, because St. Matthew has already given their equivalent in iv, 23-24.

[23] The reason for this omission will be given more precisely in a forthcoming Study. The view that in our first Gospel, the verse 23 of chap. iv. is one of Mt's own making, is confirmed by the repetition of that verse in Mt. ix, 35.

Mt. v.
1. And seeing the *multitudes*
He went up into the *mountain*,
and when He had sat down,
His disciples came to Him.
2. And having opened His mouth,
He taught them, saying,

an indication of the place and audience of that teaching of Our Lord which struck with the greatest astonishment all those present, exactly as in Mk. i, 21, where is found an indication of the place and audience of a teaching of Our Lord which struck His hearers with the same deep astonishment:

Mk. i, 21.
And they enter into Capharnaum,
and straightway on the Sabbath
into the synagogue He taught.

We are thus led to admit that St. Matthew utilized Mk. iii, 13 and coupled it with the reference to "the multitude" in the last line of Mk. iii, 8,[25] and thereby secured a substitute for Mk. i, 21. This conclusion appears all the more probable because such substitute is found in Mt's immediate introduction to the Sermon on the Mount. As our first Evangelist has very naturally used his own parallel to Mk's second verse (Mk. i, 22) in an immediate conclusion to that Sermon, so he has no less naturally employed his substitute for Mk's first verse (Mk. i, 21) in an immediate introduction to the same discourse of Our

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[24] For a similar direct coupling of a reference to the multitudes, see Mt. ix, 36.

[25] The manner in which the reference to the multitude in Mk. iii, 8d, was adapted to its different contest in our first Gospel, can be easily described. First, St. Matthew spoke of "multitudes" instead of "the great multitude," in harmony with the plural form he has used in the first line of his preceding verse. Next, our first Evangelist naturally prefixed the conjunction "and" (*and* seeing the multitude), because he has placed Mk's reference to the multitude at the opening of a new sentence. Lastly, he described Jesus as *seeing* the multitudes, because the Master must have beheld them before He went up into the mountain in order to address them. (A similar use of the phrase: "and seeing the multitudes" is found in Mt. ix, 36).

Lord. The conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that Mt's entire introduction to the Sermon on the Mount (iv, 23-4, 2) is found in our first Gospel immediately after the call of Christ's first disciples (Mt. iv, 18-22), exactly as Mk. i, 21 follows immediately the narrative of that call by our second Evangelist (Mk. i, 16-20), for this shows that St. Matthew inserted his entire introduction to the Sermon together with the Sermon itself between Mk. i, 20 and Mk. i, 22.

Finally, it is worthy of notice that in framing his substitute for Mk. i, 21 and inserting the sermon on the Mount at this point, St. Matthew remained in harmony with the document at his disposal According to St. Mark himself (Mk. i, 21-22), it was Our Lord's habitual teaching (as is denoted by the use of the imperfect εδιδασκεν in Mk. i, 21c) concerning the Law whose enactments the Jewish scribes were the professional expounders, which struck His hearers with the deepest astonishment. And this is precisely what St. Matthew set forth, in a more explicit manner than our second Evangelist, by means of his substitute for Mk. i, 21, and of his Sermon on the Mount, that is of a grouping of sayings of Jesus uttered at different times and all bearing on the manner in which the Law should be understood and carried out. Whence it appears that here, as in the preceding sections which we have thus far studied, St. Matthew completed our second Gospel without contradicting its statements.

IV. Lk's iv, 32-32 Examined.

While our first Gospel contains in Mt. vii, 28b, 29 a direct parallel to Mk. i, 22, and in Mt. v, 1-2 a simple substitute for Mk. i, 21, our third Synoptic presents in Lk. iv, 31-32 two verses which correspond directly to Mk. i, 21-22.

Mk. i.	Lk. iv.
21. And they enter into Capharnaum; and straightway [on] the sabbath into the synagogue He taught.	31. And He went down into Capharnaum, a city of Galilee, and he was teaching them on the sabbath.
22. And they were greatly struck with His teaching; for He was teaching them as having authority, and not as the scribes.	32. And they were greatly struck with His teaching, for His word was with authority. . . . . . .

These passages of our second and our third Evangelists stand undoubtedly in a close literary relation. Both have manifestly one and the same general object, viz.: that of telling the reader that Jesus' teaching was with authority. Both are built on practically parallel lines; there is first a statement of Our Lord's going into Capharnaum; next comes that of His teaching on the Sabbath; and lastly mention is made of the deep impression produced by His teaching, placed, in both Mk. and Lk., before the cause of that impression, viz.: the fact that He spoke with an authority peculiarly His own. Again, the two passages, however short, have no less than 16 words in common, and present stylistic resemblances proportionately as numerous. In a word, their literary relation is such as to positively exclude the supposition that they were penned by two independent writers.

Antecedenly speaking, the dependence is on the side of St. Luke, and not on that of St. Mark, for this has been invariably the case in regard to the similar passages we have thus far examined. In point of fact, a closer comparison of Mk. i, 21-22 with Lk. iv, 31-32, proves that the latter was composed in view and dependence of the former. While, as we have already shown, Mk. i, 21-22 contains nothing that must be considered otherwise than Marcan and primitive, it is easy to point out in Lk. iv, 31-32 several features which are not Luke's own, but are derived from Mk's parallel passage. This is the case, for instance, with the use of *τοις σαββασιν*, for St. Luke habitually employs *σαββατον* in the singular; with that of *διδαχη* nowhere else found in our third Gospel, and of *εκπλησσεσθαι* which is customary in St. Mark's narrative.[26] Again, Lk's statement: "and they were greatly struck with His teaching" appears strange on the part of our third Evangelist who has already spoken of wonders performed by Jesus in Capharnaum (iv, 23) and of His custom of teaching in the synagogues (iv, 15), and thus betrays its derivation from Mk. i, 22d where it is found in its natural context. Nay more, all the differences between Mk. i, 21-22 and Lk. iv, 31-32 are intended variations on the part of St. Luke. When St. Mark wrote his opening line: "And they enter into Capharnaum" (*και εισπορευονται εις Καφαρναυμ*) he framed a sentence in thorough harmony with his immediately preceding narrative (i, 16-20) which tells of our Lord's call of the first four disciples and of their prompt obedience in following Him: the call of the disciples occurred at the Sea of Galilee, and they together with Jesus, soon after leaving it enter the city of Capharnaum built on the shore of that Sea. In writing his own opening line, St. Luke, like St. Mark, plainly wishes to describe an entrance into Capharnaum and place it in direct connection with his own immediately preceding section, and for this purpose, he utilizes Mk's words και,εις Καφαρναυμ, but forbears using Mk's verb: εισπορευονται (they enter). The reason for which he forbears doing so is obvious: both the idea which that verb directly conveyed and its plural form were not sufficiently in harmony with his own preceding section. He has just narrated (Lk. iv, 16-30) Jesus' visit and rejection at Nazareth, a city which was far distant from and situated on a much higher level than Capharnaum, so that to describe now accurately the manner of our Lord's journey between the two cities, he feels obliged to discard Mk' εισπορευεσθαι and to have recourse to the verb which he actually used: κατερχεσθαι (to go down). Again, St. Luke knows full well that his record of Christ's visit at Nazareth has not yet been preceded by a narrative of the call of the first disciple, since he is withholding that narrative for v, 1-11, and in consequence, he cannot use the plural form of Mk's opening line: "they enter," but must speak of Jesus alone as going down into Capharnaum: hence his expression κατηλθεν "He went down." Having thus obtained a fitted term instead of the one employed by St. Mark, he simply inserts it into Mk's sentence, at the very same place, and without expressed subject, a further proof that his line is composed in full view of the opening line in our second Synoptic.

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[26] Cf. B. Weiss, *das Marcusevangelium und seine synoptischen Parallelen*, p. 60.

In like manner, when St. Luke adds to Mk's parallel mention of Capharnaum, the statement that it was "a city of Galilee," he does so in view of what he knows to be found in our second Gospel. To realize this ,we have only to bear in mind that St. Mark naturally dispensed with such a specifying clause at Mk. i, 21, because his own mention of Capharnaum was preceded by that of the province of Galilee in the immediate context, viz.: at i, 14 where our second Evangelist describes Jesus as "coming to Galilee,"[27] and at i, 16a which is the opening line of Mk's account of the call of the first disciples at "the Sea of *Galilee*." But Lk's insertion of Christ's rejection at Nazareth instead of Mk's narrative of the call of the first disciples, between Our Lord's return to Galilee and His going into Capharnaum, did manifestly away with the immediate connection which existed in St. Mark between these last two events. In fact, it placed between L's iv, 31a: "and He went down into Capharnaum," and Lk. iv, 14: "and Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee," a long passage which describes what befell Our Lord in Nazareth, and which contains no distinct reference to Galilee. Lk's readers therefore, differently from Mk's own, could not gather from anything like the immediate context that Capharnaum was a "city of Galilee," and he therefore added that clause to Mk's i, 21a, knowing full well that in doing so, he was simply setting forth explicitly what was really implied in Mk's statement in the light of its immediate context. Indeed, it behooved all the more our third Synoptic to make this addition to St. Mark's statement, because he was writing for Gentile readers unfamiliar with the geography of Palestine, and consequently unable to infer from the mention of Nazareth at the beginning of his preceding section, that both that city and Capharnaum were in the province of Galilee.

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[27] In fact, St. Mark was imitated in this by St. Luke who, when he inserted our Lord's visit at Nazareth (iv, 16-30) right after his parallel to Mk. i, 14, viz.: at Lk. iv, 14 sq., did not subjoin that Nazareth was "a city of Galilee," because the name of that town was near enough to his mention of "Galilee" in Lk. iv, 14 sq.

The remaining differences noticeable between Mk. i, 21-22 and Lk. iv, 31-32 can also, and indeed more easily than the foregoing, be referred to St. Luke's intention of modifying the parallel text of St. Mark. Thus, the next two lines of Mk. i, 21 which read as follows:

> and straightway [on] the sabbath
> into the synagogue he taught,

become under St. Luke's pen this simpler and smoother statement:

> and He was teaching them on the sabbath,

by the very natural omission of ευθυς (straightway), Mk's favorite word and no longer in harmony with Lk's context; the prefixing of the preposition εν (on) to Mk's less complete form τοις σαββασιν; the postponing of Mk's mention of the "synagogue" till Lk's next section where it is repeated by our second evangelist (cfr. Lk. iv, 33a with Mk. i, 23a); the addition of the object "them" to Mk's verb "He taught" for the sake of completing it and by means of Mk's own complete expression found at Mk. i, 22b: "He was teaching *them*;" and lastly, Lk's change of the ackward construction in St. Mark: "and [on] the sabbath....He taught," into the direct and elegant sentence: "and He was teaching them on the sabbath" (Lk. iv, 31c).[28] Again, Lk's iv, 32b: "for His word was with authority," is deliberately substituted by our third evangelist for Mk's parallel line "for He was teaching them as having authority," for St. Luke knows that he has already utilized Mk's words: "He was teaching them," and, on that account he writes in their stead: "*His word* was with authority," avoiding also thereby the inelegant use of practically the same word (διδαχη,διδασκων) found in three successive lines of Mk's parallel section. As regards Lk's final omission of Mk's concluding line: "and not as the scribes," it is readily explained by the fact that St. Luke is writing for Gentiles little, if at all, familiar with the usual methods of those Jewish teachers. It may also be noticed that this omission far from interfering with the intimate connection which St. Luke knew to exist between Mk. i, 21-22 and the miracle narrated in Mk. i, 23 sqq., rendered it all the closer, so that our third Synoptic, while omitting Mk's clause "and not as the scribes," remained in full agreement with his source of information.

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[28] In the eyes of St. Luke the form "He was teaching" was just as good Greek as "He taught"; and besides, the idea of continuance by Mk's imperfect ἐδίδασκεν was preserved by him by the use of the preposition ἐν before the words τοῖς σάββασιν.

The direct and constant dependence of Lk. iv, 31-32 on Mk. i, 21-22, which has just been pointed out, explains in a satisfactory manner all their resemblances and differences, and therefore rules out the supposition that in writing iv, 31-32, our third Evangelist was influenced either by Mt's parallel to Mk's i, 22, or by Mt's substitute for Mk. i, 21. It remains true, however, that Lk's redaction of iv, 31-32 was somewhat affected by St. Matthew's Gospel. Lk's first two differences from Mk. i, 21-22 were entailed directly, as we have shown, by the fact that our third Synoptic had substituted his narrative of Our Lord's visit at Nazareth for Mk's account of the call of the first disciples. Now, as this substitution was the result of St. Luke's wish to justify, after the example of St. Matthew, Jesus' preference of Capharnaum to Nazareth as the centre of His ministry in Galilee,[29] it follows that the differences themselves are traceable, though indirectly and remotely, to the influence of St. Matthew upon our third Synoptic.

V. Concluding Remarks.

The foregoing literary anaylsis of Mk. i, 21-22, Mt. vii, 28b, 29, and Lk. iv, 31-32, shows that our first three Evangelists reflect faithfully the testimony of Christian tradition to the fact that Our Lord "taught as one having authority." It bears out also the same general conclusions as we have stated at the end of our preceding Studies:

(1) Our first three Gospels stand in such a close literary connection as to preclude the idea that they were composed by altogether independent writers;

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[29] Cfr. the New York Review, Feb.-March, 1906, p. 656.

(2) The Gospel according to St. Mark was written first and utilized by the other two Synoptics;

(3) the order between the first three Evangelists is (1) Mark; (2) Matthew; and (3) Luke;

(4) despite the differences disclosed by a thorough examination and comparison of their contents, the Synoptics must be considered as in a true substantial agreement.

Francis E. Gigot.

JESUS TAUGHT "AS ONE HAVING AUTHORITY."

Mk. i.	Mt. vii.	Lk. iv.
21. And they enter into Capharnaum;		31. And He went down into Capharnaum,
and straightway [on] the sabbath		a city of Galilee,
into the synagogue He taught.		and He was teaching them on the sabbath.
22. And they were greatly struck with His teaching;	28b. the multitudes were greatly struck with His teaching;	32. And they were greatly struck with His teaching,
for He was teaching them as having authority	29. for He was teaching them as having authority	for His word was with authority.
and not as the scribes.	and not as their scribes.	

ENCYCLICAL LETTER

OF HIS HOLINESS

PIUS X

By Divine Providence Pope

To the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops and other local Ordinaries in peace and communion with the Apostolic See

ON THE DOCTRINES OF THE MODERNISTS

To the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other local Ordinaries in peace and communion with the Apostolic See

PIUS X POPE

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

The office divinely committed to Us of feeding the Lord's flock has especially this duty assigned to it by Christ, namely, to guard with the greatest vigilance the deposit of the faith delivered to the saints, rejecting the profane novelties of words and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called. There has never been a time when this watchfulness of the supreme pastor was not necessary to the Catholic body; for, owing to the efforts of the enemy of the human race, there have never been lacking "men speaking perverse things" (Acts xx. 30), "vain talkers and seducers" (Tit. i. 10), "erring and driving into error" (2 Tim. iii. 13). Still it must be confessed that the number of the enemies of the cross of Christ has in these last days increased exceedingly, who are striving, by arts, entirely new and full of subtlety, to destroy the vital energy of the Church, and, if they can, to overthrow utterly Christ's kingdom itself. Wherefore We may no longer be silent, lest We should seem to fail in Our most sacred duty, and lest the kindness that, in the hope of wiser counsels, We have hitherto shown them, should be attributed to forgetfulness of Our office.

Gravity of the Situation.

That We make no delay in this matter is rendered necessary especially by the fact that the partisans of error are to be sought not only among the Church's open enemies; they lie hid, a thing to be deeply deplored and feared, in her very bosom and heart, and are the more mischievous, the less conspicuously they appear. We allude, Venerable Brethren, to many who belong to the Catholic laity, nay, and this is far more lamentable, to the ranks of the priesthood itself, who, feigning a love for the Church, lacking the firm protection of philosophy and theology, nay more, thoroughly imbued with the poisonous doctrines taught by the enemies of the Church, and lost to all sense of modesty, vaunt themselves as reformers of the Church; and, forming more boldly into line of attack, assail all that is most sacred in the work of Christ, not sparing even the person of the Divine Redeemer, whom, with sacrilegious daring, they reduce to a simple, mere man.

Though they express astonishment themselves, no one can justly be surprised that We number such men among the enemies of the Church, if, leaving out of consideration the internal disposition of soul, of which God alone is the judge, he is acquainted with their tenets, their manner of speech, their conduct. Nor indeed will he err in accounting them the most pernicious of all the adversaries of the Church. For, as We have said, they put their designs for her ruin into operation not from without but from within; hence, the danger is present almost in the very veins and heart of the Church, whose injury is the more certain, the more intimate is their knowledge of her. Moreover they lay the axe not to the branches and shoots, but to the very root, that is, to the faith and its deepest fibres. And having struck at this root of immortality, they proceed to disseminate poison through the whole tree, so that there is no part of Catholic truth from which they hold their hand, none that they do not strive to corrupt. Further, none is more skilful, none more astute than they, in the employment of a thousand noxious arts; for they double the parts of rationalist and Catholic, and this so craftily that they easily lead the unwary into error; and since audacity is their characteristic, there is no conclusion of any kind from which they shrink or which they do not thrust forward with pertinacity and assurance. To this must be added the fact, which indeed is well calculated to deceive souls, that they lead a life of the greatest activity, of assiduous and ardent application to every branch of learning, and that they possess, as a rule, a reputation for the strictest morality. Finally, and this almost destroys all hope of cure, their very doctrines have given such a bent to their minds, that they disdain all authority and brook no restraint; and relying upon a false conscience, they attempt to ascribe to a love of truth that which is in reality the result of pride and obstinacy.

Once indeed We had hopes of recalling them to a better sense, and to this end We first of all showed them kindness as Our children, then We treated them with severity, and at last We have had recourse, though with great reluctance, to public reproof. But you know, Venerable Brethren, how fruitless has been Our action. They bowed their head for a moment, but it was soon uplifted more arrogantly than ever. If it were a matter which concerned them alone, We might perhaps have overlooked it: but the security of the Catholic name is at stake. Wherefore, as to maintain it longer would be a crime, We must now break silence, in order to expose before the whole Church in their true colours those men who have assumed this bad disguise.

Division of the Encyclical.

But since the Modernists (as they are commonly and rightly called) employ a very clever artifice, namely, to present their doctrines without order and systematic arrangement into one whole, scattered and disjointed one from another, so as to appear to be in doubt and uncertainty, while they are in reality firm and steadfast, it will be of advantage, Venerable Brethren, to bring their teachings together here into one group, and to point out the connexion between them, and thus to pass to an examination of the sources of the errors, and to prescribe remedies for averting the evil.

PART I.: ANALYSIS OF MODERNIST TEACHING.

To proceed in an orderly manner in this recondite subject, it must first of all be noted that every Modernist sustains and comprises within himself many personalities; he is a philosopher, a believer, a theologian, an historian, a critic, an apologist, a reformer. These roles must be clearly distinguished from one another by all who would accurately know their system and thoroughly comprehend the principles and the consequences of their doctrines.

Agnosticism its Philosophical Foundation.

We begin, then, with the philosopher. Modernists place the foundation of religious philosophy in that doctrine which is usually called *Agnosticism*. According to this teaching human reason is confined entirely within the field of *phenomena*, that is to say, to things that are perceptible to the senses, and in the manner in which they are perceptible: it has no right and no power to transgress these limits. Hence it is incapable of lifting itself up to God, and of recognising His existence, even by means of visible things. From this it is inferred that God can never be the direct object of science, and that, as regards history, He must not be considered as an historical subject. Given these premises, all will readily perceive what becomes of *Natural Theology*, of the *motives of credibility*, of *external revelation*. The Modernists simply make away with them altogether; they include them in *Intellectualism*, which they call a ridiculous and long ago defunct system. Nor does the fact that the Church has formally condemned these portentous errors exercise the slightest restraint upon them. Yet the Vatican Council has defined, "If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason by means of the things that are made, let him be anathema" (*De Revel.*, can. 1); and also: "If anyone says that it is not possible or not expedient that man be taught, through the medium of divine revelation, about God and the worship to be paid Him, let him be anathema" (*Ibid.*, can. 2); and finally, "If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore men should be drawn to the faith only by their personal internal experience or by private inspiration, let him be anathema" (*De Fide*, can. 3). But how the Modernists make the transition from *Agnosticism*, which is a state of pure nescience, to scientific and historic *Atheism*, which is a doctrine of positive denial; and consequently, by what legitimate process of reasoning, starting from ignorance as to whether God has in fact intervened in the history of the human race or not, they proceed, in their explanation of this history, to ignore God altogether, as if He really had not intervened, let him answer who can. Yet it is a fixed and established principle among them that both science and history must be atheistic: and within their boundaries there is room for nothing but *phenomena;* God and all that is divine are utterly excluded. We shall soon see clearly what, according to this most absurd teaching, must be held touching the most sacred Person of Christ, what concerning the mysteries of His life and death, and of His Resurrection and Ascension into heaven.

VITAL IMMANENCE.

However, this *Agnosticism* is only the negative part of the system of the Modernist: the positive side of it consists in what they call *vital immanence*. This is how they advance from one to the other. Religion, whether natural or supernatural, must, like every other fact, admit of some explanation. But when natural theology has been destroyed, the road to revelation closed through the rejection of the arguments of credibility, and all external revelation absolutely denied, it is clear that this explanation will be sought in vain outside man himself. It must, therefore, be looked for *in* man; and since religion is a form of life, the explanation must certainly be found in the life of man. Hence the principle of *religious immanence* is formulated. Moreover, the first actuation, so to say, of every vital phenomenon, and religion, as has been said, belongs to this category, is due to a certain necessity or impulsion; but it has its origin, speaking more particularly of life, in a movement of the heart, which movement is called a *sentiment*. Therefore, since God is the object of religion, we must conclude that faith, which is the basis and the foundation of all religion, consists in a sentiment which originates from a need of the divine. This need of the divine, which is experienced only in special and favourable circumstances, cannot, of itself, appertain to the domain of consciousness; it is at first latent within the consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern philosophy, in the *subconsciousness*, where also its roots lie hidden and undetected.

Should anyone ask how it is that this need of the divine which man experiences within himself grows up into a religion, the Modernists reply thus: Science and history, they say, are confined within two limits, the one external, namely, the visible world, the other internal, which is consciousness. When one or other of these boundaries has been reached, there can be no further progress, for beyond is the *unknowable*. In presence of this *unknowable*, whether it is outside man and beyond the visible world of nature, or lies hidden within in the *subconsciousness*, the need of the divine, according to the principles of *Fideism*, excites in a soul with a propensity towards religion a certain special *sentiment*, without any previous advertence of the mind: and this sentiment possesses, implied within itself both as its own object and as its intrinsic cause, the *reality* of the divine, and in a way unites man with God. It is this sentiment to which Modernists give the name of faith, and this it is which they consider the beginning of religion.

But we have not yet come to the end of their philosophy, or, to speak more accurately, their folly. For Modernism finds in this *sentiment* not faith only, but with and in faith, as they understand it, *revelation*, they say abides. For what more can one require for revelation? Is not that religious *sentiment* which is perceptible in the consciousness revelation, or at least the beginning of revelation? Nay, is not God Himself, as He manifests Himself to the soul, indistinctly it is true, in this same religious sense, revelation? And they add: Since God is both the object and the cause of faith, this revelation is at the same time *of* God and *from* God, that is, God is both the revealer and the revealed.

Hence, Venerable Brethren, springs that ridiculous proposition of the Modernists, that every religion, according to the different aspect under which it is viewed, must be considered as both natural and supernatural. Hence it is that they make consciousness and revelation synonymous. Hence the law, according to which *religious consciousness* is given as the universal rule, to be put on an equal footing with revelation, and to which all must submit, even the supreme authority of the Church, whether in its teaching capacity, or in that of legislator in the province of sacred liturgy or discipline.

DEFORMATION OF RELIGIOUS HISTORY THE CONSEQUENCE.

However, in all this process, from which, according to the Modernists, faith and revelation spring, one point is to be particularly noted, for it is of capital importance on account of the historico-critical corollaries which are deduced from it.—For the *Unknowable* they talk of does not present itself to faith as something solitary and isolated; but rather in close conjunction with some phenomenon, which, though it belongs to the realm of science and history, yet to some extent oversteps their bounds. Such a phenomenon may be a fact of nature containing within itself something mysterious; or it may be a man, whose character, actions and words cannot, apparently, be reconciled with the ordinary laws of history. Then faith, attracted by the *Unknowable* which is united with the phenomenon, possesses itself of the whole phenomenon, and, as it were, permeates it with its own life. From this two things follow. The first is a sort of *transfiguration* of the phenomenon, by its elevation above its own true conditions, by which it becomes more adapted to that form of the divine which faith will infuse into it. The second is a kind of *disfigurement*, which springs from the fact that faith, which has made the phenomenon independent of the circumstances of place and time, attributes to it qualities which it has not; and this is true particularly of the phenomena of the past, and the older they are, the truer it is. From these two principles the Modernists deduce two laws, which, when united with a third which they have already got from agnosticism, constitute the foundation of historical criticism. We will take an illustration from the Person of Christ. In the person of Christ, they say, science and history encounter nothing that is not human. Therefore, in virtue of the first canon deduced from agnosticism, whatever there is in His history suggestive of the divine, must be rejected. Then, according to the second canon, the historical Person of Christ was transfigured by faith; therefore everything that raises it above historical conditions must be removed. Lastly, the third canon, which lays down that the person of Christ has been *disfigured* by faith, requires that everything should be excluded, deeds and words and all else that is not in keeping with His character, circumstances and education, and with the place and time in which He lived. A strange style of reasoning, truly; but it is Modernist criticism.

Therefore the *religious sentiment*, which through the agency of *vital immanence* emerges from the lurking-places of the subconsciousness, is the germ of all religion, and the explanation of everything that has been or ever will be in any religion. This *sentiment*, which was at first only rudimentary and almost formless, gradually matured, under the influence of that mysterious principle from which it originated, with the progress of human life, of which, as has been said, it is a form. This, then, is the origin of all religion, even supernatural religion; it is only a development of this *religious sentiment.* Nor is the Catholic religion an exception; it is quite on a level with the rest; for it was engendered, by the process of *vital immanence,* in the consciousness of Christ, who was a man of the choicest nature, whose like has never been, nor will be.—Those who hear these audacious, these sacrilegious assertions, are simply shocked! And yet, Venerable Brethren, these are not merely the foolish babblings of infidels. There are many Catholics, yea, and priests too, who say these things openly; and they boast that they are going to reform the Church by these ravings! There is no question now of the old error, by which a sort of right to the supernatural order was claimed for the human nature. We have gone far beyond that: we have reached the point when it is affirmed that our most holy religion, in the man Christ as in us, emanated from nature spontaneously and entirely. Than this there is surely nothing more destructive of the whole supernatural order. Wherefore the Vatican Council most justly decreed: "If anyone says that man cannot be raised by God to a knowledge and perfection which surpasses nature, but that he can and should, by his own efforts and by a constant development, attain finally to the possession of all truth and good, let him be anathema" (*De Revel.,* can. 3).

THE ORIGIN OF DOGMAS.

So far, Venerable Brethren, there has been no mention of the intellect. Still it also, according to the teaching of the Modernists, has its part in the act of faith. And it is of importance to see how.—In that *sentiment* of which We have frequently spoken, since sentiment is not knowledge, God indeed presents Himself to man, but in a manner so confused and indistinct that He can hardly be perceived by the believer. It is therefore necessary that a ray of light should be cast upon this sentiment, so that God may be clearly distinguished and set apart from it. This is the task of the intellect, whose office it is to reflect and to analyze, and by means of which man first transforms into mental pictures the vital phenomena which arise within him, and then expresses them in words. Hence the common saying of Modernists: that the religious man must *ponder* his faith.—The intellect, then, encountering this sentiment directs itself upon it, and produces in it a work resembling that of a painter who restores and gives new life to a picture that has perished with age. The simile is that of one of the leaders of Modernism. The operation of the intellect in this work is a double one: first, by a natural and spontaneous act it expresses its concept in a simple, ordinary statement; then, on reflection and deeper consideration, or, as they say, *by elaborating its thought,* it expresses the idea in *secondary* propositions, which are derived from the first, but are more perfect and distinct. These *secondary* propositions, if they finally receive the approval of the supreme *magisterium* of the Church, constitute dogma.

Thus, We have reached one of the principal points in the Modernists' system, namely, the origin and the nature of dogma. For they place the origin of dogma in those primitive and simple formulae, which, under a certain aspect, are necessary to faith; for revelation, to be truly such, requires the clear manifestation of God in the consciousness. But dogma itself, they apparently hold, is contained in the *secondary* formulae.

To ascertain the nature of dogma, we must first find the relation which exists between the *religious formulas* and the *religious sentiment.* This will be readily perceived by him who realises that these formulas have no other purpose than to furnish the believer with a means of giving an account of his faith to himself. These formulas therefore stand midway between the believer and his faith; in their relation to the faith, they are the inadequate expression of its object, and are usually called *symbols;* in their relation to the believer, they are mere *instruments.*

Its Evolution.

Hence it is quite impossible to maintain that they express absolute truth: for, in so far as they are *symbols*, they are the images of truth, and so must be adapted to the religious sentiment in its relation to man; and as *instruments*, they are the vehicles of truth, and must therefore in their turn be adapted to man in his relation to the religious sentiment. But the object of the *religious sentiment*, since it embraces the *absolute*, possesses an infinite variety of aspects, of which now one, now another, may present itself. In like manner, he who believes may pass through different phases. Consequently, the formulæ too, which we call dogmas, must be subject to these vicissitudes, and are, therefore, liable to change. Thus the way is open to the intrinsic *evolution* of dogma. An immense collection of sophisms this, that ruins and destroys all religion. Dogma is not only able, but ought to evolve and to be changed. This is strongly affirmed by the Modernists, and as clearly flows from their principles. For amongst the chief points of their teaching is this which they deduce from the principle of *vital immanence;* that religious formulas, to be really religious and not merely theological speculations, ought to be living and to live the life of the religious sentiment. This is not to be understood in the sense that these formulas, especially if merely imaginative, were to be made for the religious sentiment; it has no more to do with their origin than with number or quality; what is necessary is that the religious sentiment, which, when needful, introduced some modifications, should vitally assimilate them. In other words, it is necessary that the primitive formula be accepted and sanctioned by the heart; and similarly the subsequent work from which spring the secondary formulas must proceed under the guidance of the heart. Hence it comes that these formulas, to be living, should be, and should remain, adapted to the faith and to him who believes. Wherefore if for any reason this adaptation should cease to exist, they lose their first meaning and accordingly must be changed. And since the character and lot of dogmatic formulas is so precarious, there is no room for surprise that Modernists regard them so lightly and in such open disrespect. And so they audaciously charge the Church both with taking the wrong road from inability to distinguish the religious and moral sense of formulas from their surface meaning, and with clinging tenaciously and vainly to meaningless formulas whilst religion is allowed to go to ruin. *Blind* that they are, and *leaders of the blind*, inflated with a boastful science, they have reached that pitch of folly where they pervert the eternal concept of truth and the true nature of the religious sentiment; with that new system of theirs *they are seen to be under the sway of a blind and unchecked passion for novelty, thinking not at all of finding some solid foundation of truth, but despising the holy and apostolic* *traditions, they embrace other vain, futile, uncertain doctrines, condemned by the Church, on which, in the height of their vanity, they think they can rest and maintain truth itself.*[1]

THE MODERNIST AS BELIEVER: INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE AND RELIGIOUS CERTITUDE.

Thus far, Venerable Brethren, of the Modernist considered as Philosopher. Now if we proceed to consider him as Believer, seeking to know how the Believer, according to Modernism, is differentiated from the Philosopher, it must be observed that although the Philosopher recognises as the object of faith the *divine reality,* still this reality is not to be found but in the heart of the Believer, as being an object of sentiment and affirmation; and therefore confined within the sphere of phenomena; but as to whether it exists outside that sentiment and affirmation is a matter which in no way concerns the Philosopher. For the Modernist Believer, on the contrary, it is an established and certain fact that the divine reality does really exist in itself and quite independently of the person who believes in it. If you ask on what foundation this assertion of the Believer rests, they answer: In the *experience of the individual.* On this head the Modernists differ from the Rationalists only to fall into the opinion of the Protestants and pseudo-Mystics. This is their manner of putting the question: In *the religious sentiment* one must recognise a kind of intuition of the heart which puts man in immediate contact with the very reality of God, and infuses such a persuasion of God's existence and His action both within and without man as to excel greatly any scientific conviction. They assert, therefore, the existence of a real experience, and one of a kind that surpasses all rational experience. If this experience is denied by some, like the rationalists, it arises from the fact that such persons are unwilling to put themselves in the moral state which is necessary to produce it. It is this *experience* which, when a person acquires it, makes him properly and truly a believer.

How far off we are here from Catholic teaching we have already seen in the decree of the Vatican Council. We shall see later how, with such theories, added to the other errors already mentioned, the way is opened wide for atheism. Here it is well to note that, given this doctrine of *experience* united with the other doctrine of *symbolism,* every religion, even that of paganism, must be held to be true. What is to prevent such experiences from being met with in every religion? In fact that they are to be found is asserted by not a few. And with what right will Modernists deny the truth of an experience affirmed by a follower of Islam? With what right can they claim true experiences for Catholics alone? Indeed Modernists do not deny but actually admit, some confusedly, others in the most open manner, that all religions are true. That they cannot feel otherwise is clear. For on what ground according to their theories, could falsity be predicated of any religion whatsoever? It must be certainly on one of these two: either on account of the falsity of the religious sentiment or on account of the falsity of the formula pronounced by the mind. Now the *religious sentiment,* although it may be more perfect or less perfect, is always one and the same; and the intellectual formula, in order to be true, has but to respond to the *religious sentiment* and to the Believer, whatever be the intellectual capacity of the latter. In the conflict between different religions, the most that Modernists can maintain is that the Catholic religion has more truth because it is more living and that it deserves with more reason the name of Christian because it corresponds more fully with the origins of Christianity. That these consequences flow from the premisses will not seem unnatural to anybody. But what is amazing is that there are Catholics and priests who, We would fain believe, abhor such enormities yet act as if they fully approved of them. For they heap such praise and bestow such public honour on the teachers of these errors as to give rise to the belief that their admiration is not meant merely for the persons, who are perhaps not devoid of a certain merit, but rather for the errors which these persons openly profess and which they do all in their power to propagate.

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[1] Gregory XVI., Encycl. *Singulari Nos,* 7 Kal. Jul. 1834.

Religious Experience and Tradition.

But this doctrine of *experience* is also under another aspect entirely contrary to Catholic truth. It is extended and applied to *tradition,* as hitherto understood by the Church, and destroys it. By the Modernists tradition is understood as a communication to others, through preaching by means of the intellectual formula, of an *original experience.* To this formula, in addition to its representative value, they attribute a species of suggestive efficacy which acts both in the person who believes to stimulate the religious sentiment should it happen to have grown sluggish and to renew the experience once required, and in those who do not yet believe to awake for the first time the religious *sentiment* in them and to produce the *experience.* In this way is religious experience propagated among the peoples; and not merely among contemporaries by preaching, but among future generations both by books and by oral transmission from one to another. Sometimes this communication of religious experience takes root and thrives, at other times it withers at once and dies. For the Modernists to live is a proof of truth, since for them life and truth are one and the same thing. Hence again it is given to us to infer that all existing religions are equally true, for otherwise they would not live.

Faith and Science.

Having reached this point, Venerable Brethren, we have sufficient material in hand to enable us to see the relations which Modernists establish between faith and science, including history also under the name of science. And in the first place it is to be held that the object of the one is quite extraneous to and separate from the object of the other. For faith occupies itself solely with something which science declares to be *unknowable* for it. Hence each has a separate field assigned to it: science is entirely concerned with the reality of phenomena, into which faith does not enter at all; faith on the contrary concerns itself with the divine reality which is entirely unknown to science. Thus the conclusion is reached that there can never be any dissension between faith and science, for if each keeps on its own ground they can never meet and therefore never be in contradiction. And if it be objected that in the visible world there are some things which appertain to faith, such as the human life of Christ, the Modernists reply by denying this. For though such things come within the category of phenomena, still in as far as they are *lived* by faith and in the way already described have been by faith *transfigured* and *disfigured*, they have been removed from the world of sense and translated to become material for the divine. Hence should it be further asked whether Christ has wrought real miracles, and made real prophecies, whether He rose truly from the dead and ascended into heaven, the answer of agnostic science will be in the negative and the answer of faith in the affirmative—yet there will not be, on that account, any conflict between them. For it will be denied by the philosopher as philosopher, speaking to philosophers and considering Christ only in His historical reality; and it will be affirmed by the believer, speaking to believers and considering the life of Christ as *lived* again by the faith and in the faith.

Faith Subject to Science.

Yet, it would be a great mistake to suppose that, given these theories, one is authorised to believe that faith and science are independent of one another. On the side of science the independence is indeed complete, but it is quite different with regard to faith, which is subject to science not on one but on three grounds. For in the first place it must be observed that in every religious fact, when you take away the *divine reality* and the *experience* of it which the believer possesses, everything else, and especially the *religious formulas* of it, belongs to the sphere of phenomena and therefore falls under the control of science. Let the believer leave the world if he will, but so long as he remains in it he must continue, whether he like it or not, to be subject to the laws, the observation, the judgments of science and of history. Further, when it is said that God is the object of faith alone, the statement refers only to the *divine reality* not to the *idea* of God. The latter also is subject to science which while it philosophises in what is called the logical order soars also to the absolute and the ideal. It is therefore the right of philosophy and of science to form conclusions concerning the idea of God, to direct it in its evolution and to purify it of any extraneous elements which may become confused with it. Finally, man does not suffer a dualism to exist in him, and the believer therefore feels within him an impelling need so to harmonise faith with science, that it may never oppose the general conception which science sets forth concerning the universe.

Thus it is evident that science is to be entirely independent of faith, while on the other hand, and notwithstanding that they are supposed to be strangers to each other, faith is made subject to science. All this, Venerable Brothers, is in formal opposition with the teachings of Our Predecessor, Pius IX., where he lays it down that: *In matters of religion it is the duty of philosophy not to command but to serve, not to prescribe what is to be believed but to embrace what is to be believed with reasonable obedience, not to scrutinise the depths of the mysteries of God but to venerate them devoutly and humbly.*[2]

The Modernists completely invert the parts, and to them may be applied the words of another Predecessor of Ours, Grgeory IX., addressed to some theologians of his time: *Some among you, inflated like bladders with the spirit of vanity strive by profane novelties to cross the boundaries fixed by the Fathers, twisting the sense of the heavenly pages*. . .*to the philo-*

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[2] Brev. ad Ep. Wratislaw. 15 Jun., 1857.

sophical teaching of the rationals, not for the profit of their hearers but to make a show of science. . .these, seduced by strange and eccentric doctrines, make the head of the tail and force the queen to serve the servant.[3]

THE METHODS OF MODERNISTS.

This becomes still clearer to anybody who studies the conduct of Modernists, which is in perfect harmony with their teachings. In their writings and addresses they seem not unfrequently to advocate now one doctrine now another so that one would be disposed to regard them as vague and doubtful. But there is a reason for this, and it is to be found in their ideas as to the mutual separation of science and faith. Hence in their books you find some things which might well be expressed by a Catholic, but in the next page you find other things which might have been dictated by a rationalist. When they write history they make no mention of the divinity of Christ, but when they are in the pulpit they profess it clearly; again, when they write history they pay no heed to the Fathers and the Councils. but when they catechise the people, they cite them respectfully. In the same way they draw their distinctions between theological and pastoral exegesis and scientific and historical exegesis. So, too, acting on the principle that science in no way depends upon faith, when they treat of philosophy, history, criticism, feeling no horror at treading in the footsteps of Luther,[4] they are wont to display a certain contempt for Catholic doctrines, for the Holy Fathers, for the Ecumenical Councils, for the ecclesiastical magisterium; and should they be rebuked for this, they complain that they are being deprived of their liberty. Lastly, guided by the theory that faith must be subject to science, they continuously and openly criticise the Church because of her sheer obstinacy in refusing to submit and accommodate her dogmas to the opinions of philosophy; while they, on their side, after having blotted out the old theology, endeavour to introduce a new theology which shall follow the vagaries of their philosophers.

THE MODERNIST AS THEOLOGIAN: HIS PRINCIPLES, IMMANENCE AND SYMBOLISM.

And thus, Venerable Brethren, the road is open for us to study the Modernists in the theological arena—a difficult task, yet one that may be disposed of briefly. The end to be attained is the conciliation of faith with science, always, however, saving the primacy of science over faith. In this branch the Modernist theologian avails himself of exactly the same principles which we have seen employed by the Modernist philosopher, and applies them to the believer: the principles of *immanence* and *symbolism.* The process is an extremely simple one. The philosopher has declared: *The principle of faith is immanent;* the believer has added: *This principle is God;* and the theologian draws the conclusion: *God is immanent in man.* Thus we have *theological immanence.* So too, the philosopher regards as certain that the *representations of the objec of faith are merely symbolical;* the believer has affirmed that *the object of faith is God in Himself;* and the theologian proceeds to affirm that: *The representations of the divine reality are symbolical.* And thus we have *theological symbolism.* Truly enormous errors both, the pernicious character of which will be seen clearly from an examination of their consequences. For, to begin with *symbolism,* since symbols are but *symbols* in regard to their objects and only instruments in regard to the believer, it is necessary first of all, according to the teachings of the Modernists, that the believer do not lay too much stress on the formula, but avail himself of it only with the scope of uniting himself to the absolute truth which the formula at once reveals and conceals, that is to say, endeavours to express but without succeeding in doing so. They would also have the believer avail himself of the formulas only in as far as they are useful to him, for they are given to be a help and not a hindrance; with proper regard, however, for the social respect due to formulas which the public magisterium has deemed suitable for expressing the common consciousness until such time as the same magisterium provide otherwise. Concerning *immanence* it is not easy to determine what Modernists mean by it, for their own opinions on the subject vary. Some understand it in the sense that God working in man is more intimately present in him than man is in even himself, and this conception, if properly understood, is free from reproach. Others hold that the divine action is one with the action of nature, as the action of the first cause is one with the action of the secondary cause, and this would destroy the supernatural order. Others, finally, explain it in a way which savours of pantheism and this, in truth, is the sense which tallies best with the rest of their doctrines.

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[3] Ep. ad Magistros theol. Paris. non. Jul. 1224.

[4] Prop. 29 damn. a Leone X. Bull. *Exsurge Domine* 16 maii 1520. *Via nobis facta est enervandi auctoritatem Conciliorum, et libere contradicendi eorum gestis, et iudicandi eorum decreta, et confidenter confitendi quidquid verum videtur, sive probatum fuerit, sive reprobatum a quocumque Concilio.*

With this principle of *immanence* is connected another which may be called the principle of *divine permanence.* It differs from the first in much the same way as the private *experience* differs from the *experience* transmitted by tradition. An example will illustrate what is meant, and this example is offered by the Church and the Sacraments. The Church and the Sacraments, they say, are not to be regarded as having been instituted by Christ Himself. This is forbidden by agnosticism, which sees in Christ nothing more than a man whose religious consciousness has been, like that of all men, formed by degrees; it is also forbidden by the law of immanence which rejects what they call external *application;* it is further forbidden by the law of evolution which requires for the development of the germs a certain time and a certain series of circumstances; it is, finally, forbidden by history, which shows that such in fact has been the course of things. Still it is to be held that both Church and Sacraments have been founded *mediately* by Christ. But how? In this way: All Christian consciences were, they affirm, in a manner virtually included in the conscience of Christ as the plant is included in the seed. But as the shoots live the life of the seed, so, too, all Christians are to be said to live the life of Christ. But the life of Christ is according to faith, and so, too, is the life of Christians. And since this life produced, in the course of ages, both the Church and the Sacraments, it is quite right to say that their origin is from Christ and is divine. In the same way they prove that the Scriptures and the dogmas are divine. And thus the Modernistic theology may be said to be complete. No great thing, in truth, but more than enough for the theologian who professes that the conclusions of science must always, and in all things, be respected. The application of these theories to the other points We shall proceed to expound, anybody may easily make for himself.

DOGMA AND THE SACRAMENTS.

Thus far We have spoken of the origin and nature of faith. But as faith has many shoots, and chief among them the Church, dogma, worship, the Books which we call "Sacred," of these also we must know what is taught by the Modernists. To begin with dogma, we have already indicated its origin and nature. Dogma is born of the species of impulse or necessity by virtue of which the believer is constrained to elaborate his religious thought so as to render it clearer for himself and others. This elaboration consists entirely in the process of penetrating and refining the primitive *formula*, not indeed in itself and according to logical development, but as required by circumstances, or *vitally*, as the Modernists more abstrusely put it. Hence it happens that around the *primitive* formula *secondary* formulas gradually continue to be formed, and these subsequently grouped into bodies of doctrine, or into doctrinal constructions as they prefer to call them, and further sanctioned by the public magisterium as responding to the common consciousness, are called dogma. Dogma is to be carefully distinguished from the speculation of theologians which, although not alive with the life of dogma, are not without their utility as serving to harmonise religion with science and remove opposition between the two, in such a way as to throw light from without on religion, and it may be even to prepare the matter for future dogma. Concerning worship there would not be much to be said, were it not that under this head are comprised the Sacraments, concerning which the Modernists fall into the gravest errors. For them the Sacraments are the resultant of a double need—for, as we have seen, everything in their system is explained by inner impulses or necessities. In the present case, the first need is that of giving some manifestation to religion; the second is that of propagating it, which could not be done without some sensible form and consecrating acts, and these are called sacraments. But for the Modernists the Sacraments are mere symbols or signs, though not devoid of a certain efficacy—an efficacy, they tell us, like that of certain phrases vulgarly described as having "caught on," inasmuch as they have become the vehicle for the diffusion of certain great ideas which strike the public mind. What the phrases are to the ideas, that the Sacraments are to the religious sentiment—that and nothing more. The Modernists would be speaking more clearly were they to affirm that the Sacraments are instituted solely to foster the faith—but this is condemned by the Council of Trent: *If anyone say that these sacraments are instituted solely to foster the faith, let him be anathema.*[5]

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

We have already touched upon the nature and origin of the Sacred Books. According to the principles of the Modernists they may be rightly described as a collection of *experiences*, not indeed of the kind that may come to anybody, but those extraordinary and striking ones which have happened in any religion. And this is precisely what they teach about our books of the Old and New Testament. But to suit their own theories they note with remarkable ingenuity that, although experience is something belonging to the present, still it may derive its material from the past and the future alike, inasmuch as the believer by memory *lives* the past over again after the manner of *the present,* and lives the future already by anticipation. This explains how it is that the historical and apocalyptical books are included among the Sacred Writings. God does indeed speak in these books—through the medium of the believer, but only, according to Modernistic theology, by vital *immanence* and *permanence.* Do we inquire concerning inspiration? Inspiration, they reply, is distinguished only by its vehemence from that impulse which stimulates the believer to reveal the faith that is in him by words or writing. It is something like what happens in poetical inspiration, of which it has been said: There is a God in us, and when he stirreth he sets us afire. And it is precisely in this sense that God is said to be the origin of the inspiration of the Sacred Books. The Modernists affirm, too, that there is nothing in these books which is not inspired. In this respect some might be disposed to consider them as more orthodox than certain other moderns who somewhat restrict inspiration, as, for instance, in what have been put forward as *tacit citations.* But it is all mere juggling of words. For if we take the Bible, according to the tenets of agnosticism, to be a human work, made by men for men, but allowing the theologian to proclaim that it is divine by immanence, what room is there left in it for inspiration? General inspiration in the Modernist sense it is easy to find, but of inspiration in the Catholic sense there is not a trace.

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[5] *Sess. VII. de Sacramentis in genere, can. 5.*

The Church.

A wider field for comment is opened when you come to treat of the vagaries devised by the Modernist school concerning the Church. You must start with the supposition that the Church has its birth in a double need, the need of the individual believer, especially if he has had some original and special experience, to communicate his faith to others, and the need of the mass, when the faith has become common to many, to form itself into a society and to guard, increase, and propagate the common good. What, then, is the Church? It is the product of the *collective conscience,* that is to say of the society of individual consciences which by virtue of the principle of *vital permanence,* all depend on one first believer, who for Catholics is Christ. Now every society *needs* a directing authority to guide its members towards the common end, to conserve prudently the elements of cohesion which in a religious society are doctrine and worship. Hence the triple authority in the Catholic Church, *disciplinary, dogmatic, liturgical.* The nature of this authority is to be gathered from its origin, and its rights and duties from its nature. In past times it was a common error that authority came to the Church from without, that is to say directly from God; and it was then rightly held to be *autocratic.* But this conception has now grown obsolete. For in the same way as the Church is a vital emanation of the collectivity of consciences, so too authority emanates vitally from the Church itself. Authority, therefore, like the Church, has its origin in the religious conscience, and, that being so, is subject to it. Should it disown this dependence it becomes a tyranny. For we are living in an age when the sense of liberty has reached its fullest development, and when the public conscience has in the civil order introduced popular government. Now there are not two consciences in man, any more than there are two lives. It is for the ecclesiastical authority, therefore, to shape itself to democratic forms, unless it wishes to provoke and foment an intestine conflict in the consciences of mankind. The penalty of refusal is disaster. For it is madness to think that the sentiment of liberty, as it is now spread abroad, can surrender. Were it forcibly confined and held in bonds, terrible would be its outburst, sweeping away at once both Church and religion. Such is the situation for the Modernists, and their one great anxiety is, in consequence, to find a way of conciliation between the authority of the Church and the liberty of believers.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

But it is not with its own members alone that the Church must come to an amicable arrangement—besides its relations with those within, it has others outside. The Church does not occupy the world all by itself; there are other societies in the world, with which it must necessarily have contact and relations. The rights and duties of the Church towards civil societies must, therefore, be determined, and determined, of course, by its own nature as it has been already described. The rules to be applied in this matter are those which have been laid down for science and faith, though in the latter case the question is one of *objects* while here we have one of *ends*. In the same way, then, as faith and science are strangers to each other by reason of the diversity of their objects, Church and State are strangers by reason of the diversity of their ends, that of the Church being spiritual while that of the State is temporal. Formerly it was possible to subordinate the temporal to the spiritual and to speak of some questions as *mixed*, allowing to the Church the position of queen and mistress in all such, because the Church was then regarded as having been instituted immediately by God as the author of the supernatural order. But this doctrine is to-day repudiated alike by philosophy and history. The State must, therefore, be separated from the Church, and the Catholic from the citizen. Every Catholic, from the fact that he is also a citizen, has the right and the duty to work for the common good in the way he thinks best, without troubling himself about the authority of the Church, without paying any heed to its wishes, its counsels, its orders—nay, even in spite of its reprimands. To trace out and prescribe for the citizen any line of conduct, on any pretext whatsoever, is to be guilty of an abuse of ecclesiastical authority, against which one is bound to act with all one's might. The principles from which these doctrines spring have been solemnly condemned by our predecessor Pius VI. in his Constitution *Auctorem fidei*.[6]

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[6] Prop. 2. *Própositio, quae statuit, potestatem a Deo datam Ecclesiae ut communicaretur Pastoribus, qui sunt eius ministri pro salute animarum; sic intellecta, ut a communitate fidelium in Pastores derivetur ecclesiastici ministerii ac regiminis potestas: haeretica.*—Prop. 3. *Insuper, quae statuit Romanum Pontificem esse caput ministeriale; sic explicata ut Romanus Pontifex non a Christo in persona beati Petri, sed ab Ecclesia potestatem ministerii accipiat, qua velut Petri successor, verus Christi vicarius ac totius Ecclesiae caput pollet in universa Ecclesia: haeretica.*

THE MAGISTERIUM OF THE CHURCH.

But it is not enough for the Modernist school that the State should be separated from the Church. For as faith is to be subordinated to science, as far as *phenomenal elements* are concerned, so too in temporal matters the Church must be subject to the State. They do not say this openly as yet—but they will say it when they wish to be logical on this head. For given the principle that in temporal matters the State possesses absolute mastery, it will follow that when the believer, not fully satisfied with his merely internal acts of religion, proceeds to external acts, such for instance as the administration or reception of the sacraments, these will fall under the control of the State. What will then become of ecclesiastical authority, which can only be exercised by external acts? Obviously it will be completely under the dominion of the State. It is this inevitable consequence which impels many among liberal Protestants to reject all external worship, nay, all external religious community, and makes them advocate what they call, *individual* religion. If the Modernists have not yet reached this point, they do ask the Church in the meanwhile to be good enough to follow spontaneously where they lead her and adapt herself to the civil forms in vogue. Such are their ideas about *discplinary* authority. But far more advanced and far more pernicious are their teachings on *doctrinal* and *dogmatic* authority. This is their conception of the magisterium of the Church: No religious society, they say, can be a real unit unless the religious conscience of its members be one, and one also the formula which they adopt. But this double unity requires a kind of common mind whose office is to find and determine the formula that corresponds best with the common conscience, and it must have moreover an authority sufficient to enable it to impose on the community the formula which has been decided upon. From the combination and, as it were, fusion of these two elements, the common mind which draws up the formula and the authority which imposes it, arises, according to the Modernists, the notion of the ecclesiastical magisterium. And as this magisterium springs, in its last analysis, from the individual consciences and possesses its mandate of public utility for their benfit, it follows that the ecclesiastical magisterium must be subordinate to them, and should therefore take democratic forms. To prevent individual consciences from revealing freely and openly the impulses they feel, to hinder criticism from impelling dogmas towards their necessary evolutions—this is not a legitimate use but an abuse of a power given for the public utility. So too a due method and measure must be observed in the exercise of authority. To condemn and prescribe a work without the knowledge of the author, without hearing his explanations, without discussion, assuredly savours of tyranny. And thus, here again a way must be found to save the full rights of authority on the one hand and of liberty on the other. In the meanwhile the proper course for the Catholic will be to proclaim publicly his profound respect for authority—and continue to follow his own bent. Their general directions for the Church may be put in this way: Since the end of the Church is entirely spiritual, the religious authority should strip itself of all that external pomp which adorns it in the eyes of the public. And here they forget that while religion is essentially for the soul, it is not exclusively for the soul, and that the honour paid to authority is reflected back on Jesus Christ who instituted it.

The Evolution of Doctrine.

To finish with this whole question of faith and its shoots, it remains to be seen, Venerable Brethren, what the Modernists have to say about their development. First of all they lay down the general principle that in a living religion everything is subject to change, and must in fact change, and in this way they pass to what may be said to be, among the chief of their doctrines, that of *Evolution*. To the laws of evolution everything is subject—dogma, Church, worship, the Books we revere as sacred, even faith itself, and the penalty of disobedience is death. The enunciation of this principle will not astonish anybody who bears in mind what the Modernists have had to say about each of these subjects. Having laid down this law of evolution, the Modernists themselves teach us how it works out. And first with regard to faith. The primitive form of faith, they tell us, was rudimentary and common to all men alike, for it had its origin in human nature and human life. Vital evolution brought with it progress, not by the accretion of new and purely adventitious forms from without, but by an increasing penetration of the religious sentiment in the conscience. This progress was of two kinds: *negative*, by the elimination of all foreign elements, such, for example, as the sentiment of family or nationality; and *positive* by that intellectual and moral refining of man, by means of which the idea was enlarged and enlightened while the religious sentiment became more elevated and more intense. For the progress of faith no other causes are to be assigned than those which are adduced to explain its origin. But to them must be added those religious geniuses whom we call prophets, and of whom Christ was the greatest; both because in their lives and their words there was something mysterious which faith attributed to the divinity, and because it fell to their lot to have new and original experiences fully in harmony with the needs of their time. The progress of dogma is due chiefly to the obstacles which faith has to surmount, to the enemies it has to vanquish, to the contradictions it has to repel. Add to this a perpetual striving to penetrate ever more profoundly its own mysteries. Thus, to omit other examples, has it happened in the case of Christ: in Him that divine something which faith admitted in Him expanded in such a way that He was at last held to be God. The chief stimulus of evolution in the domain of worship consists in the need of adapting itself to the uses and customs of peoples, as well as the need of availing itself of the value which certain acts have acquired by long usage. Finally, evolution in the Church itself is fed by the need of accommodating itself to historical conditions and of harmonising itself with existing forms of society. Such is religious evolution in detail. And here, before proceeding further, we would have you note well this whole theory of *necessities and needs*, for it is at the root of the entire system of the Modernists, and it is upon it that they will erect that famous method of theirs called the historical.

Still continuing the consideration of the evolution of doctrine, it is to be noted that Evolution is due no doubt to those stimulants styled needs, but, if left to their action alone, it would run a great risk of bursting the bounds of tradition, and thus, turned aside from its primitive vital principle, would lead to ruin instead of progress. Hence, studying more closely the ideas of the Modernists, evolution is described as resulting from the conflict of two forces, one of them tending towards progress, the other towards conservation. The conserving force in the Church is tradition, and tradition is represented by religious authority, and this both by right and in fact; for by right it is in the very nature of authority to protect tradition, and, in fact, for authority, raised as it is above the contingencies of life, feels hardly, or not at all, the spurs of progress. The progressive force, on the contrary, which responds to the inner needs lies in the individual consciences and ferments there—especially in such of them as are in most intimate contact with life. Note here, Venerable Brethren, the appearance already of that most pernicious doctrine which would make of the laity a factor of progress in the Church. Now it is by a species of compromise between the forces of conservation and of progress, that is to say between authority and individual consciences, that changes and advances take place. The individual consciences of some of them act on the collective conscience, which brings pressure to bear on the depositaries of authority, until the latter consent to a compromise, and, the pact being made, authority sees to its maintenance.

With all this in mind, one understands how it is that the Modernists express astonishment when they are reprimanded or punished. What is imputed to them as a fault they regard as a sacred duty. Being in intimate contact with consciences they know better than anybody else, and certainly better than the ecclesiastical authority, what needs exist—nay, they embody them, so to speak, in themselves. Having a voice and a pen they use both publicly, for this is their duty. Let authority rebuke them as much as it pleases—they have their own conscience on their side and an intimate experience which tells them with certainty that what they deserve is not blame but praise. Then they reflect that, after all there is no progress without a battle and no battle without its victim, and victims they are willing to be like the prophets and Christ Himself. They have no bitterness in their hearts against the authority which uses them roughly, for after all it is only doing its duty as authority. Their sole grief is that it remains deaf to their warnings, because delay multiplies the obstacles which impede the progress of souls, but the hour will most surely come when there will be no further chance for tergiversation, for if the laws of evolution may be checked for a while they cannot be ultimately destroyed. And so they go their way, reprimands and condemnations notwithstanding, masking an incredible audacity under a mock semblance of humility. While they make a show of bowing their heads, their hands and minds are more intent than ever on carrying out their purposes. And this policy they follow willingly and wittingly, both because it is part of their system that authority is to be stimulated but not dethroned, and because it is necessary for them to remain within the ranks of the Church in order that they may gradually transform the collective conscience—thus unconsciously avowing that the common conscience is not with them, and that they have no right to claim to be its interpreters.

Thus then, Venerable Brethren, for the Modernists, both as authors and propagandists, there is to be nothing stable, nothing immutable in the Church. Nor indeed are they without precursors in their doctrines, for it was of these that Our Predecessor Pius IX. wrote: *These enemies of divine revelation extol human progress to the skies, and with rash and sacrilegious daring would have it introduced into the Catholic religion as if this religion were not the work of God but of man, or some kind of philo-*

sophical discovery susceptible of perfection by human efforts.[7] On the subject of revelation and dogma in particular, the doctrine of the Modernists offers nothing new—we find it condemned in the Sylllabus of Pius IX., where it is enunciated in these terms: *Divine revelation is imperfect, and therefore subject to continual and indefinite progress, corresponding with the progress of human reason;*[8] and condemned still more solemnly in the Vatican Council: *The doctrine of the faith which God has revealed has not been proposed to human intelligences to be perfected by them as if it were a philosophical system, but as a divine deposit entrusted to the Spouse of Christ to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted. Hence the sense, too, of the sacred dogmas is that which our Holy Mother the Church has once declared, nor is this sense ever to be abandoned on plea or pretext of a more profound comprehension of the truth.*[9] Nor is the development of our knowledge, even concerning the faith, impeded by this pronouncement—on the contrary it is aided and promoted. For the same Council continues: *Let intelligence and science and wisdom, therefore, increase and progress abundantly and vigorously in individuals and in the mass, in the believer and in the whole Church, throughout the ages and the centuries—but only in its own kind, that is, according to the same dogma, the same sense, the same acceptation.*[10]

THE MODERNIST AS HISTORIAN AND CRITIC.

After having studied the Modernist as philosopher, believer, and theologian, it now remains for us to consider him as historian, critic, apologist, reformer.

Some Modernists, devoted to historical studies, seem to be greatly afraid of being taken for philosophers. About philosophy, they tell you, they know nothing whatever—and in this they display remarkable astuteness, for they are particularly anxious not to be suspected of being prejudiced in favour of philosophical theories which would lay them open to the charge of not being *objective*, to use the word in vogue. And yet the truth is that their history and their criticism are saturated with their philosophy, and that their historico-critical conclusions are the natural fruit of their philosophical principles. This will be patent to anybody who reflects. Their three first laws are contained in those three principles of their philosophy already dealt with: the principle of *agnosticism*, the principle of the *transfiguration* of things by faith, and the principle which We have called of *disfiguration*. Let us see what consequences flow from each of them. *Agnosticism* tells us that history, like every other science, deals entirely with phenomena, and the consequence is that God, and every intervention of God in human affairs, is to be relegated to the domain of faith as belonging to it alone. In things where a double element, the divine and the human, mingles, in Christ, for example, or the Church, or the sacraments, or the many other objects of the same kind, a division must be made and the human element assigned to history while the divine will go to faith. Hence we have that distinction, so current among the Modernists, between the Christ of history and the Christ of faith, between the Church of history and the Church of faith, between the sacraments of history and the sacraments of faith, and so on. Next we find that the human element itself, which the historian has to work on, as it appears in the documents, has been by faith transfigured, that is to say raised above its historical conditions. It becomes necessary, therefore, to eliminate also the accretions which faith has added, to assign them to faith itself and to the history of faith: thus, when treating of Christ, the historian must set aside all that surpasses man in his natural condition, either according to the psychological conception of him, or according to the place and period of his existence. Finally, by virtue of the third principle, even those things which are not outside the sphere of history they pass through the crucible, excluding from history and relegating to faith everything which, in their judgment, is not in harmony with what they call the *logic* of facts and in character with the persons of whom they are predicated. Thus, they will not allow that Christ ever uttered those things which do not seem to be within the capacity of the multitudes that listened to Him. Hence they delete from His *real* history and transfer to faith all the allegories found in His discourses. Do you inquire as to the criterion they adopt to enable them to make these divisions? The reply is that they argue from the character of the man, from his condition of life, from his education, from the circumstances under which the facts took place—in short, from criteria which, when one considers them well, are purely *subjective*. Their method is to put themselves into the position and person of Christ, and then to attribute to Him what they would have done under like circumstances. In this way, absolutely *a priori* and acting on philosophical principles which they admit they hold but which they affect to ignore, they proclaim that Christ, according to what they call His *real* history, was not God and never did anything divine, and that as man He did and said only what they, judging from the time in which he lived, can admit Him to have said or done.

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[7] Encycl. *Qui pluri*, 9 Nov. 1846.

[8] Syll. Prop. 5.

[9] Const. *Dei Filius* cap. iv.

[10] Loc. cit.

CRITICISM AND ITS PRINCIPLES.

And as history receives its conclusions, ready-made, from philosophy, so too criticism takes its own from history. The critic, on the data furnished him by the historian, makes two parts of all his documents. Those that remain after the triple elimination above described go to form the *real* history; the rest is attributed to the history of the faith or, as it is styled, to *internal* history. For the Modernists distinguish very carefully between these two kinds of history, and it is to be noted that they oppose the history of the faith to real history precisely as real. Thus we have a double Christ: a real Christ, and a Christ, the one of faith, who never really existed; a Christ who has lived at a given time and in a given place, and a Christ who has never lived outside the pious meditations of the believer—the Christ, for instance, whom we find in the Gospel of St. John, which is pure contemplation from beginning to end.

But the dominion of philosophy over history does not end here. Given that division, of which We have spoken, of the documents into two parts, the philosopher steps in again with his principle of *vital immanence*, and shows how everything in the history of the Church is to be explained by *vital emanation.* And since the cause or condition of every vital emanation whatsoever is to be found in some need, it follows that no fact can ante-date the need which produced it—historically the fact must be posterior to the need. See how the historian works on this principle. He goes over his documents again, whether they be found in the Sacred Books or elsewhere, draws up from them his list of the successive needs of the Church, whether relating to dogma or liturgy or other matters, and then he hands his list over to the critic. The critic takes in hand the documents dealing with the history of faith and distributes them, period by period, so that they correspond exactly with the lists of needs, always guided by the principle that the narration must follow the facts, as the facts follow the needs. It may at times happen that some parts of the Sacred Scriptures, such as the Epistles, themselves constitute the fact created by the need. Even so, the rule holds that the age of any document can only be determined by the age in which each need has manifested itself in the Church. Further, a distinction must be made between the beginning of a fact and its development, for what is born one day requires time for growth. Hence the critic must once more go over his documents, ranged as they are through the different ages, and divide them again into two parts, and divide them into two lots, separating those that regard the first stage of the facts from those that deal with their development, and these he must again arrange according to their periods.

Then the philosopher must come in again to impose on the historian the obligation of following in all his studies the precepts and laws of evolution. It is next for the historian to scrutinise his documents once more, to examine carefully the circumstances and conditions affecting the Church during the different periods, the conserving force she has put forth, the needs both internal and external that have stimulated her to progress, the obstacles she has had to encounter, in a word everything that helps to determine the manner in which the laws of evolution have been fulfilled in her. This done, he finishes his work by drawing up in its broad lines a history of the development of the facts. The critic follows and fits in the rest of the documents with this sketch; he takes up his pen, and soon the history is made complete. Now we ask here: Who is the author of this history? The historian? The critic? Assuredly, neither of these but the philosopher. From beginning to end everything in it is *a priori*, and *a priori* in a way that reeks of heresy. These men are certainly to be pitied, and of them the Apostle might well say: *They became vain in their thoughts...professing themselves to be wise they became fools* (Rom. i. 21, 22); but, at the same time, they excite just indignation when they accuse the Church of torturing the texts, arranging and confusing them after its own fashion, and for the needs of its cause. In this they are accusing the Church of something for which their own conscience plainly reproaches them.

How the Bible is Dealt With.

The result of this dismembering of the Sacred Books and this partition of them throughout the centuries is naturally that the Scriptures can no longer be attributed to the authors whose names they bear. The Modernists have no hesitation in affirming commonly that these books, and especially the Pentateuch and the first three Gospels, have been gradually formed by additions to a primitive brief narration—by interpolations of theological or allegorical interpretation, by transitions, by joining different passages together. This means, briefly, that in the Sacred Books we must admit a *vital evolution*, springing from and corresponding with the evolution of faith. The traces of this evolution, they tell us, are so visible in the books that one might almost write a history of them. Indeed this history they do actually write, and with such an easy security that one might believe them to have with their own eyes seen the writers at work through the ages amplifying the Sacred Books. To aid them in this they call to their assistance that branch of criticism which they call *textual*, and labour to show that such a fact or such a phrase is not in its right place, and adducing other arguments of the same kind. They seem, in fact, to have constructed for themselves certain types of narration and discourses, upon which they base their decision as to whether a thing is out of place or not. Judge if you can how men with such a system are fitted for practising this kind of criticism. To hear them talk about their works on the Sacred Books, in which they have been able to discover so much that is defective, one would imagine that before them nobody ever even glanced through the pages of Scripture, whereas the truth is that a whole multitude of Doctors, infinitely superior to them in genius, in erudition, in sanctity, have sifted the Sacred Books in every way, and so far from finding imperfections in them, have thanked God more and more the deeper they have gone into them, for His divine bounty in having vouchsafed to speak thus to men. Unfortunately, these great Doctors did not enjoy the same aids to study that are possessed by the Modernists for their guide and rule,—a philosophy borrowed from the negation of God, and a criterion which consists of themselves.

We believe, then, that We have set forth with sufficient clearness the historical method of the Modernists. The philosopher leads the way, the historian follows, and then in due order come internal and textual criticism. And since it is characteristic of the first cause to communicate its virtue to secondary causes, it is quite clear that the criticism We are concerned with is an *agnostic, immanentist, and evolutionist* criticism. Hence anybody who embraces it and employs it, makes profession thereby of the errors contained in it, and places himself in opposition to Catholic faith. This being so, one cannot but be greatly surprised by the consideration which is attached to it by certain Catholics. Two causes may be assigned for this: first, the close alliance, independent of all differences of nationality or religion, which the historians and critics of this school have formed among themselves; second, the boundless effrontery of these men. Let one of them but open his mouth and the others applaud him in chorus, proclaiming that science has made another step forward; let an outsider but hint at a desire to inspect the new discovery with his own eyes, and they are on him in a body; deny it—and you are an ignoramus; embrace it and defend it—and there is no praise too warm for you. In this way they win over many who, did they but realise what they are doing, would shrink back with horror. The impudence and the domineering of some, and the thoughtlessness and imprudence of others, have combined to generate a pestilence in the air which penetrates everywhere and spreads the contagion. But let us pass to the apologist.

THE MODERNIST AS APOLOGIST.

The Modernist apologist depends in two ways on the philosopher. First, *indirectly*, inasmuch as his theme is history—history dictated, as we have seen, by the philosopher; and, secondly, *directly*, inasmuch as he takes both his laws and his principles from the philosopher. Hence that common precept of the Modernist school that the new apologetics must be fed from psychological and historical sources. The Modernist apologists, then, enter the arena by proclaiming to the rationalists that though they are defending religion, they have no intention of employing the data of the sacred books or the histories in current use in the Church, and composed according to old methods, but *real* history written on modern principles and according to rigorously modern methods. In all this they are not using an *argumentum ad hominem*, but are stating the simple fact that they hold, that the truth is to be found only in this kind of history. They feel that it is not necessary for them to dwell on their own sincerity in their writings—they are already known to and praised by the rationalists as fighting under the same banner, and they not only plume themselves on these encomiums, which are a kind of salary to them but would provoke nausea in a real Catholic, but use them as an offset to the reprimands of the Church.

But let us see how the Modernist conducts his apologetics. The aim he sets before himself is to make the non-believer attain that *experience* of the Catholic religion which, according to the system, is the basis of faith. There are two ways open to him, the *objective* and the *subjective*. The first of them proceeds from agnosticism. It tends to show that religion, and especially the Catholic religion, is endowed with such vitality as to compel every psychologist and historian of good faith to recognise that its history hides some unknown element. To this end it is necessary to prove that this religion, as it exists to-day, is that which was founded by Jesus Christ; that is to say, that it is the product of the progressive development of the germ which He brought into the world. Hence it is imperative first of all to establish what this germ was, and this the Modernist claims to be able to do by the following formula: Christ announced the coming of the kingdom of God, which was to be realised within a brief lapse of time and of which He was to become the Messiah, the divinely-given agent and ordainer. Then it must be shown how this germ, always *immanent* and *permanent* in the bosom of the Church, has gone on slowly developing in the course of history, adapting itself successively to the different mediums through which it has passed, borrowing from them by *vital* assimilation all the dogmatic, cultual, ecclesiastical forms that served its purpose; whilst, on the other hand, it surmounted all obstacles, vanquished all enemies, and survived all assaults and all combats. Anybody who well and duly considers this mass of obstacles, adversaries, attacks, combats, and the vitality and fecundity which the Church has shown throughout them all, must admit that if the laws of evolution are visible in her life they fail to explain the whole of her history—the *unknown* rises forth from it and presents itself before us. Thus do they argue, never suspecting that their determination of the primitive germ is an *a priori* of agnostic and evolutionist philosophy, and that the formula of it has been gratuitously invented for the sake of buttressing their position.

But while they endeavour by this line of reasoning to secure access for the Catholic religion into souls, these new apologists are quite ready to admit that there are many distasteful things in it. Nay, they admit openly, and with ill-concealed satisfaction, that they have found that even its dogma is not exempt from errors and contradictions. They add also that this is not only excusable but—curiously enough—even right and proper. In the Sacred Books there are many passages referring to science or history where manifest errors are to be found. But the subject of these books is not science or history but religion and morals. In them history and science serve only as a species of covering to enable the religious and moral experiences wrapped up in them to penetrate more readily among the masses. The masses understood science and history as they are expressed in these books, and it is clear that had science and history been expressed in a more perfect form this would have proved rather a hindrance than a help. Then, again, the Sacred Books being essentially religious, are consequently necessarily living. Now life has its own truth and its own logic—quite different from rational truth and rational logic, belonging as they do to a different order, viz., truth of adaptation and of proportion both with the medium in which it exists and with the end towards which it tends. Finally the Modernists, losing all sense of control, go so far as to proclaim as true and legitimate everything that is explained by life.

We, Venerable Brethren, for whom there is but one and only truth, and who hold that the Sacred Books, *written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, have God for their author* (Conc. Vat., *De Revel.*, c. 2) declare that this is equivalent to attributing to God Himself the lie of utility or officious lie, and We say with St. Augustine: *In an authority so high, admit but one officious lie, and there will not remain a single passage of those apparently difficult to practise or to believe, which on the same most pernicious rule may not be explained as a lie uttered by the author wilfully and to serve a purpose.* (Epist. 28). And thus it will come about, the holy Doctor continues, that *everybody will believe and refuse to believe what he likes or dislikes.* But the Modernists pursue their way gaily. They grant also that certain arguments adduced in the Sacred Books, like those, for example, which are based on the prophecies, have no rational foundation to rest on. But they will defend even these as artifices of preaching, which are justified by life. Do they stop here? No, indeed, for they are ready to admit, nay, to proclaim that Christ Himself manifestly erred in determining the time when the coming of the Kingdom of God was to take place, and they tell us that we must not be surprised at this since even Christ was subject to the laws of life! After this what is to become of the dogmas of the Church? The dogmas brim over with flagrant contradictions, but what matters that since, apart from the fact that vital logic accepts them, they are not repugnant to symbolical truth. Are we not dealing with the infinite, and has not the infinite an infinite variety of aspects? In short, to maintain and defend these theories they do not hesitate to declare that the noblest homage that can be paid to the Infinite is to make it the object of contradictory propositions! But when they justify even contradictions, what is it that they will refuse to justify?

SUBJECTIVE ARGUMENTS.

But it is not solely by *objective* arguments that the non-believer may be disposed to faith. There are also *subjective* ones at the disposal of the Modernists, and for those they return to their doctrine of *immanence.* They endeavour, in fact, to persuade their non-believer that down in the very deeps of his nature and his life lie the need and the desire for religion, and this not a religion of any kind, but the specific religion known as Catholicism, which, they say, is absolutely *postulated* by the perfect development of life. And here We cannot but deplore once more, and grievously, that there are Catholics who, while rejecting *immanence* as a doctrine, employ it as a method of apologetics, and who do this so imprudently that they seem to admit that there is in human nature a true and rigorous necessity with regard to the supernatural order—and not merely a capacity and a suitability for the supernatural, such as has at all times been emphasised by Catholic apologists. Truth to tell it is only the moderate Modernists who make this appeal to an exigency for the Catholic religion. As for the others, who might be called *integralists,* they would show to the non-believer, hidden away in the very depths of his being, the very germ which Christ Himself bore in His conscience, and which he bequeathed to the world. Such, Venerable Brehtren, is a summary description of the apologetic method of the Modernists, in perfect harmony, as you may see, with their doctrines—methods and doctrines brimming over with errors, made not for edification but for destruction, not for the formation of Catholics but for the plunging of Catholics into heresy; methods and doctrines that would be fatal to any religion.

The Modernist as Reformer.

It remains for Us now to say a few words about the Modernist as reformer. From all that has preceded, some idea may be gained of the reforming mania which possesses them: in all Catholicism there is absolutely nothing on which it does not fasten. Reform of philosophy, especially in the seminaries: the scholastic philosophy is to be relegated to the history of philosophy among obsolete systems, and the young men are to be taught modern philosophy which alone is true and suited to the times in which we live. Reform of theology: rational theology is to have modern philosophy for its foundation, and positive theology is to be founded on the history of dogma. As for history, it must be for the future written and taught only according to their modern methods and principles. Dogmas and their evolution are to be harmonised with science and history. In the Catechism no dogmas are to be inserted except those that have been duly reformed and are within the capacity of the people. Regarding worship, the number of external devotions is to be reduced, or at least steps must be taken to prevent their further increase, though, indeed, some of the admirers of symbolism are disposed to be more indulgent on this head. Ecclesiastical government requires to be reformed in all its branches, but especially in its disciplinary and dogmatic parts. Its spirit and its external manifestations must be put in harmony with the public conscience, which is now wholly for democracy; a share in ecclesiastical government should therefore be given to the lower ranks of the clergy, and even to the laity, and authority should be decentralised. The Roman Congregations, and especially the Index and the Holy Office, are to be reformed. The ecclesiastical authority must change its line of conduct in the social and political world; while keeping outside political and social organisation, it must adapt itself to those which exist in order to penetrate them with its spirit. With regard to morals, they adopt the principle of the Americanists, that the active virtues are more important than the passive, both in the estimation in which they must be held and in the exercise of them. The clergy are asked to return to their ancient lowliness and poverty, and in their ideas and action to be guided by the principles of Modernism; and there are some who, echoing the teaching of their Protestant masters, would like the suppression of ecclesiastical celibacy. What is there left in the Church which is not to be reformed according to their principles?

Modernism and all the Heresies.

It may be, Venerable Brethren, that some may think We have dwelt too long on this exposition of the doctrines of the Modernists. But it was necessary, both in order to refute their customary charge that We do not understand their ideas, and to show that their system does not consist in scattered and unconnected theories but in a perfectly organised body, all the parts of which are solidly joined so that it is not possible to admit one without admitting all. For this reason, too, We have had to give this exposition a somewhat didactic form and not to shrink from employing certain uncouth terms in use among the Modernists. And now, can anybody who takes a survey of the whole system be surprised that We should define it as the synthesis of all heresies? Were one to attempt the task of collecting together all the errors that have been broached against the faith and to concentrate the sap and substance of them all into one, he could not better succeed than the Modernists have done. Nay, they have done more than this, for, as We have already intimated, their system means the destruction not of the Catholic religion alone but of all religion. With good reason do the rationalists applaud them, for the most sincere and the frankest among the rationalists warmly welcome the Modernists as their most valuable allies.

For let us return for a moment, Venerable Brethren, to that most disastrous doctrine of *agnosticism*. By it every avenue that leads the intellect to God is barred, but the Modernists would seek to open others available for sentiment and action. Vain efforts! For after all, what is sentiment but the reaction of the soul on the action of the intelligence or the senses. Take away the intelligence, and man, already inclined to follow the senses, becomes their slave. Vain, too, from another point of view, for all these fantasies on the religious sentiment will never be able to destroy common sense, and common sense tells us that emotion and everything that leads the heart captive proves a hindrance instead of a help to the discovery of truth. We speak, of course, of truth in itself—as for that other purely *subjective* truth, the fruit of sentiment and action, if it serves its purpose for the jugglery of words, it is of no use to the man who wants to know above all things whether outside himself there is a God into whose hands he is one day to fall. True, the Modernists do call in *experience* to eke out their system, but what does this *experience* add to sentiment? Absolutely nothing beyond a certain intensity and a proportionate deepening of the conviction of the reality of the object. But these two will never make sentiment into anything but sentiment, nor deprive it of its characteristic which is to cause deception when the intelligence is not there to guide it; on the contrary, they but confirm and aggravate this characteristic, for the more intense sentiment is the more it is sentimental. In matters of religious sentiment and religious experience, you know, Venerable Brethren, how necessary is prudence, and how necessary, too, the science which directs prudence. You know it from your own dealings with souls, and especially with souls in whom sentiment predominates; you know it also from your reading of ascetical books—books for wihch the Modernists have but little esteem, but which testify to a science and a solidity very different from theirs, and to a refinement and subtlety of observation of which the Modernists give no evidence. Is it not really folly, or at least sovereign imprudence, to trust oneself without control to Modernist experiences? Let us for a moment put the question: If experiences have so much value in their eyes, why do they not attach equal weight to the experience that thousands upon thousands of Catholics have that the Modernists are on the wrong road? Is it, perchance, that all experiences except those felt by the Modernists are false and deceptive? The vast majority of mankind holds and will always will hold firmly that sentiment and experience alone, when not enlightened and guided by reason, do not lead to the knowledge of God. What remains, then, but the annihilation of all religion,—atheism? Certainly it is not the doctrine of *symbolism*—will save us from this. For if all the intellectual elements, as they call them, of religion are pure symbols, will not the very name of God or of divine personality be also a symbol, and if this be admitted will not the personality of God become a matter of doubt and the way opened to Pantheism? And to Pantheism that other doctrine of the *divine immanence* leads directly. For does it, We ask, leave God distinct from man or not? If yes, in what does it differ from Catholic doctrine, and why reject external revelation? If no, we are at once in Pantheism. Now the doctrine of immanence in the Modernist acceptation holds and professes that every phenomenon of conscience proceeds from man as man. The rigorous conclusion from this is the identity of man with God, which means Pantheism. The same conclusion follows from the distinction Modernists make between science and faith. The object of science they say is the reality of the knowable; the object of faith, on the contrary, is the reality of the unknowable. Now what makes the unknowable unknowable is its disproportion with the intelligible—a disproportion which nothing whatever, even in the doctrine of the Modernist, can suppress. Hence the unknowable remains and will eternally remain unknowable to the believer as well as to the man of science. Therefore if any religion at all is possible it can only be the religion of an unknowable reality. And why this religion might not be that universal soul of the universe, of which a rationalist speaks, is something We do not see. Certainly this suffices to show superabundantly by how many roads Modernism leads to the annihilation of all religion. The first step in this direction was taken by Protestantism; the second is made by Modernism; the next will plunge headlong into atheism.

PART II: THE CAUSE OF MODERNISM.

To penetrate still deeper into Modernism and to find a suitable remedy for such a deep sore, it behoves Us, Venerable Brethren, to investigate the causes which have engendered it and which foster its growth. That the proximate and immediate cause consists in a perversion of the mind cannot be open to doubt. The remote causes seem to Us to be reduced to two: curiosity and pride. Curiosity by itself, if not prudently regulated, suffices to explain all errors. Such is the opinion of Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI., who wrote: *A lamentable spectacle is that presented by the aberrations of human reason when it yields to the spirit of novelty, when against the warning of the Apostle it seeks to know beyond what it is meant to know, and when relying too much on itself it thinks it can find the truth outside the Church wherein truth is found without the slightest shadow of error* (Ep. Encycl. *Singulari nos*, 7 Kal. Jul. 1834).

But it is pride which exercises an incomparably greater sway over the soul to blind it and plunge into error, and pride sits in Modernism as in its own house, finding sustenance everywhere in its doctrines and an occasion to flaunt itself in all its aspects. It is pride which fills Modernists with that confidence in themselves and leads them to hold themselves up as the rule for all, pride which puffs them up with that vainglory which allows them to regard themselves as the sole possessors of knowledge, and makes them say, inflated with presumption, *We are not as the rest of men*, and which, to make them really not as other men, leads them to embrace all kinds of the most absurd novelties; it is pride which rouses in them the spirit of disobedience and causes them to demand a compromise between authority and liberty; it is pride that makes of them the reformers of others, while they forget to reform themselves, and which begets their absolute want of respect for authority not excepting the supreme authority. No, truly, there is no road which leads so directly to Modernism as pride. When a Catholic laymen or a priest forgets that precept of the Christian life which obliges us to renounce ourselves if we would follow Jesus Christ and neglects to tear pride from his heart. ah! but he is a fully ripe subject for the errors of Modernism. Hence, Venerable Brethren, it will be your first duty to thwart such proud men, to employ them only in the lowest and obscurest offices; the higher they try to rise, the lower let them be placed, so that their lowly position may deprive them of the power of causing damage. Sound your young clerics, too, most carefully, by yourselves and by the directors of your seminaries, and when you find the spirit of pride among any of them reject them without compunction from the priesthood. Would to God that this had always been done with the proper vigilance and constancy.

If we pass from the moral to the intellectual causes of Modernism, the first which presents itself, and the chief one, is ignorance. Yes, these very Modernists who pose as Doctors of the Church, who puff out their cheeks when they speak of modern philosophy, and show such contempt for scholasticism, have embraced the one with all its false glamour because their ignorance of the other has left them without the means of being able to recognise confusion of thought, and to refute sophistry. Their whole system, with all its errors, has been born of the alliance between faith and false philosophy.

METHODS OF PROPAGANDISM.

If only they had displayed less zeal and energy in propagating it! But such is their activity and such their unwearying capacity for work on behalf of their cause, that one cannot but be pained to see them waste such labour in endeavouring to ruin the Church when they might have been of such service to her had their efforts been better employed. Their artifices to delude men's minds are of two kinds, the first to remove obstacles from their path, the second to devise and apply actively and patiently every instrument that can serve their purpose. They recognise that the three chief difficulties for them are scholastic philosophy, the authority of the Fathers and tradition, and the magisterium of the Church, and on these they wage unrelenting war. For scholastic philosophy and theology they have only ridicule and contempt. Whether it is ignorance or fear, or both, that inspires this conduct in them, certain it is that the passion for novelty is always united in them with hatred of scholasticism, and there is no surer sign that a man is on the way to Modernism than when he begins to show his dislike for this system. Modernists and their admirers should remember the proposition condemned by Pius IX: *The method and principles which have served the doctors of scholasticism when treating of theology no longer correspond with the exigencies of our time or the progress of science* (Syll. Prop. 13). They exercise all their ingenuity in diminishing the force and falsifying the character of tradition, so as to rob it of all its weight. But for Catholics the second Council of Nicea will always have the force of law, where it condemns those *who dare, after the impious fashion of heretics, to deride the ecclesiastical traditions, to invent novelties of some kind... or endeavour by malice or craft to overthrow anyone of the legitimate traditions of the Catholic Church;* and Catholics will hold for law, also, the profession of the fourth Council of Constantinople: *We therefore profess to conserve and guard the rules bequeathed to the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church by the Holy and most illustrious Apostles, by the orthodox Councils, both general and local, and by every one of those divine interpreters the Fathers and Doctors of the Church.* Wherefore the Roman Pontiffs, Pius IV. and Pius IX., ordered the insertion in the profession of faith of the following declaration: *I most firmly admit and embrace the apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions and other observances and constitutions of the Church.* The Modernists pass the same judgment on the most holy Fathers of the Church as they pass on tradition, decreeing, with amazing effrontery that, while personally most worthy of all veneration, they were entirely ignorant of history and criticism, for which they are only excusable on account of the time in which they lived. Finally, the Modernists try in every way to diminish and weaken the authority of the ecclesiastical magisterium itself by sacrilegiously falsifying its origin, character, and rights, and by freely repeating the calumnies of its adversaries. To all the band of Modernists may be applied those words which Our Predecessor wrote with such pain: *To bring contempt and odium on the mystic Spouse of Christ, who is the true light, the children of darkness have been wont to cast in her face before the world a stupid calumny, and perverting the meaning and force of things and words, to depict her as the friend of darkness and ignorance, and the enemy of light, science, and progress* (Motu proprio, *Ut mysticum*, 14 March, 1891). This being so, Venerable Brethren, no wonder the Modernists vent all their gall and hatred on Catholics who sturdily fight the battles of the Church. But of all the insults they heap on them those of ignorance and obstinacy are the favourites. When an adversary rises up against them with an erudition and force that render him redoubtable, they try to make a conspiracy of silence around him to nullify the effects of his attack, while in flagrant contrast with this policy towards Catholics, they load with constant praise the writers who range themselves on their side, hailing their works, exuding novelty in every page, with choruses of applause; for them the scholarship of a writer is in direct proportion to the recklessness of his attacks on antiquity, and of his efforts to undermine tradition and the ecclesiastical magisterium; when one of their number falls under the condemnations of the Church the rest of them, to the horror of good Catholics, gather round him, heap public praise upon him, venerate him almost as a martyr to truth. The young, excited and confused by all this clamour of praise and abuse, some of them afraid of being branded as ignorant, others ambitious to be considered learned, and both classes goaded internally by curiosity and pride, often surrender and give themselves up to Modernism.

And here we have already some of the artifices employed by Modernists to exploit their wares. What efforts they make to win new recruits! They seize upon chairs in the seminaries and universities, and gradually make of them chairs of pestilence. From these sacred chairs they scatter, though not always openly, the seeds of their doctrines; they proclaim their teachings without disguise in congresses; they introduce them and make them the vogue in social institutions. Under their own names and under pseudonyms they publish numbers of books, newspapers, reviews, and sometimes one and the same writer adopts a variety of pseudonyms to trap the incautious reader into believing in a whole multitude of Modernist writers—in short they leave nothing untried, in action, discourses, writings, as though there were a frenzy of propaganda upon them. And the results of all this? We have to lament at the sight of many young men, once full of promise and capable of rendering great services to the Church, now gone astray. And there is another sight that saddens Us too: that of so many other Catholics, who, while they certainly do not go so far as the former, have yet grown into the habit, as though they had been breathing a poisoned atmosphere, of thinking and speaking and writing with a liberty that ill becomes Catholics. They are to be found among the laity, and in the ranks of the clergy, and they are not wanting even in the last place where one might expect to meet them, in religious institutes. If they treat of biblical questions, it is upon Modernist principles; if they write history, it is to search out with curiosity and to publish openly, on the pretext of telling the whole truth and with a species of ill-concealed satisfaction, everything that looks to them like a stain in the history of the Church. Under the sway of certain *a priori* rules they destroy as far as they can the pious traditions of the people, and bring ridicule on certain relics highly venerable from their antiquity. They are possessed by the empty desire of being talked about, and they know they would never succeed in this were they to say only what has been always said. It may be that they have persuaded themselves that in all this they are really serving God and the Church—in reality they only offend both, less perhaps by their works themselves than by the spirit in which they write and by the encouragement they are giving to the extravagances of the Modernists.

PART III.: REMEDIES.

Against this host of grave errors, and its secret and open advance, Our Predecessor Leo XIII., of happy memory, worked strenuously especially as regards the Bible, both in his words and his acts. But, as we have seen, the Modernists are not easily deterred by such weapons—with an affectation of submission and respect, they proceeded to twist the words of the Pontiff to their own sense, and his acts they described as directed against others than themselves. And the evil has gone on increasing from day to day. We, therefore, Venerable Brethren, have determined to adopt at once the most efficacious measures in Our power, and We beg and conjure you to see to it that in this most grave matter nobody will ever be able to say that you have been in the slightest degree wanting in vigilance, zeal or firmness. And what We ask of you and expect of you, We ask and expect also of all other pastors of souls, of all educators and professors of clerics, and in a very special way of the superiors of religious institutions.

1.—THE STUDY OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

1. In the first place, with regard to studies, We will and ordain that scholastic philosophy be made the basis of the sacred sciences. It goes without saying that *if anything is met with among the scholastic doctors which may be regarded as an excess of subtlety, or which is altogether destitute of probability, We have no desire whatever to propose it for the imitation of present generations* (Leo XIII. Enc. *Aeterni Patris*). And let it it be clearly understood above all things that the scholastic philosophy We prescribe is that which the Angelic Doctor has bequeathed to us, and We, therefore, declare that all the ordinances of Our Predecessor on this subject continue fully in force, and, as far as may be necessary, We do decree anew, and confirm, and ordain that they be by all strictly observed. In seminaries where they may have been neglected let the Bishops impose them and require their observance, and let this apply also to the Superiors of religious institutions. Further let Professors remember that they cannot set St. Thomas aside, especially in metaphysical questions, without grave detriment.

On this philosophical foundation the theological edifice is to be solidly raised. Promote the study of theology, Venerable Brethren, by all means in your power, so that your clerics on leaving the seminaries may admire and love it, and always find their delight in it. *For in the vast and varied abundance of studies opening before the mind desirous of truth, everybody knows how the old maxim describes theology as so far in front of all others that every science and art should serve it and be to it as handmaidens* (Leo XIII., Litt. ap. *In Magna*, Dec. 10, 1889). We will add that We deem worthy of praise those who with full respect for tradition, the Holy Fathers, and the ecclesiastical magisterium, undertake, with well-balanced judgment and guided by Catholic principles (which is not always the case), seek to illustrate positive theology by throwing the light of true history upon it. Certainly more attention must be paid to positive theology than in the past, but this must be done without detriment to scholastic theology, and those are to be disapproved as of Modernist tendencies who exalt positive theology in such a way as to seem to despise the scholastic.

With regard to profane studies suffice it to recall here what Our Predecessor has admirably said: *Apply yourselves energetically to the study of natural sciences: the brilliant discoveries and the bold and useful applications of them made in our times which have won such applause by our contemporaries will be an object of perpetual praise for those that come after us* (Leo XIII. Alloc., March 7, 1880). But this do without interfering with sacred studies, as Our Predecessor in these most grave words prescribed: *If you carefully search for the cause of errors you will find that it lies in the fact that in these days when the natural sciences absorb so much study, the more severe and lofty studies have been proportionately neglected—some of them have almost passed into oblivion, some of them are pursued in a half-hearted or superficial way, and, sad to say, now that they are fallen from their old estate, they have been disfigured by perverse doctrines and monstrous errors* (*loco cit.*) We ordain, therefore, that the study of natural science in the seminaries be carried on under this law.

2.—Practical Application.

2. All these prescriptions and those of Our Predecessor are to be borne in mind whenever there is question of choosing directors and professors for seminaries and Catholic Universities. Anybody who in any way is found to be imbued with Modernism is to be excluded without compunction from these offices, and those who already occupy them are to be withdrawn. The same policy is to be adopted towards those who favour Modernism either by extolling the Modernists or excusing their culpable conduct, by criticising scholasticism, the Holy Fathers, or by refusing obedience to ecclesiastical authority in any of its depositaries; and towards those who show a love of novelty in history, archæology, biblical exegesis, and finally towards those who neglect the sacred sciences or appear to prefer to them the profane. In all this question of studies, Venerable Brethren, you cannot be too watchful or too constant, but most of all in the choice of professors, for as a rule the students are modelled after the pattern of their masters. Strong in the consciousness of your duty, act always prudently but vigorously.

Equal diligence and severity are to be used in exmining and selecting candidates for Holy Orders. Far, far from the clergy be the love of novelty! God hates the proud and the obstinate. For the future the doctorate of theology and canon law must never be conferred on anybody who has not made the regular course of scholastic philosophy; if conferred it shall be held as null and void. The rules laid down in 1896 by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars for the clerics, both secular and regular, of Italy concerning the frequenting of the Universities, We now decree to be extended to all nations. Clerics and priests inscribed in a Catholic Institute or University must not in the future follow in civil Universities those courses for which there are chairs in the Catholic Institutes to which they belong. If this has been permitted anywhere in the past, We ordain that it be not allowed for the future. Let the Bishops who form the Governing Board of such Catholic Institutes or Universities watch with all care that these Our commands be constantly observed.

3.—Episcopal Vigilance over Publications.

3. It is also the duty of the Bishops to prevent writings infected with Modernism or favourable to it from being read when they have been

published, and to hinder their publication when they have not. No book or paper or periodical of this kind must ever be permitted to seminarists or university students. The injury to them would be equal to that caused by immoral reading—nay, it would be greater, for such writings poison Christian life at its very fount. The same decision is to be taken concerning the writings of some Catholics, who, though not badly disposed themselves but ill-instructed in theological studies and imbued with modern philosophy, strive to make this harmonise with the faith, and, as they say, to turn it to the account of the faith. The name and reputation of these authors cause them to be read without suspicion, and they are, therefore, all the more dangerous in preparing the way for Modernism.

To give you some more general directions, Venerable Brethren, in a matter of such moment, We bid you do everything in your power to drive out of your dioceses, even by solemn interdict, any pernicious books that may be in circulation there. The Holy See neglects no means to put down writings of this kind, but the number of them has now grown to such an extent that it is impossible to censure them all. Hence it happens that the medicine sometimes arrives too late, for the disease has taken root during the delay. We will, therefore, that the Bishops, putting aside all fear and the prudence of the flesh, despising the outcries of the wicked, gently by all means but constantly, do each his own share of this work, remembering the injunctions of Leo XIII. in the Apostolic Constitution *Officiorum*. *Let the Ordinaries, acting in this also as Delegates of the Apostolic See, exert themselves to prescribe and to put out of reach of the faithful injurious books or other writings printed or circulated in their dioceses.* In this passage the Bishops, it is true, receive a right, but they have also a duty imposed on them. Let no Bishop think that he fulfils this duty by denouncing to us one or two books, while a great many others of the same kind are being published and circulated. Nor are you to be deterred by the fact that a book has obtained the *Imprimatur* elsewhere, both because this may be merely simulated, and because it may have been granted through carelessness or easiness or excessive confidence in the author as may sometimes happen in religious Orders. Besides, just as the same food does not agree equally with everybody, it may happen that a book harmless in one may, on account of the different circumstances, be hurtful in another. Should a Bishop, therefore, after having taken the advice of prudent persons, deem it right to condemn any of such books in his diocese, We not only give him ample faculty to do so but We impose it upon him as a duty to do so. Of course, it is Our wish that in such action proper regard be used, and sometimes it will suffice to restrict the prohibition to the clergy; but even in such cases it will be obligatory on Catholic booksellers not to put on sale books condemned by the Bishop. And while we are on this subject of booksellers, We wish the Bishops to see to it that they do not, through desire for gain, put on sale unsound books. It is certain that in the catologues of some of them the books of the Modernists are not unfrequently announced with no small praise. If they refuse obedience let the Bishops have no hesitation in depriving them of the title of Catholic booksellers; so too, and with more reason, if they have the title of Episcopal booksellers, and if they have that of Pontifical, let them be denounced to the Apostolic See. Finally, We remind all of the XXVI. article of the above-mentioned Constitution

Officiorum: All those who have obtained an apostolic faculty to read and keep forbidden books, are not thereby authorised to read books and periodicals forbidden by the local Ordinaries, unless the apostolic faculty expressly concedes permission to read and keep books condemned by anybody.

4.—Censorship.

4. But it is not enough to hinder the reading and the sale of bad books—it is also necessary to prevent them from being printed. Hence let the Bishops use the utmost severity in granting permission to print. Under the rules of the Constitution *Officiorum,* many publications require the authorisation of the Ordinary, and in some dioceses it has been made the custom to have a suitable number of official censors for the examination of writings. We have the highest praise for this institution, and We not only exhort, but We order that it be extended to all dioceses. In all episcopal Curias, therefore, let censors be appointed for the revision of works intended for publication, and let the censors be chosen from both ranks of the clergy—secular and regular—men of age, knowledge and prudence who will know how to follow the golden mean in their judgments. It shall be their office to examine everything which requires permission for publication according to Articles XLI. and XLII. of the above-mentioned Constitution. The Censor shall give his verdict in writing. If it be favourable, the Bishop will give the permission for publication by the word *Imprimatur,* which must always be preceded by the *Nihil obstat* and the name of the Censor. In the Curia of Rome official censors shall be appointed just as elsewhere, and the appointment of them shall appertain to the Master of the Sacred Palaces, after they have been proposed to the Cardinal Vicar and accepted by the Sovereign Pontiff. It will also be the office of the Master of the Sacred Palaces to select the censor for each writing. Permission for publication will be granted by him as well as by the Cardinal Vicar or his Vicegerent, and this permission, as above prescribed, must always be preceded by the *Nihil obstat* and the name of the Censor. Only on very rare and exceptional occasions, and on the prudent decision of the Bishop, shall it be possible to omit mention of the Censor. The name of the Censor shall never be made known to the authors until he shall have given a favourable decision, so that he may not have to suffer annoyance either while he is engaged in the examination of a writing or in case he should deny his approval. Censors shall never be chosen from the religious orders until the opinion of the Provincial, or in Rome of the General, has been privately obtained, and the Provincial or the General must give a conscientious account of the character, knowledge and orthodoxy of the candidate. We admonish religious superiors of their solemn duty never to allow anything to be published by any of their subjects without permission from themselves and from the Ordinary. Finally We affirm and declare that the title of Censor has no value and can never be adduced to give credit to the private opinions of the persons who holds it.

Priests as Editors.

Having said this much in general, We now ordain in particular a more careful observance of Article XLII. of the above-mentioned Constitution *Officiorum*. It is *forbidden to secular priests, without the previous consent of the Ordinary, to undertake the direction of papers or periodicals.* This permission shall be withdrawn from any priest who makes a wrong use of it after having been admonished. With regard to priests who are *correspondents* or *collaborators* of periodicals, as it happens not unfrequently that they write matter infected with Modernism for their papers or periodicals, let the Bishops see to it that this is not permitted to happen, and, should it happen, let them warn the writers or prevent them from writing. The Superiors of religious orders, too, We admonish with all authority to do the same, and should they fail in this duty let the Bishops make due provision with authority delegated by the Supreme Pontiff. Let there be, as far as this is possible, a special Censor for newspapers and periodicals written by Catholics. It shall be his office to read in due time each number after it has been published, and if he finds anything dangerous in it let him order that it be corrected. The Bishop shall have the same right even when the Censor has seen nothing objectionable in a publication.

5.—CONGRESSES.

5. We have already mentioned congresses and public gatherings as among the means used by the Modernists to propagate and defend their opinions. In the future Bishops shall not permit Congresses of priests except on very rare occasions. When they do permit them it shall only be on condition that matters appertaining to the Bishops or the Apostolic See be not treated in them, and that no motions or postulates be allowed that would imply a usurpation of sacred authority, and that no mention be made in them of Modernism, presbyterianism, or laicism. At Congresses of this kind, which can only be held after permission in writing has been obtained in due time and for each case, it shall not be lawful for priests of other dioceses to take part without the written permission of their Ordinary. Further, no priest must lose sight of the solemn recommendation of Leo XIII.: *Let priests hold as sacred the authority of their pastors, let them take it for certain that the sacerdotal ministry, if not exercised under the guidance of the Bishops, can never be either holy, or very fruitful or respectable* (Litt. Encyc. *Nobilissima Gallorum,* 10 Feb., 1884).

6.—DIOCESAN WATCH COMMITTEES.

6. But of what avail, Venerable Brethren, will be all Our commands and prescriptions if they be not dutifully and firmly carried out? And, in order that this may be done, it has seemed expedient to Us to extend to all dioceses the regulations laid down with great wisdom many years ago by the Bishops of Umbria for theirs.

"In order," they say, "to extirpate the errors already propagated and to prevent their further diffusion, and to remove those teachers of impiety through whom the pernicious effects of such diffusion are being perpetuated, this sacred Assembly, following the example of St. Charles Borromeo, has decided to establish in each of the dioceses a Council consisting of approved members of both branches of the clergy, which shall be charged with the task of noting the existence of errors and the devices by which new ones are introduced and propagated, and to inform the

Bishop of the whole so that he may take counsel with them as to the best means for nipping the evil in the bud and preventing it spreading for the ruin of souls, or, worse still, gaining strength and growth" (Acts of the Congress of the Bishops of Umbria, Nov. 1849, tit. 2, art. 6). We decree, therefore, that in every diocese a council of this kind, which We are pleased to name "the Council of Vigilance," be instituted without delay. The priests called to form part in it shall be chosen somewhat after the manner above prescribed for the Censors, and they shall meet every two months on an appointed day under the presidency of the Bishop. They shall be bound to secrecy as to their deliberations and decisions, and their function shall be as follows: They shall watch most carefully for every trace and sign of Modernism both in publications and in teaching, and, to preserve from it the clergy and the young, they shall take all prudent, prompt and efficacious measures. Let them combat novelties of words remembering the admonitions of Leo XIII. (Instruct. S.C. NN. EE. EE., 27 Jan., 1902): *It is impossible to approve in Catholics of a style inspired by unsound novelty which seems to deride the piety of the faithful and dwells on the introduction of a new order of Christian life, on new directions of the Church, on new aspirations of the modern soul, on a new vocation of the clergy, on a new Christian civilisation.* Language of this kind is not to be tolerated either in books or from chairs of learning. The Councils must not neglect the books treating of the pious traditions of different places or of sacred relics. Let them not permit such questions to be discussed in periodicals destined to stimulate piety, neither with expressions savouring of mockery or contempt, nor by dogmatic pronouncements, especially when, as is often the case, what is stated as a certainty either does not pass the limits of probability or is merely based on prejudiced opinion. Concerning sacred relics, let this be the rule: When Bishops, who alone are judges in such matters, know for certain that a relic is not genuine, let them remove it at once from the veneration of the faithful; if the authentications of a relic happen to have been lost through civil disturbances, or in any other way, let it not be exposed for public veneration until the Bishop has verified it. The argument of prescription or well-founded presumption is to have weight only when devotion to a relic is commendable by reason of its antiquity, according to the sense of the Decree issued in 1896 by the Congregation of Indulgences and Sacred Relics: *Ancient relics are to retain the veneration they have always enjoyed except when in individual instances there are clear arguments that they are false or supposititious.* In passing judgment on pious traditions be it always borne in mind that in this matter the Church uses the greatest prudence, and that she does not allow traditions of this kind to be narrated in books except with the utmost caution and with the insertion of the declaration imposed by Urban VIII., and even then she does not guarantee the truth of the fact narrated; she simply does not forbid belief in things for which human arguments are not wanting. On this matter the Sacred Congregation of Rites, thirty years ago, decreed as follows: *These apparitions and revelations have neither been approved nor condemned by the Holy See, which has simply allowed that they be believed on purely human faith, on the tradition which they relate, corroborated by testimonies and documents worthy of credence* (Decree, May 2, 1877). Anybody who follows this rule has no cause for fear. For the devotion based on any apparition, in as far as it regards the fact itself, that is to say in as far as it is *relative*, always implies the hypothesis of the truth of the fact; while in as far as as it is absolute, it must always be based on the truth, seeing that its object is the persons of the saints who are honoured. The same is true of relics. Finally, We entrust to the Councils of Vigilance the duty of overlooking assiduously and diligently social institutions as well as writings on social questions so that they may harbour no trace of Modernism, but obey the prescriptions of the Roman Pontiffs.

7.—Triennial Returns.

7. Lest what We have laid down thus far should fall into oblivion, We will and ordain that the Bishops of all dioceses, a year after the publication of these letters and every three years thenceforward, furnish the Holy See with a diligent and sworn report on all the prescriptions contained in them, and on the doctrines that find currency among the clergy, and especially in the seminaries and other Catholic institutions, and We impose the like obligation on the Generals of Religious Orders with regard to those under them.

This, Venerable Brethren, is what we have thought it our duty to write to you for the salvation of all who believe. The adversaries of the Church will doubtless abuse what we have said to refurbish the old calumny by which we are traduced as the enemy of science and of the progress of humanity. In order to oppose a new answer to such accusations, which the history of the Christian religion refutes by never-failing arguments, it is Our intention to establish and develop by every means in our power a special Institute in which, through the co-operation of those Catholics who are most eminent for their learning, the progress of science and other realms of knowledge may be promoted under the guidance and teaching of Catholic truth. God grant that we may happily realise our design with the ready assistance of all those who bear a sincere love for the Church of Christ. But of this we will speak on another occasion.

Meanwhile, Venerable Brethren, fully confident in your zeal and work, we beseech for you with our whole heart and soul the abundance of heavenly light, so that in the midst of this great perturbation of men's minds from the insidious invasions of error from every side, you may see clearly what you ought to do and may perform the task with all your strength and courage. May Jesus Christ, the author and finisher of our faith, be with you by His power; and may the Immaculate Virgin, the destroyer of all heresies, be with you by her prayers and aid. And We, as a pledge of Our affection and of divine assistance in adversity, grant most affectionately and with all Our heart to you, your clergy and people the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 8th day of September, 1907, the fifth year of our Pontificate.

PIUS X., POPE.

circumstances remain true to their faith amidst unexampled temptations to perversion. What is the bond, fine as silk, true as steel, and as enduring as human life itself, that binds them to it?

Such a bond may conceivably be sought for in four directions. In the authority of God—the motive of belief; in the principle of belief—the habit of faith in the soul; in our experience of the transient visitations of the Holy Ghost to the soul—the illustrations and inspirations of actual grace; or, abstracting from the operation of grace, our attachment to certain truths may be empirical—the result of our experience of their beneficial effect on our spiritual life.

Now, speaking theoretically, the first reason is unquestionably adequate to explain the firmness and stability of faith. For the authority of God is sufficient to make us do and suffer everything, rather than compromise one tittle or iota of the truth it guarantees. But in practice, we have to consider how the divine authority is linked with the particular dogma that may be called in question. And of course the link is supplied by a certain process of reasoning, having at one end an investigation into the existence of miracles or prophecy, in the case of the educated, and an acquiescence in the teaching of parents or priests, in the case of the unlearned, and having at the other end actual assent to the dogma on the authority of God. Whether this process is logical and continuous throughout, or whether, as others suppose, the mind in virtue, as it were, of a kind of impulse it has gained in its assent to the *praambula fidei* is enabled to project itself on to quite a different plane when it gives its actual adherence to the dogma, it is not my purpose to enquire. Now, there can be no doubt that it is in some way as this we all first receive the faith, and in after life too, the memory of what we have been taught about God at a mother's knee will often keep us in the straight path in the midst of allurements into the by-ways of sin.

But nevertheless, I believe that the authority of God brought to bear on the truths of religion in this somewhat obscure and circuitous way is not an adequate explanation of all the phenomena of religious life, and in particular, of the unswerving assent of faith. Such a delicate bond, connecting us with the Divine authority, may indeed keep us in our religion when there is no inducement to give it up, when our affairs are prosperous, when we do not feel the chastening hand of God, and when we have only to go with the current. But in times of danger and doubt and difficulty, when the horizon of our lives all round is dark and lowering, and the hour of the prince of darkness has come, we require something of much less tenuity, something that will appeal much more to our composite nature. When the frail vessel in which our eternal fortunes are embarked has to weather the storm against every buffet of adversity, rather than strike its colours to the powers of evil, it must be anchored to the faith by something much more tangible than any reasoning process or the word of priest or teacher; though these are sufficient at ordinary times to generate certainty in our creed, and secure a practical observance of its precepts. No doubt, many say that in every supernatural act the authority of God revealing must somehow be contained, but I believe that nothing but the most minute introspective analysis will reveal its influence in the ordinary exercise of the virtues.

Generally speaking then, it would seem that the divine authority for religious teaching is not brought home to our minds with that urgency that would explain our unswerving assent to it.

And I think an appeal to the infused habit of Faith—the second possible explanation—will be equally unsatisfactory notwithstanding the opinion to the contrary of many distinguished theologians[1]. For the infused virtues do not of themselves import any strengthening or satisfying of our mental faculties. Though of course there is a certain proportion between them, for God no doubt chooses for the higher supernatural life those natures that are most refined, most sensitive, and most spiritual, still these virtues are in no sense the supplements or correlatives of our faculties; nor do the latter experience any pleasurable excitation by their exercises. Just as the supernatural habits do not check the passions or exclude vicious propensities,[2] so they do not confirm us in our religion or facilitate us in observing its precepts, for unlike actual grace they are in no sense medicinal.

But I believe it is otherwise[3] in the case of the third reason I proposed viz:—the operation of actual grace in our souls, especially in times of doubt or difficulty. For in these temporary visitations of the Holy Ghost which constitute actual grace, our spiritual perceptions become clarified and quickened; instead of seeing through a glass, darkly, we see with flashes of divine light that resemble in some way the noon-day sun of the Beatific Vision itself. Similarly in the will, the Paraclete gives a certain feeling of satisfaction, of contentment, of rest and peace which passes human understanding. Considering the intimate relations that exist between body and soul, there is no doubt that these spiritual motions sometimes overflow to the senses, and so obtrude themselves more on our attention than if they were confined to the spiritual faculties. Just as according to St. Thomas "whatever in us the will insists on having done, even the very act of the will so insisting is paid for out of the store of physical energy belonging to the body",[4] so conversely, the body cannot be wholly uninfluenced by the divine energy that is being communicated to the will.

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[1] v. g. Lugo, *de Fide* d. I N. 105, and Mazzella, *de Vir. Infusis* n. 613, who ascribe the unwavering assent of Faith to the habit as well as to the motive.

[2] Lugo, *de Euch.* d. 14 n. 46 sqq.

[3] This seems to be the view of Cardinal Franzelin, for he ascribes the firmness of faith to the action of the will, strengthened by grace. This grace cannot be the virtue of Faith which is in the intellect, and as there is no corresponding virtue in the will, he can only refer to the actual graces which connaturally follow Faith. *De Traditione*, p. 635.

Hence it is that at such seasons of divine mercy, the whole man —body and soul—is blessed with a certain spiritual comfort and exhilaration; and such experiences almost altogether preclude repudiation or doubt, then or subsequently, of the religion that begets them, and in them we have a sufficient explanation of the lives and deaths of the martyrs.

The fundamental emotion and impulse of fallen human nature is to gratify its passions, to shun the narrow rugged road of religion and to twine its affections round the world and its pleasures. And God designs to counteract or neutralize this bias or propensity, not only by proposing reasons that appeal to the speculative intellect, but by coming down to our level, as it were, by rejuvenating the old Adam and implanting in our nature a countervailing impulse or motion through the means of actual grace. This, I take it, is the meaning of saying that grace is not only elevating but medicinal.

Renouncement of self is not indigenous to the human heart, it is a delicate exotic; and yet we know with what joy and happiness martyrs have died, and saints have crucified the flesh, for they were wedded to their religion, not only because they had heard, but because they had seen and experienced.

> "Comfort came down the trembling wretch to raise,
> And his last faltering accents whispered praise."

And in the prosaic atmosphere of ordinary life, those who make a sacrifice for God are often conscious of a feeling of light and comfort permeating their entire being, for the divine grace comes down as a soothing balm to heal the wounded and tortured heart.

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[4] *Of God and His Creatures*, p. 409. Rickaby.

Mere mortification of the passions will not suffice to give this relish for the religious life, for its action is mostly negative; it only conciliates for us a greater measure of God's grace, and by refining away the grossness of our mental powers, facilitates their thorough and harmonious co-operation with it. But by a reverent and dutiful submission, our entire nature becomes gradually adjusted to the exigencies of the inner life, our intellects sensitive to its teaching, and our wills attuned to the motions of divine grace.

In face of this modification of nature, it is plain that the operation of actual grace to which it is attributable must supply a confirmatory argument for our religion based on personal experience, and hence more telling than any mere *a priori* one, no matter how plausible or ingenious.

This teaching as to the strengthening and consoling properties of actual grace is adumbrated in many parts of our theology, where its harmony or congruity with our nature is insisted on, and where it is alluded to as a delectation, especially by St. Augustine[5] and his school. For it is quite impossible, as we know from psychology, to have any delectation in the mental faculties without a corresponding pleasurable emotion in the body. I do not mean to assert that the one is always proportionate to the other, for experience testifies to the contrary, and in the Penance tract, though external emotion is considered presumptive evidence of the corresponding internal disposition, still we are warned that rebutting evidence is always admissible.[6] Actual grace then, since it carries with it a certain pleasure or delectation, must of necessity come within the range of our experience.

But the doctrine that divine grace and its effects are an object of experience—even bodily experience—is no where so fully elaborated as in the theology of the Blessed Eucharist.

Urban IV in the bull *Transiturus*, speaking of this sacrament says: "This bread is eaten, but not transmitted; it is nowise changed into the consumer; but if it be worthily received, the recipient becomes like to It. This transmutation is brought about by the streaming in upon us of the spirit and life of Christ. As a result

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[5] *De pecc. mer. et rem.* 1. 2. c. 19, n. 33; M 44, 170.

[6] Cf. St. Liguori, n. 460: "Quapropter ordinarie, nisi aliud percipiatur oppositum, credendus est poenitens ex inspiratione Dei lacrymas effundere."

Christ liveth in us; our thoughts, *our senses* and *impulses*, our wills and activities assume a resemblance to the hidden life of the Eucharistic Saviour, and become Divine."

Dr. Hedley[7] says, "The Holy Eucharist seems to have a special grace for the bodily passions. These passions are not exclusively corporeal, but they are attached to or located in a bodily organ. Hence their violence largely depends upon bodily conditions. It is the express teaching of the Fathers that the Eucharistic contact not only affects the passions indirectly, through the graces which are conveyed to the soul, but has also a directly healing and sanctifying effect upon the flesh".[8] I lay such stress on these effects of the Blessed Eucharist on the body, because whatever as to its spiritual effects, it is clearly impossible that these physical ones should not be registered in the experience of the recipient.

Another effect of the Holy Communion that goes to show the same is the delight, the sense of pleasure, the mental exaltation that not infrequently accompanies its worthy reception. It is compared by the saints and the doctors to the most delicious bread, to honey and to the wine that makes glad the heart of man.[9] This means that by worthy and frequent communion the spirtiual life becomes congenial to us, we become acclimatised to its higher reaches, and can live with comparative serenity, as it were, in its attenuated atmosphere.

From this it follows that to the devout and thoughtful, the reception of the Eucharist must be a marvellous confirmation of the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence, and of all the doctrines it involves, and inferentially, a crushing confutation of the other Christian churches who do not hold this sublime dogma. From our doctrine of the Eucharistic effects then, it is clear that no Catholic can deny to the theology of experience and emotion an important, though of course, secondary part in the economy of belief.

Our teaching about impetratory prayer and its infallible efficacy in certain circumstances, also bears testimony to the value of experience as an aid to faith in God and His providence. For seeing, on the one hand that God is bound to grant us certain favours, and on the other, that we can be sometimes sure that it was impossible to obtain them through the ordinary channels, the circumstances being so unpropitious, no other conclusion is open to us than that we owe them to a beneficent interposition of Providence. Or again, the obtaining of some boon has so synchronised with our prayers for it, that the same explanation is the only one admissible.

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[7] *The Holy Eucharist*, p. 123.

[8] Cf. Lehmkuhl, II. 115; Noldin, *de Euch.* 103.

[9] Hoc autem sacramentum est spiritualis manducatio quæ habet actualem delectionem. *S. Theol.* III Q. 79, A. 8.

It follows, at once, that the answer to our prayers is often a powerful argument in confirmation of the truths common to all theistic religion. And even when our requests seem unheeded, the same may be true; when, for instance, God refuses something to our prayers, subsequent experience often proves to us that the granting of it, instead of being a favour, would in reality be detrimental to the interests we were anxious to serve.

So far we have considered our experience of God's goodness, at work in our spiritual life, and it may be, furthering our temporal interests in answer to our prayers, as wedding us to our religion. And now we come to the fourth reason which I put forward in the beginning as a possible explanation of our irreformable assent to our religious beliefs; how far, namely, our experience of the advantage of particular dogmas to our souls, justifies or confirms our adherence to the religion of which they form an organic part.

In this connection we have already seen some of the effects of the Holy Eucharist, and I shall now consider seriatim a few more of the distinctively Catholic dogmas.

And in the first place, as regards our doctrine about the Blessed Virigin, preachers and writers in their enthusiastic devotion sometimes, as Newman says, use language that is calculated to give a misleading idea of the part we ascribe to our Lady in the work of our salvation, and it occasionally needs the corrective of a little practical knowledge of Catholicism to reconcile the ebullitions of their piety with the principles of sound theology. And this is perhaps partly the reason why Protestants are guilty of the unpardonable folly of slighting the Mother of God, for their detached, non-committal attitude towards her is a mere accretion on their system, and has no logical connection with their characteristic tenets at all. But a short acquaintance with devotion to her, as it is practised amongst us, is bound to remove all misapprehension, and indeed to awake a responsive echo in every human heart of normal sensibility. For such an experience will show that we look upon her as a mother that will heal our wounds and kiss away our tears—that will take us by the hand, and lead our tottering footsteps over the rough and thorny paths of the religious life. Instead of our devotion to her overshadowing what we owe to God, as may seem to a mere academic onlooker, the practical Catholic feels that loyalty to Him is the *raison d'etre* of all the honour we show her, and that her chief office in our eyes is to help to disarm His resentment when we return as prodigals to our Father's house. A short experience of devotion to the Blessed Virgin in this—the true Catholic spirit—will by its chastening of the passions, and its humanising, refining influence on the heart, render superfluous extrinsic reasons or the avouchment of authority as to her prerogatives.

Again, how consoling is our doctrine about the Guardian Angels! How satisfying to know that we have one bright spirit—all to ourselves—ever hovering round to help and comfort and protect us! He is for us a kindly light to illumine the gloom that falls from time to time on the spiritual life of everyone. If we were not taught by faith we should not know what to ascribe their good offices to, but once apprised of their existence, a short trial of their benevolence will enable us to dispense with the complicated and subtle apparatus of faith by which we were first brought into touch with them, and to take our stand on the more familiar and tangible ground of our own personal experience.

What an appeal too, does the doctrine of the Communion of saints make to human nature, unless indeed in the case of those who are specially hardened or depraved! What a consolation to know that when death is near and earthly ties are being severed, that new ones are being forged, closer, more spirtual, more enduring, and incomparably more prolific of good results. It enables us to clasp again in spirit a hand long vanished from our material touch, to bridge the gulf between time and eternity, and hold loving converse with those who are gone.

In the case of Infallibility again, a person relying merely on *a priori* arguments may be, in a sense, excused for thinking that it was likely to be a relentless foe to all theological progress, and to be responsible for a cast-iron, lifeless system of dogmas, whereas a practical acquaintance with its scope and limitations will convince anyone, that it is, on the contrary, a careful guide for human reason, sustaining its feeble and uncertain steps towards a fuller knowledge of the divine Revelation. To us, Catholics, who understand the character and rationale of our creed, how fitting Infallibility seems, once it is proposed for our acceptance. We see in it the coping stone of the great spiritual edifice, which would be else in somewise unworthy of the Master Mind that designed it.

Our life or death insistence on distinctively Catholic teaching forming an integral part of the school curriculum of our children has always been a rock of scandal to those outside the Church, and at present perhaps more than ever, at least in England. But to one impregnated with the spirit of Catholicism, denominational teaching commends itself instinctively, and indeed to him any other attitude would appear suicide. For he will understand that we cannot lay an amorphous foundation that may suit anything or nothing, and then erect a jerry-built structure on it, in accordance with our own peculiar views. He knows by experience that from foundation to apex the edifice of our spiritual life, like the edifice of our Church must be compact and homogeneous throughout; and that if religious education is anaemic and characterless in the beginning, it will remain so to the end, and can never become definite and characteristic and Catholic. This is plain enough to the experienced Catholic instinct, but it is no matter for wonder that outsiders cannot understand the principle on which we object to have those doctrines that we hold in common with them, taught to our children in common with theirs.

In fact, I believe that Protestant hostility to some of our most cherished beliefs arises largely from the fact that they cannot be adequately appreciated except through experience.

I do not mean to contend that all the Catholic dogmas, like the ones I have considered, are guaranteed by our own experience, as well as by the divine authority, or that those I have specified have equal warrant in the experience of every one, but at the same time it is well to remember that if we have reason to believe in one characteristic tenet of a particular church, that that carries with it strong presumptive evidence of the truth of the other doctrines of the same Church as well.

I venture to think I have shown that our experience of the workings of God's grace in our souls, and our experience of the value of certain doctrines to our spirtual life, have a share with authority in convincing the intellect of religious truth and in moulding the heart to virtue.

The just man lives by faith; it is the beginning in us of the supernatural life, and we may also consider it as the soil in the garden of the soul, for it is the indispensable foundation of all virtue. But experience also has an important place, for in order to bring forth fruit in due season, the subsoil (human nature) must be nourished and refreshed by the living waters of divine grace.

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THE CURRENT SCIENCE-PHILOSOPHY

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It is now seventy years ago since Macaulay, writing on Lord Bacon in the *Edinburgh Review*, made the following comparison between the practical results of the old philosophy and the new science:

> "Suppose that Justinian, when he closed the schools of Athens, had called on the last few sages who still haunted the Portico, and lingered round the ancient plane-trees, to show their title to public veneration; suppose that he had said: 'A thousand years have elapsed since, in this famous city, Socrates posed Protagoras and Hippias; during those thousand years a large proportion of the ablest men of every generation has been employed in constant efforts to bring to perfection the philosophy which you teach; that philosophy has been munificently patronized by the powerful; its professors have been held in the highest esteem by the public; it has drawn to itself almost all the sap and vigor of the human intellect; and what has it effected? What profitable truth has it taught us which we should not equally have known without it? What has it enabled us to do which we should not have been equally able to do without it?' Such questions, we suspect, would have puzzled Simplicius and Isidore. Ask a follower of Bacon what the new philosophy, as it was called in the time of Charles the Second, has effected for mankind, and his answer is ready: 'It has lengthened life; it has mitigated pain; it has extinguished diseases; it has increased the fertility of the soil; it has given new securities to the mariner; it has furnished new arms to the warrior; it has spanned great rivers and estuaries with bridges of form unknown to our fathers; it has guided the thunderbolt innocuously from heaven to earth; it has lighted up the night with the splendor of the day; it has extended the range of the human vision; it has multiplied the power of the human muscles; it has accelerated motion; it has annihilated distance; it has facilitated intercourse, correspondence, all friendly offices, all despatch of business; it has enabled man to descend to the depths of the sea, to soar into the air, to penetrate securely into the noxious recesses of the earth, to traverse the land in cars which whirl along without horses, and the ocean in ships which run ten knots an hour against the wind. These are but a part of its fruits, and of its first fruits. For it is a philosophy which never rests, which has never attained, which is never perfect. Its law is progress. A point which yesterday was invisible is its goal to-day, and will be its starting-post to-morrow.'"

Since these lines were written science has gone on working wonders which even the brilliant generalizations of Macaulay fail to cover. Its triumphs have aroused the enthusiasm of the age which has witnessed them; they have been made the theme of its orators and poets; they have become so common as to furnish stock in trade for the humorist. Says the genial American philosopher, "Mr. Dooley," commenting on the Victorian age: An' th' invintions,—th' steam-injun an' th' printin'-press an' th' cotton-gin an' the gin sour an' th' bicycle an' th' flyin'-machine an' th' nickel-in-th'-slot machine an' th' Croker machine an' th' sody fountain an' —crownin' wur-ruk iv our civilization—th' cash raygisther. What gr-reat advances has science made in my time an' Victory's!"

They can scarcely be spoken of except in the form of the paradox. As a specimen of this I may quote from an article by Mr. Gerald Stanley Lee:

> "The man who finds himself on a planet that is only lighted part of the time, is merely reminded that he must think of something. He digs light out of the ground and glows up the world with her own sap. When he finds himself living on an earth that can only be said to be properly heated a small fraction of the year, he makes the earth itself burn itself and keep him warm. Things like this are small to us. We take water and burn it into air and we telegraph boilers and we flash mills around the earth on poles. We move vast machines with a little throb, like light. We put a street on a wire. Great crowds in the great cities—whole blocks of them are handed along day and night like dots and dashes in telegrams. A man cannot be stopped by a breath. We save a man up in his own whisper hundreds of years when he is dead. A human voice that reaches only a few yards makes thousands of miles of copper talk. Then we make the thousand miles talk without the copper wire. We stand on the shore and beat the air with a thought thousands of miles away—make it whisper for us to ships."

If one were to attempt in more serious mood to fill up the lines of Macaulay's picture, he might say: Science has entered into every phase of human life: it has been pressed into the service of the family; it has lightened the work of the household, furnished and beautified the home, invented new methods and materials for the construction of the dwelling; it has irrigated, tilled and reaped the fields, making not only two blades of grass grow where one grew before, but evoking smiling harvests from the desert, and then carrying them to the populous centers of the world; it has invented countless methods for the utilization of products which formerly were lost to the use of mankind; it has delved into the bowels of the earth and laid their treasures at the feet of men; it has revolutionized medicine by making surgery possible and by abolishing diseases which were the scourge of the race; it has affected jurisprudence by inventing new methods for the detection of crime; it has modified most profoundly the relations between man and man by the facilities it has created for intercommunication, opening new fields for the labors of the trader and the missionary, promoting the migration of nations to new lands, rendering possible the growth of cities; it has cut through continents, straightened rivers, leveled mountains; it has tamed the destructive powers of electricity and explosives and has used them to destroy the barriers of space and time, until now the ether has been made a vehicle for speech which travels across thousands of miles at a speed almost equal to that of thought.

By its aid man has overcome the most dreaded powers of nature and has rendered himself independent of the more beneficent. It prophecies storms, it destroys pestilences, it makes habitable the waste places; it boldly essays to go down into the deeps in sub-marines, to ascend towards the firmament in airships, to overcome the powers of ice and snow and set the flag of civilization at the poles. It has made the mariner independent of the stars; it supplies warmth where the sun does not shine, and living waters where the rain never falls; it lights up the darkness of the night so that in great cities men forget the existence of the moon.

One can scarcely speak of its beneficent victories without employing language which has been consecrated to the uses of religion. It instructs the ignorant, heals the sick, feeds the hungry, clothes the naked. Like the prophet of old, it lays the mountains low and fills up the valleys and makes straight the paths of the world for the coming of—of whom?

All this would seem at first sight to be a glorious tribute to the achievements of modern science. But many a scientist would laugh it to scorn. Why, he would say, you are simply speaking of the menial occupations of science when she was the Cinderella of the sisterhood of knowledge, when she was content to scrub the floor and cook the food and run errands for the family. But it fails to estimate her position now. Her scornful sisters, philosophy and religion, are thrust out of doors and are wandering on wounded feet through the dark and waste places of the world while she sits enthroned dictating her lessons and laws to humanity.

That there is a large measure of truth in this view no well-informed person can deny. The achievements of science in the world of human service or utility which Macaulay contemplated, certainly form only the less striking part of its successes. The most magnificent results have been in the extension of the bounds of human knowledge. And here, though we must proceed more cautiously, there is still ample room for the full triumphal note. For science has weighed and measured the heavenly bodies, calculated the speed of light, and tracked the path of the comets; it has peered into the cosmic process of the suns; watched the formation of our planet and traced the outlines of its history at a time when no living thing yet existed upon it; it narrates the succession of various forms of life from the protozoa to man; it has unearthed from the ashes of forgotten civilizations and from the hidden mysteries of dead tongues the history of man on this planet for thousands of years. And on still profounder mysteries it has its more or less confident word to say—on the inner nature of the atom, the secret of life, the human soul, the destiny of man.

What wonder then that men should make of it a religion? Men have worshipped the sun for its beneficence—but the benefits of science have entered into every channel of life. Men have been found to follow any guide who could offer a solution to the problems of thought—but few prophets have spoken with the authority of this new leader of humanity. What wonder then that its more enthusiastic votaries should exclaim: "Science has lifted the veil of Isis; loosed the Gordian Knot; it solves the mysteries, makes the prophecies; it is the seer, the sage, the preacher of humanity."

And yet—and yet—in our less ecstatic moments we begin to fear that there may be something in the fling: "What science says goes—at least with the unscientific." May it not be that while the worshippers wait for the auguries with bowed heads outside the temples, the soothsayers within are wrangling with one another, or lost in doubt, or, it may be, smiling a knowing smile when they pass, as in the days of Cicero. Indeed, some come to the door and say: "God save you, Christian gentlemen" (or words to that effect) "we know naught of the things you fain would hear. Go to your homes—mayhap you will learn the secret there." Evidently the counsels are divided. Some preach that the key to all truth is the mystical formula of evolution—and others protest that this is being carried too far. And one who announces his doctrine in words "of learned length and thundering sound" is accused by his own followers of talking "solemn nonsense." Some lesser priestlings would perform the mystery of evoking life—soberer heads assure them that the trick has never been done. Some blend mind and matter—and a perfect chorus of dissentient voices proclaim that the connection is impossible. Another assumes the voice of the oracle and solves all the riddles of the universe—and a British dissenter proclaims him to be old-fashioned and behind the times.

> "The progress of thought has left him, as well as his great English exemplar, Herbert Spencer, somewhat high and dry, belated and stranded by the tide of opinion which has now begun to flow in another direction. He is, as it were, a surviving voice from the middle of the nineteenth century; he represents, in clear and eloquent fashion, opinions which then were prevalent among many leaders of thought—opinions which they themselves in many cases, and their successors still more, lived to outgrow; so that by this time Professor Haeckel's voice is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, not as the pioneer or vanguard of an advancing army, but as the despairing shout of a standard-bearer, still bold and unflinching, but abandoned by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in a fresh and more idealistic direction.[1]

When men eminent in science say that the solemn philosophical pronouncements of many among their brethren are not the voice of science itself, but of an old-fashioned and discredited philosophy dressed in the clothes and speaking through the mask of science, we lesser men begin to take heart, and to enquire more boldly where the truth may be. And we are stimulated to the enquiry all the more by the fact that the philosophy of scientific monism is still strong. In fact, there is a reason to believe that if matters of speculation could be decided by a show of hands, it would be the winner—almost surely so if we admitted to the polls only those whose philosophic systems are held independently of religious faiths.

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Science, then, aims at being considered as a philosophy. Now a philosophy is always an attempt to give an ordered presentation of all reality, to reduce this higgledy-piggledy world to a system of origins, natures and ends.

It is evident that everybody nowadays who aims at a philosophy must take into consideration the results of science. We shall see later on how much it has done to help the work of systematizing. Nor is there any reason whatever why the scientist should not attempt the task of philosophy. Our main objection against the class of scientists whom we are criticizing is not that they become philosophers, but that they do not. But if the scientist does venture on philosophy, he has a decided advantage in his knowledge of a great part of reality. On the other hand, though, he may suffer a drawback in the one-sided bent which his particular trade may have given him. One does not expect a manufacturer of steel rails, no matter how sincere a patriot he may be, to give an absolutely unbiased opinion on the tariff. After all, as David Harum says, "There is as much human nature is some folks as there is in others, if not more."

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[1] Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 51.

But when science aims at becoming a philosophy—that's another story, as Kipling has it. This is a proposition eminently open to discussion. It means that all reality can be examined by the methods and catalogued in the categories of the physical sciences. It *might* not mean just that, but it does mean that if it means anything more than the truism that one should not philosophize without knowing what science has to tell. And as a matter of fact this is just what the current science philosophy does contend. The concepts of physics may be softened a bit here and there to suit new needs, but in the long run the new philosophy gives us just the mechanical concept of the universe which is associated with physics.

We shall see more clearly as we go on what this means, but it is worth while to stop for a moment here to develop this general idea of what a science philosophy is. Let us consider science as a method, for a method it is primarily. It is a method of codifying sense experiences, of arranging the things perceived by sense in order of coexistences, similarities, sequences,—what things invariably go together, are like one another, follow one another. It learns its trade in a porton of reality where things go according to set forms and laws; and it has made the discovery that its progress depends on applying mathematics to facts. It weighs, measures, counts—the scales and the tapeyard are the instruments of its craft. A good *bourgeois* in its point of view, it has no use for the spontaneous and the unusual. Freedom and spontaneity it rejects or reduces to the level of its counter. What cannot be weighed by its system of avoirdupois, what its measuring string will not go round is non-existent. It may have various theories—or no theory at all—concerning the nature of the matter of which it treats; but it retains as a philosophy its original assumption—that there is no knowledge except of things which are perceptible by sense and can be considered as fixed, determined, mechanical; that all things which at first blush seem to be exceptions, life, souls, wills, consciences, gods, must submit themselves to the methods and ultimately to the concepts of physics.

But let us proceed to study historically the successes which science has already attained in reducing the complex world to its own form of unity. And since it is good for us to view the opposing position at its strongest, we shall not boggle over lesser points, but rather concede to monism all the advantages it can possibly claim.

The modern scientific conception of reality begins with the good Polish canon Copernicus who first opened the way for a systematic view of the universe. The earth we live on took its position in a general scheme of things—unfortunately for our self-complacency, a very subordinate position. We are used to it now, but no revolution in the human point of view has ever been greater. No wonder that it was violently opposed. But it established itself in spite of opposition, as every truth must ultimately do. Copernicus and Galileo reduced the heavens to a system. By the law of gravitation Newton showed the bonds which unite its gigantic molecules so closely that a man cannot flick the ashes off his cigar without disturbing the harmony of the spheres. Later still Kant and Laplace traced a genetic similarity between the parts of the universe by pointing out the laws of their formation from the original nebular mass. And our modern astronomers such as Father Secchi have read in the messages which light inscribes on the spectroscope the further lesson that all the heavenly bodies are formed of similar substances.

Meanwhile patient investigators had been establishing unities in the narrower field of those substances which lie within the reach of our hands. At first glance the world seems to be made up of a vast number of quite different sorts of things. A lump of quartz, a handful of sand, a cup of water, an oaken plank, a sheet of linen, a volume of gas, and the human hand seem to be radically different in their make-up. But the science of chemistry has shown that these and all other material things are only different structural combinations of some seventy different kinds of entities called elementary substances.

In reaching this conclusion physics too had played its part. First of all it smoothed the way by showing what philosophy had often guessed at—that the principal qualities by which things seem different to sight and taste and hearing do not exist as perceived. Color, sound, heat and cold, savors, odors, do not really exist in things—they are only ways in which a sentient organism reacts to movements from without. The material universe is colorless, odorless, soundless. We sit in a church or a theatre. We gaze at the beautiful paintings and decorations, are entranced by the harmonies of sound evoked from organ or violin. breathe in the odor of incense or of violets—in reality there is nothing in the room, not even our own bodies and brains, but the varied, recurrent, ceaseless jigglings of particles of matter. To a man of artistic perceptions it is no doubt a bleak and repulsive view to think that the world "which lies before us like a land of dreams, so various, so beautiful, so new" is really only a place in which a vast storm of corpuscles move. However, it is a view which presents harmonies of its own, and it is certainly a convenient view for the man who wishes to do accurate thinking; a view, moreover, which justifies itself by its results.

The tendency in physics, indeed, is to go beyond the findings of the chemist, and to assert that the chemical atoms are fundamentally the same, their differences being once more the result of molecular arrangements of the ultimate homogeneous atoms or ions. These atoms form the universe of matter. They gather in swarms too small for the microscope to detect, or great as Arcturus. Their various combinations, more or less stable, may impress us with their differences, but they are the same. They may gather or scatter, lie above or below or Nor'-nor'-West of each other, move faster or slower, around or across, but they differ only in position, they do nothing but move.

Matter in motion, then, or matter *plus* energy is the fundamental concept of the universe. And these primary entities (which are *one* for the monist) are conceived as being at bottom everlasting and unchangeable.

The matter may be driven apart or drawn together in new forms, but at least so far as the test of weight goes, it is never destroyed. And the energy too, though different in its manifestations as heat, electricity, etc., is fundamentally the same and is invariable in amount if account be taken not merely of the energy which is found to be at work but of that which is stored up for future activity as in a lump of coal.

The main contributions therefore of physical science towards a philosophy are the mechanical concept of the world as a procession or dance of material particles, and the two laws of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. As the universe is to-day so substantially it has ever been. Nothing real ever ceases; nothing real ever begins—things change only in position—things differ only in structure. No will of either God or man has ever added to its substance or changed the course of its energies. What it is to-day was absolutely laid down by what it was before this planet was flung off as a solar ring; what it will be a billion years from now is already determined by the collocation of atoms this minute.

> With the first dust they did the last man knead
> And then of the last harvest sowed the seed
> And the first morning of creation wrote
> What the last dawn of reckoning shall read.

Such is the testimony concerning the nature of the universe which we get from such sciences as astronomy, chemistry and physics. But unfortunately for the theory (fortunately however for larger interests) there were found certain classes of things which presented phenomena that stubbornly refused to accommodate themselves to a physical explanation: those facts which form the subject matter of biology, psychology, ethics, politics, religion—life and the distinction of classes among living things, consciousness, human reason, free will, the dictates of conscience, duty, sin, the supernatural. True, these events do not manifest themselves in as wide a field as do those of the physical order. The latter hold sway throughout the eight thousand miles of solid earth– they stretch beyond the confines of this planet to the ends of all creation; the former reveal themselves (so far as our direct knowledge extends) only in connection with certain organisms which exist on or near the surface of this planet. If they be weighed indeed in the golden scales of worth the vital phenomena will be found to outweigh in nobility and importance the burly universe of matter. But, setting this point aside, all who aim at a philosophy are willing to grant that the narrow range of any set of phenomena is no reason for excluding it from consideration in a system which aims at explaining all reality.

They constitute therefore a set of facts which cannot be pushed aside, which must be explained, or explained away. As they stand to ordinary view they present aspects quite out of harmony with the physical view which we have been considering. In the first place life could not have always existed on this planet—therefore it would seem that some really new thing had been introduced into the supposedly closed series—and this is the greatest heresy for the orthodox physicist. Moreover the action of mind and will seem to affect the disposition of matter—a blasphemy against the sacred law of the conservation of energy. But the main difficulty lies still deeper. Thoughts, volitions, feelings present none of the marks of the physical series. They cannot be weighed or measured—cannot be thought of as having size or shape, as being above or below each other, larger or smaller, cubical or spherical. They elude geometry; they cannot be conceived in terms of space or matter or motion. Moreover the higher regions of thought, the dictates of moral conscience, the experiences of religion point in the direction of a higher sphere of reality than sense reveals or science knows aught of. Such in brief outline is the problem that a scientific philosophy must deal with.

From the first it had one great fulcrum—the fact that, so far at least as our normal experience goes, these vital and mental facts are always found in connection with a material organism. There are certainly difficulties as to what life is—but living things are in one aspect collections of atoms of carbon, oxygen, etc., which were drawn from the storehouse of inanimate nature and which return thither when life is withdrawn. If we consider man on his bodily side he obeys the laws of matter. If I break through a scaffolding, thought has no wings to keep my body from following the law of gravitation and coming to the ground. And I depend for physical strength on sunlight and air and water and carbohydrates, etc. And even my sensations and other mental products are always associated, at least in ordinary experience, with the activities of a nervous system which is composed of the most familiar elements of the chemical laboratory. A Welsh rarebit can derange the speculations of a philosopher, and the cudgel of a savage can put a quietus on them forever.

In our own generation good work has been done in the new science of psycho-physics towards establishing the relations between the physical and the mental series. However, but little has been added for our present purposes to the generalizations which were made as long ago as the time of Aristotle. The brain has been mapped out so that we can tell the portions which are connected with the various classes of sensations and the movements of different portions of the body. But no special organ has been discovered for the higher mental operations. The attempt to apply mathematics—the favorite method of science—has been disappointing, as all know who are familiar with the limitations of Weber's Law. And so far as physiological psychology can go, the original difficulty of reducing the facts of consciousness to a neural tremor or an atomic knot in the brain or any other sort of material jiggle—remains just where it was. But of this presently.

In the domain of ethics and politics the work of scientific reduction has been mainly done along the lines of studying the effects of physical environment on the character of individuals and races, and of applying mathematics to the facts of conduct by the use of statistics. But all of these have become subsidiary to one great theory which has affected speculation in every department of human knowledge—the theory of organic evolution.

Before the time of Darwin the general view had been that living things were of as many distinct classes as there are species of plants and animals. The existence of each species formed a separate difficulty for any philosophy which aimed at finding a single basis for reality. By proving (at least to the satisfaction of many) that they all had a common origin, and that their differences were only accidental results of structure or arrangements of the organic parts, Darwin introduced into biology a unity akin to that which had been shown in the world of physics. The whole range of living things from the smallest micro-organism to man, belong, it could be contended, to the same series, the same species—they belong indeed to the same family by virtue of a common descent.

Difficulties, it is true—tremendous ones, indeed—still remain: the difficulty of scientific proof under which the theory of evolution must labor; and the apparent "gaps" in the continuity of the process.

But the scientific philosopher makes short work of these difficulties. Darwin has supplied him not only with a new kind of unity but with a valuable hint. The most radical kinds of apparent differences were found to disappear by tracing them to their origin. Only go back far enough, and things become homogeneous and simple—heterogeneity and complexity are the result of time and development. Laplace has presented a cosmic evolution of the stellar bodies from a vague and formless mass of nebulae. Darwin in his turn has shown the evolution of living things. Just join those two processes together and view the latter as a phase of the former, and you have your complete and ready made explanation of all things in heaven and on earth.

The beautiful patchwork garment thus fashioned for Nature looks so well at a little distance that it is almost a pity to venture on a nearer inspection. Do so, and you may find that the pieces do not join at all.

Confessedly, indeed, the theory is not without its difficulties, the main one being that of finding in the original cosmic dust all the elements out of which the present universe is constructed. If this point be abandoned, one may have to fall back on what Professor Haeckel styles in his usual judicious manner "the absurd hypothesis of a God."

We shall proceed to examine the theories which have been elaborated to satisfy the needs of the situation. One of these is the rather old-fashioned out-and-out Materialism of the "crass" or "gross" variety, which sticks closely to the concepts of physics.

But a more noteworthy theory is that which goes by the name of Scientific Monism, although it is really a pluralism. It sets about its work by a shrewd preliminary process of "leveling up" and "leveling down." The main factors of the problem are four:—matter-energy, life, animal consciousness, the higher human faculties. The "leveling down" process consists in reducing the second of these to the first, and the fourth to the third. The final unification is established by "leveling up" matter by injecting consciousness into the atoms.

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In order to understand the strength of any system we must appreciate, perhaps sympathize with, the state of mind which is back of it. And it is easy for a man of large views to sympathize with the monistic tendency in speculation. Philosophers are popularly supposed to be logic-machines; but in fact all of the craft who are worthy of the name have a bit of the poet about them. They see things in large ways and from uncommon points of view; they have the faculty of constructive imagination; their theories are great epics. And the dominant passion of the reason is that of explaining all things by some common concept. This is the key to the history of philosophy from Zeno to Mrs. Eddy. And the human mind will go on forever in the attempt to reduce all things to some sort of unity, even though it suffer the disappointment over and over again of finding that "we can button a monistic system over the front of Reality only at the expense of splitting it up the back." Actuated by this impulse the convinced evolutionist who considers that by combining the biological system of Darwin with the cosmogony of Laplace, he has discovered a continuous process of one material principle, jumps impatiently over the serious breaks in his process made by the lack of proof for spontaneous generaton and the need of a higher principle to account for the facts of consciousness. The monistic temper can never be thoroughly empirical, for nature steadfastly refuses to be cabined and confined in the narrow limits of any one principle. Only by the methods of Procrustes can it be made to fit the monistic couch.

One may sympathize with the monistic temperament, but sympathy should not get the better of one's judgment. And the time has certainly come for a protest against hasty generalizations, in the name of logic, facts, and common sense; against scientific monism in the name of scientific methods. It is the glory of science that not the least fact is left unnoted. Its progress has depended largely on the attention it has given to the "residual phenomena," the less obvious or less frequent facts which common sense (or nonsense) dismisses with the silly formula "The exception proves the rule." Has the monistic tyranny grown so great that we must humbly sue the scientist to give a little consideration to those petty residues: mind and reason and conscience and God?

Haeckel is a good example of the monist rampant. He is a patient investigator in his special field of biology, but when possessed by his great idea, he rejects honest investigation of opposing facts, and dogmatizes in learned words like the village schoolmaster. In his *Riddle of the Universe* he offers his single patent formula for the settlement of all the questions that have perplexed mankind since the days of Job. It may be that the riddle is not stated by him as nature has proposed it; it is true that at times he has a certain high and mighty Alexandrian way of cutting knots he cannot loose, or on occasion a tricky conjuring way of making it seem that there really never was any knot to be untied, but the reader is always impressed (if he does not spoil the effect by thinking) that there are no mysteries in the universe for "Ernst Haeckel, Ph. D., M. D., LL. D., Sc. D., etc." The past has nothing in its bosom which escapes his eagle glance; other scientists may confess the limitations of their knowledge and defects of evidence, but the genius of Haeckel falters at nothing—there are no limitations to his knowledge, and where stubborn nature refuses to give the necessary evidence, he can tell what *must* have been. He speaks as familiarly of the workings of evolution in the past as if they had gone on under his superintendence and according to his will.

One is reminded of the story told of the Norfolk alderman who placed benches on the sea strand in his native town with the inscription: "Presented to his fellow citizens by Alonzo Gubbins, Esq. *The sea is his and he made it*". His omniscience extends to the practical workings of the universe. In his lighter moments he suggests solutions for the difficulties encountered by mankind in running its little sphere of the cosmos; he propounds systems of government and of education; he solves the difficulty of dealing with his bugbear, the Catholic Church; he speaks with all the authority of his knowledge of animalculae on the training of lawyers and the proper viewpoint in art.

Years ago, and time has certainly not improved him—his logical (or illogical) methods were well characterised by Sir William Dawson:

> "An eminent French professor of the art of sleight-of-hand has defined the leading principle of jugglers to be that of 'appearing and disappearing things'; and this is the best definition that occurs to me of one method of reasoning largely used by Haeckel, and of which we need to be on our guard when we find him employing, as he does in almost every page, such phrases as 'it cannot be doubted,' 'we may therefore assume', 'we may readily suppose', 'this afterwards assumes or becomes', 'we may confidently assert', 'this developed directly', and the like, which in his usage are equivalent to the presto of the conjuror, and which, while we are looking at one structure or animal, enable him to persuade us that it has been suddenly transformed into something else.
>
> In tracing the genealogy of man he constantly employs this kind of sleight-of-hand in the most adroit manner. He is perhaps describing to us the embyro of a fish or an amphibian, and as we become interested in the curious details, it is suddenly by some clever phrase transformed into a reptile or a bird; and yet without rubbing our eyes and reflecting on the differences and difficulties which he neglects to state, we can scarcely doubt that it is the same animal after all."[2]

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It would be foolish to attempt to treat in the limits of a single article all the objections that are offered by both science and philosophy to the adequacy of scientific monism. It must suffice to enter a protest against the assumption of the eternity of matter and energy; of spontaneous generation; of the essential identity of plant and animal, sensation and reason; of the applicability of the physical laws of conservation of energy and inertia of matter to mental facts; against the rejection of purpose in the universe; of the evidence that may be advanced for the existence of purely spiritual agencies; and of freedom, intellect, and conscience in man; and finally, against the smuggling in of contraband metaphysics in the form of positivism or agnosticism when the invoice explicitly declares that the cargo contains nothing but facts.

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[2] Sir William Dawson, *Modern Ideas of Evolution*, p. 35.

We shall confine our enquiry to a single point—the "gap" between matter and consciousness. If it can be established in this crucial instance that monism is utterly unable to account for the facts, its inadequateness as a system will be manifest. One might go about the problem in another, perhaps better way. One might begin with the facts of consciousness, which, after all, are the nearest and most evident. One result of this beginning might be idealism. Matter, which looms so large in the vision of the physicist, would become a mental fact; matter—m-a-t-t-e-r—is something I happen to think. Or, if we suppose that consciousness reveals in ourselves a duality of mind and body, this dualism could be extended, after the system of Aristotle, in ever diminishing degrees to all grades of being. This latter method has the advantage of carrying the mind over difficult spots by the force of the original impulse—an advantage which we have ceded to the materialist by starting out with our eyes filled with the vision of the sweep and the power of matter. Despite the disadvantages of the method we employ, it has, however, one important point in its favor; it meets the materialist on his own grounds. He would accuse Aristotle and Berkeley of reasoning *a priori*; we can convict him on his own evidence of reasoning *a priori*.

We have already seen the physical concept of matter as consisting of homogeneous extended corpuscles which do nothing but move. It remains to examine the facts of consciousness. It seems an odd thing that these latter facts, which lie so much nearer to our thought than any others, are harder to grasp clearly than those of the outer world. Most people live habitually on the outside of their own minds—if it were otherwise, materialism would never acquire the strength it often does. It is irritating to hear even religious-minded people speaking of the ideal as if it were always synonymous with the non-real, through a failure to distinguish its meaning as referring to mental facts from its use as equivalent to "imaginary."Ideas not real! Well, if we consider them merely as modifications of consciousness, they are at least as real as the things they represent in the world outside. More so, indeed, in some cases. My sensations of redness and of pleasant odor are real facts while they last; but what are color and perfume in the rose? And if we go back to the substances which sustain them, does not the majority of mankind believe that the true and stable and lasting reality is that of spirit, and not this "real world" of matter which I can see and handle and knock my shins against; that God and souls will remain forever, even though

> The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
> And, like an insubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind."

But even for those who possess such beliefs, a clear view of the nature of thought is difficult. What must it not be for the man whose whole bent of mind is towards external reality, and whose methods of observation and appliances for experiment are continually used in connection with things that can be weighed and measured. A little insight into the real meaning of materialism will reveal that the following fancy scene is not so much of a burlesque as it may seem at first sight.

A physicist stands in his laboratory amid the implements of his craft.

Someone says: "Here's a curious sort of agglomeration, Professor. They call it a man."

"Ah! let us analyse it," quoth the professor.

He hauls it over to his work-bench and proceeds to apply his tools—scales, metewand, thermometer, lancet, microscope, retort. The results: "Length, 5 ft. 9; weight, 157.8 ℔s; cubic inches, 406; temperature when operation began, 98.8; parts—bone, muscle, adipose, blood, etc.; chemical constituents—C., H., O., N., S., K., Ca., etc. Very interesting specimen—some complex reactions—that's all."

Is that all? Why, man, that thing was the theater of pleasures and of pains; it reflected in itself the whole universe without; it had that within which transcended the little portion of space and time it occupied; from its slight standing point on this planet it soared aloft and wandered through the stars; it delved into the remotest recesses of the past and watched the birth of ancient suns; with clear and steady vision it read in the changing world the eternal laws that govern it; it faced the terrific powers of matter and mastered them to its own uses; it throbbed with love and devotion and despair; it heard in the sacred call of duty a voice which the elements never spake; it mounted above the world of matter and set itself face to face with God. And all this is nothing!

Surely we can gather from this at least that we have here a fact, a "residual phenomenon," if you will, that is worth analysing. But in our description of the nature of the facts of consciousness we shall not endeavor to make the argument turn on the higher forms of human consciousness. Whatever we have to say will apply equally to the dimmest sensations of warmth or pressure which a jelly-fish may feel.

The first thing that impresses us about ideas (using the term in the broad sense indicated above) is that we cannot apply to themselves or their inter-relations any of the notions that are bound up with space—length, breadth, thickness, size, shape, distance, velocity, weight, resistance, motion. If we ever use such terms concerning them, we do so by metaphor or in jest—and we see that this is so just as soon as we turn our attention to it. In reality we do not think (and we cannot) of states of consciousness as being larger or smaller, cubical or cylindrical, solid or hollow, light or heavy, rotary or zigzag, rough or smooth, heaped or scattered, far or near, right or left. Is the idea of a million larger than that of a unit? or the idea of Sirius heavier than that of an atom? Is honesty square, and hate corrugated, and love smooth, and indecision rotary? Do ideas clash and jostle when they contradict one another? Does the mind get cluttered up with them when they increase in number? If these examples seem ridiculous, it is only because the attempt to apply the concepts of extension or matter to consciousness is ridiculous. Ideas are not material. "The microscope does not detect them. They cannot be weighed, measured, or bottled."[3] They are not "a secretion of the brain," nor a twist, or tangle, or coagulation, or track, or furrow of brain or anything else that occupies space. Nor is there any help in the naive notion of the popular materialism that if we could only strain out the coarse matter of everyday experience until it is thin enough, we would have a gruel that might suit for thought—ether and electricity are suggested as solutions. The suggestion would be amusing if it were not pathetic. If all that physics says be true, the atoms are fine enough for any sort of work that can be expected of matter. But of course the problem is just the same whether it be stated in terms of electrons or of pumpkins.

Physics has dug its own grave. The universe is a swirling mass of homogeneous atoms that do nothing but move, A local eddy in the maelstrom is the brain. Why should this particular agglomeration of matter and energy acquire consciousness any more than an earthquake or a prairie fire? "Redistributions of matter and motion"—all of them. The pool-balls on a table are sent rolling about; four or five are jammed together in a corner, still moving; and there they get the idea that they are one being, that they are bruised, that the table is green. Is this science, or is it magic?

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[3] Maher, *Psychology*, p. 496.

Or consider the process of sensation. A gun is shot off in my neighborhood—a discharge of energy. It sets up a movement in the atmosphere which is carried to my ear. This starts a series of movements in a string of atoms called a nerve and afterwards causes a jiggle in a pulpy mass of matter, the brain. And then? And then it goes on about its further business. Is that all? That is all that physics knows about it. Its atoms move. And "a feeling," warns Mr. Spencer, "has nothing in common with a unit of motion."[4] A boy sets up a row of ten dominoes at close intervals. He pushes the first, which knocks over the next, and so on. What happens with the tenth? Does it look back and associate itself with the other nine, or feel hurt, or go after the boy? No, it just falls and passes its motion on. And indeed, as Tyndall says:

> "Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem: How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?"[5]

We may terminate this section of our study with a quotation from Professor Paulsen:

> "The proposition, Thoughts are in reality nothing but movements in the brain, feelings are nothing but bodily processes in the vaso-motor system, is absolutely irrefutable; not because it is true, however, but because it is absolutely meaningless. The absurd has this advantage in common with truth, that it cannot be refuted. To say that thought is at bottom nothing but a movement is to say that iron is at bottom made of wood. No argument avails here. All that can be said is this: I understand by a thought a thought and not a movement of brain-molecules; and similarly, I designate with the words anger and fear, anger and fear themselves and not a contraction or dilation of blood-vessels. Suppose the latter processes also occur, and suppose they always occur when the former occur, still they are not thoughts and feelings. Turn it which way you will, you will never find thought in movement. The common man knows nothing whatever of the motion in the brain or of the vaso-motor process, but he knows what anger is, and what thought is, and he

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[4] Spencer, *Psychology*, I. § 62.

[5] Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, "Scientific Materialism." p. 419.

means these, when he speaks of them, and not something else of which the physiologist alone knows or thinks he knows. Or will the physiologist stop talking of thoughts and feelings after his science will have acquired more exact information concerning the bodily processes, and will be, instead, speak only of what they are at bottom and in reality or objectively considered, that is, movements? Will he, in case he should happen to fall in love, no longer confess his love, but mention the corresponding vaso-motor processes or, in the words of Tyndall, discourse on the right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain? Does that tell the whole story? How nonsensical!"[6]

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It is evident (though many folk seem not aware of it) that materialism of the cruder sort is dead—and waked and buried, for the matter of that. But there has arisen in its stead a new system which rejects the old name, but which is the same in all practical results concerning knowledge, ideals, views of life, freedom, immortality, God. It is less loyal to physics than its predecessor, but it is materialism just the same.

It is a new answer to the old problem: how to account for everything in the cosmos to-day by elements in the primitive nebular mass—everything from Orion and the Pleiades to

> "Shoes and ships and sealing-wax
> And cabbages and kings."

The old scientific materialism had no difficulty with the constellations, but it stopped short when it came to the "cabbages and kings." The new unscientific monism meets the difficulty by chopping those useful objects up fine and distributing them piecemeal through chaos. The argument is simple:—They must have come from the nebular mass; true, we cannot detect them in it, but let us put them there and then we can go and find them there. Just suppose that every atom has a shred or tag of life or consciousness attached to it somehow, and the trick is done. This is known as the "double-aspect" or "mind stuff" theory.

Now it may seem harsh language, but this sort of thing is only a bit of metaphysical "bunco-steering." Certain enterprising fellow-citizens of ours in the Western States have invented an ingenious method of obtaining the superfluous wealth of their brethren in the effete East or their confiding cousins from across the seas. They select a worked out gold mine and inject into it gold dust and slugs of quartz. Then they lead the confiding investor to the mine, and thence, laden with specimens, to the assayer's office. The result is generally satisfactory—to the ingenious Westerner. The process is called "salting the mine." The monists have made use of the trick on a magnificent scale—they have "salted" the universe.

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[6] *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 82-83.

It would be unpardonable to turn a serious system into a joke if there were a single particle of proof in the whole inorganic universe to support its claims. Indeed, if it goes beyond a joke, if it insists on being taken as anything more than a passing play of fancy, more especially if it be proposed as the results of "science," it merits more serious rebuke. As Father Maher says,[7] the advocate of this system

> "has to make an absolutely incredible assumption without a scrap of evidence in its favor. In order to do away with the souls of a few living beings, who do not constitute the one-hundred-millionth part of the mass of the physical world, he has to assign a mental life to every grain of sand and drop of water on the earth. He has to ascribe to every molecule of matter in the universe something the nature of which cannot be imagined, and of the existence of which neither the experiments of science nor the observation of mankind has ever discovered the slightest trace. Such is the modest demand on our powers of faith made by scientists—who can, when it suits them, be so exacting in their demands for proof. Even Tyndall, sympathetic though he be with such views, is forced to declare: 'It is no explanation to say that objective and subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two sides? There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it rises into frost ferns upon a window-pane? If not, why should the molecular motions of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion consciousness?'"

In fact, the new monism lends itself much more to the requirements of humor than to those of philosophic thinking. Professor Haeckel (on the lack of saving humor in the Professor and his school see Chesterton's *Heretics*) unconsciously supplies a theme for wit and fancy. Speaking of chemical affinities, he says: "Every shade of inclination, from complete indifference to the fiercest passion, is exemplified in the chemical relation of the various elements towards each other, just as in the psychology of man, and especially in the life of the sexes."[8] Here is a field for someone possessing the genius for the absurd of Lewis Carroll or the imagination of Poe or Fitz-james O'Brien. Such a writer could chronicle the loves of Mr. Carbon and Miss Oxygen. He could picture the affinities, the domestic broils and explosions of the atoms, their tribal wars and coalitions, the rise and fall of empires. And this would be an outcome of exact science! Father Michael Maher—as one might expect from his name—does not miss the suggestion of humor in the theory. This mind-stuff, he says, must be conscious or unconscious. If the latter, "how is it like our mortal life? Does a multiplicity of unconscious acts constitute an act of conscious intelligence? If, on the other hand, we ascribe real but incipient consciousness to the molecules of matter, and if mental life is the outcome of their combinations, it would seem that a mental existence ought to belong to all material objects with which experience presents us....Is a new steam-tug a thing of joy to itself? What are the emotions of a deserted coal-mine? Or is it only very *small* lumps of coal that have minds?"[9]

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[7] Maher, *Psychology*, pp. 509-510.

[8] *Riddle of the Universe*, p. 224.

Immaterial substance has evidently taken a complete revenge on its assailants. It is but a little thing, said the atoms, and we shall reduce it to the position of a petty province of our domain. And when the war is ended, we find them offering to it an equal share even in the vast territory in which they had claimed undisputed sway. But in vain. It possesses a spirit of pride and independence. It consents to an alliance only where it can maintain its superiority.

Matter is not spiritual any more than spirit is material. If any confidence whatever can be placed in human powers of knowing, the spiritual and the material are two different sorts of things. Experience testifies indeed that they *act* on each other, but reason forbids us to hold that either *is* the other. But, perversely enough, this new double-aspect Identity-hypothesis, rejecting, as we think, both experience and reason, says that matter and mind are so different that they cannot act on each other, but are still only phases of the *same* thing. It begins to look as if logical consistency had been sent the same road as experience and rational inference. We can conceive of two different entities which can act on each other; we can conceive that there might be two things so absolutely different or apart that neither could influence the other; but what are we to make of two things so essentially at twain in their operations, and yet so inextricably at one in their being? Have we here two entities or one? If one, we are back to materialism[10]—a system that is consistent at any rate, even though it does burke the facts. If two (and the whole argument points to two) why not admit dualism without more ado?

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[9] *Psychology*, p. 511.

[10] We are not considering here the answer of Idealistic Monism.

Monism has been driven to this self-destructive position partly by its recognition of the essential difference between the facts of physics and the facts of consciousness, and partly by its allegiance to the law of the Conservation of Energy. This law was used first against freedom of the will. If the will could affect energy from without, it was argued, then the sum of energy would be increased, and the law set at naught. But it did not take much reflection to see that the law could not be consistently applied without denying *all* interaction between mind and matter. Once granted that the mental and physical facts are on different planes, it follows that if the mental activities affect the physical in any way, the sum of energy is increased; and if motion passes out of its own plane to produce thought, the amount of energy is diminished. Here is not the place to discuss this use of the law of conservation. In passing we may remark that if we examine the kind and extent of the proof for it even in the physical world, we shall be justified in saying that it is a bit of impertinence to use it as a basis for deduction in psychology. But we must take monism as we find it. And monism must accept the consequences of its position.

Matter and its changes never affect consciousness. They are not merely strangers

> "hedged with alien speech
> And lacking all interpreter."

They cannot get into touch at all. I have a sensation of being burned. But I have no right to say that it was caused by fire, or even by the reaction of my nervous system—these things belong to another world. On "scientific" grounds one might more reasonably claim that the rings of Saturn are the cause of the Hudson River, for these are both in the physical order, and might at least conceivably be connected. And so too the sensations of sight and hearing, of smiting or being smitten, have no relation to the movements of light or air or the more ponderable things of the physical universe. The two series run parallel, they never meet or collide. Passing over the more evident objections which everyday experience offers to this theory, we ask what becomes of science itself if it be held. If the material world stands so completely aloof from my consciousness, how can I claim to know anything about it?

And if we turn to the other half of the theory, the difficulties are no less overwhelming. We need not delay over them. The following quotation from Professor James will suffice to indicate the final results of a system which has been proposed as a *scientific* presentation of the *facts of experience.*

> "To comprehend completely the consequences of the dogma so confidently enunciated, one should unflinchingly apply it to the most complicated examples. The movements of our tongues and pens, the flashings of our eyes in conversation, are of course events of the material order, and as such their casual antecedents must be exclusively material. If we knew thoroughly the nervous system of Shakespeare, and as thoroughly all his environing conditions, we should be able to show why at a certain period of his life his hand came to trace on certain sheets of paper those crabbed little black marks which we shall for shortness' sake call the manuscript of Hamlet. We should understand the rationale of every erasure and alteration therein, and we should understand all this without in the slightest degree acknowledging the existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare's mind. The words and sentences would be taken, not as signs of anything beyond themselves, but as little outward facts, pure and simple. In like manner we might exhaustively write the biography of those two hundred pounds, more or less, of warmish albuminoid matter called Martin Luther, without ever implying that it felt."[11]

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If monism be considered the best that human reason can do to solve the relations between matter and mind, it is small wonder that many fall back on agnosticism. This is of course Mr. Spencer's final solution of the problem, although he makes tentative efforts towards some more definite theory. We have seen that he recognized the difference between motion and feeling to be one that "transcends all other differences." This statement would make an excellent basis for a system of dualism. On the other hand his theory of evolution draws him in the direction of monism. In fact Professor James is able to quote certain passages from the *Synthetic Philosophy* in which Mr. Spencer seems to be asserting the evolution of consciousness from the unconscious. And in answer to Mr. Spencer's disclaimer that he never really meant to explain how consciousness is evolved, James says in his delightfully impudent way: "That, when a critic calls attention to the inanity of his words, Mr. Spencer should say that he never meant anything particular by them, is simply an example of the scandalous vagueness with which this sort of 'chromo-philosophy' is carried on."[12]

But the ultimate solution of Mr. Spencer and his school is that mind and matter are twin manifestations of the one Unknowable Reality. This theory is not without its serious logical defects. As

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[11] *Psychology,* I. pp. 132-133.

[12] *Psychology,* I. p. 149. Footnote.

Dr. Pace remarks: "Before saying that two things are the same, one may be reasonably supposed to have some slight acquaintance with each. The fact that we have found no value for x and no value for y is hardly a warrant for inferring that x is equal to y; they may be unequal."[13] In truth, this identifying of things on the basis of *what they are not* does not meet with the approval of logicians. A good example of the results of it is shown by the answer to the conundrum of our schoolboy days: that an elephant is like a brick because neither can climb a tree.

Mr. Spencer's argument concerning matter and mind might be fairly summed up: Points of diversity: practically everything we know about them; points of identity: what we do not know about them. Result: they must be identical. But on this point a master of the art of criticism has spoken, and to him we shall give the final word:

> "Since the unknowable declines to recognize the laws of logic, rational criticism would be obviously futile. In its dark continent the identification of thought and matter may be peacefully accomplished without the disturbing interference of either the profane scientist or the impertinent philosopher. Screened off from the inconveniences of public discussion, rebellious facts, and repugnant principles can there be silently suppressed. The freedom, responsibility, abiding identity and individuality to which conscious experience testifies can be rejected as irrelevant evidence—because, of course, no evidence is accepted within the jurisdiction of the Unknowable. The difficulties of the theory which maintains that human thought has never influenced human civilization, are easily overcome—the resources of the Unknowable being equal to all emergencies. Enjoying the hospitality of its ample territory, the most violent contradictions and implacable inconsistencies can rest in tranquil repose. Its frontiers once crossed, the Monist has reached a hallowed asylum, into which even the most relentless persecution of logic or common sense cannot follow him. There, at last, all objections are answered, all difficulties are solved, all doubts are assuaged by the one great axiom so well—if not wisely expressed by Dr. Hodgson: "Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else."[14]

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

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[13] NEW YORK REVIEW, Feb.-Mar., 1906, p. 545.

[14] *Psychology*, by Rev. Michael Maher, S. J., p. 524.

A STUDY IN BUDDHISM

A. Roussel, D. D.

The Catholic whose privilege it is to possess the Christian faith in its integrity, does not need to be informed about other religions in order to be convinced of the beauties and excellence of his own, but such knowledge, always useful, becomes to a certain extent indispensable if he would form for himself an adequate conception of its superiority. If besides, he wishes to contribute to the diffusion of Christianity in the world, his first task must be to convince those whom he would convert, of the inadequacy of their own religious system. This is an important factor in the formulation of his message, and consequently a knowledge of other religions becomes absolutely necessary.

It is a noteworthy fact that notwithstanding the prevailing atmosphere of indifference, never perhaps have religious problems been the object of so much interest and pre-occupation as in our own day. Unfortunately, however, the trend is too often in the direction of negative rather than of positive results. Certain writers are bent on explaining away the supernatural character to which all religions lay claim, and as Christianity which they desire especially to overthrow, is the one which above all other religions clearly establishes this claim, an attempt is made to dim that halo whereby the Church of Christ compels the recognition and even the admiration of the unbeliever. With this purpose in mind, efforts are made to find rival systems of religion and even to establish their superiority by extolling their tenets and forms of worship, and depreciating those of Christianity. Care is taken in this comparison to pass over in silence those religions which with their deities have long since been discarded and which have retained only a historic interest. Naturally appeal is made only to those religions which still live and are perpetuated from generation to generation. More fortunate than their predecessors of the eighteenth century who were less well informed, the infidels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries oppose to Christianity what they consider to be a worthy rival, one whose triumph they are striving to secure, viz., the religion of Buddha. It is by proclaiming loudly the superiority of Buddhism—awaiting the moment when it too shall be discarded—that modern infidelity endeavors to undermine Christianity and offset its claims. Buddhism is thus valued merely as a tool wherewith to demolish that pillar and ground of truth which was proclaimed indestructible by its Founder; and could it once be made to bring about this result, it would doubtless soon be set aside and lose all interest.

The enemies of Christianity are chiefly at pains to proclaim the great power and influence as well as the antiquity of Buddhism, and the fabulous number of its adherents; whence they conclude that a religion which is older than Christianity, which is even at present practiced by a greater number of men, must possess in itself a greater vitality and be at least equal if not superior to it.

These assertions involve a challenge which we cannot afford to disregard. We need not shrink from bringing to the test the rival claims of the two religious systems, but we must choose between two tactical methods, each of which has its drawbacks as well as its advantages. The first, which for a long time was the only one employed, is less aggressive and consists in maintaining a defensive attitude in presence of the enemy. It has perhaps the advantage of allowing us to quietly concentrate our strength on the means of defence, and force our adversaries to exhaust themselves in successive attacks. This method may save us from defeat in the eyes of many onlookers, but, on the other hand, it cannot assure us the victory, and many witnesses of the conflict may be tempted to admit that so many assaults must have weakened our position.

The other method consists in carrying the war into the enemy's camp, on the oft justified principle that the best way to defend oneself from an adversary is to attack him. The chief drawback to this method of warfare would arise from lack of proper preparation, from the use of antiquated weapons or the enrolment of undisciplined forces. In the present controversy therefore, between the religion of Christ and that of Buddha, since the latter has been compared with the former, let us endeavor to ascertain what Buddhism really was, and what it is.

The present writer is convinced, that since Christianity is at present attacked on all sides, it is more than ever incumbent on Catholic scholars to apply themselves assiduously to the comparative study of religions; and this conviction caused him to give a series of university lectures during the past year, not only on the philosophical systems of India, but also on the principal religions of the extreme Orient. Of these the first to be discussed was Buddhism, and it is the substance of the lectures delivered on that subject that will be presented in this and in subsequent articles. The matter will be divided into three sections treating respectively of the person called the Buddha, of his doctrine or Dhamma, and of his community or Samgha.

In the first section we shall endeavor to distinguish the historical from the legendary elements in the life of the Buddha, examining critically what is known, or at least affirmed, concerning his youth, the beginnings and duration of his preaching and his death.

In the second part we shall discuss the philosophical and moral doctrines of Buddhism (for of theological doctrine there can be no question) viz., the Dhamma, signifying Law or Duty.

Since the great aim of the Buddha is the suppression of pain, it will be necessary to examine what he understood by that term, how according to him pain originates and develops and how it can be overcome.

The *Samgha* or Buddhistic community will be studied in the third section, viz., the origin of the famous *viharas* or monasteries which even at the present day form such an important factor in Buddhism, as may be inferred from the fact that certain *lamaseries* in Thibet count as many as ten thousand bonzes.

Thus the first part of the discussion belongs to the domain of history and especially of legend, the second belongs to philosophy, while the third deals exclusively with matters of discipline; from which it will appear that Buddhism, at least in its primitive form, has really nothing in common with theology in the proper sense of the word. Indeed it could hardly be otherwise since its founder studiously excluded God from the object of his speculation.[1]

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[1] In these studies the writer adopts the order and divisions as contained in the excellent work of Oldenberg, of which there exists an English translation by Hoey, London, 1882. Besides this treatise, there are some other works on Buddhism which I take the liberty to recommend especially to the reader; they are chosen from among many. *Buddha and his Religion*, Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, new edition. Paris, Didier, 1862. This work is, of course, quite old, but it is far from having lost all its value. Monier, William. *Buddhism in its Connection with Brahmanism and Hinduism, and its Contrast with Christianity.* London, 1889. All the assertions of the Author are not equally acceptable. Bigamdet (Mgr). *The Life or Legend of Gautama, the Buddha of the Burmese.* Two English editions of this work appeared in Rangoon in 1858 and 1866. A third was published in London in 1880. M. V. Gauvain translated it into French in 1879. *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, by Charles F. Aiken. Boston, 1900. Abbé Collin brought out a French edition of it with Lethielleux in 1903. Chantipie de la Saussaye. *Lehrbuch der Religions-Geschichte*, 2 Bde Freiburg im Brisgau. This manual has just been translated into French under the direction of Henri Hubert and Isidore Levy. Armand Colin, 1904.

Buddhism began about 500 years before the Christian era, with a society of what we would now call "mendicant friars," who went about from place to place preaching the doctrine of deliverance from pain—in other words from existence itself—and making known the means of arresting in its course the terrible wheel of Samsara, viz. by putting an end to that metempsychosis or endless series of rebirths whereby the soul no sooner completes one life of terrestrial suffering than it is forced to begin another in similar painful conditions.

The new religion, if we may bestow upon it this undeserved title, spread rapidly and soon dealt the death blow to Brahmanism, many of whose adherents became zealous apostles of Buddhism. How can this wonderful success be explained? Was Buddhism something entirely new, the exclusive creation of its founder, or did it have some historical connection with the past? These and others questions claim our attention, but before taking up the subject proper, it may be well to say a word about the land which became the theatre of the great conflict of philosophical, religious and social ideas.

India forms a vast peninsula joined by the Himalaya mountain range to the Asiatic continent. On the West it is separated from Beluchistan by the Indus, while on the South of the Himalayas and towards the East flows the Ganges one of the greatest rivers of the world, to which the ancient Brahmans ascribed a celestial origin, and of which the waters have always been considered as holy. The historic role of the basin of the Indus—apart from the Punjab which is common to both—fades into insignificance when compared with that of the great valley of the Ganges. To the latter belong all of the most celebrated cities of ancient and even of modern India: Delhi, Agra, Kanodge, Lucknow, Benares (the holy city *par excellence*), Patna and the very recent Calcutta. This region was the cradle of Brahmanism and later, of Buddhism which belonged more particularly to the angle of territory formed by the Ganges and the Yamuna, one of its tributaries, and at the junction of which is situated the city of Benares. In this region lived the various peoples who are famous in Indian epic poetry: The Angas, Magadhas, Videhas, Kasis, Kosalas, etc. They were not aborigines but came either form the North or from the West. They called themselves the Aryans i. e. nobles, and consistently with this title they formed the three privileged castes of India, the fourth caste being composed of slaves and captives.

To form a true notion not only of the propagation, but also of the origin of Buddhism, it is necessary to take a preliminary glance at the religious condition of India in the 5th Century B. C.

In consequence of a natural evolution, the progress of which can be traced with tolerable accuracy, Vedism had gradually been supplanted by Brahmanism without however, entailing any complete break between the two, for in the Brahmanic monuments still extant we find numerous evidences of Vedism, as also in the ideas and language. Whether the primitive religion of the Aryans consisted in nature worship is a question which in our present state of knowledge it is hard to answer. The most ancient documents bearing on the point are the Vedas, and these pre-suppose a religion which has already become refined and speculative in character. Sacrifice and prayer are the two elements that constitute the essence of the Vedic cult, which can be termed primitive not in the sense that it was not preceded by more rudimentary forms of worship, but because the historic knowledge of its earlier stages has not come down to us. The altar and its accessories, all the instruments of sacrifice were held not only as sacred but as divine—so many gods—and the time came when even the spoon used in the sacrificial ceremonies became itself the object of sacrifice. Prayer also was deified, and the sacred monosyllable *Om* so often met with in the Hinduism and Buddhism of to-day, from being the monogram of the *Trinnurti* (the Brahmanic Trinity inherited from Vedism) came to be honored as the *Trinnurti* itself.

Certain fundamental philosophical ideas passed from Vedism into Brahmanism. Thus, there is the *Atman*, or soul, the precise meaning of which it is not easy to define. It is not unlikely that the word had several different significations at different times, or even simultaneously. Finally it was defined as "that which is and is not," by which was meant that it was both visible and invisible, palpable and impalpable. It is All, it is Brahma. As everything proceeds from Brahma in order to return to him, it follows that all things presently outside of his being are merely in a transitory state which is neither definite nor true. Hence arose in the minds of certain Vedantic philosophers desirous of safe-guarding the unity of being, the idea of denying the reality of the visible universe. They wished to avoid the difficulty arising from the existence of contingent beings outside of the absolute Being, and thus affirmed that the latter alone existed; all visible things were but an illusion.

Buddhism on the other hand, far from denying the reality of the visible world, emphatically asserts its existence. But going to another extreme, it proclaims, not that existence in this world is something good, though limited and imperfect, but that is simply an evil—the Evil. What added to the Buddhistic horror of existence was the belief—ancient though perhaps not explicitly contained in the Vedas—that mortals are condemned not only to one life, but to pass through a series of re-births during countless ages. Those who find themselves fairly comfortable in their present existence are haunted by the fear of misery in a subsequent life, and those who are miserable in this life are liable to have the same lot later on, or even worse. For all there is distress in the present life caused or aggravated by the fear of lives to come. If it be asked why a re-birth following upon a good life should be feared, since more favorable conditions might be expected as a recompense, the Hindu replies that the new life will bring with it the danger of lapsing from the right way, and all the more as its conditions are to be, *ex hypothesi*, more fortunate; and thus the unhappy man will have later to begin another life of misery. Our existence then, revolves in a fatal circle and the best for us is to get out of it altogether and as soon as possible

Brahmanism had laid down the premisses, and Buddhism drew the conclusion: existence is an evil. Hindu fatalism contained the germ of Buddhistic pessimism. The prevalence of such a doctrine explains the torpor in which the peoples of the extreme Orient have languished for so many centuries, and from which, with the exception of Japan, it is so difficult to arouse them even in our own day. On the other hand this religious fatalism explains the present rapid spread of Islam in central Asia.

That the Buddha was not so much of an innovator as has been generally supposed, will appear more and more in the course of this study. Thus, for instance, monasticism is not a Buddhistic invention, though Buddhism is essentially monastic. Anchorites were common in Brahmanism at all times; solitude, a life of retreat in the depths of the forest or in the jungle found place among its recognized and approved institutions. The Mahabharata and the Ramayana abound in stories of monks living in community. Throughout these vast repertories of ancient tradition we are continually meeting with solitaries eminent in science and in sanctity to whom disciples flock from all parts on account of their renown, and we find that the great number of these cenobites belong to the Brahmanic caste. Nor were the travelling monks less common in Brahmanism than the solitaries, but what does seem to be peculiar to Buddhism is the practice of nuns living together in the *viharas* or convents, about which more will be said in the sequel.

THE LIFE OF BUDDHA.

At an early date legends began to grow up in connection with the life of Buddha, and it is quite probable that here, as in many similar instances, legend has preceded as well as obscured history. Indeed so large is the place occupied by it in the accounts that have come down to us, that in the opinion of certain scholars it is the only source from which they are derived, and Buddha according to them would be nothing more than a solar myth. No attempt was made to write a biography of the founder until long after his death, when all the witnesses of his works and their contemporaries had passed away. Until then the account of his life passed by means of oral tradition from one generation to another, and it is hardly necessary to say that it was not embodied in a fixed or stereotyped tradition, but was transmitted with many variations and additions. And so, when finally an attempt was made to gather up and unify these oral and fragmentary written traditions, it was already a difficult task to distinguish the fabulous from the historical elements, and indeed no thought of attempting such a discrimination entered into the minds of the compilers. On the contrary, the greatest importance was attached to the marvelous episodes of the accounts as being alone worthy of such a personage. It is well known that the hagiographers of the Middle Ages proceeded in the same manner in composing the "edifying" lives of the saints, as is amply shown in the excellent treatise of Delehaye *Les Légendes des Saints*. Modern critics therefore, in studying the accounts of the life of Buddha are endeavoring to do what his first biographers not only omitted, but which they had neither the desire nor the means of accomplishing, namely to eliminate from the story the unhistorical elements.

The most ancient traditions concerning Buddha are those of the island of Ceylon on the South, and those of Nepal on the extreme North. The former have always been and still continue to be studied; the latter after having lain for centuries in oblivion were brought to light only in recent times. All these traditions are preserved in *Pali*, the sacred language of Buddhism. In dealing with the productions of these ancient hagiographers of the East we of course expect to find none of the qualifications required in the modern historian, such for instance, as order, or precision or a coherent method of exposition. We should seek in these writings only what their authors wished to put into them, to wit, incidents supposed to be edifying, and which are generally set forth without any serious guarantee as to their actual occurrence. This indeed was a secondary consideration in the hagiographer whose purpose was to move the reader by the narration of edifying examples and precepts rather than to supply the mind with a knowledge of facts.

The writings in which the life of Buddha is related are for the most part collections of discourses or sermons attributed to the Master. Care is taken to indicate where and before what audience these discourses were pronounced, v. g. at Jatavana, near Kipilavastu, in the park of Anathapindika, in the midst of a great assembly of Bhikshus, etc. but the dates are not given. The Buddhistic writings are generally meagre with regard to details of the early years of Gautama (Buddha) and in many instances even these are manifestly legendary in character. Nor is this paucity of facts hard to account for. Gautama is of interest to the Buddhists only in his capacity or character of Buddha (i. e. the perfectly enlightened one) and consequently in the story of his life, all that preceded his illumination was held to be of little account. Besides, the form given to these texts, their object and peculiar character, precluded all research concerning the early life of the Saint. In the innumerable Buddhist *Sutras* for instance, as also in the *Vinaya*, it is only a question of his preaching and rules together with the various explanations and interpretations that have been given of them; of his existence before he became the Buddha little or nothing is said.

Such are the so-called historical data concerning our personage. Throughout this discussion the proper names shall be given in their original Sanscrit form: it was only later that they were modified into their Pali equivalents.

* * *

It was about six centuries before the Christian era that the founder of Buddhism was born in Kapilavastu, the capital of the Sakyas on the left bank of the Ganges. He was called Siddhartha. His father was Prince Suddhodana and his mother's name was Maya. His family, after the fashion of the princely races of India, wished to be considered as connected with some Vedic ancestor and Gautama was chosen to that effect, hence the name Gautama or Gotama given to Buddha. He is also known in history as Sakyamuni, a title which signifies the *muni* or original ancestor of the Sakya family. Maya his mother having died when he was only eight days old, he was brought up by his aunt Mahaprajapati. Arriving at man's estate, he was married to a princess whose name, though absent from the more authentic legends, is given in the others as Gopa, and to them was born a son who was named Rahula. Such are the only details which history has preserved concerning the youth of Buddha. Naturally legend could not be satisfied with such a meagre content, and it busied itself with long disquisitions on his miraculous birth and the prodigies of his childhood, which for brevity's sake are here passed over. Thus we come directly to the famous "goings out" (*sorties*) which were the occasion of his vocation, and which being in all the accounts, cannot be omitted.

According to the story, the father of Siddhartha (Buddha) in order to keep him in complete ignorance of human misery, had him brought up in a vast palace where everything was disposed with a view to charm his senses and deceive him as to the fleeting and unstable character of worldly happiness. Those who had charge of the young prince's education, were forbidden to allow him to go outside of this royal dwelling. Tired of moving always in the same restricted surroundings however enchanting in themselves, Siddhartha, already married, managed to evade the vigilance of his guardians and make a few rapid visits to the outer world.

On the first of these occasions he met an old man with gray hair and beard and quite decrepit. He inquired if he had been born in that condition, and was informed that he had once been young and vigorous like himself, but that old age had reduced him to his present condition. He asked if such were the fate of all men, and was told that none could escape it provided they lived long enough. The prince returned to his palace in a pensive dreamy mood. On the occasion of his next exit to the outer world, he beheld a sick person stretched on a couch and screaming because of the excruciating pains he was enduring. He asked an explanation and learned with stupefaction that sickness and pain respected no one, and that sooner or later he himself would have to experience them. Again he returned to his quarters with a new theme for meditation. On a third excursion outside the prescribed bounds he met with a funeral procession. Death, even the name of which he had thus far been ignorant of, suddenly appeared to him in all its hideous reality. He discovered that this great evil was even more inexorable than the others; that it spared no one, king or slave, prince or pauper, and that each day it was making a new advance toward himself in order to strike him down in his turn. The young man returned a prey to an extreme agitation of mind. All the splendors wherewith he was surrounded melted away from his view; the vision of the repulsive corpse lighted in ghastly fashion by the funereal torches haunted him day and night, and he could neither eat nor sleep.

Finally in a fourth visit beyond the forbidden precincts he came across a man with shaven head and a yellow garment, who went along with his eyes cast down and without paying any attention to his surroundings. The prince accosted him and inquired who he was and what was his occupation. The other replied that he was an ascetic and that he was laboring for his salvation. This was an occupation of which Siddhartha had never heard, and feeling a deep interest in the subject, he brought the monk back with him into the palace and placed himself under his instruction. It was this his first master who decided his vocation.

Such is in substance the most famous perhaps of all known legends. St. John Damascene found it circulating in his day, and was firmly persuaded that it was of Christian origin. From him it was borrowed by Jacobus de Voragine who incorporated it into the *Legenda Aurea* under the title: 'Lives of SS. Barlaam and Joasaph'. It goes without saying that the primitive story underwent many changes in the long course of ages before it was embodied in the work of Jacobus the Archbishop of Genoa.

The fantastic Hindu imagination gave itself a free rein in dealing with the episode of Siddhartha's departure from his palace. However, the more ancient documents speak of it with more sobriety, and first of all they set forth briefly the considerations which determined the young Kshatriya to leave home and those dear to him. He said to himself: "Family life is a life of subjection and servitude, a sinful condition; liberty consists in abandoning one's home." Thus thought Gautama and he left his home.

He departed, not as is stated in the later documents, furtively and without even saying adieu to his wife and child, but with the full knowledge of the members of his family who by their prayers and tearful entreaties vainly sought to retain him. Turning his back on his home, he gave himself up straightway to the quest of that science which was to dissipate the darkness of his soul and permit him to behold truth as it is in reality; in the possession of this science he sought for the discernment necessary in order that he might be delivered from his present state of illusion.

The sequel of the account of his life is almost entirely made up of late legends from which it is difficult to separate the few grains of historic truth which they may contain. During a period of seven years he wandered like a fugitive from solitude to solitude, from forest to forest, visiting the most renowned ascetics and placing himself under their direction. Thus he journeyed through vast regions, though always keeping near to the great basin of the Ganges, the holy river which he had been accustomed to revere ever since his early childhood. Nowhere in his peregrinations did he meet with aught but deception, but far from giving way to the temptations of discouragement by which he was at times assailed, he kept on his way, obstinate in his resolution to master at all costs the science of salvation.

His long perseverance was finally rewarded at a moment when he least expected it. One night weary from vain meditation on the great problem that had weighed so long and so heavily on his mind, he fell asleep at the foot of a *pippala* or sacred fig tree, when all at once the truth he had been seeking dawned upon his intelligence like a flash of lightning piercing through a mass of dark clouds, and immediately he was illumined to the very depths of his being. The young ascetic awoke to find himself the *Buddha* or illuminated one. At the same time a happiness such as he had never experienced flooded the soul of the seer. The crisis was over. The world no longer had for him any secret or mystery; henceforth he was enlightened as to its origin and destiny. Full of the assurance that he was not condemned to be born again, he felt in himself an intense and boundless joy.

In this illumination of Buddha (as we shall henceforth call him) some writers are pleased to see a solar myth, while others perceive in it a historical fact explicable by a kind of auto-suggestion such as we meet with so often in psychical investigation. The former view is hardly tenable, nor can much credence be given to the latter theory, however much in itself within the limits of possibility, for it is more than likely that we are dealing with a pure legend. This I venture to put forward as my own opinion until such time as new evidences, which I do not expect to be forthcoming, will have decided the case otherwise.

* * *

The newly illumined spent four weeks in recollection, solitude and silence. The comparison which has been made between this retreat in which Buddha prepared himself immediately for his apostolate and that of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the desert just after His baptism, is only, as Oldenberg remarks, a chance identity of situation, and of circumstances determined by this situation. I would add that that identity is merely on the surface, and that the conditions in which Christ sojourned in the desert are not at all the same as in the case of Buddha. The Messias never doubted of his mission, nor hesitated in fulfilling it, as happened with Buddha. Nor had He need of light from without to illumine Him in the accomplishment of that mission, He who was the Light itself come into the world.

At the end of the first week of his retreat Buddha saw unfold before his mind the whole chain of causes and effects of transmigration. Here briefly is his account of it.

"From ignorance come forms, and from forms knowledge, etc."

I will come to the last links of that long chain which binds the first cause to last effects.

"From concupiscence comes attachment (to existence), from attachment (to existence) conception, from conception birth, from birth come old age and death, sorrow and groaning, pain, chagrin and despair." Ignorance, it is seen, produces, if not immediately, at least by a series of secondary causes of which it is itself the principal cause, birth into this world with all its evils. It is the mother of sorrow: to suppress the one we must begin by suppressing the other.

In that last night of the first week, the Sublime, as he will call himself hereafter, assists at this long series of causes and effects. His imagination descended from that high pyramid where ignorance held sway to the ever enlarging base, where all the vanities and miseries of this world were rampant. When the vision was at an end and he turned back upon himself to draw the moral, the Perfect, (another of his numerous surnames), pronounced the following stanza: "Whilst the reign of eternal order unveiled itself to meditation, to the ardent meditations of Brahma, Brahma routed the legions of the Tempter as the sun pierces through the clouds."

The Tempter in question is none other than the famous Mara, the Spirit of evil, the Wicked One, who strove three several times to turn Buddha from his mission by promising to make him enter immediately into the supreme felicity of Nirvana. To the first temptation of Mara Buddha replied that he did not wish to enter Nirvana until he had formed a body of religious; to the second he replied that he wished first to assemble the religious women; to the third he expressed himself in these terms: "I shall not enter into Nirvana, O Wicked One, until the holy way of life I preach develops, is heard, is propagated among all the people and becomes familiar to all, after having been announced to all."

The texts in which we read this legend are far from being the most ancient, and if the Mahaparinibbana-sutta where they are found for the first time, as well as the Lalita-Vistara which reproduced it later are of a primitive redaction, anterior to the Gospels, which is not at all absolutely demonstrated, there is nothing to assure us that these works have escaped the common lot of Oriental writings, that they have not been retouched and have not undergone interpretations more or less considerable.

What might furnish this problem with a solution favorable to the partisans of the theory of borrowings from Buddhistic legends on the part of traditions in general and especially of the Gospels—a thesis dear to Ernest de Bunson, Rodophe Seydel and Arthur Lillie, not to speak of Max Müller, of Rhys-David, savants otherwise very estimable, nor of Emile Burnouf or of Jacolliot, to descend to these names—is the epigraphic and iconographic monuments of India, for it can hardly be question here of other countries where Buddhism was solidly implanted only in the first centuries of our era, posterior therefore to the composition of the Gospels and to the fixing of the traditions relative to the life of Christ. And to return to the point we are treating, if we discover in this period for example an inscription of Acoka which makes mention of the temptation of Buddha by Mara, so different otherwise from that of Our Savior by Satan, or if we discover an image or a statue representing the episode, and dating plainly back beyond our era, there would be ground to conclude, not that Christianity had borrowed some of its traditions from Buddhism, Oldenberg, Barth and Eugene Burnouf, their master (do not confuse Eugene with Emile) would forbid us this, but it should at least be recognized that Buddhism, in this regard and on this side, owes nothing either to Christianity.

The borrowings of modern Buddhism from Catholicism, from the liturgical and cultural point of view, are numberless. What it does now in this line it may very well have done in other lines before. It is a religion of adaptation and this explains in part its enormous and lasting success.

Let us not forget, I say it once for all, that our position, for us Christians, is excellent when it is question of borrowings and plagiarisms, a propos of the similarities existing between the traditions of Christianity and Buddhism. The Gospels can be dated within the limits of a century, and apart from certain contested passages, mostly of secondary interest, they have not undergone interpolations, whereas the writings of Brahmic and Buddhistic India wherein are related the deeds and exploits of Krishna and of Buddha cannot be dated even approximately, and they may have undergone incessant retouching even down to our own day.

We have just read the account of the triple temptation of Mara to turn Buddha from his mission. According to another Buddhic monument of greater importance, the Mahavagga (the Great Part, the Great Good) things did not happen the same way. The newly-illumined asked himself whether he ought to keep for himself the truth he had conquered at the price of such terrible conflicts. While he deliberated within himself upon it, the god Brahma came down from heaven to comfort him and to determine him to undertake the conversion of the world despite the fatigues and the perils that would attend it. "Arise, he said to him, arise valiant hero, rich in victories, walk through the world thou stainless guide! Raise thy voice O Master: many will comprehend thy word."

Buddha did not respond to this first summons. He raised the objection of the uselessness of his efforts for a great number, who would reject his teaching.

Notice the difference between this legend and the preceding, that of the temptation of Mara. Three times Mara tried to turn Buddha from teaching the good doctrine, alleging besides what we have seen that same indifference of people toward him, and three times Buddha replied that had he but one soul to listen, that would suffice to determine him to speak. Here Brahma renews his prayer three times and presses the Sublime to quit his solitude and instruct the multitudes. It is not till the third time that he allows himself to be convinced. We are in the presence of two contradictory currents of tradition.

Buddha finally yields to the insistence of the god, he who later seems not to admit the existence of the Divinity, and is taken for an atheist. The world, according to the image employed by the poet of Mahavagga, appeared to him a pool full of lotuses, some blue, some white, some above water, others on its surface, the rest at the bottom. The latter represented base sordid souls with whom his preaching would be ineffectual. The lotuses resting on the surface of the water were a figure of souls incapable of saving themselves, but only awaiting a ray of the sunlight truth to emerge and open out in full bloom. The first finally were the intelligences of the elite open before the sunlight. So a third of men were damned in spite of him, another third were saved without him, and the other third awaited him in order to be able to avoid hell and to attain the felicity of Nirvana.

Buddha cries out: "Let this gate of salvation be open to all! Let him that hath ears hear my word and believe! I thought of my own suffering; this is why, O Brahma, I have not yet revealed the noble word to men.

The god withdrew satisfied.

Buddha experiences no further obstacles; his scruples are dispelled; a new phase of his existence is about to begin—preaching.

His first sermon Buddha gives at Benares. He had for auditors five monks who had formerly followed him, at the time he was leading the penitent and mortified life, but who had left him later when he believed he ought to renounce that life of privation and live like the rest of men. They had seen him coming from afar, when after his illumination he turned toward Benares. After a little hesitation they consented to hear him, demanding however how he had been able to attain unto truth leading a comfortable and easy life, since he had not found it in the macerations of the most rigorous asceticism. Buddha replied that the truth is precisely in the way which lies equally distant from macerations and voluptuousness. It is the sacred way of eight branches viz. "pure faith, pure will, pure language, pure action, pure means of existence, pure aspirations, pure memory, pure meditation."

Birth, old age, sickness, separation from what one loves, union with what one does not love, privation of desire; all this is sorrow. In fine sorrow is the five-fold attachment viz. attachment to the five elements which constitute the physical and moral being of man: the body, sensations, representations, formation of tendencies, and knowledge. It is the thirst for life that causes rebirth; quench this thirst and we shall be reborn no more.

Knowledge of the fourfold truth—sorrow, its origin, its abolition and the means of abolishing it—this is the essence of Buddha and consequently of Buddhism.

Such is the substance of the famous sermon at Benares. Buddha, according to the consecrated expression, had "turned the wheel of the law" in order to arrest the law of Samsara or of transmigrations.

The five monks were converted to the doctrine of Buddha and so became the first disciples of Buddha. They were the sacred Bhikshus, or as it will be pronounced Bhikkhus. Soon the number of neophytes was sixty. The Perfect One sent them out alone to preach the holy truth. He said to them: "O disciples, go forth for the salvation of many, for the happiness of many, through compassion for the world, for goodness, for salvation, for the happiness of gods and men. Go not two in the same way. Preach, O disciples, the doctrine which is glorious in its beginning, glorious in its surroundings, glorious in its end, preach it in its spirit and in its letter, publish the full life, the perfect and pure life, the life of sanctity. There are beings whom the dust of the earth does not blind; but if they do not hear this doctrine preached they cannot attain salvation. They will embrace the doctrine."

This is indeed a program magnificent in appearance, and yet what Buddhism pursues by another way, is, like Brahminism, the destruction of personality. In Brahaminism, however, that destruction consists in the absorption of the individual soul, of Jîvatman, of Paramatman or the Supreme Soul, while Buddhism ignores the Supreme Soul, at least it is not occupied with it. It places salvation in Nirvana, the nature of which we shall study later on, but of which we may say here that it is a destruction and not an absorption.

Setting out from Benares, the Perfect One turned his steps toward Ourouvela where lived a thousand ascetics whom he undertook to convert. They had as chiefs the three brothers Kassapa. Buddha first delivered these Muni from an infernal serpent that troubled their sacrifices. The gods themselves came down to hear him, so eloquent was his word! One of the brothers still resisted after all his companions had been converted to the new doctrine. A last conference got the better of his resistance. From Ourouvela Buddha betook himself to Rajagaha, the capital of Magadha, where he was awaited by the king Bimbisara whom he converted without difficulty to his teaching together with all his people. It was at Rajagaha that Oupatissa put to the disciple Assaji his famous questions, and held with him the dialogue mentioned in the inscription of Bairat, engraved at the instance of the Buddhist king Acoka, about 260 B. C. and recently discovered. Oupatissa besought Assaji to sum up the doctrine of his master for him, whereupon Assaji recited this stanza: "Objects result from one cause, the Perfect One teaches this cause and shows how they come to an end."

That speech was a revelation for Oupatissa, who concluded: "All that is subject to birth, is subject also to disappearance." And taking leave of his interlocutor: "Even tho the doctrine of the Master confined itself to this you would none the less have attained to the state wherein there is no sorrow, a state unknown for myriads of cycles." Buddhism counted one more adept.

According to previous agreement, the neophyte went in search of a friend named Moggalana and announced to him that he had at last found the truth for which they had each been seeking. Seeing him afar off Moggalana cried to him: "Friend, thy countenance is serene and thy face pure and clear. Hast thou found deliverance from death?" And Oupatissa answered him joyfully: "Yes, friend, I have found deliverance from death." He then recounted to him his conference with Assaji. Moggalana had his eyes opened in turn and ranged himself under the banner of Buddha. The inhabitants of Magadha complained of the many conversions wrought by Buddha and his disciples especially among the youth. Children quitted their parents to attach themselves to his following. Buddha stopped their murmurs by converting the malcontents. These primitive traditions for the most part legendary, help us, in the absence of documents clearly and candidly historical, to form an idea of the way the generations following almost immediately that of Gautama understood the origin of Buddhism and its developments. We have to deal here with peoples of a special temperament, of a spirit at once religious and very philosophical, starving for beliefs and greedy of reasonings, disposed to believe all and yet equally inclined to dispute all. Having thought they recognized the insufficiency of ancient traditions, they embraced with enthusiasm a new doctrine which appeared to answer better their preoccupations and of a nature to dissipate their doubts. The hour of reflection will come when that of infatuation is passed. They will discuss, and consequently will doubt. Buddhism, at least in India, its cradle, will not be able to endure that crisis of examination, and there will be as much precipitation in abandoning it for the ancient beliefs as there was in deserting them for it. So this almost total disappearance of Hindu Buddhism which seems to have been so rapid, (history telling us nothing but the mere fact), can be explained in large measure, without having recourse to the hypothesis of persecutions, of which there is no mention, by that dissolving spirit of examination which has always characterized the people of India.

Pursuing this study, we shall see how much modern Buddhism differs from primitive Buddhism, how much that of China and of Japan, for example, differs from that of Mongolia and Thibet, and we shall be led to conclude that this word is like a tent that covers much merchandise of every sort.

Siddartha was forty years of age when he became Buddha, and his preaching lasted, it is said, the other forty years of his life. Of that preaching of nearly a half century we have an infinite number of details but very little information that is precise or characteristic. Legend has transformed this last period of the life of the Master, as it has the first, and transmitted, it has been well observed, not portraits of individuals but purely conventional types, each one of a whole category of personages. The Buddhist is one type, his enemy is another. Going through the life of Buddha as it is described in the most ancient monuments, we see that the figure of the Master detaches itself in bold relief, and it could hardly be otherwise; but it is not so with its entourage. His disciples, or simply his partisans, were all cast in the same mould, likewise his adversaries. All are alike and when you have met one you know them all. This desolate uniformity is found not only in persons but in their discourses and their acts. They use the same formulae in interrogating the Master, who for his part is at no more expense to his imaginaation. An example which I take from Oldenberg is quite typical.

Buddha is at Rajagaha when a crowd of unqualified persons each one having a diriment impediment, present themselves for minor ordination, Pabbajja. They are about to proceed, not knowing of these defects, when remonstrance is made, attracting the attention of the Master, who decides that the candidate is not admissible in a certain determined case. His decision is law. We pass on to another case of irregularity which is debated and settled in the same fashion. It is a course in canon law dramatized, but all the persons are alike as well as their sayings, and the monotony that perhaps was sought to be avoided by this process becomes only heavier and more fatiguing, at least for us Europeans who much prefer a regular treatise without all this stage-setting. The Asiatic temperament is not the same as ours, especially the Hindu temperament. What we regard as sobriety would pass as indigence with this people, and what we would call a foolish debauch of the imagination would seem to them quite simple and natural.

Buddha was wont to interrupt his evangelical courses during the rainy season, which lasted three months. He then took refuge as best he could in huts of foliage a little apart from the populace. The day began with meditation, then in the morning the Bhikkhus went begging through the neighboring villages. They presented themselves in silence at each door, dish in hand, and waited for some time. Whether they were given or refused an alms they departed without a word and returned to their hermitage a little before noon to take their repast, which was the principal, even sometimes the only one of the day. After eating they took a siesta which was followed by another meditation interrupted by instructions for the edification of the people from outside who came to visit the Master, or by instructions from himself.

The rainy season over, Buddha quitted his asylum to resume the course of his pious pilgrimages. He was always followed by a troup of faithful, varying according to the estimate of ancient texts, from three hundred to five hundred. His field of action was chiefly the North-East of India, what is now the provinces of Oude and Bihar which formed at that epoch the ancient kingdoms of Kocakas and Magadhas.

Buddha preached in the open air, at the gates of cities and towns or in public gardens and parks, the most famous of which were the Velouvana and the Jetavana, the former graciously given to the Sublime by his friend king Bimbisara, the second bought from Prince Jeta by the rich merchant Anathapindaka. When they heard of his arrival in one of these parks or pleasure-groves which encircled every town of importance, the whole population, headed by the king if it were a royal city, gathered around him, according to tradition, to salute him, to submit their doubts and to hear his exhortations.

Nevertheless all did not accept at once the new doctrine, particularly the Brahmans, up to this the exclusive and undisputed masters of science, and it was in their ranks that Buddha, who it will be remembered belonged to the warrior caste, found his most bitter adversaries. The ancient annalists complacently describe these numerous tournaments which of course invariably ended in a victory for the Master and the conversion of the vanquished.

The person of Buddha was an object of contention, and it was accounted a great privilege even for a prince, that he should consent to dine with him together with his disciples. He honored the feast out of deference for his hosts, avoiding of course everything that might reflect upon his reputation. These marks of condescendence had the effect of gaining hearts to him; they approached him willingly because they saw he was easily accessible, without ever pushing liberty to the point of familiarity. His most distinguished hosts, kings, queens, the latter especially, served him with their own hands and accounted it a great honor that he should but accept their pressing attentions.

We shall see later upon what subjects the Sublime turned his thoughts, and there perhaps, we shall, while admiring the constancy of his efforts, regret the end to which he devoted them. At any rate at first sight this attitude is not lacking in dignity, and even in a certain grandeur.

The first Buddhists were monks, for they were only admitted into the growing community after having passed, not perhaps an apprenticeship or regular novitiate, but at least a sort of initiation, and having been submitted to an interrogation the formula of which has been preserved to us. We shall consider it later on. Exterior marks distinguished them in public; the yellow robe, the tonsure, and the alms-dish. They were thus separated from the profane by their manner of dress and of life, for they were vowed to poverty as well as to celibacy. Everything was abandoned to follow what was regarded as one's vocation, and there is recorded this word of the father of a family whom his wife, showing him his little babe, sought to keep him at home and prevent him from answering the call of Buddha. "Though you throw our son to the jackals and the dogs you will not persuade me to remain, O miserable woman, for the love of our child." Hence the reproaches addressed to Buddha that he was accused of depriving children of their parents and parents of their children, and wives of their husbands, leaving behind him, like cruel conquerers, none but widows and orphans. Be it noted here that if the Buddhic community were not a closed one, and if its members were allowed to remain with their families such complaints would not have been raised on this point. Moreover the

Master was not reproached with having inaugurated a new kind of life, monasticism, but with having recruited his neophytes even from among fathers of families.

All the members of the Buddhist community were equal, whatever the caste to which each might belong. We have already observed that Buddha did not endeavor to abolish castes nor did he preach that social equality that he is credited with. He contented himself with ignoring them in his community where all lived on the same footing, which indeed was already a progress and a great progress. I may add that this was all in this matter, and that the laity affiliated to Buddhism in the quality of protectors, as we shall see later, might preserve and did preserve their social rank.

To pretend that Sakyamuni abolished these is contrary to the truth: "Every consciencious historian of Buddha," says Oldenberg, these are his own expressions, "must deny him absolutely the glory of having accomplished a revolution of this kind, in any other way than is represented in the details."The eminent Indianist recalls that even this pretended progress which I spoke of just now in the abolition of castes in religious communities, the Cramanas or Samanas practiced long before the appearance of Buddhism, so that here again Gautama did no more than follow a tradition regularly and firmly established. Oldenberg goes further. While recognizing that in theory Buddha did not close the gates of his community to any one, he observes that in fact the community is recruited exclusively from the privileged castes and especially from the ranks of the Brahmans. He cites the principal disciples of Buddha whose names and titles tradition has preserved to us; they are all "sons of family" as we would say to-day. The sole exception usually made in favor of the barber Oupali and which, perhaps, would only prove the rule, would not really be an exception, Oupali being an official person, accredited to the family of the Sakyasto which Buddha himself belonged.

Another remark to make, and which has been made, is that according to the Buddhist dogma a Buddha can only be born in the caste of the Brahmans or that of the Kshatriyas. So in that case the bourgeois element itself is eliminated, a fortiori the popular element. The old documents, which are the best authorized, when speaking of the early days of Buddhism as being best formed in the original spirit, never fail in referring to a person considerable for his eminent sanctity, to note that he was priest or noble, Brahman or Kshatriya.

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[to be continued].

THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST AND MODERN CRITICISM

Gabriel Oussani, D. D.

I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The concentrated attack, so fiercely launched by the radical wing of modern German and English New Testament critics, against the Scriptural and traditional doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth has reached, of late, such an acute stage that it has created, we must confess, an alarming situation, alarming for Catholics and conservative Protestants alike. The attack, it must be recognized, is not merely an isolated effort, but it represents a movement and a tendency on the part of certain German and Anglican theologians and critics to discredit the historical trustworthiness and authenticity of the Gospel narratives and to reduce Christianity to a set of historical and psychological phenomena which were exceptional indeed, but still quite natural in character. Were the movement in question confined to German critics alone it would not perhaps have created such consternation, as German theological surprises, critical shocks and pan-Babylonian earthquakes are the order of the day and always ready for delivery; but the fact that the movement in question has been heartily welcomed, patronized and even pushed forward by some of the most distinguished and most representative Anglican critics and theologians has produced a most lamentable impression.

It is needless to say that scientific freedom in New Testament criticism and exegesis should be welcomed by all those who have at heart the real interests of religion and science. But when this freedom becomes merely an instrument of destructive criticism which goes beyond its own limits, and bases itself on unwarranted assumptions, presuppositions, prejudices, fancies and mythological mania, it must be denounced and opposed not only for the interest of religion but also for that of true science and criticism. We cannot but greatly admire and welcome the splendid work accomplished by these same critics in many of their investigations in the vast and difficult field of Old and New Testament literary and historical criticism, but we must speak out vigorously against the abuses and indiscretions which they have, directly or indirectly, committed in many of their investigations and conclusions; a splendid specimen of which is furnished in their criticism of the Christian doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

It is hardly necessary to insist on the capital importance of the dogma in question, as it affects the very vitals of the organism of Christianity, the very heart of Christian tradition and belief. With the destruction of the historical character of the dogma of Christ's Virgin Birth the whole fabric of dogmatic Christianity would be shattered.

PART I.

HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY.[1]

In its present shape, the attack against the dogma of Christ's Virginal conception is of quite recent date. It started in Germany in a rather mild and general way some fifty years ago, became more earnest thirty years later and assumed a dangerous aspect in the last ten or fifteen years. From Germany it crossed into England where at first it aroused only a passing interest. Towards the closing years of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth, however, it burst out with startling vehemence and raged with such violence that it threatened for a while to disrupt the powerful organization of the Church of England. America, France and Italy refused for a while to be drawn into the controversy, but in the last three or four years they have been forced to enter the arena by the pressing nature of the question at issue.

Strauss and the Tübingen school may be properly asserted to be the pioneers in the negative criticism of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth. But as Prof. Sweet rightly remarks, "It is to be remembered that Strauss should not be quoted against the Infancy section *exclusively*, inasmuch as he was the assailant of every cardinal fact in the N. T. narrative....The Tübingen theory of the origin of the New Testament dealt impartially with all the documents, ranging them on the one side or the other of the great Pauline-Petrine controversy according to the alleged tendency of each. In this distribution, the Infancy documents shared with the others, but suffered no more severely than any".[2]

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[1] For the history of the Controversy see in particular: *L. M. Sweet "The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ according to the Gospel Narratives,"* Philadelphia, 1906; *A. J. Maas, S. J. Modern Protestants on the Virginity of the Mother of Christ,"* in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, April, 1903, and separately in the collection entitled *The Catholic Mind*; *Lobstein P. Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York, 1903, especially in the *Introduction*, and in the *Notes* appended to the volume; Mgr. *T. Batiffol, La Question Biblique dans l' Anglicanisme*, Paris (collection *Science et Religion*); *Orr A. The Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York, 1907, lecture 1st, and especially *S. Verschoyle, "The Liberal Movement in the Church of England,"* in the "*Contemporary Review,*" August, 1903; and *Abbé Houtin* in "*La Question Biblique au XXe Siècle, Paris,* 1906. pp. 223-240.

The Strauss-Tübingen attack was resumed and more systematically engineered by critics like Keim,[3] Beyschlag[4], De Wette,[5] Reuss,[6] O. Holtzmann,[7] Sydow,[8] Fischer,[9] Hillmann,[10] Harnack,[11] Usener,[12] Rohrback,[13] Schmiedel,[14] Hering[15], Gunkel,[16] Soltau,[17] Lobstein,[18] and others.[19] Their concentrated attack on the Virginal Conception of Christ naturally terminated in a consistent denial of Mary's "*ante-partum*" and "*in partu*" as well as "*post-partum*" virginity. These various German attacks on these unique privileges of Jesus and Mary have been summarised in a masterly way by Father A. J. Maas S. J. as follows: "The modern school rejects to a great extent even the divinity of Christ, and denies therefore, almost of necessity the virginity of His Blessed Mother. Hermann Usener[20] derives what he calls the legend of the Virgin Birth from pagan sources, seeing in it a Christian adaptation of certain parts of pagan mythology. H. J. Holtzmann[21] considers all the gospel passages which imply Mary's virginity as later interpolations. Joh. Hillman[22] attempts to prove that the 'redactor' is responsible for all the objectionable passages, i. e., for all the verses favoring Christ's miraculous conception and birth. Joh. Weiss,[23] though not favourably impressed with Hillman's theory, feels quite certain that the Judaeo-Christian source of the third gospel knew nothing of the virgin birth. Both Hillman and Joh. Weiss, therefore, agree with Usener in tracing the account of the miracle back to mythological sources. Adolf Harnack[24] considers it as one of the most certain results of historical criticism that the words 'born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary' formed no part of the original gospel teaching. P. Lobstein,[25] though he is either not acquainted or not satisfied with the work of some of his predecessors, applies the principles of not merely the higher but the highest criticism to what he calls the myth of the virigin birth. F. Kattenbusch believes the main critical difficulty can be removed by the omission of the few words 'because I know not man'.

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[2] *The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, Philadelphia, 1906. pp. 288-289.

[3] *Life of Jesus of Nazara* (Eng. tr. Williams and Norgate, 2d. ed.).

[4] *Leben Jesu*, vol. I.

[5] In his *commentary on the Gospels*, ad locum.

[6] In his *Commentary on the Gospels*, ad locum.

[7] *Life of Jesus* (Eng. Translation, 1904,); also *H. J. Holtzmann, Synoptischen Evangelien. Ihr Ursprung und Geschichtlichen charakter*, secs. 12 and 13.

[8] *Die Wunderbare Geburt Jesu; Berlin*, 1873, and *Aktenstucke betretend das ueber mich verhœngte Disciplinarverfahren wegen meines Vortrags uber die wunderbare Geburt Jesu*, Berlin 1873.

[9] *Das Berliner Consistorium und Sydow*, Berlin, 1873.

[10] *Die Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu nach Lukas*, in the *Jahrbuecher fuer protestantische Theologie*, 1891, pp. 192-261.

[11] *Das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss*, Berlin ,1892, p. 23ff.

[12] *Religionsgeschichte Untersuchungen*, vol. I. Bonn, 1899; and his article on *Mary*, in Cheyne's *Encyclopedia Biblica.*

[13] *Geboren von der Jungfrau. Das Zeugniss des Neuen Testaments gegen die Lehre von der ubernaturliehen Geburt Jesu Christi*, Berlin, 1898.

[14] In his articles *Jesus*, and *Brethren of Jesus* in Cheyne's *Encyclopedia Biblica.*

[15] *Die dogmatische Bedeutung und der religioese Wert der uebernatuerlichen Geburt Christi*, in the *Zeitschrift fuer Theologie und Kirche*, vol. v. (1895) pp. 58-91.

[17] *Die Geburtsgeschichte Jesu Christi*, Leipzig, 1902; translated into English under the title *The Birth of Jesus Christ*, Edinburg, 1902.

[18] *Die Lehre von der uebernatuerlichen Geburt Christi*, Freiburg, 1896. This work, which was originally written in French (1890) and afterwards revised and enlarged in German (1896), appeared also in English under the title *Virgin Birth of Christ*, Putnam, 1903, forming vol. 2nd of the *Crown Theological Library*.

[19] The doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth was also indirectly attacked in Germany about 15 years ago when the heated controversy over the Apostle's Creed was in full rage. As was to be expected, this often bore upon the dogma of the miraculous Birth, and gave rise to a certain number of works immediately inspired by it. The defensive side was taken by *Wohlenberg, Empfangen und heiligen Geist, geboren von der Jungfrau Maria*, Leipzig, 1893; *Wagner, Mitteilungen und Nachrichten fuer die evangelische Kirche in Russland*, Januarheft, 1894; *Haussleiter, Zur Vorgeschte des apostolischen Glaubensbekenntnisses*, Muenchen, 1893; *Th. Zahn, Das apostolische Symbolum*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1892; and *Cremer, Zum Kampf um das Apostolikum*, 1892. The negative side, on the other hand, was advocated by *Harnack, The Apostles' Creed*, London, 1892; *Herrmann, Worum handelt es sich im dem Streit*

"Meanwhile, H. J. Holtzmann, dissatisfied with his former solution of the problem, proposed a new way of removing the objection-

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um das Apostolikum? Leipzig, 1893; *Bornemann, Der Streit um das Apostolikum*, Magdenburg, 1893; *Kattenbusch, Das apostolische Symbol*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1984-1897-1900; also *Harnack, History of Dogma*, vol. I. For these and other details see in particular *Lobstein, The Virgin Birth of Christ*, pp. 115-118; and *Holtzmann*, in his *Handbook of New Testament Theology, Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, 1897, vol. I. pp. 409-415. See also *James Orr, The Virgin Birth of Christ*, Scribners, New York, 1907, pp. 4-6.

[20] *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen I: Das Weihnachtsfest*, Bonn, 1889.

[21] *Hand-Commentar zum N. T.*, vol. I. Freiburg, 1889, p. 31 f.

[22] *Die Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu nack Lukas kritisch untersucht, in Jahrbuecher fuer protestantische Theologie*, vol. XVII., 1891, p. 192-261.

[23] *Bernhard Weiss und Lic. Joh. Weiss zu Luk.* i, 34-39, in *H. A. W. Meyer's Krit-exegetische Kommentar ueber das N. T.*, Goettingen, 1892, p. 302, 305.

[24] *Das Apostol. Glaubensbekenntniss*, Berlin, 1892, p. 23 ff.

[25] *Die Lehre von der uebernatuerlichen Geburt Christi*, Freiburg, 1896, p. 27, 33, 36.

able passage in Lk. i. e. 34 f.;[26] but H. Weinel[27] pronounced Kattenbusch's theory the best way out of the difficulty. But even with all this, Adolf Harnack did not consider the spuriousness of Lk. i. 34 f. sufficiently established; he therefore summarized his own proofs against the authenticity of the passage in a paper contributed to the *Zeitschrift fur neutestamentliche Wissenschaft,* leaving it, however,[28] doubtful whether the passage had been inserted by Luke himself or a later interpolator. Whatever effect Harnack's proofs may have produced on the circle of his own followers, they did not convince Adolf Hilgenfeld;[29] this independent critic assigns the whole account of the birth and infancy of Jesus[30] to a later recension of the third gospel, and objects most decidedly against the practice of treating the above shortened passages in the narrative as interpolations. Still, while this eminent scholar answers most of Harnack's arguments quite satisfactorily, he agrees with Harnack, and with Lobstein too, in deriving the so-called myth of the virgin birth from a false interpretation of Is. vii., 14, current in early Judaeo-Christian circles.

Of late, Ludlow Conrady[31] has come to the conclusion that the history of the infancy has been derived from Egyptian mythology; he believes that it passed into our gospels through the medium of the *Protoevangelium Jacobi,* an apocryphal work written by a good-natured Christian poet in Alexandria, about 120 A. D. But Conrady found out to his sorrow that our professional higher critics are as averse to any theory that outrages common sense too much as they are impatient of any view which agrees too closely with the dictates of sound reason. Hence representatives of as different critical tendencies as Ernst von Dobschutz,[32] H. J. Holtzmann[33] and J. Hillmann[34] agree in disagreeing with Conrady's explanation of the account of the virgin birth. But the end is not yet. Theod. Zahn, of Erlangen, a scholar well known for his conservative tendencies,[35] and Professor F. A. C. Sieffert, of Bonn,[36] have refurbished the old weapon so often and so ineffectually wielded against Mary's perpetu a virginity. They again appeal to the brethren of Jesus in order to show that Mary cannot have remained a virgin at least after giving birth to our Lord."[37]

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[26] *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie* I. Freiburg, 1897 p. 412 f.

[27] *Die Auslegung des apostolischen Bekenntnisses von Kattenbusch und die neutestamentliche Forschung,* in the *Zeitschrift fuer neutestamentliche Wissenschaft,* II., 1901, 37-39.

[28] vol. II., 1901, pp. 53-57.

[29] *Die Geburt aus der Jungfrau in dem Lukasevangelium,* in the *Zeitschrift fuer Wissenschaftliche Theologie,* vol. XLIV, p. 313-317.

[30] Luke I., 5-ii., 52.

[31] *Die Quelle der Kanonischen Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu; ein wissenschaftlicher Versueh;* Gottingen, 1900.

[32] *Litteratur Centralblatt,* vol. LI, 1900, 2153 f.

[33] *Theologische Litteraturzeitung,* XXVI., 1901, 135-137.

[34] *Deutsche Litteraturzeitung,* vol. XXII.. 1901, 1605-1607.

The destructive criticism of these otherwise brilliant scholars and critics, who, by the way, deny more or less explicitly the divinity of Christ, was met, by strong protests and opposition from scholars like Weiss,[38] Endemann[39] Resch,[40] Steinmeyer,[41] Nebe[42], Berthoud,[43] Thraen,[44] and Zahn,[45] in Germany; Lightfoot,[46] Gore,[47] Ramsay,[48] Sanday,[49] Plummer,[50] Robinson,[51] Knowling,[52] Allen,[53] Orr,[54] and others in England; and by Godet[55] in France. Even Mary's *perpetual* virginity found strong defenders in Lightfoot,[56] Feine,[57] Plummer,[58] Nösgen,[59] Resch,[60] Endemann,[61] and others, not to speak of our Catholic scholars, Dr. Fonck,[62] Bardenhewer,[63] Lagrange,[64] Maas,[65] Durand,[66] Batiffol,[67] Camuset,[68] Vacandard,[69] Lesêtre,[70] Rose[71] and others.

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[35] *Forschungen zur Geschichte der neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altchristlichen Literatur, vol. vI.*, 2, *Brueder und Vettern Jesu*, p. 225-372; Leipzig, 1900.

[36] *Jacobus im N. T.*, in the *Realencyclopedie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3d edit., vol. VIII, Leipzig, 1900.

[37] *Modern Protestants on the Virginity of the Mother of Christ*, in the series called the *Catholic Mind*, pp. 6-8, originally appeared in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, April, 1903.

[38] *Life of Jesus* (English translation), Edinburg, 1883, and the same author's *Introduction to the New Testament* (Eng. trans.) 2 vols. Also *Lange, Life of the Lord Jesus Christ* (English translation by Taylor and Ryland), Philadelphia.

[39] *Zur Frage uber die Bruder des Herrn*, in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, vol. IX., 1900, 833-865.

[40] *Das Kindheitsevangelium nach Lukas und Matthaeus*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 327 ff.

[41] *Die Geschichte der Geburt des Herrn und seiner ersten Schritte im Leben, mit Bezug auf die neueste Kritik*, 1873.

[42] *Die Kindheitsgeschichte des Herrn nach Matthæus und Lukas*, 1893.

[43] *La naissance miraculeuse de Jesus-Christ*, in the *Chretien évangélique*, 20 Mai, 1893.

[44] *La naissance miraculeuse*, in his *Conférences apologetiques et dogmatiques*, Paris, 1900, pp. 51-161.

[45] *Einleitung in das N. T.* An English translation of this masterly work is about to be issued by Scribners.

[46] *Essays on the work entitled Supernatural Religion*, London, 1889, p. 235 ff; *The Brethren of the Lord*, in *Dessertations on the Apostolic Age*, London, 1892, p. 1-45; and *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, London, 1892, pp. 252-291.

[47] *The Virgin Birth of Our Lord*, in his *Dissertations on subjects connected with the Incarnation*, London, 2d ed., 1896, pp. 1-68; and in his *Bampton Lectures* on *The Incarnation of the Son of God*, London, 1891, 10th ed., 1898.

[48] *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* New York, 1898.

[49] *The Virgin Birth of Our Lord Jesus Christ*, in the *Christian World Pulpit*, 4 February, 1903; and in his *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, NewYork, 1905, reprinted from *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible.*

[50] *Commentary on Luke*, in the *International Critical Commentary*, New York, 1896.

[51] *Some Thoughts on the Incarnation*, London, 1903.

[52] *Our Lord's Virgin Birth and the Criticism of To-day*, London, 1904.

[53] *Commentary on Matthew*, in the *International Critical Commentary*, New York, 1907.

[54] *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York. This book contains Dr. Orr's Lectures on the subject delivered in New York, April, 1907, under the auspices of the Bible

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Teachers' Training School. These interesting lectures are followed by an Appendix giving the opinions of various living scholars on the subject. These papers were procured by Dr. W. W. White, of the Bible Teachers' Training School. The authors are the following: Prof. Sanday, of Oxford; Sir William Ramsay, of Aberdeen; Rev. G. Box, of Herefordshire; Prof. Addis, of Manchester College; Canon R. J. Knowling, of Durham College; Principal Alfred Garvie, of New College; Rev. Wheeler Robinson, of Rawdon College; Prof. Theodore Zahn, of the University of Erlangen; Prof. Seeberg, of Berlin; Prof. Bavinck of Amsterdam; Rev. Prof. Doumergue, Montauban, France; Rev. H. C. G. Moule, bishop of Durham; Rev. Griffith-Thomas, Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford; Prof. H. Cowan of the University of Aberdeen; Joseph Jacobs (Jew), of New York; Prof. Ismar J. Peritz (Jewish convert), of Syracuse University; Pasteur Hirsh, of Paris, and Rev. Gabriel Oussani of St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie. With the exception of Mr. Joseph Jacobs, (who is a Jew), all the above mentioned writers defend more or less explicitly the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

[55] *Commentary on Luke's Gospel* (American Standard edition, Funk and Wagnall). It is needless to mention here the "scurrilous indecency" with which that most superficial and indecent of Deists, Voltaire, treated the Gospel narrative of Christ's Virgin Birth (see his *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke*, ch. x). Not less insipid was Paulus who tried to give a natural explanation of the event by supposing Mary to have been the victim of a deception practised upon her by her kinswoman Elisabeth (See Strauss's *Life of Christ*, vol. I. p. 18). Renan, of course, denies the supernatural element (*Life of Jesus*, ch. II.).

[56] In his works cited above, especially in the second.

[57] *Eine vorkanonische Uberlieferung des Lukas, Gotha*, 1891, pp. 27-30.

[58] *Commentary on Luke*, 1896, p. 6, 24.

[59] *Die Evangelien nach Matthaeus, Mark und Lukas*; in the *Kurzgefasster Kommentar*, Munchen, 1897, p. 291 ff.

[60] *Das Kindheitsevangelium nach Lukas und Matthaeus*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 327 ff.

[61] *Zur Frage uber die Brueder des Herrn*, quoted above, pp. 833-865.

[62] in the *Zeitschrift fur Katholische Theologie*, vol. IV. 1901, pp. 649-677.

[63] *Zur Geschichte der Auslegung der Worte "Wie soll dies geschehen, da ich keinen Mann erkenne?"* in the *Compte rendu du Ame Congres scientifique internationale des Catholiques*, Freibourg, vol. II. pp. 13-22; also his *Patrologie*, 2d ed. Freiburg, 1901, p. 128; *Lit Rundschau*, vol. XXVII., 1901, 7-9, but especially his *Maria Verkundigung, Ein Kommentar zu Lukas* I, 26-38, forming Heft 5 of Band X. of *Studien Biblische*, edited by the distinguished same author.

[64] *Revue Biblique*, 1895, pp. 160-185.

[65] op. laud.

[66] In a series of articles entitled *L'Evangile de l' Enfance*, in the *Revue Pratique d' Apologétique*, vol. IV. 1907.

[67] *La Question Biblique dans l' Anglicanisme*, Paris, forming a vol. of the well-known series *Science et Religion.*

[68] *La conception virginale de Christ*, in the *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, vol. IV. N(1907), pp. 701-709.

While these attacks were being launched in Germany against the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth, English theologians and critics did not remain, and how could they? unaffected and inactive. At first, and even as late as the year 1900, the great majority of Anglican critics and divines held steadfast to the traditional belief, so much so that all candidates for the ministry who did not explicitly profess the Gospel doctrine in question were *ipso facto* ineligible to Anglican orders. But the destructive fire of German criticism swept slowly but surely into the Anglican camp with the lamentable result that nowadays the Gospel doctrine in question forms no longer an obligatory article of faith, and is, consequently, quite openly and safely rejected by a great number of the most distinguished members of the Church of England.

In England, the controversy over the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth may be said to have started as early as 1861 when a book entitled *Essays and Reviews* was put forth by some liberal Anglican clergymen. This work advocated a larger freedom in the interpretation of the Bible and of dogma than was then considered compatible with the Thirty-nine Articles. The book, on its very first appearance, raised a storm of alarm and indignation. A review in the *Quarterly* by one of the Bishops was the first thunderclap of the storm. This was followed by a meeting of Bishops summoned by the Primate, the immediate result of which was an Episcopal pronouncement formally condemning the heretical book. The Primate, as mouthpiece of the Episcopate, wrote, in reply to indignant addresses that had been received, that the Bishops "unanimously agree with me in expressing the pain it has given them that any clergyman of our Church should have published such opinions as those concerning which you have addressed us. We cannot understand how these opinions can be held consistently with an honest subscription to the formularies of our Church, with many of the fundamental doctrines of which they appear to be essentially at variance." The change in the attitude of the Anglican Church may be judged from the following sketch:

"An Episcopal pronouncement of course increased the violence of the storm. Proceedings in Convocation, where the book was

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[69] *Saint Marc et la Conception Virginale,* in the same Revue, vol. IV. (1907), pp. 412-417.

[70] *Lesêtre H. La Vierge-Mère,* in the *Revue de Clergé Français, July,* 1907, pp. 113-130;

[71] *Studies in the Gospels,* translated from the French by Robert Fraser, Longmans, Green Co. 1903 pp. 41-86.

described as 'corrupting the young and thrusting them almost into hell,' were adjourned during the progress of suits against two of the authors, and after the delivery of the final judgment by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to which the accused had appealed from the sentence of the Court of Arches, a Synodical condemnation of the book was passed by both Houses of Convocation in July, 1864.

"Thus the storm was still raging more than three years after it arose; and even after an interval of several years, when one of the authors of the condemned book was appointed to a Bishopric, efforts were made to stop his election, and at the eleventh hour Episcopal opposition was offered to his consecration.

"Thirty-three years after this last experience of Episcopal censure the Liberal clergyman in question, who had been publicly stigmatised by the Archbishops and Bishops for dishonest subscription to the formularies, died, and the whole Church of England lamented him, while the rugged nobleness and fearless honesty of his personal character were not more eulogised than the perefct orthodoxy of his views and the greatness of his services to the Church. That clergyman, Frederick Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, had, it may be added, flatly refused to make any retraction or even to dissociate himself from his fellow authors in *Essays and Reviews* at the time when condemnation of the book was violent and universal, replying to Bishop Tait, whose large and liberal mind was the reconciling and peacemaking influence in the Episcopate, 'Nothing on earth will induce me to do what you propose; it would be base and untrue.' It is true, however, that Dr. Temple, as soon as he had been made a Bishop, withdrew his Essay, but this may be best explained like Bishop Gore's withdrawal from the E. C. U. A bishop is no longer pleading at the Bar, but is on the Judicial Bench. Then it was, I think, that Dr. Temple laid down an axiom that, thanks to his influence, has of late years greatly modified Episcopal action: 'You cannot narrow the Church of England', an axiom in perfect harmony with the spirit of the Church of Hooker and Butler, of which breadth of view is the distinguishing characteristic. Once more, after forty years, the Bishops of the Church of England have been pressed and entreated to condemn another of the Liberal clergy, this time the Dean of Ripon, a well-known Liberal theologian, and a persistent advocate of the freedom of enquiry and opinion, so stoutly championed all his life by Archbishop Temple.

"And the purpose and significance of this condemnation, urged alike by the extreme men of the Church Association and by the extreme Sacerdotalists of the opposite party in the Church, was to condemn not merely Dean Fremantle individually, but in Dean Fremantle's position the whole position of the Liberal clergy. This attack on the position of the Liberal clergy amounts, in fact, to an attack on the best tradition of the Church, on its breadth of view and faith in divinely-guided progress; on its Liberalism, in short, maintained by a long array of Liberal clergymen, among whom in the immediate past are to be found the Primates, Tait and Benson and Temple, and many scholars and thinkers of the type, though not of the calibre, of Lightfoot and Westcott."[72]

Now, in one of these famous "Essays", among many other things, freedom was advocated in interpreting the Gospel narrative concerning the Virgin Birth. This particualr attack, however, did not arouse any more indignation and criticism than any other attack contained in that famous book, as the appeal for freedom was general and sweeping; so the Virgin Birth controversy remained, at least for the time, in the background. From 1890 to 1898 the controversy, which was then furiously raging in Germany, attracted once more the attention of the liberal Anglican clergymen but in a rather conservative direction, and scholars like Lightfoot, Robinson, Gore, Plummer, Sanday, Ramsay and others took valiantly the defensive side of the controversy. In 1889, however, Dr. Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*[73] made its first appearance. In this work (which is cleverly written indeed and in which the author, it must be confessed, shows a remarkable acuteness and ability marred, however, by a far too subjective criticism) the dogma of Christ's Virgin Birth is ascribed to Heathenish influences. In Chapter XIX, entitled "The Birth at Bethlehem",[74] our author maintains—I. "That the narratives in which the birth is spoken of are, as historic documents, very unsatisfactory. II. That the tale of a miraculous birth was not generally accepted by the first Christians; and III. That the tale would have arisen, in all probability, whether true or not". On page 245 he argues that on doctrinal or dogmatic grounds the dogma in question may be held as such but on historical grounds it has absoultely no *raison d'etre.* Having thus defined his position, the author, in a long and spirited note (pp. 247-254), attacks Canon (now Bishop) Gore and Prof. Ramsay's famous essays in defence of the dogma, which have for their principal keynotes the veracity and historical accuracy of Luke's narrative.

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[72] J. *Verschoyle, The Liberal Movement in the Church of England*, in the *Contemporary Review*, 19 3, pp. 233-234.

[73] *Exploratio Evangelica, A brief examination of the basis and origin of Christian belief*, London 1899. See especially pp. 234-254.

[74] p. 234 ff.

In 1899-1900 the controversy was still on in England. And in 1901, Harnack's remarkable lectures on the *Essence of Christianity* (which were then translated into English) gave it a new impetus. This was soon followed by the startling and scandalous articles of Schmiedel and Usener on "Jesus", "Mary", the "Virgin Birth" (art. *Nativity*), in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* edited by that most radical and eccentric of Old Testament critics, Canon Cheyne of Oxford. Schmiedel and Usener's savage attacks on the historical character of the Gospel narratives in general and on that of the Virgin Birth in particular, aroused indignation and stormy protests in the conservative and moderate liberal camps of the Anglican Church. Nevertheless, Cheyne's *Encyclopedia* found its way into every stronghold of liberal Anglican theology and criticism. In 1903, the English translation of Wernle's *Beginnings of Christianity,*[75] of Lobstein's *The Virgin Birth of Christ,*[76] and of Soltau's *The Birth of Jesus Christ*[77] added still greater confusion to an already very chaotic theological situation. This series of attacks was soon followed by Canon Cheyne's bold yet reverent lecture (afterwards published in book form with numerous notes and discussions) on *Bible Problems and the Materials for their Solution.*[78] This famous Oxford scholar, whose name is already linked with several fantastic Old Testament theories, and who for erudition and originality has hardly an equal, never appeared to better advantage. His attractive style, constantly permeated with veiled but sufficiently pointed sarcasms, and, strange to say, always clothed with an apparently most reverential theological tone, threw another bomb into the conservative camp by his attack on the Virgin Birth. Following Winckler, Stucken, Gunkel and others, Cheyne tries his best to show that in the Gospel narrative of Christ's Virgin Birth we have clear and unmistakable South Arabian and Babylonian mythological elements and infiltrations.

But a few months previous to Canon Cheyne's delivery of his lecture before the Churchmen's Union at the Church House (June

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[75] Translated by G. A. Bienemann, in 2 vols.

[76] Being vol. 2d of the *Crown Theological Library,* published by Putnam's Sons.

[77] Translated by Maurice Canney, London, Adam & Charles Black, 1903.

[78] Forming vol. 8th of Putnam's *Crown Theological Library,* 1904.

16, 1904), the controversy had already reached one of its acutest stages by the publication in the *Hibbert Journal*[79] of an article by Dr. Beeby. After controverting and attacking the traditional doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth, the writer launches an impassionate appeal to all his Anglican confreres to come forward with an honest expression of views on the real significance of that article of the Creed in which the Virginal Conception of Christ is officially formulated.

Beeby's attack earned him his immediate deposition from the ministry of the Church of England, and the event caused a sensation in Anglican circles. In the month of October of the same year, Dean Fremantle read before the Churchmen's Union a paper on "Natural Christianity" which attracted great attention. The English newspapers immediately circulated the report that the distinguished Dean of Ripon had denied in his paper the Incarnation and Resurrection of Our Lord. The Bishop of Ripon, "a theologian of clear vision and large sympathies dealt with the situation promptly and judiciously. Knowing Dean Fremantle to be truly orthodox, that is, a fervent believer in Christ and Christ's teaching, he wrote asking him to give the assurance that would remove the alarm and disquiet occasioned among simple believers, and the Dean unhesitantly gave the assurance in words that had the ring of Christian sincerity. This assurance, however, while it satisfied the Bible Society, at whose annual meeting at Leeds the Dean soon after presided, did not remove the suspicions of his clerical critics, and the controversy went on in the religious Press, the Dean very properly endeavouring to stand aloof" [80]

As a matter of fact, Dean Fremantle had not explicitly denied in his paper the Virgin Birth of Christ, but simply tried to harmonize the traditional doctrine with the laws of biology. And, in fact, in one of his letters to the Bishop of Ripon this distinguished Dean wrote as follows: "Not only was there in my paper no denial of the birth from a Virgin, but there was an attempt to explain (I trust humbly and reverently as befitting such a subject) how we might understand without any violation of biological law the words of the Apostle's Creed and the words of St. Luke's Gospel".[81]

Dean Fremantle's sophistic attempt to harmonize the Gospel account with the laws of biology was afterwards given in summary form to J. Verschoyle who reproduced it in full in his often quoted article in the *Contemporary Review* as follows: "In Darwin's book on *The Changes of Plants and Animals under Domestication* he points out that Parthenogenesis is found much higher than is generally known in the organised creation, and he asks why the operation of the male is required, the germ or ovum of the female being complete in itself. He answers that he can give no reason except, probably, that force and energy is thus added. If then, the accounts in the Gospels—that is, Matthew i. and Luke i.—are true literally, the meaning of my suggestion would be, that the yearnings of a young Hebrew woman, longing with intense and holy desire to be the Mother of the Messiah (which longings were the direct action of the Holy Spirit) excited and quickened the germ within her, and produced in this case what is usually produced by the action of the male. This seems to me the only meaning that can be got out of the words of St. Luke, unless you are to invoke the word 'Miracle'. But this will not help us. It is really nothing more than a confession of our ignorance: or, if definition be imposed upon it, such as that assumed by writers like Paley, then we must say that it is not only ambiguous but it is not a scriptural word at all nor a scriptural idea; for σημεῖον and δύναμις, the Greek words which our version translates by miracle, do not mean what Paley meant, and what in a somewhat vague way is popularly understood by the word."[82]

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[79] In the October issue pp. 875, a propos of which see Prof. Percy Gardner's article in the *Independent Review*, Sept. 1904, entitled "*The Abbé Loisy and Mr. Beeby.*"

[80] *J. Verschoyle, art. cit.* p. 235.

[81] *ibid.* p. 236.

This ingenious attempt of the Dean of Ripon to account for the Gospel narrative without any violation of biological law clearly shows that Dean Fremantle did not accept the Matthew and Luke narratives of Christ's Virgin Birth in their literal and obvious meaning, for, according to him, the Angel's Annunciation represents symbolically the purely spiritual experience of the Virgin Mary in the same way as Our Lord gave a symbolical account of His spiritual experience in the words of the Devil who tempted Him not less than three times and in three different ways According to this symbolical interpretation of Mary's spiritual experience, although we still have an instance of a working of some sort of Parthenogenesis in conformity with natural law, the fact is left, nevertheless, as a unique working of that law. Hence it is clear that Dean Fremantle's system of interpretation is not only analogous but almost identical with Archbishop Temple's argument advanced in his famous paper in *Essays and Reviews*, mentioned above, that the Virgin Birth should remain a miracle only for the purposes of revelation, though not a miracle for the purposes of science, having proved to be a unique instance of the working of a natural law.

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[82] p. 236.

Dean Fremantle s attempt made a favourable impression on some other Anglican clergymen and church dignitaries. The Bishop of Worcester, for instance, in one of his lectures on the historic trustworthiness of the Gospels, openly says that "it was not a part of the Apostolic testimony, which was testimony to that which they had seen and heard, beginning from the Baptism of John until the Ascension....Even to-day this question of the Virgin Birth was not the ground on which belief is asked".[83] The Bishop of Ripon, too, in his Introduction to the "Temple Bible," speaking of the relation of moral supremacy to the miraculous element, says: "Now, in the Common Stock Gospel, the miraculous accessories connected with the Birth and Resurrection of Jesus Christ do not find a place. These accessories are found in the group of secondary witnesses—i. e., in a narrative common to two Evangelists. Upon these, in the first instance, we have purposely refused to lay stress; our belief in Jesus Christ must be based upon moral conviction, not on physical wonder".[84] And Archdeacon Wilberforce in one of his sermons clearly states his mind in the following question and answer: "In order to believe rightly in the Divinity of Jesus Christ, is it necessary to believe that he was supernaturally born of a Virgin Mother without human paternity? Answer: No.".[85]

These and many other instances which for brevity sake we omit, clearly show that in 1904, some of the most representative members of the Church of England had almost entirely drifted from the traditional doctrine to one of more or less conventional character, with the consequence that in the Church of England the controversy of the Virgin Birth of Christ became concerned not so much with the historic trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives in question as with the doctrinal importance of the belief itself in relation to Christian faith and dogma, the principal contention of these distinguished Anglican theologians and critics being that differences of opinion concerning the Virgin Birth of Christ are compatible with loyalty to the Christian faith and in no way incompatible with the Divinity of Christ and the Incarnation.

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[83] *ibid.* p. 238.
[84] *ibid.* p. 239.
[85] *ibid.* p. 239.

The attacks of Beeby, Fremantle and other liberal Anglican theologians, directed more or less explicitly against the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth, accomplished in the long run their end and produced their poisonous effect on the younger members of the Anglican Church, many of whom joined openly the liberal school. In 1904, Canon Hensley Henson's attack on the historical character of our Lord's resurrection[86] aggravated still more the already very grave situation. The Canon was publicly criticised and denounced by his own bishop who, although endowed with large sympathies for modern biblical criticism, felt, nevertheless, the necessity of putting a stop to the steadily increasing infiltrations of destructive German criticism into the Anglican Church. But, as is always the case in theological controversies, the episcopal censure increased the violence of the storm, creating unrest and agitation rather than tranquility and peace. In the same year, a Committee, originally composed of but twenty-one distinguished Anglican theologians, but afterwards increased to one hundred and one members, was organized for the purpose of advocating still more freedom in New Testament criticism than had as yet been officially granted in their church. The original members of the Committee were the following: Papillon, Escreet, Palmer Smythe, Atkinson, Wood, Shaw-Stewart, Mann, Boyd, Hutton, Tollinton, Comper, Jephson, de Sausmarez, Wragge, Oxford, Sharp, Handley, Bury, Dodd, Elliot and Colchester. Of those who later on joined this original committee it will be sufficient to mention names like Charles, Henderson, Woods, Barnett, Geikie, King, Gray, Shepard, Henslow, Abbott, Rashdall, Allen, Bartlett, Jackson, Mastermann, Hunt, Aitken, Healey, Edmonds, Mann, Douglass, Talbot, Boyle, Baxter, Mitchell, Wilson, Hutton, H. J. Palmer, Sommerville, Lilley, Chambers, and Beaumont, most of whom are familiar to us by their scholarly researches in Biblical studies, especially through their active cooperation in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, and Cheyne's *Encyclopedia Biblica.* A circular was sent by this committee to the ministers of the Anglican Church all the world over for the purpose I. of testing their opinion in the matter, and II. of enlisting their help and sympathy.[87]

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[86] "*The Resurrection of Our Lord.*" London 1904.

[87] Concerning the history, work and results of this Committee, the reader is referred to the following work "*A Declaration on Biblical Criticism by* 1725 *Clergy of Anglican Communion, together with* (1) *the letter of invitation to sign, and a list of the* 101 *inviting clergy*; (2) *a public explanatory letter from the Dean of Winchester*; (3) *an introduction of some results of the declaration, by the editor*; (4) *the names and*

This circular created at first a furor in England. Nevertheless, it was adhered to and signed by not less than 1720 Anglican clergymen, divided as follows: 1362 from England, 363 from the Colonies (Canada, Australia, South Africa) and 20 from India, Burmah, and Ceylon. The same was afterwards, in 1906, adopted by 76 ministers of the Episcopal Church of America. From 1904 down to the present time the controversy concerning our Lord's Virign Birth has been kept going in England, but with less and less vehemence, apparently for the reason that the liberals have won most of their contention. The literature on the subject, for and against, has been constantly increasing but with the lamentable result that at present the majority of the most distinguished and representative theologians of the Church of England seem to stand on the negative side in the discussion, some denying the historical character of the doctrine, others contending that, whether it be true or false, it is neither essential to the truth of Christian dogma in general, nor to the doctrine of the Incarnation in particular.

In America, the controversy has not provoked the same degree of unrest and agitation as in England and Germany, and if we except the contributions to the subject by scholars like Briggs, Allen, Sweet, Machen, Ropes, Cooke, Steele, Potter, Terry, Hoben, and a few others, the great majority of the American Protestant clergy have stood aloof from it. It must be added, however, that by far the greater number of them profess more or less explicitly their firm belief in the traditional doctrine.

Within the Catholic Church, as was to be expected, the controversy has not yet, at least not to any great extent, influenced our theologians and critics. The lack of interest that most of our Catholic students and prests ordinarily show in face of such burning questions is much to be lamented, whether this lack of interest is to be attributed to a deficiency in knowledge or to a condit on of intellectual apathy. Exceptions, however, must be made of scholars like Bardenhewer, Lagrange O. P., Rose O. P., Maas S. J., Batiffol, Lesêtre S. S. and a few others who have come to the front valiantly defending the traditional dogma of Christ's Virgin Birth. Their contributions have been quoted above.

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addresses of the signatories; (5) *some anonymous extracts from a large mass of private correspondence concerning the Declaration chosen by two Members of the Committee*; (6)*the allied American Declaration*; edited by Hubert Handley, M. A., Vicar of St. Thomas's, Camden Town, N. W. the London, 1906, in-8, 149 pp.

Three Catholic critics, however, have of late disturbed this serenity, viz: the Abbé Loisy in his *L'Evangile et l' Eglise*[88] and *Le Quatrième Evangile*;[89] the bold and reckless Abbé Houtin, in his *La Question Biblique au Vingtième siècle, Paris,* 1906.;[90] and a certain unknown Herzog (probably a pseudonym) in a recent article in the *Revue d' histoire et de littérature Religieuses.*[91] These departures, however, represent but an isolated attempt, although it is asserted that a few members of the younger generation of the French clergy are on the negative side of the controversy, but are reticent of their opinion through prudential motives.

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[88] Paris 1902. "It is true, however, that these narratives (of the birth of Jesus) represent a normal development of the history of Christ. The very nature of their subject, the critical examination of the two versions (Matthew and Luke) taken separately or compared, and an analysis of evangelical tradition, make it impossible to regard them as a definite expression of historical memories; none the less they are put forward as a document of Christian faith, and in this capacity attract the attention of the historian. The idea of the Virginal Conception by the operation of the Holy Ghost is not merely, as is readily admitted, a physical explanation of the Divine Sonship of Jesus, but a religious explanation, like that attached to the idea of the Messiah, and a metaphysical explanation like that that belongs to the idea of the Incarnation; it is of the nature of both, because, if the Virginal Conception in a sense demonstrates the Fatherhood of God, the operation of the Holy Ghost has not for its immediate end the miraculous formation of a purely human being, but rather the communication of Divine life, which makes Jesus, from the earliest moment of His existence, the elect of God, the Christ anointed by the Spirit, the only Son of the Heavenly Father....The narratives of the Childhood of Christ are for the historian only an expression and an assertion of faith in the Messiah, that faith which is affirmed at the beginning of the Gospel of Mark, and transfigured the memories of the Apostles, which is also affirmed and developed in Paul, and then in the Fourth Gospel. This faith is, as it were, the reply made by the generations of believers in succession to the proposition of the gospel of Jesus; it increases, yet remains the same, like an echo which, reverberating from mountain to mountain, becomes more sonorous the further it travels from its point of origin.

"The subject of this faith is at no stage of its development presented to the historian as an actual reality. Criticism has not to decide if Jesus is or is not the Word Incarnate, if He existed before His terrestial manifestation, if He were consecrated Messiah from His conception, or from the day of His baptism,if the idea of the Messiah in its earliest form and in its successive transformations, is a truth. Considered as belief, this idea is addressed to faith, that is to say, to the man, judging with all his soul the worth of the religious doctrine presented to him. The historian as such need not constitute himself either apologist or adversary. He knows it simply as a conception or a force whose antecedents, central manifestation and indefinite progress, he can analyse up to a point, but whose deep meaning and sacred power are not things that can be deduced from simple analysis or critical discussion of texts and facts" *L'Evangile et l' Eglise,* pp. 29-32, which corresponds to pp. 48-51 of the English translation, by Christopher Home, N. Y. Scribner's Sons, 1904. This translator's name is unknown to us, but his English rendering of Loisy's deep and difficult book shows once more the ignorance of many Protestant writers concerning the dogmas of the Catholic Church. A striking example is to be found in the above mentioned rendering where the translator stupidly renders "*Conception Virginale*" by "*Immaculate Conception.*" op. cit. p. 49.

[89] Paris, 1903. See especially pp. 177-183.

[90] pp. 241-261.

[91] "*La Virginité de Marie après l'enfantement,* vol. XII (1907) pp. 320-340.

From the above sketch our readers can easily appreciate the gravity and importance of this new attitude towards one of the most cherished dogmas of Christianity. Its burning actuality should stimulate the most talented of our young clergy to take up the study of this and other such vital problems and assume the role of exponents and defenders of the deposit of faith, a mission to which they are called by the very fact of their vocation and office.

PART II.

THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY AND THE REAL KEY TO ITS SOLUTION.

The opponents of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth are forced to assume the unreasonable position and the difficult task of attacking a traditional and a scriptural belief, which is, to say the least, of venerable antiquity—and almost contemporary with the age of Christ Himself. For, while it is universally admitted that many of our Christian dogmas cannot be historically traced farther back than the fourth, fifth or even later centuries of the Christian era, that of Christ's Virgin Birth is at least as old as Matthew and Luke's Gospels which are regarded by the great majority of critics as written but a few decades after Christ's death and, in all probability, but a few years after that of Mary, the Mother of Jesus, and that of the apostles and the other relatives, members and acquaintances of Christ's family circle. Hence, at the very outset, and quite apart from all other internal and external considerations, the presumption remains tremendously in favor of the genuineness, reliability and credibility of the Virgin Birth narrative, unless it can be shown that the fact, or the event itself, miraculous and supernatural as it is, involves either contradiction, or impossibility or improbability—a hypothesis, as far as we know, by no one openly maintained.

Another consideration must be constantly borne in mind, viz: that not every historical event, in order to be acknowledged as such, need *necessarily* be verified or verifiable by strictly tangible, experimental and infallible methods of testing; as historical facts are of various orders, some verifiable, others scarcely so or not at all. Now, to the category of this latter class belongs undoubtedly the miraculous conception and the Virgin Birth of Christ. Unlike the other miracles of the New Testament, that of the Virginal Conception of Christ is by its very nature of the utmost privacy, and could have been known directly by only three persons, namely Mary, Jesus and Joseph, and indirectly but by a few close relatives and friends. Accordingly the defenders of the doctrine, from the very nature of the phenomenon itself, need take but one line of argument and defence, namely: to show that the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth rests ultimately on a historical event and basis which can be substantiated as having occurred on the ground that a distinct notice of it has come down to us through the testimony of men morally and intellectually qualified to testify, and who were, furthermore, in a position to know of it and to inquire about it from persons either directly connected with it (as Jesus, Mary and Joseph), or from those in position to know of it, such as the relatives and the apostles and disciples of the Lord. We must also be able to show that the written and oral testimony of these witnesses has come down to us without substantial modification. Fortunately enough, nowadays it is generally admitted that the Evangelists were men unimpeachable for their truthfulness, sincerity and general historical accuracy, and who had, furthermore, ample opportunity to learn about the facts, to investigate their origin and to determine their historical value. Consequently, unless these fundamental premises can be gainsaid (a feat which has been, especially of late, strenuously undertaken but without success) every Christian is bound to accept the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth not only as dogma but as history as well.

This is, according to us, the real status of the controversy, and it is around these elementary premises that the ultimate solution of the problem must rest. Other details and considerations are but logical consequences of these few fundamental principles which should form, after all, the real battleground for both orthodox and heterodox critics. Radical critics, indeed, have, now and then, attempted to discredit the Matthean and Lukan authorship of their two respective narratives. They have tried to offset Matthew's and Luke's testitimonies by the apparent silence of Mark, John and Paul. They have even attempted to point out contradictory statements in regard to the matter in the Gospels of the two first named Evangelists (such as the mention of the brothers and sisters of Jesus). They have attributed the story of the two Gospels to Jewish theological speculations. They have, finally, endeavored to detect in them traces of

Greek, Roman, Hindoo, Babylonian, Arabian, Zoroastrian and Egyptian mythological beliefs and superstitions, in which efforts, but especially in the last, they have shown more ingenuity than sound reasoning, more learning than good sense. But, these efforts notwithstanding, our critics have not been able, as yet, to discredit the fact of the antiquity, authenticity and historical credibility of the Gospel narrative, and this, as we have above remarked, is and must always remain the real question at issue; so much so that many of these critics have concentrated their destructive fire on this phase of the problem only. In the last part of this study we shall show how the theory of Oriental and Graeco-Roman mythological infiltrations in the narrative is neither warranted nor pertinent. We shall show that this is simply the result of that mythological and pan-Babylonian mania which has of late so deeply stirred the vivid imaginations of some of our most distinguished modern biblical scholars. We shall also examine the question of the antiquity, authenticity and credibility of Matthew's and Luke's narratives. Such being the case, we may sum up this preliminary part of our study with the following consideration: It is an approved canon of legitimate historical criticism that when a supposed fact or event, in itself neither contradictory, nor impossible nor improbable, is related by two or more contemporary, reliable and qualified writers, or witnesses, their testimony is to be presumed and accepted as correct, even though other contemporary and equally reliable witnesses and writers do not make formal mention of it,—unless it can be shown that these same contemporary witnesses who simply omit it would have or should have mentioned it had they known of it. Now, as we shall see later on, this latter restriction does not apply to the present case. It is true that Mark, John and Paul do not expressly mention the Virgin Birth, but it is not less true that they not only do not oppose it but almost presuppose it. Furthermore, it cannot be shown that it was within the scope of their viewpoint and plan to make explicit mention of it. The Gospels of Mark and John, as Dr. Briggs remarks, agree in having no gospel of the infancy of Jesus. This was due, doubtless, to a lack of interest in that part of the life of Jesus, as well as to the fact that both of these Gospels seem to be limited to the testimony of what the primary authorities themselves had seen and heard, St. Peter in Mark, and St. John in the Gospel of John. Furthermore, the fact that in both cases the gospel of the Infancy is attached to genealogies shows an interest in Matthew and Luke in proving that Jesus was the son of David, the heir of the promises to David and his seed, and so the Messiah. The references to Christ's brothers and sisters found in some of the Gospels, even were they His own brothers and sisters from Mary and Joseph, do not, of course, as we shall see later on, affect or impair the fact or the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth. These, indeed, may be reasonably accounted for as the issue of the union of Joseph with a former wife. Hence, we can safely conclude that Matthew's and Luke's accounts of Christ's Virgin Birth cannot be shown to be either non-authentic, or interpolated or unreliable, or contradictory, or impossible, or improbable, or legendary and mythological or, finally, purely theological. And, such being the case, we may safely and on strictly historical evidence cling steadfastly to the venerably old, traditionally sacred and evangelically genuine doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

This is all that a believer in the dogma in question can hope or can be expected to show in order to justify unalterable belief in it. On the other hand, if the adverse critic can *disprove* this position, he shall certainly have succeeded in his attempt to remove from the domain of history the dogma of the Virgin Birth of Christ.

PART III.

THE DOGMA OF CHRIST'S VIRGIN BIRTH AND THE THEORY OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT.

In the Catholic Church the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth has given rise to various theological and devotional developments. The first stage, and undoubtedly the only one which can be shown to rest on unmistakable Scriptural authority, is the one concerning the virginal conception of Christ without the cooperation of man based on the explicit testimony of Matthew and Luke. It has been accepted by the earliest Fathers and writers of the Church, such as Ignatius, second bishop of Antioch, martyred between 107 and 117 A. D.; Aristides (circa 138 A. D.), Justin Martyr (about 110-166 A. D.), Tatian (about 110-172 A. D.), Irenaeus (about 120-202 A. D.), Tertullian (about 150-240 A. D.), Clement of Alexandria (died about 220 A. D.), Origen (185-254 A. D.), Hippolytus (flourished 198-239), Cyprian, bishop of Carthage (martyred 258), Novatian, a Roman presbyter (circa 256), Malchion (about 270), Archelaus (about 277), Arnobius (flourished 290-310), Lactantius (about 250-330), Methodius (martyred about 311), Victorinus (martyred about 312), and many others. The doctrine in its first stage is that Jesus Christ, the son of God, was conceived by the Holy Ghost in the womb of His Virgin Mother, Mary, without the co-operation of man. The ground for this doctrine is twofold: first, Scriptural (or historical); and secondly, theological.

The historical basis rests evidently on the narratives of Matthew and Luke, both couched in words and expressions as clear and unmistakable as can be, as well as on early oral traditions. The apparent and, to a certain extent, real incompatibility of these two narratives in many of their minor details and expressions concerning the Nativity of Christ and the events immediately anteceding and following it, are to be neither denied nor ignored nor belittled. These incompatibilities, to be sure, must have impressed themselves on the minds of such men as Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen just as deeply as on those of our own modern critics. But these incompatibilities, important as they may appear to be in themselves, do not in the least affect the main doctrine at issue, viz: The divine conception of Christ and His Virgin Birth. On the contrary, these little discrepancies between the two accounts, which are manifestly independent of one another, serve purely to strengthen their witness to the great central fact in which they are at one. At any rate the testimony of the earliest fathers of the Church indicates that, even before the death of the last apostles, the doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Christ must have been among the rudiments of the faith in which every Christian was initiated, and this not only in one church or another but in all Christian Churches and communities, such as the Church of Rome (Irenaeus), Greece (Aristides), Africa (Tertullian), Asia (Irenaeus, Justin and Ignatius), Syria and Palestine (the documents of the first and third Gospels, Ignatius, Justin), Alexandria (Clement and Origen), Mesopotamia and Persia (Aphraates, Ephrem) etc. The same doctrine is either explicity affirmed or implicitly involved in almost all the other Fathers and Councils. In their writings and decisions variations in words may indeed be found, but variations in the words of creeds are to be carefully distinguished from variations in the substance of tradition. Thus, for example, the creed of the Church of Caesarea, as it was presented in the Council of Nicaea, and the actual creed of Nicaea itself, state the fact of the Incarnation, but make no specific mention of the *Virgin Birth*, through which the Incarnation took place. This, however, does not mean that they attach no importance to the Virgin Birth. Eusebius, the bishop of Caesarea, shows us in his writings that the Virgin Birth was supposed to be *involved* in any statement of Incarnation. Thus in *contra Macellum de Eccl. Theol.*, after much discussion of the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth is incidentally mentioned.

Such a consensus, accordingly, in the third and second centuries, reaching back to the end of the first, among very independent churches, seems to us, apart from any question of the Gospels, to prove for the belief an apostolic origin. It could not have arrived at such an undisputed and universal acceptance unless it had really the countenance of the apostolic founders of these same churches—Peter, Paul, John, James, Mark, etc.; and the argument of Tertullian and Irenaeus from the identity of distinct traditions to their apostolic origin is here, in the main, of conclusive force.

Our adversaries do not, of course, deny the antiquity of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth in the primitive church. They do, however, attempt to offset its historical value by the contention that it was not the result of the belief in a historically ascertained fact but rather the result of Judaeo-Christian theological speculation, strengthened by the powerful influence of Graeco-Roman and Oriental mythological beliefs. This assertion is, as we shall see, untenable, for in order to develop a theological myth and belief and force it upon the Universal Church, a greater length of time is required than the few years which elapsed between the death of Christ and of those who knew Him and His family intimately, and the final codification of the belief in Matthew and Luke, or rather in their yet more primitive constituents. Moreover, the primitive Judaeo-Christian Church of Palestine was a community distinctly Jewish in race, spirit and tendencies, remote from the other Christian churches of Asia Minor, Alexandria and Rome, and possessing little contact with Graeco-Roman or Oriental mythologies. Such speculation, furthermore, was not, as we shall see, in strict harmony with their Old Testament conception of the Messiah.

Besides this historical there is also a theological basis for the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth; and this consists in the fact that the doctrine in question possesses close relations of propriety and of logical sequence with the belief in the divinity of Christ. This divinity of Christ, as is admitted by all critics alike, is solemnly attested and proclaimed by Christ Himself; and after Him, unanimously accepted by all the Apostles, Evangelists, Fathers and Early Christians; hence, it follows that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is to be maintained both on historical and theological grounds.

That the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is quite logically, although not of necessity, connected with the dogma of the divinity of Christ can be quite forcibly shown as follows "Granted that the eternal Son of God did at a certain moment of time take flesh by a real incarnation in the womb of Mary,—granted that he was born as man, without change of personality or addition of another personality, but simply by the assumption of a new nature and by an entrance into new conditions of life and experience—granted in this sense the incarnation of the Son of God in the womb of Mary, can we conceive it to have taken place by the ordinary process of generation? Do not we inevitably associate with the ordinary process of generation the production of a new personality? Must not the denial of the Virgin Birth involve the position that Jesus was simply a new human person in whatever specially intimate relations with God? And this argument becomes almost irresistible when the question is removed from the idea of incarnation strictly considered, to the associated idea of the sinless humanity, the humanity of a second Adam. Christ was a new departure in human life, a marvellous phenomenon, which becomes still more marvellous, more impenetrable and altogether unintelligible were we to ascribe to him the same process of generation as other mortals."[92]

The second stage of development in the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth is shown in the Catholic doctrine of Mary's *perpetual* virginity. As a dogma, the doctrine of the *perpetual* virginity of Mary must be accepted as correct; for it is nowhere contradicted by the Gospels: neither directly (as the reading of the newly discovered Codex Sinaiticus may be safely rejected as being in this case in direct discordance with most of the other Manuscripts of the Gospels), nor indirectly (as the mention of Jesus' brethren can be satisfactorily understood as referring to children of Joseph by a former wife). It has furthermore a powerful support in early Christian tradition, theology and worship. It must be admitted, however, that viewed as an historical fact it has no explicit support in Scripture. The dogma must therefore be based on tradition rather than Scripture, a tradition which is attested by the majority of the Fathers of the Church and by the Christian cult.

Besides the traditional element, specific theological reasons can be shown to have strengthened the basis and motive of this further extension of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. These are: I. The great esteem in which virginity was universally held within as well as without the Christian Church. II. An argument of propriety, viz: that the virgin-mother of God should remain a virgin even after the birth of her Divine Son. III. The pious and quite justifiable fear that, should the brethren of the Lord, so often mentioned in the Gospels, be regarded as His real brethren, having Mary and Joseph for parents, suspicion would be thrown on Mary's "*ante-partum*" virginity, and doubts aroused concerning the divinity of Jesus Himself. Mary's perpetual virginity is, in fact, expressly stated in the works of Clement of Alexandria († 217), Eusebius of Caesarea († 338), Epiphanius († 403), Ephrem († 381) and the great majority of the Eastern and Western Fathers of the Church. It is not implied, however, in Tertullian's writings († circa 225). Indeed, he explicitly affirms that the Lord's brethren were His real brethren, although it is not improbable that his words may be quite satisfactorily interpreted as referring to an earlier marriage of Joseph. On Scriptural grounds, Mary's perpetual virginity seems to be contradicted directly by Matthew's statement in I., 25 "And he (Joseph) knew her not till she had brought forth her firstborn son", as the Authorized, the Douay and the Vulgate versions have it, or "till she had brought forth a son", as the Revised version has it. In which connection it is of interest to note that the Sinaitic Syriac Gospel simply has "When Joseph arose from his sleep he did as the angel of the Lord had commanded him, and took his wife: *and she bore to him a son*, and he called his name Jesus." It seems also to be contradicted, indirectly, by Matthew XIII. 55-56 and, Mark VI. 3-4, where we meet with the following statements: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not His Mother called Mary, and his brethren James, and Joseph, and Simon, and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us?"

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[92] *Canon* (now *Bishop*) *Gore, Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, N. Y. 1895, pp. 64-65.

Strictly speaking, the above quoted statements of Matthew and Mark do not necessarily oppose Mary's perpetual virginity, as they can be easily referred to Joseph alone in connection with a former marriage as is clearly attested by several apocryphal gospels and many fathers of the Church. But, at any rate, whether the Catholic doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity be scripturally demonstrable or not, it matters little for our present purpose, as it has no bearing whatever on the antecedent question of Christ's virginal conception.

The third and last stage of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth in the Catholic Church closes with the pious belief in the *perpetual* virginity of Joseph. The transition to this belief was quite natural, for if Mary, on account of her being the Mother of the Lord, has been adorned with the crown of perpetual virginity, why should not Joseph, on account of his being Christ's adoptive father, enjoy the same prerogative? When Helvidius, in the IVth century, denied the perpetual virginity of Mary, he was sharply rebuked by St. Jerome who thus replied to him "Tu dicis Marian virginem non permansisse: ego mihi plus vindico, etiam ipsum Joseph virginem fuisse per Mariam, ut ex virginali conjugio virgo filius nasceretur" (Migne. *Pat. Lat.* vol. XXIII. p. 203).

Jerome's line of argument was soon adopted by many writers and commentators, and in the seventh century the Venerable Bede († 735) had already succeeded in propagating the doctrine throughout the West. From that time on, it became a favorite theme for Catholic theologians, exegetes and preachers although, it must be noted, the Catholic Church has never pronounced itself dogmatically on the matter. The Catholic dogma of Mary's perpetual virginity excludes, of course, *ipso facto*, the possibility of any carnal relation between Joseph and Mary, but it does not exclude the possibility of a former marriage of Joseph, the result of which may have been the so-called brethren and sisters of Jesus.

The Catholic tradition of Joseph's perpetual virginity, coupled with the dogma of Mary's similar prerogative, proved a stumbling block to Catholic commentators and exegetes, and it was only to overcome it that they were forced to apply to the Gospel passages referring to Jesus' brethren the most forced and unnatural interpretation. For, if Mary and Joseph were both virgins, "ante" as well as "post partum," logic required that the "brethren and sisters" of Jesus should be understood as being purely his cousins.

It is needless to insist that the belief in Joseph's perpetual virginity has no ground whatever either in Scripture or in early Christian tradition and literature. The Gospel statements, were they to be rationally interpreted, are explicitly against it, although, as a specimen of dogmatic or rather theological process of evolution, it falls quite naturally within the sphere of progressive development, so apparent and visible in both Catholic and Protestant theology alike.

PART IV.

THE DOGMA OF CHRIST'S VIRGIN BIRTH CANNOT BE THE RESULT OF THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.

From the above considerations it is evident that if a process of development can be shown to have taken place in the second (which we deny) and especially the third stage (which we affirm) of the doctrine concerning the parentage and birth of Christ, no such process can be shown to have taken place in the first stage of the doctrine, as it is perfectly demonstrable that the doctrine, in its first stage relating to the divine conception of Christ and His Virgin Birth, was the primitive belief of the Apostles, Evangelists and Disciples of Our Lord, and at a time when theological development could not yet have taken place in the Church. Hence, if the doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary and of Joseph can be attacked on Scriptural and critical grounds, that of the Virgin Birth of Jesus stands as solid as a rock. It is of paramount importance to insist on the absurdity of the theory that the Christian doctrine of the Virgin Birth originated through the theological speculation of the earliest followers and admirers of Christ. Some critics maintain that the early Christians, far from being influenced by purely heathen mythologies, developed a speculative theology of their own. Lobstein expressly excludes the supposition of any dominating heathen influence. "The aversion," he tells us, "which primitive Christianity felt for polytheistic paganism was so deep-seated that before supposing the new religion to have been influenced by pagan mythologies, we must examine with the utmost possible care the points of resemblance which are sometimes found to exist between beliefs and institutions." Harnack, on the other hand, maintains that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth rests exclusively on the mistranslation and misunderstanding of the so-called Isaianic Immanuel prophecy (Isa. vii, 14), strengthened, of course, by those Jewish speculative theological tendencies so manifest in the Jewish school of Alexandria, etc.

How groundless this theory is will be easily seen from the following considerations: The belief in incarnations and in births by power of deities was confined exclusively to the heathen, and the conceptions of the Deity which made such notions possible were utterly foreign both to the Old Testament and to the Jewish adherents of the Gospel. It is a well known fact that the Gospel of the

Infancy originated with the Jewish Christian community of Palestine, which was distinctly of the Old Testament type, separate entirely from heathen influences. Hence, the supposition that the idea of the Virgin Birth originated out of the Old Testament ideas, is, to say the least, very improbable. Neander truly says that "such a fable as the birth of the Messiah from a virgin could have arisen anywhere else easier than among the Jews;" and Dr. B. Weiss adds that "According to the views of Judaism, not the virgin condition, but that of marriage was regarded as a Divine institution, and the children of marriage as a blessing from God." Equally baseless is the idea that a misunderstanding of the Isaianic Immanuel prophecy furnished the basis for the doctrine, as it is a well known fact that the prophecy in question was never understood by the Jews as referring to the Messiah's birth, for such an interpretation is distinctly Christian, advanced by early Christian apologists by way of an argument.

According to Lobstein, the process of development must have been simple and easy. From the strong conviction of Jesus' superiority over patriarchs, lawgivers and prophets, to the idea that Jesus was Himself the Son of God by a supernatural generation, the entire process was as easy and natural as the growth of a plant from stem to flower and fruit. But this supposition is too violently opposed to all that we know of the nature of the circumstances under which they were placed. As Dr. Sweet remarks, the most marked characteristic of Christ's disciples and of the people by whom He was usually surrounded, was their almost immovable intellectual conservatism. They were fixed in the traditions of the scribes and elders. Any novelty of teaching or practice, any departure from the beaten track of traditional interpretation or action, was sure to awaken feelings of fear, suspicion and disgust. Christ's own disciples moved under His leadership out of the old era into the new with most amazing reluctance and timidity.

To give these men or their immediate successors credit for so startling an innovation as the attempt to interpret Christ's divine life by a supernatural generation, is to lay upon them a task which they were utterly incapable of performing. The panic into which the more conservative brethren were thrown by the liberalism of Paul gives one an indication of the atmosphere of intense conservatism, in which the early Jewish Christians had been trained, and from which they never wholly escaped. It required all the force of the entire Christian revelation, and the lifelong teaching of such a leader as John, to bring men of Jewish blood to the acceptance of the idea of an incarnation at all, and many revolted from it finally, to the loss of Christian fellowship and hope. To these men, the chasm which separates the wonder-stories concerning the birth of Isaac, Moses and the other Jewish heroes from the story of a divine incarnation by birth from a virgin would have been utterly impossible. The men, who hesitated to sit down at meat with Gentiles, lest it be an innovation upon what they had been taught, would have hesitated and stopped a long way this side of the invention of a Virgin Birth to explain Christ's divine Sonship. Besides, the Gospels were formed and written in an atmosphere of controversy and criticism and not in a period of peace and tranquillity which is required for theological speculation. During the latter part of Christ's ministry, during the early days of the young church after the Resurrection, and during the entire period of the formation of the canon, the disciples were in the midst of a continual conflict with critics, Jewish and heathen. They were formed to put emphasis upon essentials, to guard every statement, so as not to leave themselves open to misconstruction. They would be loyal to the teachings of the Lord, and to all authentic traditions concerning Him, but they would be certain not to form innovations which might be misconstrued and used against them.

Equally untenable is the supposition that the Virgin Birth narrative was invented in order to increase honor to Jesus or to convince the early Christians of His divinity. It is a well-known fact that among the Jews birth out of wedlock was a fearful disgrace to all in any way connected with it, and with the family.

The reluctance of Joseph to believe in the possibility of a Virgin Birth must have been shared by every person to whom it is was told. The doctrine, therefore, would have been the last thing in the world to be invented by the Evangelists, as it would have furnished the Jews and the anti-Christians with a means of discrediting the origin and mission of Jesus, and the character of Mary.

In view of these facts, it is hardly conceivable how Matthew and Luke's narratives of Christ's Virgin Birth should have been the result of Jewish dogmatic speculation rather than the honest and sincere record of a historical event.

Gabriel Oussani.

THE SYLLABUS OF PIUS X

Is is a fine thing to belong to a great wide old Church, if only for the corporate wisdom and patience which it acquires, and in which one can hardly help sharing. It partakes of the unhurrying confident serenity of things vast and everlasting. Those outside may criticise; some within may worry, but the great body moves on about its work unashamed and unafraid. The latest example of this is the reception of the new Syllabus of Pius X. The gentlemen of the press (one thinks of Edmund Burke's parable of the grasshoppers) have all expressed their well matured over-night views on it. Most of the non-Catholic critics said just what we expected them to say—they would have said the same if the Pope had reaffirmed the Ten Commandments or condemned polygamy and idolatry. Here and there an ardent member of the Church has shown how much better a Catholic he is than the Pope by extending the condemnation to include, it would seem, everybody who has studied biology or Hebrew. But the Church Universal is indifferent alike to critics and alarmists. The teaching authority has condemned only extreme views; and the great body of the faithful, bishops, priests, laity, universities, seminaries, reviews have accepted its decisions with unanimity and equanimity. If the "thousand peering littlenesses" had only the wit to see it, they are here in presence of a great fact which shows that faith and hope and brotherly charity are still forces that unite a large mass of human kind.

The nineteenth century piled up a vast array of facts, and not a few theories which were in many instances incompatible with the accepted statement of Catholic, or, indeed, theistic belief. In response to the needs of the situation learned Catholics took up the work of refutation or the still more delicate task of restatement and reconciliation. From the Catholic point of view as manifested in our history, there is nothing deserving of reproof in this undertaking. To condemn it is to condemn Suarez and Aquinas, Augustine and Clement. But it is essentially a difficult and dangerous undertaking since it is the application by a fallible individual of human reason and knowledge to a set of divine truths which are to be safeguarded in the long run by an infallible teaching body. Despite these dangers, however, in the actual working out of that infallible guidance, the preliminary work is done by historians, exegetes, philosophers, theologians—any one of whom is liable to be mistaken in the solutions he proposes. It would all be easy if we had a new revelation for every difficulty, or if *ex cathedra* pronouncements were given in every case of doubt, or even if we could always be sure of having amongst the body of the faithful an Aquinas in whose scientific knowledge and theological fidelity we could place equal confidence. But such helps are rarely given us. Men must venture on solutions, and men will make mistakes. And there are times when the official caretakers of the faith must "reprove, entreat, and rebuke in all patience and doctrine."

"In omni patientia et doctrina." For a quarter of a century and more this movement of Catholic scholarship has been allowed to proceed almost unchecked by the central authority of the Church. Here and there a book, here and there an individual has been censured. But in the main the settlement of difficulties has been left to the friendly warfare of theological schools within the Church. As is generally the result in such cases, many of the new positions after having been hotly debated, were accepted as safe and true. But still more extreme views were proposed which seemed out of harmony with any orthodox statement of Catholic belief. For the past two years the highest Congregation in the Church has been at work considering such views, and the result of their deliberations has been the issuing of the list of condemned propositions which has been called the Syllabus of Pius X.

Reactionary, illiberal, obscurantist, extreme—such are some of the epithets applied to this document in the secular and non-Catholic prrss, by men who write as if speaking out of the abundance of their knowledge on the matter. But it is a trifle disconcerting to the believer in journalistic infallibility who has taken the trouble to read through the propositions, to reconcile the fact that thy contain not the slightest reference to economic questions with the oft repeated statement that the views of the Abbate Murri are again condemned. And for one who is acquainted with the works of (for example) Cardinal Newman or Father Lagrange, it requires a grotesque twisting of words to find in the Syllabus a repudiation of their positions. Now what strikes the Catholic theologian in this document is its moderation. He knows the strength of the language Rome is not using. He reads a list of false propositions which are gently denominated "errors" even though they deserve in many instances the deeper brand of "heresy." The condemnation is promulgated in a way that is authoritative and effective indeed, but without invoking the infallible magisterium of the Church. And as he reads the lucid and careful statement of the sixty-five propositions that are proscribed, there come up to his mind a number of opinions which the Congregation must have considered, and left uncondemned.

More official statements of Protestant opinion make interesting and curious reading. The Protestant position, or rather the lack of it, is always an odd thing to the Catholic. They seldom seem to recognize that they have the same dilemma as ourselves to solve in the conflict between authority and individualism, the main difference to a bystander being that we have taken up a more definite and consistent stand. One should expect that, as men who in spite of intellectual difficulties still retain faith in Christ and the Bible, they would welcome a strong pronouncement from the old Church in defense of the common Christian teachings. One should expect that, as members of ecclesiastical organizations, they would have some appreciation of the mind of men who defer to a Church which they have freely accepted as representing divine truth to them. But the old critical and destructive spirit which is the essence of Protestantism is too much for them. So they deplore the tyranny of the Roman Church even though it be defending the basic doctrines of Christianity; and they see in the rational obedience of Catholics only a manifestation of weakness or hypocrisy. If Protestantism were a definite system of any sort, whether of faith or of free thought, one might debate the question. But as things are one can only shrug one's shoulders and regret the lack of logic in men who, by definition, at least, ought to be rational.

The same strange lack of understanding is manifest in the prophecy by some indulged in that this act of authority will lead to a "Los von Rom" movement. If it did, Protestantism would not be the gainer by it. In a famous passage Macaulay notes that "it is surely remarkable that neither the moral revolution of the eighteenth century, nor the moral counter-revolution of the nineteenth, should, in any perceptible degree, have added to the domain of Protestantism.... We think it a most remarkable fact that no Christian nation, which did not adopt the principles of the Reformation before the end of the sixteenth century, should ever have adopted them. Catholic communities have, since that time, become infidel and become Catholic again; but none has become Protestant." It is quite true that during the last 300 years there has been almost no spirit of schism amongst the religious-minded members of the Catholic Church. Men have dropped away because they abandoned religion entirely. Some have joined Protestant sects, but their motive has been usually political or social, or "for revenue only." It is difficult to find instances of those who have renounced their obedience to the Roman Church to improve their religious condition; the *religious* movement, in fact, has been in the return direction. And, if we may speak plainly, the deterrent reason has been that Protestantism affords a "horrible example" of what heresy leads to. And, to come to the present instance, we find the need of religious unity strongly asserted in the writings of the men who are most directly affected by the condemnations of the new Syllabus.

More naive, if anything, is the notion that some writers seem to have that the result (if it be not indeed the purpose) of the Syllabus will be the stifling of intellectual activity within the Catholic Church. And of this view we find traces in the less thoughtful and less responsible utterances of some writers in the Catholic press. But such an idea is egregiously absurd. The whole history of Catholic theology, the evident intentions of the Holy Father, the very words of the Syllabus itself are against it. One of the condemned propositions reads: "The Church has shown herself to be hostile to the progress of the natural and theological sciences" (prop. 57); and the third and the last propositions of the Syllabus convey the same view.

Non-Catholics who are so generous with their sympathy for unfortunate Catholic scholars deprived of their liberty might do well to reserve their tears until they find out whether these scholars have lost any liberties which they were anxious to retain. It must be a disconcerting experience to go on a visit of condolence only to find the reputed prisoner enjoying the usual liberties of a citizen or the supposed corpse making merry with his friends. As a matter of fact, though a few more adventurous Catholic scholars may be affected by the Syllabus, the vast majority of them have been working quite within the lines that it lays down; and the notion that their activities must now cease betrays gross ignorance both of their views and of the condemned propositions. We have in English a number of Catholic publications which treat serious theological problems: In America, the *University Bulletin*, the *Catholic Quarterly*, the *Ecclesiastical Review*, the *Messenger*, the *Catholic World*, the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, the *New York Review*; in England, the *Dublin Review*, the *Month*, the *Tablet*; in Ireland, the *Ecclesiastical Record*, the *Theological*

Quarterly. Now it would not be difficult to find in any one of these at least some admissions, theories, facts, principles, methods which would sound strange and modern to theologians of the thirteenth or the seventeenth centuries. We need only suggest certain headings: new facts and theories in physics and astronomy, biology and theories of restricted evolution, the results of psycho-physics, the victories of sane criticism, the treatment of the Synoptic problem, the new data in archeology, the study of comparative religions, the use of Newman's theory of development of doctrine, the application of new historical methods to patrology, the handling of obnoxious historical facts, the study of the psychology of religions assent, etc., etc. In all of the fields thus roughly indicated our Catholic writers have grappled with difficulties which were a source of grave fears to the faithful during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But we think it a safe prophecy to make that one could go through these periodicals Syllabus in hand without discovering any one of the condemned propositions. Naturally, nobody has sufficent knowledge of the whole field to declare categorically beforehand that such a quest would be absolutely fruitless. But such we believe would be the case—unless, indeed, the examiner be one of "those vulgar heads that love to look asquint on the face of truth."

It is a great source of confidence in the present crisis that the great mass of Catholic scholars stand in a solid phalanx, obedient to the voice of authority, and ready still for the combat against error. They reject the half-scornful sympathy which subtly attacks their allegiance; they rebuke the counsels of the timid and the lazy who prefer surrender or inaction to an honest, manly effort for truth and right.

"*Foris pugnae*," says the Apostle, "*intus timores*." Panic is a greater foe than armed legions. In times of stress there are always to be found men who would haul down the standard from territory which has been occupied, and may still be retained, with the blessing and sanction of authority. They are ignorant or heedless of the fact that the territory which they would abandon must be reoccupied, and the next time by forces disheartened, disorganized, and warring amongst themselves. Such men are ill-fitted to understand or execute the plans of a sagacious leader who recalls his men from untenable positions which can only open an entrance to the enemy, in order to do battle more efficiently on ground that can be defended.

From the dangers which spring from vague and empty fears the Church will be saved by the broad views and wise discretion of its strong central authority, supported by the bishops of the Catholic world, men who are not wont to lose their heads in times of difficulty. Under such leadership the movement towards concentration will not usher in a period of surrender or inaction. Indeed, the history of theology shows that the limitation of the field of free enquiry by dogmatic definitions has frequently promoted rather than suppressed the activity of the Catholic intellect. It was so after Nicæa and it was so after Trent. And so too it will appear, we trust, to the future historian who writes the annals of Catholic thought in the twentieth century.

The above remarks were written some time ago for the number of the Review which appears as the first half of this issue. Since then the Encyclical has appeared. It has been the occasion of new and more violent criticisms of the Holy See of the kind which we have striven to characterise in our comments on the critics of the Syllabus. We see no reason to modify the severity of our remarks, nor the attitude of faith and hope which we hold. The new pronouncement limits more exactly the field of the Catholic worker in the domain of knowledge. It must be studied carefully and followed by all who assume the statement or defense of Catholic positions. But the prophecy we indulged in that these recent decisions of authority will be the beginning of a more glorious period of Catholic intellectual activity is given a prospect of fulfilment by the announcement of the Holy Father's intention to form a body of Catholic scholars who shall devote themselves to the advancement of learning. Catholics needed no such assurance of the Sovereign Pontiff's attitude towards science and progress, but to stop the lips of gainsayers we are happy to be able to quote the decisive words of his Encyclical: "The adversaries of the Church will doubtless abuse what we have said to refurbish the old calumny by which we are traduced as the enemy of science and of the progress of humanity. In order to oppose a new answer to such accusations, which the history of the Christian religion refutes by never-failing arguments, it is our intention to establish and develop by every means in our power a special Institute in which, through the co-operation of those Catholics who are most eminent for their learning, the progress of science and other realms of knowledge may be promoted under the guidance and teaching of Catholic truth. God grant that we may happily realise our design with the ready assistance of all those who bear a sincere love for the Church of Christ. But of this we will speak on another occasion."

Meanwhile the best refutation that humbler members of the Church can give to the injurious assertion that Catholic scholarship has been rendered impossible by the recent official pronouncements is to go calmly ahead in union with the Holy See, and show the folly of such statements by the facts. "Solvitur ambulando." And as an instance of this method of refutation we may be pardoned if we call attention to the present number of the New York Review. The contributions treat of practically every department of religious knowledge: Dogma, patrology, apologetics, history, archaeology, textual criticism, Biblical theology, theodicy, ethics, metaphysics, science. And be it noted that here we have no attempt to offer a specious appearance of scholarship by directing attention to useless and forgotten questions of interest only to the antiquarians of theology. The topics selected are of present-day interest; the writers are versed in all the lore of the moderns; they face resolutely the most recent difficulties; they make their attack armed with the best weapons of their adversaries. And in their attitude and conclusions they prove that loyalty to science and to the Holy See is a double, but not a divided duty.

Nor can it be said that this happy combination of alertness and obedience is a characteristic of Catholic scholars in only one distant corner of the world-wide Church. We could show this by referring to theological publicatons in the different countries, but happily we need not go beyond the covers of this issue to prove the point. Our contributors represent three continents: Asia, Europe, America; and nine countries: Mesopotamia, Italy, Switzerland, France, England, Ireland, Scotland, Canada, and the United States. The list includes men who were born to the inheritance of the faith and men who obtained that priceless gift in later life by grace and prayer; priests of different rites; members of the two great religious orders which are most illustrious in the annals of theology; representatives of teaching bodies, of learned periodicals, of the parochial clergy.

Those outside the Church might well pay attention to facts such as these (and they could be multiplied a thousandfold) before they assume so jauntily the office of critics or of prophets. For our own part, we shall go on about our work, devoted to the ancient Faith and to its living exponent, the Vicar of Christ; meeting what is false in modern thought with its own weapons; strengthening our souls against "combats without" and "fears within" by the reflection with which we began: "It is a fine thing to belong to a great wide old Church, if only for the corporate wisdom and patience it acquires. It partakes of the unhurrying confident serenity of things vast and everlasting. Those outside may criticise; some within may worry; but the great body moves on about its work unashamed and unfraid."

NOTES.

THE EPISCOPATE OF NEW YORK ON THE SYLLABUS.

Most Holy Father,

The recent publication of the Syllabus of Modern Errors calls for some fitting expression of our sentiments of filial devotion, and especially of our most profound gratitude for this exceptional evidence of Apostolic care and solicitude, which all those entrusted with the salvation of souls as well as all the faithful embrace with the deepest appreciation.

The paternal heart of Your Holiness is ineffably grieved over the pernicious persecution that is still raging against the Church of Christ, and this sorrow is all the more insufferable because this insidious attack is being nurtured not only by those outside the fold, but even by sons and brethren who have been carried away by the gravest errors. In view of these facts, We, too, cannot but feel, with Your Holiness, the burden of intense sorrow.

This tender solicitude of Your Holiness commands universal admiration and praise, for though worn out by so many and so great labors and tribulations, you keep a most constant watch over the Universal Church to preserve intact the integrity of the faith and ward off all dangers that menace the deposit of doctrine given to us from Heaven. The decree recently promulgated is a magnificent monument to the office of the Supreme Teacher and evokes from our humble hearts feelings of the liveliest joy and gratitude, first towards the Divine Founder of the Church and then towards His most worthy Vicar on earth.

These same sentiments are unanimously shared by the faithful of the Province of New York who are united to the See of Peter by the closest ties of obedience reverence and affection.

While none among us, as far as We know, is imbued with these disastrous errors nevertheless, We and all those committed to us, both clergy and laity, hasten to assure Your Holiness of our immediate and steadfast adhesion to this most opportune decree. We condemn and proscribe all and each of the propositions condemned and proscribed by Your Holiness, and, moreover, We have taken effective measures to preserve the doctrine and discipline of our Churches, Schools, and Seminaries, from the dangers indicated in the new decree.

The Professors in all the Faculties of our Seminaries subscribe to these provisions with full, explicit, and nominal assent. Peter has spoken once more and though the evils that now threaten Holy Church are numerous and grave, still it is our firm hope that the promise made to Peter and his Successors will triumph: the gates of Hell shall not prevail.

Prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, We most humbly implore the Apostolic Benediction for ourselves, for our most devoted clergy and for our beloved and faithful flocks.

Your Holiness':

Most obedient sons,

John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York,
Bernard McQuaid, Bishop of Rochester,
Patrick A. Ludden, Bishop of Syracuse,
Henry Gabriels, Bishop of Ogdensburg,

CHARLES E. McDONNELL, Bishop of Brooklyn,
THOMAS M. A. BURKE, Bishop of Albany,
JAMES A. McFAUL, Bishop of Trenton,
JOHN J. O'CONNOR, Bishop of Newark,
CHARLES H. COLTON, Bishop of Buffalo,
THOMAS F. HICKEY, Coo-adjutor of Rochester,
THOMAS F. CUSACK, Auxiliary Bishop of New York.

Given at New York, the thirty-first day of August, 1907.

On account of its value to those who are interested in clerical studies, we present to our readers the letter of Cardinal Ferrata to the Bishops of Italy prescribing a uniform course of studies in the seminaries of that land. The version and synopsis are taken from the *Ecclesiastical Review.*

The Congregation of Bishops and Regulars commissioned by the Holy Father to reorganize the Seminaries of Italy has deemed it advisable to submit a common Program of Studies whereby to unify and improve the instruction imparted in our Seminaries.

In outlining the order of studies it has been decided to take as a basis the division of the courses which has been already introduced into nearly all the seminaries, namely, Gymnasium, Lyceum, and Theologicum.

For the subjects which make up the courses in the Gymnasium and Lyceum, and for their distribution, it was necessary to adopt, with some necessary modifications, the programs in general use in Italy, not because these are perfect, but principally for the following reasons:

1. The program in use represents in public estimation that culture which is required to-day; hence the efficiency of the clergy who have been educated according to them will be increased, whilst a lack of these demands will create, at least in the eyes of many, the impression that priests are inferior to laymen as regards true culture.

2. It is also to be considered that candidates, as a rule, cannot definitely decide upon their having a vocation to the ecclesiastical state before they have reached a certain age; hence it is advisable to regulate their studies in such a way that they may obtain recognized certificates of fitness, which will be useful to them in case they should adopt some other state of life. It is needless to say that such certificates are also likely to prove of advantage to those whom God may be pleased to call to the priesthood.

A wise and judicious superintendence will easily prevent, or will at the least greatly lessen, the abuses arising from the fact that students may remain in the seminaries after the Gymnasium course, for the mere purpose of obtaining the licentiate of the Lyceum course.

Moreover, the program of studies in the Lyceum accords with that which should form part of the Philosophy course in the seminaries, with the addition only of the department of Letters and History, quite necessary for students of the sanctuary who should be *instructi ad omne opus bonum.*

It has also been deemed advisable to prefix to the Theology course a year of Propedeutics, so as to complete the course of Philosophy, and to treat of certain subjects which cannot easily be included in the course of Theology. This additional year may be dispensed with, if it can be shown that during the Lyceum course adequate preparation has been given for that of Theology.

Rules for the theological course are given so as to render it complete and easily compassed within four years.

Finally, a time-table is added, to serve as a guide to Prefects of Studies.

By the authority of the Holy Father, I have the honor to communicate this program to you with the request that you see it put in force in your seminary for the course of the next scholastic year.

You are also requested to report to this Sacred Congregation the rules governing the studies in your seminary and to forward the list of professors and of textbooks used by them.

I trust that, under the assiduous care of Your Lordship, the exact observance of the program will be ensured whereby you will contribute efficaciously to the higher education of the clergy and enable them, with greater advantage to souls, to fulfil their noble mission.

D. Card. Ferrata, *Prefect.*
F. Giustini, *Secretary.*

The Course of Studies.

The course of studies in all the Seminaries of Italy is divided into the departments of the Gymnasium, Lyceum, and Theologicum.

I. GYMNASIUM.

1. No student shall be admitted to the classes of the Gymnasium unless he present a certificate of fitness, showing that he has regularly completed the preceding classes, and pass the entrance examination.

2. The course of the Gymnasium shall be one of five years, divided into five classes, during which shall be taught the matters of the programs in general use, and the same time-table shall be followed, but in such a way as to give a certain preference to Latin in all the classes while at the same time qualifying the students to pass the examination of the Gymnasial licentiate.

3. At least one hour a week shall be assigned in every class for catechetical instruction.

II. LYCEUM.

1. No student shall be admitted to the Lyceum unless he have regularly gone through the classes of the Gymnasium and passed the examinations.

2. The Lyceum shall be divided into three classes, corresponding with the three years of the course, and these classes shall correspond both with regard to the subjects and to the time-tables with the programs in general use, in such a way that the students shall be prepared to pass the Lyceal licentiate and at the same time a more ample development be given to sound philosophy. (See IV, 2 and 3.)

3. At least one hour a week shall be assigned for religious instruction.

III. PROPEDEUTICS.

1. In this course the students, besides acquiring a more profound knowledge of philosophy, shall study other matters, which may be those indicated in the time-table appended.

2. In the Seminaries where this year of Propedeutics shall be established the study of philosophy in the three years of the Lyceum shall embrace psychology, logic, general metaphysics, ethics.

3. Where a dispensation for this year has been obtained, clerics aspiring to the priesthood shall during the three years of the Lyceum, in addition to the matters contained in the program, have assigned to them at least two hours a week, if neces-

sary even on Thursdays, for the completion of the study of philosophy, and especially of those parts of philosohpy which are necessary for an adeqpate preparation for theological studies.

IV. THEOLOGY.

1. The course of Theology shall be one of four years, divided into four classes, with a regular time table of four hours a day of teaching.

2. It shall embrace the following matters: Loci theologici, General and Particular Introduction to the Sacred Scripture, Biblical Exegesis, Dogmatic Theology and the Sacraments, Moral and Pastoral Theology, Institutions of Canon Law, Ecclesiastical History, Hebrew, Greek, Sacred Archeology and Art, Sacred Eloquence and Patrology, Liturgy.

V. GENERAL REGULATIONS.

1. In order that this program may be properly carried out every Seminary shall have a Prefect of Studies, who is to be elected by the Bishop.

2. To the Prefect, always under the superintendence of the Bishop, shall appertain the preparation of the course of lectures for the Professors, the compilation of the Calendar and of the scholastic time-tables.

3. After having consulted with the Professors, whom he is to assemble in council every month, and more frequently should he judge it necessary, the Prefect of Studies shall apply, or even modify, the program in general use, arrange the hours of teaching according to these programs in such a way as to observe the substance of them and leave them adequate for the examinations of the licentiate, while at the same time allowing more time for matters of greater importance for the scope of the Seminaries, as has been above observed for Latin in the Gymnasium and Philosophy in the Lyceum.

4. The scholastic year shall last for not less than nine months.

5. The Prefect of Studies with the Board of Professors shall arrange that at the end of the year searching examinations be held regularly in all the matters, for promotion to the higher classes, and decide on the number of votes required for a pass.

6. A session for supplementary examinations shall be established for those who have failed to pass in the first examinations.

7. The different matters in the Lyceal and Theological courses shall be entrusted to good Professors, who may also, by way of exception, be charged with teaching some branch kindred to their own. But in all cases care must be taken that no Professor be burdened with too many hours of teaching, to the evident loss of the students.

8. Each Professor in treating his subject shall employ a text-book, which he shall explain in such a way as to complete the annual course marked out in the Program.

9. For the Gymnasium and the Lyceum, as the programs in general use are to be followed, the text-books shall be selected in conformity with these programs, due regard of course being paid to the nature and scope of the Seminaries.

10. For Philosophy and Theology the text-book shall be proposed by the Board of Professors, and submitted for the approval of the Bishop.

NOTE.—In the central and interdiocesan seminaries the rights of the Ordinary belong to the body of Bishops interested.

Seen and approved, with the earnest recommendation that Our Venerable Brothers the Bishops faithfully observe the above.

Feast of St. Pius V.
5 *May*, 1907. PIUS X POPE.

Appendix.

TIME-TABLE FOR THE CLASS OF PROPEDEUTICS.

First hour.—Every day: "De vera religione,"

Second hour.—Monday, Wednesday and Friday: "Propedeutics to Ecclesiastical History;" Tuesday and Saturday: "Biblical Greek."

Third hour.—Monday, Wednesday and Friday: "Theodicea;" Tuesday and Saturday: "Natural Law."

Fourth hour.—Monday, Wednesday and Friday: "Cosmology;" Tuesday and Saturday: "History of Philosophy."

TIME-TABLE FOR THEOLOGY.

Monday, first hour.—First year: "Loci Theologici;" second, third and fourth year: "Moral Theology."

Second hour.—Second, third and fourth year: "Dogma;" first year: "Moral, De actibus humanis, Conscientia, Legibus."

Third hour.—First and second year: "Hebrew or Greek, Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures;" third and fourth year: "Institutions of Canon Law."

Fourth hour, for all years: "Hebrew or Greek, Introduction to Ecclesiastical History."

Tuesday, first hour.—First and second year: "The Sacred Scrpitures;" third and fourth year: "Institutions of Canon Law."

Second hour, all four years: "Biblical Exegesis,"

Third hour, all four years: "Sacred Archeology and Art."

Fourth hour, all four years: "Ecclesiastical History."

Wednesday, first, second and third hour as on Monday.

Fourth hour, all four years: "Biblical Exegesis."

Friday, as on Monday.

Saturday, first and second hour, as on Monday.

Third hour, all four years: "Sacred Eloquence, Patrology."

Fourth hour, all four years: "Sacred Liturgy."

With the foregoing time-table the plan of lectures works out as follows:

For the first year: Four hours of "Hebrew or Greek, and Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures;" two hours of "Biblical Exegesis;" four hours of "Loci Theologici;" four hours of "Fundamental Treatises of Moral Theology;" three hours of "Ecclesiastical History;" one hour of "Sacred Archeology and Art;" one hour of "Sacred Eloquence and Patrology; one hour of "Sacred Liturgy." Total, twenty hours.

For the second year: Four hours of "Hebrew or Greek and Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures;" four hours of "Moral;" two hours of "Biblical Exegesis;" four hours of "Dogma;" three hours of "Ecclesiastical History," one hour of "Sacred Archeology and Art;" one hour of "Sacred Eloquence and Patrology;" one hour of "Sacred Liturgy." Total, twenty hours.

For the third and fourth years: Four hours of "Moral and Pastoral Theology;" four hours of "Institutions of Canon Law;" three hours of "Ecclesiastical History;" two hours of "Biblical Exegesis;" one hour of "Sacred Archeology and Art;" one hour of "Sacred Eloquence and Patrology;" one hour of "Sacred Liturgy." Total, twenty hours.

SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI PII DIVINA PROVINDENTIA PAPAE X.

DE SENTENTIIS PONTIFICALIS CONSILII REI BIBLICAE PROVEHENDAE PRAEPOSITI AC DE CENSVRIS ET POENIS IN EOS QVI PRAESCRIPTA ADVERSVS MODERNISTARVM ERRORES NEGLEXERINT.

MOTV PROPRIO

Praestantia Scripturae Sacrae enarrata, eiusque commendato studio, Litteris Encyclicis *Providentissimus Deus*, datis xiv Calendas decembres a. MDCCCLXXXIII, Leo XIII, Noster immortalis memoriae Decessor, leges descripsit quibus Sacrorum Bibliorum studia ratione proba regerentur; Librisque divinis contra errores calumniasque Rationalistarum assertis, simul et ab opinionibus vindicavit falsae doctrinae, quae *critica sublimior* audit; quas quidem opiniones nihil esse aliud palam est, nisi *Rationalismi commenta*, quemadmodum sapientissime scribebat Pontifex, *e philologia et finitimis disciplinis detorta.*

Ingravescenti autem in dies periculo prospecturus, quod inconsultarum deviarumque sententiarum propagatione parabatur, Litteris Apostolicis *Vigilantiae studiique memores*, tertio calendas novembres a. MDCCCCII datis, Decessor idem Noster Pontificale Consilium seu *Commissionem* de re Biblica condidit, aliquot doctrina et prudentia claros S. R. E. Cardinales complexam, quibus, Consultorum nomine, complures e sacro ordine adiecti sunt viri, e doctis scientia theologiae Bibliorumque Sacrorum delecti, natione varii, studiorum exegeticorum methodo atque opinamentis dissimiles. Scilicet id commodum Pontifex, aptissimum studiis et aetati, animo spectabat, fieri in Consilio locum sententiis quibusvis libertate omnimoda proponendis, expendendis disceptandisque; neque ante, secundum eas Litteras, certa aliqua in sententia debere Purpuratos Patres consistere, quam quum cognita prius et in utramque partem examinata rerum argumenta forent, nihilque esset posthabitum, quod posset clarissimo collocare in lumine verum sincerumque propositarum de re Biblica quaestionum statum: hoc demum emenso cursu, debere sententias Pontifici Summo subiici probandas, ac deinde pervulgari.

Post diuturna rerum iudicia consultationesque diligentissimas, quaedam feliciter a Pontificio de re Biblica Consilio emissae sententiae sunt, provehendis germane biblicis studiis, iisdemque certa norma dirigendis perutiles. At vero minime deesse conspicimus qui, plus nimio ad opiniones methodosque proni perniciosis novitatibus affectas, studioque praeter modum abrepti falsae libertatis, quae sane est licentia intemperans, probatque se in doctrinis sacris equidem insidiosissimam maximorumque malorum contra fidei puritatem fecundam, non eo, quo par est, obsequio sententias eiusmodi, quamquam a Pontifice probatas, exceperint aut excipiant.

Quapropter declarandum illud praecipiendumque videmus, quemadmodum declaramus in praesens expresseque praecipimus, universos omnes conscientiae obstringi officio sententiis Pontificalis Consilii de re Biblica, ad doctrinam pertinentibus, sive quae adhuc sunt emissae sive quae posthac edentur, perinde ac Decretis Sacrarum Congregationum a Pontifice probatis, se subiiciendi; nec posse notam tum detrectatae oboedientiae tum temeritatis devitare aut culpa propterea vacare gravi quotquot verbis scriptisve sententias has tales impugnent; idque praeter scandalum, quo offendant, ceteraque quibus in causa esse coram Deo possint, aliis, ut plurimum, temere in his errateque pronunciatis.

Ad haec, audentiores quotidie spiritus complurium modernistarum repressuri, qui sophismatis artificiisque omne genus vim efficacitatemque nituntur adimere non Decreto solum *Lamentabili sane exitu*, quod v nonas Iulias anni vertentis S. R. et U. Inquisitio, Nobis iubentibus, edidit, verum etiam Litteris Encyclicis Nostris *Pascendi Dominici gregis*, datis die VIII mensis Septembris istius eiusdem anni, Auctoritate Nostra Apostolica iteramus confirmamusque tum *Decretum* illud Congregationis Sacrae Supremae, tum *Litteras* eas Nostras *Encyclicas*, addita *excommunicationis* poena adversus contradictores; illudque declaramus ac decernimus, si quis, quod Deus avertat, eo audaciae progrediatur ut quamlibet e propositionibus, opinionibus doctrinisque in alterutro documento, quod supra diximus, improbatis tueatur, centura ipso facto plecti Capite *Docentes* Constitutionis *Apostolicae Sedis* irrogata, quae prima est in excommunicationibus latae sententiae Romano Pontifici simpliciter reservatis. Haec autem excommunicatio salvis poenis est intelligenda, in quas, qui contra memorata documenta quidpiam commiserint, possint, uti propagatores defensoresque haeresum, incurrere, si quando eorum propositiones, opiniones doctrinaeve haereticae sint, quod quidem de utriusque illius documenti adversariis plus semel usuvenit, tum vero maxime quum modernistarum errores, id est *omnium haereseon collectum*, propugnant.

His constitutis, Ordinariis dioecesum et Moderatoribus Religiosarum Consociationum denuo vehementerque commendamus, velint pervigiles in magistros esse, Seminariorum in primis; repertosque erroribus modernistarum imbutos, novarum nocentiumque rerum studiosos, aut minus ad praescripta Sedis Apostolicae, utcumque edita, dociles, magisterio prorsus interdicant: a sacris item ordinibus adolescentes excludant, qui vel minimum dubitationis iniiciant doctrinas se consectari damnatas novitatesque maleficas. Simul hortamur, observare studiose ne cessent libros aliaque scripta, nimium quidem percrebrescentia, quae opiniones proclivitatesque gerant tales, ut improbatis per Encyclicas Litteras Decretumque supra dicta consentiant: ea summovenda curent ex officinis librariis catholicis multoque magis e studiosae iuventutis Clerique manibus. Id si sollerter accuraverint, verae etiam solidaeque faverint institutioni mentium, in qua maxime debet sacrorum Praesulum sollicitudo versari.

Haec Nos universa rata et firma consistere auctoritate Nostra volumus et iubemus, contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, die XVIII mensis Novembris a. MDCCCCVII, Pontificatus Nostri quinto.

PIVS PP. X.

We offer no apologies for presenting *in extenso* the remarks of some evidently friendly critic of this REVIEW, which were published in the English *Catholic Weekly*, November 15, 1907. We feel that the pleasure we experience in having our efforts appreciated will be shared by all our friends.

"With the current number, THE NEW YORK REVIEW enters upon its third year of publication. We take the occasion to congratulate it on its success, and to call the attention of our readers to some of its more salient features. When it was started three years ago, its promoters realized that the strides made in scientific and historical research during the past half-century demanded the consideration of new problems. But they also realized that those problems could not be adequately dealt with except by working in sympathy with the Holy See. The journal, issuing from the diocesan seminary of New York, was under the responsibility of Archbishop Farley, whose intimate friendship with, and devotion to Pius X. were sufficient guarantee of the utmost loyalty. Working, then, in this spirit of progress under authoritative guidance, the editors have been able to produce in one special periodical some of the best work of Catholic scholars, both at home and abroad. Not only have America and England been represented, but also France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Italy. Amongst the contributors we notice the names of Wilfrid Ward,

Ernesto Bonaiuti, William Turner, James J. Fox, Francis E. Gigot, William Barry, M. J. Lagrange, William J. Kerby, Henri Bremond, Vincent McNabb, Walter McDonald, Gabriel Oussani, John T. Driscoll, Joseph Turmel, Cornelius Clifford, Edward J. Hanna, William L. Sullivan, Henry A. Poels, Mgr. Batiffol, Joseph McSorley, George Fonsegrive, Thomas J. Gerrard, Charles Plater.

It only too frequently happens that the learned journals are so highly technical that the busy layman, and even the busy missionary priest, has neither the time nor the courage to digest them. Yet if the work of experts is to be of any value at all, if it is not to remain for ever in the catacombs of libraries and buried in dust, it must be presented in a way so that it may be fairly well assimilated by the average all-around scholar. And we think that the NEW YORK REVIEW has succeeded in striking that happy mean which avoids extreme dryness on the one hand, and the obvious or commonplace on the other.

The first place is naturally given to the apologetic questions of the hour. They are treated, however, in a positive and constructive, rather than in a controversial or destructive manner. Thus, Mr. Wilfrid Ward, in an article entitled "The Spirit of Newman's Apologetics," outlines the temper and spirit of the review. The movement, or, rather, tendency, known as the new apologetic, has been treated with an objectivity which is as rare as it is necessary and admirable. If M. Fonsegrive, for instance, has been allowed to present one aspect of the matter, Dr. McDonald, and Dr. Turner have had equal liberty in presenting another. Again, in the criticism of the articles a new line has been taken. A section is reserved for discussions. A critic may say what he has to say, the original writer is allowed one reply, and there the discussion ends. Writers on both sides thus learn to set forth their remarks in the fewest possible words, and no time is allowed for any controversy to reach its personal, and therefore useless, stage.

Next in importance after the current articles is a section for shorter studies, dealing with such subjects as Scripture, Patrology, and Archæology. Here the Review has been especially fortunate in securing writers of the first rank. The Abbé Joseph Turmel has given patristic studies on St. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, St. Augustine, and St. Clement of Alexandria. Dr. Gabriel Oussani would seem to have prepared himself for Orientalism from his childhood. Born in Bagdad, he studied in the patriarchal seminary at Mossul (ancient Ninive), in Mesopotamia, travelled extensively in the Levant country, studied further at Propaganda, in Rome, and eventually at the Johns Hopkins University in the United States, where he was appointed fellow in Semitic Languages. His studies on the Code of Hammurabi are models of what can be done in making difficult subjects comparatively easy, and in bringing the big questions within reach of moderate capacities. Then we have Dr. Gigot, who has given us three courses of study, respectively in "The Synoptics," "Divorce in the New Testament," and the "Higher Criticism of the Bible."

Finally there is a section entitled "Notes and Reviews." Of the "reviews" it may be sufficient to say that they are all signed—a most desirable feature in these days of the writing of many books, and when so much depends on the reviewer. Of the "notes," however, it ought to be said that they are worthy of a better name. They are unsigned. We suggest to the writer that his work is of an importance which should justify him in coming to the front with his name. Practically every recent event worth speakng about which has happened in the world of religious thought is recorded with suitable, and sometimes very vigorous, comment. It is largely through "notes" of this kind that general opinion is formed. It is particularly here that those expressions of loyalty to the Holy See find vent. It is here that an attitude is taken towards orthodoxy and unorthodoxy. It is here that we find an indication of that spirit of true progress which pays due regard to the guidance of authority and to the choice of the most distinguished thinkers and writers.

Those of our readers who desire to be kept up-to-date, and at the same time to be kept within the safety limits, cannot do better than add the New York Review to their list of periodicals. We commend it especially to the hard-worked parochial clergy."

His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, in his capacity as Chancellor of the Catholic University, has issued the following report and appeal in the matter of its finances. Wealthy Catholics, in our opinion, could find no worthier object of their generosity than this center of Catholic faith and learning.

BALTIMORE MD., NOVEMBER 1, 1907.
CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE,

It affords me great pleasure to inform you that the collection for the University last year reached the handsome sum of $100,000, and I avail myself of this opportunity to express my profound satisfaction at this result and my sincere thanks therefor to yourself and to the generous clergy and laity of your diocese. While it is true that this sum falls somewhat below the amounts collected in former years, the difference is readily explained in view of unusual circumstances in some localities, and it is offset by the fact that in many dioceses there was a notable increase.

With the collection and with other contributions, the University met all current expenses, made various needed improvements without incurring any debt, and added to its assets the sum of $93,530.52. The Report just published for 1906-07 is truly encouraging, as it shows a sound financial condition and a vigorous academic life.

But at the same time it is clear that much remains to be done. While it is very consoling to know that under present arrangements the work of the University is conducted on a safe economic basis, it would be blindness on our part not to recognize the urgent need of enlarging that work and securing for it the highest possible efficiency. Faculties must be completed, equipment increased and an endowment provided that will enable the University to become in reality what its name implies. For this purpose the sum of $2,000,000, at least, will be required; and as at present we have only about $550,000, it follows that the remaining $1,450,000 should be raised. We have in prospect, on a reasonable expectation, $450,000; thus leaving a million dollars, which I sincerely trust will be obtained by earnest efforts in the near future. The proposed endowment of two million dollars would mean an annual income of eighty thousand dollars.

In comparison with the revenues of the older universities in our country, this is not a large amount. And when we consider that in many of these institutions with unlimited resources and far-reaching influence there is a siprit of antagonism to revealed religion, the necessity of developing our Catholic University as a stronghold of faith becomes more and more obvious.

It is doubtless a great and laudable work to erect imposing temples for Divine worship, yet these will avail but little unless we also build the living temple of God in the souls of men. The very splendor of the material structure requires that the spiritual edifice should be of equal strength and proportion; and this requirement, under God's grace, is chiefly fulfilled by education. Our Catholic schools are doing a noble work towards this end, and it is but just and reasonable that they should enjoy the advantages which a thoroughly equipped university would offer to our educational system.

Our action in building up the University would also be a fitting response to the words burning with zeal of our Holy Father who, in his recent Encyclical, appeals so earnestly to all Bishops to withstand, by the teaching of sound science, the pernicious encroachments of error. Nothing, I am sure, would afford him greater comfort nor prove our devotion to him more completely than a resolute and united endeavor in behalf of the Catholic University.

For these reasons, then, I venture to urge that the great movement for higher Catholic education be carried forward with ever-increasing energy for the glory of God, the defense of religion, the consolation of our sorely-tried Pontiff and the honro of the Church in America.

J. CARD. GIBBONS,

Chancellor of the Catholic University of America.

We have received the following notice, entitled "Modernism and the Bible," from the publishers of the *Catholic Encyclopedia.* We are happy to print it in full, and for various reasons:—for the compliment it pays to the really remarkable scholarship of a confrère and contributor of our own; as a confirmation from irreproachable sources of views expressed elsewhere in this issue of the NEW YORK REVIEW; as an evidence of the fine blending of Catholic loyalty and devotion to science which marks the editorial management of the *Catholic Encyclopedia*; and most of all, as an inducement to the learned readers of this REVIEW to give all possible financial and moral support to that excellent publication.

"It may not be the fault of the average Catholic layman if recent non-Catholic newspaper talk has somewhat confused and bewildered him as to the Pope's recent Encyclical on "Modernism." In this rushing age the average layman can hardly be expected to make a profound and exhaustive study of the Encyclical itself and the history of nineteenth-century thought which led up to it, which would be necessary to reach any clear and well-defined idea as to what "Modernism" really means. The thing meant seems, in fact, to be rather a diffused taint in the intellectual atmosphere than any compact body of doctrine; the Modernists, says the Holy Father, "present their doctrines without order and systematic arrangement into one whole, scattered and disjointed."

And yet there is a solid nucleus to this impalpable noxious vapor of Modernism. The nebula seems to thicken round and about the field of sacred letters, where the exegesis of some Catholic scholars has been far too accommodating to the modern spirit of scepticism. The new volume, the second, of *The Catholic Encyclopedia,* comes opportunely to summarize and to illustrate our position in the matter of Pius X. and "Modernism." Those whose function it is to watch over the safety of God's flocks have long since perceived that here was a danger for which the Chief Shepherd must immediately find a remedy. The article "Biblical Commission," in this volume, tells, within the relatively small compass of one page, how that body was constituted by Papal authority in 1901, to investigate the menacing conditions and to suggest a remedy; it tells of the personnel, the official authority, and the work of the commission, and a perusal of that one, clearly and tersely written page is as the beam of a great searchlight striking through the fog which our non-Catholic contemporaries have raised. So much for clear instruction; for illustration the same volume gives us, among others of similar scope, an article entitled "Biblical Antiquities"—eight pages—which in years to come will serve to mark the degree of enlightened freedom fairly sanctioned by the Church in Old-Testament exegesis. Let no good Catholic with this volume before him be afraid that Pius X. is going to "turn off the light" which modern research has afforded to Christian scholarship; the last-named article and those on "Assyria," "Babylonia," and "Baal" (all by the same author, the Rev. Dr. Gabriel Oussani) give ample assurance that in our day, as heretofore, the Catholic Church can afford to tolerate a proper freedom of criticism in her exegetes in perfect consistency with her own inflexible principles."

BOOK REVIEWS.

The International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament—edited by Rev. Ch. A. Briggs, D.D., D.Litt.; Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., D.Litt., and Rev. A. Plummer, M. A., D.D.: New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.

That the study of the Bible in the present day should be not only reverential but also thoroughly critical and scientific no one doubts, for the problems involved are of vital importance, not only for theology but also for the interests of the Christian religion itself. It is therefore much to be regretted that English speaking Catholics do not as yet possess any critical and scientific commentary on the Bible. In this respect our Catholic brethren of the Continent are much more fortunate than ourselves. Thus the Germans can justly be proud of their *Kurzgefasster Kommentar zu den heiligen Schriften* and many other valuable commentaries on several of the O. and N. T. books; while the French have *Le Saint Bible*, in 27 vols., by such writers as Fillion, Clair, Gillet, Lesêtre, Trochon, etc. This work is, of course, in many respects antiquated, but the new series projected by the distinguished head of the Dominican Biblical School of Jerusalem, and of which the vol. on Judges, by Lagrange; on Isaias, by Condamin; on John, by Calmes, and on the Minor Prophets, by Van Hoonacker, have already appeared, will doubtless leave nothing to be desired in point of sound, accurate scholarship. The Italian brethren too, are beginning to appreciate the value and usefulness of Dr. Minocchi's praiseworthy commentaries on the Song of Songs, on the Lamentations, on the Psalms, on Isaias, and lately on Genesis. Such are some of the products of our scholarly exegetes on the Continent. English speaking Catholics can point to no such achievement. Not only do we lack a complete critical commentary on the Bible in English, but we are also without any serious critical commentary on any of its individual books. This fact alone is painfully significant and should, we think, stimulate some of our representative English speaking Catholic exegetes to take the matter in hand and begin to fill this grave lacuna in our religious literature. The *Cursus Scripturæ Sacræ*, projected and edited by some distinguished German Jesuits, such as Cornely, Knabenbauer, Hummelauer and a few others, is indeed an admirable monument of erudition but it is written in Latin, and the credit for it belongs to Catholic Germany. Yet a critical English commentary of the Old and New Testament is an ever growing need for all Catholic theologians and clergymen, to say nothing of the cultured laity; and awaiting the realization of such a work by our Catholic scholars, we deem it useful to call the attention of those interested in such studies to the International Critical Commentary, which in many respects is well adapted to satisfy our present needs. The series, though incomplete, has already won its place among the best critical commentaries on the Bible, be they German, French, Latin or Italian. Indeed, many of its volumes are doubtless the best that have as yet been written on their respective portions of Holy Writ. The practical success and popularity of the International Critical Commentary is due to two main reasons, viz: I. Its strictly scientific, critical and up-to-date treatment of topics, and II. Its truly international or better, inter-denominational character.

The series, as is well known, is published under the editorship of three distinguished biblical scholars, namely, Prof. Charles Briggs, of Union Theological Seminary, New York; Prof. S. Driver, of Oxford, foremost among the living Old Testament scholars of England, and Prof. Plummer, of University College, Durham. The first two are in charge of the Old Testament, while Prof. Plummer edits the New Testament commentaries in the series. From the point of view of competency, of painstaking, sober and reverent criticism, the selection of editors was indeed a happy one, and leaves nothing to be desired. Their programme, which has been conscientiously carried out, is set forth by the Editors themselves as follows: "The Commentaries will be international and inter-confessional, and will be free from polemical and ecclesiastical bias. They will be based upon a thorough critical study of the original texts of the Bible, and upon critical methods of interpretation. They are designed chiefly for students and clergymen, and will be written in a compact style. Each book will be preceded by an Introduction, stating the results of criticism upon it, and discussing impartially the questions still remaining open. The details of criticism will appear in their proper place in the body of the Commentary. Each section of the Text will be introduced with a paraphrase, or summary of contents. Technical details of textual and philological criticism will, as a rule, be kept distinct from matter of a more general character; and in the Old Testament the exegetical notes will be arranged, as far as possible, so as to be serviceable to students not acquainted with Hebrew. The History of Interpretation of the Books will be dealt with, when necessary, in the introduction, with critical notices of the most important literature of the subject. Historical and archeological questions, as well as questions of Biblical Theology, are included in the plan of the Commentaries, but not Practical or Homiletic Exegesis. These volumes will constitute a uniform series."—(From the Editors' Preface). The following is a list of the various volumes of the series, many of which have been published, while others are in preparation:

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Genesis. The Rev. John Skinner, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature, College of Presbyterian Church of England, Cambridge, England.

Exodus. The Rev. A. R. S. Kennedy, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, University of Edinburgh.

Leviticus. J. F. Stenning, M.A., Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford.

Numbers. The Rev. G. Buchanan Gray, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Mansfield College, Oxford. [Now Ready].

Deuteronomy. The Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., D.Litt., Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford. [Now Ready].

Joshua. The Rev. George Adam Smith, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, United Free Church College, Glasgow.

Judges. The Rev. George Moore, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Theology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. [Now Ready].

Samuel. The Rev. H. P. Smith, D.D., sometime Professor of Biblical History, Amherst College, Mass. [Now Ready].

Kings. The Rev. Francis Brown, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew and Cognate Languages, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

Chronicles. The Rev. Edward L. Curtis, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Ezra and Nehemiah. The Rev. L. W. Batten, Ph.D., D.D., Rector of St. Mark's Church, New York City, sometime Professor of Hebrew, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia.

Psalms. The Rev. Chas. A. Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York. [2 vols. Now Ready].

Proverbs. The Rev. C. H. Toy, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. [Now Ready].

Job. The Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., Litt.,D. Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford.

Isaiah. Chaps. I-XXXIX. The Rev. G. Buchanan Gray, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Mansfield College, Oxford.

Isaiah. Chaps. XL-LXVI. The Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., D.Litt., Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford.

Jeremiah. The Rev. A. F. Kirkpatrick, D.D., Dean of Ely, sometime Regius Professor of Hebrew, Cambridge, England.

Ezekiel. The Rev. G. A. Cooke, M.A., sometime Fellow Magdalen College, and the Rev. Charles F Burney, D.Litt., Fellow and Lecturer in Hebrew, St. John's College, Oxford.

Daniel. The Rev. John P. Peters, Ph.D., D.D., sometime Professor of Hebrew, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia, now Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York City.

Amos and Hosea. W. R. Harper, Ph.D., LL.D., sometime President of the University of Chicago, Illinois. [Now Ready].

Micah to Haggai. Prof. John P. Smith, University of Chicago; Prof. Charles P. Fagnani, D.D., Union Theological Seminary, New York; W. Hayes Ward, D.D., LL.D., Editor of *The Independent*, New York; Prof. Julius A. Bever, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Prof. H. G. Mitchell, D.D., Boston University.

Zechariah to *Jonah.* Prof. H. G. Mitchell, D.D., Prof. John P. Smith and Prof. J. A. Bever.

Esther. The Rev. L. B. Paton, Ph.D., Professor of Hebrew, Hartford Theological Seminary.

Ecclesiastes. Prof. George A. Barton, Ph. D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Bryn Mawr College, Pa. [In Press].

Ruth, Song of Songs and Lamentations. Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York.

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

St. Matthew. The Rev. Willoughby C. Allen, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in Theology and Hebrew, Exeter College, Oxford. [Now Ready].

St. Mark. Rev. E. P. Gould, D.D., sometime Professor of New Testament Literature, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia. [Now Ready]

St. Luke. The Rev. Alfred Plummer, D.D., sometime Master of University College, Durham. [Now Ready].

St. John. The Very Rev. John Henry Bernard, D.D., Dean of St. Patrick's and Lecturer in Divinity, University of Dublin.

Harmony of the Gospels. The Rev. William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Oxford, and the Rev. Willoughby C. Allen, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in Divinity and Hebrew, Exeter College, Oxford.

Acts. The Rev. C. H. Turner, D.D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, and the Rev. H. N. Bate, M.A., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of London.

Romans. The Rev. William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, and the Rev. A. C. Headlam, M.A., D.D., Principal of King's College, London. [Now Ready].

Corinthians. The Right Rev. Arch. Robertson, D.D., LL.D., Lord Bishop of Exeter, and Dawson Walker, D.D., Theological Tutor in the University of Durham.

Galatians. The Rev. Ernest D. Burton, D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature, University of Chicago.

Ephesians and Colossians. The Rev. T. K. Abbott, B.D., D.Litt., sometime Professor of Biblical Greek, Trinity College, Dublin, now Librarian of the same. [Now Ready].

Philippians and Philemon. The Rev. Marvin R. Vincent, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Union Theological Seminary, New York City. [Now Ready].

Thessalonians. The Rev. James E. Frame, M.A., Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York.

The Pastoral Epistles. The Rev. Walter Lock, D.D., Warden of Keble College and Professor of Exegesis, Oxford.

Hebrews. The Rev. A. Nairne, M.A., Professor of Hebrew in King's College, London.

St. James. The Rev. James H. Ropes, D.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism in Harvard University.

Peter and Jude. The Rev. Charles Bigg, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. [Now Ready].

The Epistle of St. John. The Rev. E. A. Brooke, B. D., Fellow and Divinity Lecturer in King's College, Cambridge.

Revelations. The Rev. Robert H. Charles, M.A., D.D., Professor of Biblical Greek in the University of Dublin.

Some of the published volumes such as those on Judges (Moore), Deuteronomy (Driver), Numbers (Gray), Psalms (Briggs), Romans (Sanday), Luke (Plummer), and Matthew (Allen), have already won international applause, and have taken their place among the classical treatises of their kind. It is to be noted, however, that with few exceptions (v. g., Matthew), the volumes on the Old Testament are more original and searching than those on the New.

Students of theology, teachers and preachers will find in these Commentaries invaluable aid for their public and private studies and references. They are, as a whole, sound, sober, and conservative, embodying the results of the most scholarly and reliable biblical research.

Gabriel Oussani.

The Life of Christ—by Mgr. E. Le Camus, Bp. of La Rochelle, France. Translated by Wm. A. Hickey, priest of the diocese of Springfield. Vol. II. New York. The Cathedral Library Association. pp. xviii, 499.

This volume is the second instalment of the English translation of the late Bp. Le Camus' valuable *Vie de Notre Seigneur Jésus Christ.* With regard to both its contents and its rendering into English, this second volume is the worthy continuation of the preceding one, an account of which was given in The New York Review for Nov.-Dec., 1906. It takes up the narrative of Our Lord's Public Life at the precise point where it was left off at the end of the first volume, and carries it on to the Third Part of the whole work, which tells of the Last Days of Jesus on earth. It deals first with the remainder of the period in Christ's ministry which Bp. Le Camus aptly calls the "Formative Period in Galilee,"and during which Jesus organized, taught, and disciplined "with the wisdom of a God," the new society which owes to Him its origin (pp. 1-204). It next treats of the "Period of Struggle in Judea" (pp. 205-499), recording in detail Our Lord's visits to Jerusalem on the solemn festivals of the Tabernacles and the Dedication, and concluding with the narrative of Jesus' journey through Perea on His way for a last public entrance into the Holy City on Palm Sunday. It thus narrates much the larger part of Christ's public ministry, and hence, as far as the topics handled are concerned, this second volume is, if anything, of greater importance than the preceding one. The method applied by the late Right Rev. author to the study and setting forth of those topics, is the one which he has pursued in all his writings, and which has secured for him the following high commendation from the present Sovereign Pontiff, Pius X, in date of Jan. 11, 1906: "You deserve a special praise for your constant care, in explaining Holy Writ, to adhere to that method which, through respect for the truth and the honor of the Catholic doctrine, should absolutely be adhered to under the guidance of the Church. For, as we must condemn the temerity of those who, having more regard for novelty than for the teaching authority of the Church, do not hesitate to adopt a method of criticism altogether too free, so we should not approve the attitude of those who in no way dare to depart from the usual exegesis of Scripture, even when, faith not being at stake, the real advancement of learning requires such departure. You follow a wise middle course, and by your example show that there is nothing to be feared for the Sacred Books from the true progress of the art of criticism, nay, that a beneficial light may be derived from it, provided its use be coupled with a wise and prudent discernment." The present, like the foregoing, volume bespeaks at each step a close acquaintance with the recent data of Palestine exploration, Biblical philosophy, textual and historical criticism. The historical setting of the Savior's words and deeds is given with great fulness and remarkable accuracy. The difficulties arising from a comparison of the parallel texts of the Evangelists are not minimized, but frankly acknowledged and examined with the honesty that befits genuine Catholic scholarship. The authenticity of certain important parsages of the Gospels is discussed with learning and lucidity. The actual meaning of Christ's utterances regarding the most varied topics is established with true and reverent historical insight. The human side of Jesus' mortal life is not ignored, but pictured in such a way as to show that, though true God of true God, He was indeed a man moving and acting among the men of His time. In every way, the narrative is made interesting and instructive.

In view of the fact that Bp. Le Camus' Life of Christ embodies the results of his mature learning and of his prolonged study of the Gospel narratives, it may not be amiss to point out a few of the scientific positions which he has deliberately adopted in the present volume. With regard to the manner in which our first Gospel was composed, he informs us (p. 5) that "owing to the analogous nature of the subjects, and through the force of a simple association of ideas, he (St. Matthew) has even inserted (into the Sermon on the Mount) some fragments, which on St. Luke's authority we shall place where they more naturally belong." To complete this statement he adds at once the following note (footn. 2 p. 5). "Inasmuch as it is evident that St. Matthew did not seek to maintain the strictest order in his narrative, we may reasonably suppose that he was not much more concerned about adhering to it in his discourses. As he groups together, simply because they have an analogous meaning (chap. xiii), parables separated from each other by several incidents, so he may have united in one great moral thesis (the Sermon on the Mount) diverse fragments that refer to the development of the spiritual life." At p. 80, footn. 1, he says in connection with directions given by Our Lord at different times: "St. Matthew has put all this together because passing over the later sending of the Seventy disciples, he found trouble in otherwise distributing those important instructions which he did not wish to sacrifice. Again, it is well known that he took pleasure in summing up in one discourse such teachings as were analogous, although given at different times. St. Luke, in this discourse at least, puts each in its own place." Finally, at p. 360, footn. 1, he speaks of a "capricious distribution of fragments in St. Matthew." In reference to the compilatory character of St. Luke's Gospel, Bp. Le Camus writes (p. 35 footn.): "We have here another instance of the great respect with which he (St. Luke) treated the fragmentary narratives which were at hand in the preparation of his Gospel;" and at p. 498, footn. he says: "St. Luke (xvi, 18), having found only a word on this question (the question of divorce) in the documents at his disposal, has located it haphazard, like almost all the fragments from the middle of this chapter as far as xviii, 15, without seeking to attach to it an incident of which he knew nothing. These breaks in continuity and the appearance of disorder found in St. Luke are a proof of his conscientious accuracy." In connection with the differences which exist between Mt. x, 9; Mk. vi, 3; and Lk. ix, 3, the learned prelate writes: "This is probably another of those unimportant inaccuracies which we must admit in the sacred text,...... however, although the terms differ, the idea is the same in the three Gospels." In his comments on the description of heaven and hell in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, he rightly remarks (p. 484 note) that "the details of the scene are adapted to the hearers, and do not create any serious objection against Christian dogma." The traditional tomb of Lazarus still shown at Bethany he does not regard as answering sufficiently the description in St. John's Gospel (p. 457); and Mt. Tabor is not, according to him, the summit on which occurred Our Lord's transfiguration (p. 462 sq.). He prefaces his narrative of the raising of Lazarus by the following words; "This event, which is one of the most important in the Gospel history, since it provoked the Sanhedrim to extreme measures against Jesus, has been passed over by the synoptics in complete silence. They tell of the repast at Bethany without the slightest allusion to this event which was directly connected with it. The triumphal entrance into Jerusalem was itself partly a consequence of the resurrection of Lazarus. How then shall we explain that they who relate the one incident, say nothing of the other? Such silence is as surprising as that of St. John concerning the institution of the Eucharist. No hypothesis, yet suggested, gives the solution of the enigma, which very likely lies wholly in the fragmentary character of the Synoptics" (p. 446 footn.). In his critical note relative to the woman taken in adultery, he admits distinctly the genuineness of the passage (pp. 232-234).

The Rev. Translator of this second volume has done his work with the same constant care and felicity as we had noticed in his rendering of the first part of Bp. Le Camus' Life of Christ. This indeed will appear no small merit to any one who is at all acquainted with the idiomatic, and at times over-rhetorical, style of the original French. In respect to both its contents and its literary form, this second, like the first, volume of this translation fully deserves to obtain a wide circulation among English-speaking Catholics.

Francis E. Gigot.

The Legends of the Saints—From the French of Père H. Delehaye, S. J., Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.

A sharp reviewer once said of one of England's historians: "Everybody reads, everybody admires, but nobody believes, Mr. Macaulay." With certain restrictions the same has often been said of the second nocturns in the Roman Breviary. In fact, their character has formed the basis for a terse saying on mendacity which in ecclesiastical circles in Rome itself has almost passed into a proverb. The desire for the unvarnished statement of plain facts in the lives of the servants of God has within recent years given birth ot an excellent series of biographies based on the sound psychological as well as ethical, principle that the truth about the saints is much more to their glory and to our comfort and encouragement than repertories of extraordinary and often extravagant, unsubstantiated events and performances. Indeed it is well known that Leo XIII projected the revision of the biographical notices given in the breviary, being fully aware, it is said, that such revision would entail no inconsiderable amount of correction and suppression.

The achievements of the illustrious Jesuits forming the society of Bollandists which during nearly three hundred years has been engaged in sifting the evidence connected with the lives of the saints, have made a revision of many of the generally received traditions in these matters both possible and imperative. Since the first five volumes compiled and edited by John Bolland in the early part of the seventeenth century, this work has gone on with more or less regularity. No man should be better qualified to speak of the nature of the material out of which the lives of the saints have been put together for the public than a Bollandist; and that one of them has been able to digest, classify and reduce to some system this material, good, bad, and indifferent, only goes to show how thoroughly familiar he is with his subject. This, Père H. Delehaye, S. J., has done for us in his excellent little volume, "The Legends of the Saints."

It is the third in "a Series of Manuals for Catholic Priests and Students," published by *The Westminister Library*, and designed to meet the wants of those who wish to be in touch with the results of science and criticism as these bear on religion.

Father Delehaye clears the ground for us with a chapter of Preliminary Definitions. A hagiographic document is not a page out of a secular or ecclesiastical history. A hagiographic document must have a religious character and aim at the edification of the faithful. It may therefore be an official record or an exuberant poetical composition. We see at once what an important *role* the imagination may play, and yet its product be a hagiographic document. The imagination may either be that of an individual, and then the result will be simply a romance; or the imagination may be at work as the collective force of a whole people, and then there grow up unconsciously and little by little, myths, legends, folklore. These are "the anonymous product of that abstraction known as the spirit of the people."

Has the popular imagination been thus at work upon the lives of the saints? The saints are the heroes of faith, and a people always decks out its heroes according to generally accepted ideals. There is a certain stock of folklore which the popular mind loves to fasten upon its heroes or to connect with unique spots on the earth. Some extraordinary character or some unusual natural phenomenon attracts the attention of the people and around them is built up a story in all its details.

A very interesting chapter is that on the development of the legend, of this "outcome of an unconscious or unreflecting agent acting upon historical material." Every individual takes his own view of things. No two men who have seen the same event will recount it in exactly the same fashion to a stranger. Did not this constitute the virtue of the troubadours and minstrels? These little personal touches served to distinguish one from another. Personal prejudice, too, would play a large part. The prejudice might be, of course, in favor of astonishing one's hearers and readers by the strangeness of the events described. The ordinary man exercises but little discrimination and when even the better equipped or better trained man thinks he is exercising discrimination, he may be only trying to make out his case.

As for the crowd, there are special abstract qualities peculiar to it. A mob or gathering of people will do things which as individuals no one would be guilty of. They are carried away by an idea or assent to a statement in a body. This truth finds exemplification in hagiographic literature. In the Middle Ages the populace was intensely interested in the saints. The extraordinary was, so to speak, a commonplace to them. Even the rare individual possessed of the critical faculty was absorbed in the crowd and carried away by its spirit. Then came the hagiographer, or man of letters, who gathered up these factitious traditions. Frequently such men were mere literary hacks with a certain stock in trade culled from general literature. Orators, as far back as Cicero at least, have kept what they call a commonplace book, a book of topics in which under their proper headings they gather strange facts, stranger stories, beautiful and appropriate passages on subjects of frequent occurrence, and to which they have recourse for the building up of their speeches. We may well suppose that a panegyrist would not be at a loss for material to draw upon in the hagiographic treatment of the life and virtues of his hero.

Just as the struggles of centuries between two peoples are summed up and told as though they had happened within the fraction of a year around the walls of Troy, so frequently in hagiographic literature a local saint would become heir to the whole tradition of the marvelous common to his people. Chronology and geography presented no difficulties to the popular imagination or to the hagiographer who wrote down its product. No one for long centuries dreamed of writing in this connection history, as we now understand it. The people formed a concept of the typical saint or martyr, and the individual favorite was made to conform to it. And so we find the stories recurring among all races and in all countries. The themes are identical and have been traced back to common sources by the study of comparative folklore.

Again, the popular mind has a weakness for trivial details. The average man wants the concrete and the visible. And so we find the names of great men so often connected with the stones, the rocks, or the buildings of a country. Relic-hunting is a fad and a weakness from which many people of pretensions are not wholly free, and to satisfy it, the people of a locality find no difficulty in pointing out to a morbid curiosity "the precise spot where David composed his psalms, the rock smitten by Moses, the cave that sheltered Elijah," etc., etc. Strange phenomena in the natural world have to be attributed to some person, and so we find all sorts of connections established: footprints of famous men on rocks, or men turned into stone by wonderworkers. Nay, paintings and statues must have their prototypes, and so the people of Verona have gone so far as to locate the fancy of the poet's mind, and point out to tourists the house and the tomb of Romeo and Juliet. All of which is lucidly set forth and illustrated by facts and examples in Père Delehaye's splendid little book.

A chapter is given to the work of the hagiographer in writing the life of his saint. He strove but little after accuracy, had no critical spirit whatever, and was preoccupied mainly with "the beauty of the descriptions and the brilliancy of the style." He wrote to edify as well as to entertain, and so we have "biography, panegyric and moral instruction" all combined in one. We can readily see what will be the result. He was especially interested in the glory of his saint, and it seemed to him that anything merely human would bedim that glory.

What were the sources at the disposal of the hagiographer? Sometimes, indeed, a certain childish pride led him to conceal his sources from his readers, as if to appear the sole creator of his work. To-day the historian plumes himself on the lists of his references and authorities. Not so the classical authors and their imitators, the hagiographers. Written tradition, oral tradition, pictures, monuments, buildings, a tomb, a shrine, or some relic of the saint were the data of the hagiographer. He was rarely a good epigraphist, but that did not at all deter him from entering boldly where specialists fear to tread. In his enthusiasm he could guess what an abbreviation should mean. The popular taste craved for what was striking, and he felt it to be his duty to furnish it in no stinted measure. And so we find a writer transfer "the 83rd mile of a Roman road, LXXXIII mil (liario), into 83 martyred Roman soldiers, LXXXIII mil (ites)"! Whatever real historic material came to his hand he changed and amplified in his effort to write a literary life; for, a story of just proportions, with the Aristotelian beginning, middle and end, of rounded periods and well-balanced sentences, was of much more importance to him than a few unvarnished facts of authentic value. He had skeletons or programmes for different classes of saints, just like the antiquated outlines given to students for school-compositions and other things. These he filled up from his classic commonplaces. The plagiarizing of passages or incidents did not trouble him at all, and even "as early as the fourth century in Italy, and, indeed, in Rome, we come across deliberate adaptations of foreign legends to fit national saints."

The longest and most interesting chapter in the book is that on "Pagan Survivals and Reminiscences." It is a contribution to the study of comparative religion. Father Delehaye naturally finds in analogies between pagan and Christian rites and practices not so much borrowings of the latter from the former, as the natural response of men everywhere to the same needs, cravings, or questions; or under stress of like emotions. The alleged connection between saint-worship and hero-worship is examined, but though the parallels are numerous and marked, it is pointed out that the Christian practice arose independently in the honors paid to the early martyrs, the witnesses to faith in Christ. Their remains and everything connected with them became objects of veneration. But unlike the pagans, the Christians always recognised and emphasised the martyrs and saints as servants of the Most High God.

But while the general proposition that the Christian saints are only the heirs of the pagan gods and heroes is shown not to be sustained, yet it is admitted that there are some remarkable resemblances, and that a few representations and practices have continued under new patronage. But this was inevitable; the wonder is that the developing Church did not take over and metamorphose more subjects found ready to hand.

Father Delehaye's book is interesting from beginning to end, and we owe a debt of gratitude to the editors of the Westminister Library for bringing it out in, English, for it cannot fail to render a note-worthy service to the interests of real religion.

Thomas J. Mulvey.

Divine Authority—by J. F. Scholfield, M. A. Longmans, Green & Co.

Mr. Scholfield was, until lately, an Anglican clergyman, rector of a "High" Episcopalian Church in Edinburgh, Scotland. He is also, it is said, a nephew, or, at all events, some near relative of Father Faber, whom he has now followed into the Catholic Church.

The nature of his book will be evident from its title. It deals with the need of a Teaching Authority to set forth and guard the Christian Revelation, and no doubt it conducts us through the train of reasoning which led its author to abandon "Advanced" Anglicanism for the Catholic Church. The book travels over familiar ground, showing the needs of human nature to which a Divine Revelation corresponds; the claim of Christ to be such a Revealer; the need of some organ to proclaim, interpret and guarantee His message; the qualities and characteristics which such an organ must possess; and the actual possession of these by the Holy Catholic and Roman Church. Necessarily, also, Mr. Scholfield is led to discuss the claim made by High Anglicanism to satisfy these demands, and does full justice to the incoherences and contradictions of that position. The ground traversed is, as we have said, familiar, for we have had of recent years many accounts by converts from Anglicanism of their conversion and the reasons impelling thereto. There does not seem to be anything strikingly original in the present treatment of the theme, but it is a calm, carefully reasoned and readable presentation of the argument for the authority of the Church as understood by Catholics.

Samuel P. Macpherson.

The Principles of Christianity—by Rev. A. B. Sharpe, M. A. Sands & Co., London and Edinburgh. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo.

This is the first volume in the series of Expository Essays in Christian Philosophy, edited by Dr. Aveling, of which two have already appeared and others are announced to follow. Such a series, supplementing the Westminster Lectures, issued under the same editorship, is calculated to do a great amount of good in these days when the press teems with cheap editions of books, pamphlets and essays attacking different portions of the Christian system. Fr. Sharpe has already given us proof of his ability to deal with such subjects in his essay, in the Westminster series, on the Freedom of the Will, and in articles along philosophical lines in various reviews, and this present volume, we believe, will go far to enhance his standing as a Catholic apologist. To bring together, within the space of some one hundred and seventy pages a discussion of the leading principles of Christianity, embracing such subjects as the Existence of God, the Soul, Revelation, Faith, Miracles, etc., necessarily implies that the treatment of each must be but brief, and in a few cases the presentation of the argument seems to suffer from the exigencies imposed by brevity; however in no case can it be called inadequate. If at times it seems so, the reader must always bear in mind the nature of the volume (and, indeed, of the whole series), which is that of exposition, not of controversy. If the latter element had entered in, a much fuller treatment would have been required on many points; but as it is, opposing theories are only noticed when really necessary. Fr. Sharpe might have given us references to works dealing more at large with the subjects treated, say by means of a list at the end of the book but at all events, we are thankful for what we have supplied here, which is of good quality as far as it goes. After all that has been said *pro* and *con* in regard to these subjects, it is hard to find anything new to say, nor do we see much evidence of originality here—indeed the author expressly warns us not to expect anything new—but it is something to have brought together in a small volume, and expressed in clear and readable style an exposition like this of all the leading principles of Christianity, which will doubtless meet the wants of many who have not time nor opportunity to consult larger works.

Samuel P. Macpherson.

The Prince of the Apostles: A Study—by The Rev. Paul James Francis and The Rev. Spencer Jones. The Lamp Publishing Co., Graymoor, Garrison, N. Y., 1907.

Under the above title we have not only an exposition of the place of St. Peter in the Christian economy, an exposition which is at the same time thoroughly Catholic and Roman, but also an apology for the position taken by those Anglicans who desire corporate reunion with the Roman Catholic Church. The Rev. Paul James Francis, one of the authors of this book, who is also the editor of *The Lamp* (which is described as an Anglo-Roman monthly in advocacy of the re-union of the Anglican church with the Apostolic See of Rome,) has since 1898 been the leader of a body of men in the High Church party of the Anglican communion whose purpose is to do all in their power to bring about corporate reunion with the Roman Catholic Church. Father Paul in this country, Lord Halifax and the Rev. Spencer Jones in England, and the Rev. Arthur Lloyd in Japan, among others, stand in the front rank of those Anglicans who believe that when any members of their communion come to recognize the fact that the body to which they belong has gotten out of its orbit by rejecting Papal Supremacy, their duty is not to seek their individual safety regardless of their brethren by an immediate submission to our Holy Father the Pope, but rather to remain in the Anglican communion and endeavor to bring it back into right relations with the Holy See. They hold that the breach with the Roman Catholic Church was due in the first instance to the violence and self will of Henry VIII and not to the free act or choice of the Church of England. They claim, too, that though the Anglican Church has wandered far afield from her Catholic traditions and sunk deeper and deeper into the slough of Erastianism, yet by her *own free synodical action* she has never formally repudiated the spiritual jurisdiction and authority of our Holy Father the Pope or denied the Catholic faith as defined by the General Councils.

The order in which the High Church party has returned to its Catholic position has been the exact reverse of the order in which little by little she allowed her ancient faith to fall into decay. The first battle at Oxford had to do with Baptismal Regeneration; next the controversy raged over Apostolic succession; then came the furious struggles to restore, according to their belief, the Mass and the long neglected use of Confession; very recently Purgatory and the Cultus of the Saints have been the battle grounds of their advance, and now, simultaneously in England and America, the vanguard of the Romeward movement has unfurled the banner of reunion with the see of Peter.

They believe that their priests are true priests and that their sacraments are true sacraments; in other words they hold to the validity of their orders, believing that the Bull of our Holy Father, Leo XIII, was not an infallible utterance on the subject. They declare that besides the recognition of the validity of Anglican orders it would be necessary that the Ecclesia Anglicana be allowed to retain the use of the Book of Common Prayer, the English Bible, and the Mass and the office in English. In fact, that the Holy Father would deal no less generously with them than he has in the past with the Uniat Greeks and other Eastern bodies.

The question of the validity of Anglican orders might possibly be reconsidered by our Holy Father, the Pope, and the details concerning the use of English in the mass and office are matters of discipline which the Church might decide one way or the other, but the question which comes to our minds is that in the event of corporate reunion becoming a fact, would the number of Anglicans who would take advantage of it be large enough to warrant our Holy Father to grant a separate rite, or large enough to maintain it, once it were granted.

The individual soul which recognizes the truth of the Church of God and puts off its individual submission to it, no matter for what reason, assumes a grave responsibility before God, not only for itself, but for all those who may be affected by its example. Each soul should fulfil its own personal obligations and trust to the Providence of God to bring about reunion in His own good time. Over and above the question of reunion the book is an excellent exposition of Catholic belief concerning the Prince of the Apostles. It sums up in a clear, distinct, and forcible manner all that is usually taught in Catholic Apologetics about St. Peter and we recommend it to the use of the students in our Seminaries as the best short work in English upon the subject.

SAMUEL LUDLOW.

Have Anglicans Full Catholic Privileges?—By E. H. FRANCIS, Benziger Brothers, N. Y., 1907.

Another point of view of the Anglican question is presented in this little book. The author tells us that the Church of England may be roughly divided into three parties; first, the Evangelical or Low Church party, who are proud of the title Protestant, who repudiate everything Catholic and glory in "the principles of the Reformation"; second, the great body of moderate men, "the historic High Church party," who claim that the Church of England is a branch of the Catholic Church, but who have no sympathy with many of the essentials of the Catholic Church; then there is the third party, who claim they are Catholics in the modern sense, who speak of Holy Communion as the Mass, who use Catholic books of devotion, and adopt, as far as they can, Catholic practises. The author points out that this third body is a very small one and that they themselves admit that they are in a minority and that the rest of the Anglican Communion is not in sympathy with them. He goes on to show that this party in the Anglican Church, prescinding from the question of the validity of Anglican orders, does not enjoy the privileges of the Blessed Sacrament, the sacrifice of the Mass, the sacrament of penance, and the privileges of authority and discipline. His main argument for his position is that the teaching and practise of the very large majority of the Anglican communion and of all the Anglican bishops are opposed to the claims of this small *Catholic* body, and this body has only its own assertions to these great privileges, and that its practises are merely tolerated and that to a very limited extent by the Anglican body in general It is a very lucid, brief, and interesting work and should be read by all who take an interest in the Anglican question. SAMUEL LUDLOW.

Ritual in Catholic Worship—by the VERY REV. FATHER PROCTOR, O. P., Benziger Bros., 1907.

The mind turns willingly from the controversy of Ritualism to these truly Catholic sermons of Father Proctor on the use of ritual in Catholic Worship. Under the headings of the use, the soul, the language, the centre, and the development of ritual, the author leads us, willing and interested readers, through a series of excellent discourses, originally preached in Westminster Cathedral during the Lent of 1904. Though but a small brochure the work is an epitome of good things, teeming with learning and eloquence. The introductory discourse on the use and abuse of ritual would make excellent reading for those, especially outside of the Church, who make too much of the externals of worship.

The final chapter, on the other hand, is a well put answer to those who appeal to the primitive usage of the early church. It is book well worth buying and perusing. SAMUEL LUDLOW.

The Blind Sisters of St. Paul—Authorized translation by L. M. Legatt —By MAURICE DE LA SIZERANNE, Benziger Bros. pp. 303.

This volume belongs to the International Catholic Library edited by the Rev. Dr. J. Wilhelm. In it, Monsieur de la Sizeranne gives us an account of the origin, mode of life, etc., of a minor religious community. Like a great many other minor communities, this one has France for its birth-place. It is known as the "Blind Sisters of St. Paul". The title of the book is misleading: One might be led to think it had reference to the natural sisters of the Apostle of the Gentiles.

The community was founded about the year 1850 by Anne Bergunion. She had tested her vocation in a few religious communities, but found herself wanting. She then started a workshop for blind girls, from whom she afterwards formed her community. She herself became known as Sister Saint Paul. The community was named from that instance in the Apostle's life when he was struck with blindness and miraculously cured. After nearly sixty years of existence, the community can lay claim only to about sixty members. It still exists undisturbed in irreligious France; not being a teaching order but a "Congregation Hospitalière", it has received authorization. Not all the sisters are devoid of sight; blindness is not a condition of reception. Their constitution requires that the superioress be never chosen from among the blind.

From its name and appearance it would appear that this book is out of place among the erudite works of the International Catholic Library. But no; on perusal the book is scientific and interesting. It is divided into two parts; the first of interest to psychologists; the second, to philanthropists.

The first part is, in the main a psychological treatise in which are brought together a great number of curious incidents all bearing on, and illustrating the law governing the abnormal development of the other senses in those who have been deprived of their eyesight. Thus, for instance, a case is on record of a blind person who could take a dozen gloves belonging to different persons present, and then by merely smelling the hands of the latter, return each glove to its proper owner

Part II of the book is devoted to a history of the community. Their occupations are principally music, knitting, brush making and printing of "White books", or books for the blind. It is interesting to note the processes employed to teach these different occupations to the blind pupils.

JOHN F. CHERRY.

"The Papers of a Pariah"—By ROBERT HUGH BENSON, Longmans Green & Co., pp. 211.

This is a posthumous work of an English convert, edited by Rev. Father Benson, who received the author into the church a week before his death.

It consists of a number of papers committed to the disposal of the editor. The essays are fourteen in number, and consist in observations on the Catholic Church by one outside her pale.

The editor tells us "they were written by one who was not only not a Catholic but by one who did not at all continuously contemplate the becoming one."

It is good to know how outsiders view the Catholic Church, her ceremonies and practices, but it would be an advantage to be able also to identify the outsider. There is very little in the book to commend it. Nobody would think of placing it in a Library where all hands could reach it; it would only tempt its readers to ridicule Catholic ceremonies. The writer had no idea of the mind of the church in her Ritual. He was not an apt pupil in that school wherein she teaches by signs and ceremonies. Were all his observations on a par with those he gives us at seeing a priest administer the last Sacraments, the book would fulfil a useful mission. Father Benson has been a busy writer and many things have come in quick succession from his facile pen. Possibly he is exposing himself to the danger of quantity versus quality. At all events, he has been more fortunate in writing than in editing.

J. F. C.

THE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST (IV)

Edward J. Hanna, D. D.

In former articles, (New York Review, Vol. I, Nos. 3, 4 and 5), we gave a rapid survey of the history of opinions concerning the human knowledge of Christ, and we made an historical study of the data of Scripture and tradition on which the solution of this interesting question must ultimately depend. We have seen that neither in Scripture or patristic tradition is there any warrant for the kenotic theories espoused by Delitzsch, Hoffmann, Godet, and Gore, which would interpret the ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν of St. Paul (Philippians ii, 6) as applying to the divine nature of the Word made Flesh. Nor does the tradition adown the ages give the slightest help to the Modernist who would admit possible error in the words and in the thoughts of Christ (New York Review, Vol. I, p. 429; cf. *Syllabus Lamentabili Sane*, Prop. 33). Aside from these positions which are manifestly against Catholic teaching, we touched the broader question, whether or not there were any limitations in the human knowledge of Christ, except those which creation and the created nature naturally imposed. We said that the first thing that impresses one who carefully peruses the New Testament, is the overwhelming evidence in favor of supernatural knowledge in the Man-Christ, and so striking is this testimony that one instinctively hesitates about asserting any limit whatever when there is question of what Christ really knew as man. (New York Review, Vol. I, p. 425; cf. Luke xxii, 10; Luke xix, 30; Matthew xvii, 27; John ii, 47-50; Luke ix, 47; Matthew xi, 21-27; John ii, 24-25). Without drawing any conclusion, we brought forward from Scripture, from tradition, and from theological writers evidence on the special question, whether or not the soul of Christ from the first moment of its existence until the close of Christ's mortal life always enjoyed the beatific vision, and seeing God as he is, knew all things that human mind may know and human ken embrace. We concluded our third article with the tradition of the Fathers down to the beginning of the seventh century.

In the light of this evidence, to say naught of the subsequent teaching of the Fathers and theologians, what position must the

Catholic teacher take concerning the beatific vision in the soul of Christ? The doctrine of the Church is thus put by Petavius (*De Incarnatione*, Lib. xi, Cap. 4): "Facile tamen assentiar theologis qui licet nondum hoc ad fidei dogmata pertinere dicunt (quod locus in scriptura sit nullus qui id perspicue declaret; nec ullius auctoritate synodi generalis aut alia quapiam fidei regula decretum aut constitutum fuerit) errori tamen et hereticæ impietati proximum censent, etc." He puts his conclusion thus strongly though he grants in the same place that some of the Fathers can hardly be interpreted in this light ((New York Review, Vol. I, pp. 599-615). Concerning the teaching of the Fathers which at first blush may seem contrary to the accepted teaching of the Church, we may remark: (1) That the Fathers are not treating the subject of the beatific vision in Christ "ex professo," and (2) that the Fathers who wrote thus were in the midst of the Arian controversy, and therefore wholly intent upon proving the divinity of the Logos, and consequently while insisting that texts like Mark xiii, 32, Luke ii, 40 and 52, Philippians ii, 6, seqq., which seemed to put limitations in Christ, were not applicable to his divine nature, they would grant for the sake of argument, that they might indicate a real limitation in that which was human in the Man-God—but mark, always for the sake of argument. (Petavius, *Ibidem*, Cap. i, n. 5). Certainly after the Arian controversy had passed and the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon had closed the questions then rife, Christian tradition, both in the East and in the West, became more and more emphatic in asserting no limitation, but on the contrary, the greatest possible knowledge in Christ as man. (New York Review, Vol. I, pp. 611-615). This tradition **Cassiodorus** (New York Review, *Ibidem*, p. 614), voices when he writes that it is "nefarium judicare si illa omnipotens Verbi humanatio aliquod de futuris ignorasse putaretur quod Patrem scire prædicavit"; and **Eulogius,** in writing to St. Gregory the Great, asserts that it is simply impious to say that even as man Christ could have been ignorant.

The **Venerable Bede**, following the Benedictine tradition laid down by Gregory the Great, seems to admit that even as a growing child, Christ had all fulness of knowledge, and still, in some way, he seems to think that Christ advanced in wisdom. "Quæ tamen in sapientia nullatenus proficeret si naturalem intelligentiam quæ hominibus rationis causa concessa est, non haberet." Without expressing it openly he doubtless had in mind the "scientia acquisita," taught later by St. Thomas Aquinas, because he immediately adds: "Non quia hoc susceptor Deus eguit, præsertim cum supra *plenus sapientia* puer describitur." (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 92, col. 350, also col. 348).

Alcuin (*Patr. Lat.* 91, col. 303), asks the question whether or not the soul of Christ knew fully Christ's divinity? He quotes John iii, 34: "Non enim ad mensuram dat Deus Spiritum," and agrees that the spirit was given to Christ without limit or measure. This fulness of the Spirit would seem impossible were Christ to lack in any degree a knowledge of his own divinity. "Ubi enim mensura dicitur non esse plenitudo perfectionis et perfectio plenitudinis invenitur...non enim æstimandum est animæ Christi in aliquo plenam divinitatis deesse notitiam, cujus una est persona cum verbo, quum sic sapientia suscepit, ut cum ipsa divinitate sua una sit in Trinitate persona, id est, Christus crucifixus, quem Dei virtutem et sapientiam Paulus Apostolus prædicat" (I Cor. i, 24). With Alcuin a full knowledge even of the Godhead is bound up irrevocably with the hypostatic union. Concerning the difficulty from St. Mark xiii, 32, cf. *Ibid.* Cap. xii, col. 37.

St. John Damascene teaches (*De Hœres.* Migne, *Patr. Grœca*, 94, col. 756), that the Agnoitæ were heretics because they impiously taught that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgment. He also remarks that they were the same as the followers of Themistius whose tenets were decidedly Eutychian (Natalis Alexander. *Selecta Hist. Eccles.* vi, cap. iii, art. 3)

Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* (Lib. II, cap. xiii; Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 158, col. 413), is even more explicit. He asks why Christ could not have taken upon himself our ignorance when he assumed our mortality. He answers: "Illa hominis assumptio in unitatem personæ Dei non nisi sapienter a summa sapientia fiet, et ideo non assumet in homine quod nullo modo utile, sed valde noxium est ad opus quod idem homo facturus est. Ignorantia namque ad nihilum illi utilis esset, sed ad multa noxia; quomodo enim tot et tanta opera quæ facturus est, faciet sine summa sapientia, aut quomodo illi homines credent si eum scient nescium?" Not only does he deny all lack of knowledge on the part of Christ, but he even hints at the principle put forward later by St. Thomas Aquinas that fulness of knowledge is required for the working out of the purpose of the Incarnation.

The school of **St. Bernard** puts this doctrine even more emphatically. St. Bernard (*De Laudibus B. Mariœ Virginis*) in his homily entitled *Super Missus est* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 183, col. 65-66), writes thus concerning the growth in wisdom of which St. Luke speaks ii, 40 and 52: "Nam quod de sapientia et gratia hic dictum est non secundum quod erat sed secundum quod apparebat intelligendum est; non quia videlicet aliquid ei novum accideret quod antea non haberet, sed quod accidere videretur quando volebat ipse ut videretur...at puer Jesus quando volebat et quibus volebat sapiens apparebat, quando et quibus volebat sapientior, quando et quibus volebat sapientissimus, quamquam in se nunquam esset non sapientissimus."

With still greater clearness does Bernard write in the eighth sermon on the Canticle of Canticles. (*Ibid.* 184, col. 49). In this place he insists strongly upon the distinction between the two natures in Christ, and he ascribes to the divine and to the human that which of right belongs to each. The soul of Christ sees all in the Word, and yet not with the clearness with which the Word beholds His own essence (cf. Conc. Basil. Sess. 22). "Manet itaque naturis istis sua cuique tam integritas quam proprietas. Consequenter etiam competentes his comprehensiones et affectus et contemplationes et beatitudines impermistæ sunt...nam quis assereret beatissimum Christi animum aut nihil sentire penitus dulcedinis et gaudii, aut iterum gustum intimum illi permittere suavitatis et saporis et beatitudinis illius qua beatissima perfruitur Trinitas?...Deinde licet anima hæc in Verbo omnia videt, et ipsum Verbum in Verbo videt, tamen quia admissa non est in societatem essentiæ nec admitti potest in æqualitatem notitiæ." No clearer expression than this is needed of the beatific vision in the soul of Christ. "Anima hæc (Christi) in Verbo omnia videt."

At the beginning of the scholastic age the **Master of the Sentences** (Lib. iii, Dist. xiv; Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 192, col. 1077), puts the case as follows: "Ad hæc sciendum animam Christi omnium rerum habere scientiam quas Christus scit, quia spiritus scientiæ non est datus ei ad mensuram (John iii). Si enim quædam sciret, quædam non, non sine mensura scientiam haberet." When he brings forward the saying of Cassiodorus "homo assumptus divinæ substantiæ non potest æquari in scientia vel in alio," he answers that the soul of Christ must know all things though not with the same clearness as the Father; "Licet enim omnia sciat anima Christi quæ Deus, non tamen omnia ita clare et perspicue capit sicut ipse Deus."

St. Thomas Aquinas found the theological position such as St. Bernard and Peter Lombard had formulated it. The Angelical Doctor recognized with the earlier Fathers that the texts in St. Luke (ii, 40, 52) needed explanation. He recognized too that the perfection of human nature in Christ demanded supernatural illustration (scientia infusa), and he saw that the tradition, voiced with utmost clearness by St. Bernard, gave to the soul of Christ the knowledge which comes from the vision beatific. St. Thomas, with his usual power, with one stroke seems to fix the question for all time. (*Quæst. Disp. De Veritate*, Quæst xx, art. i, seqq.; *In Lib. Sent.* iii, Dist. xiv, seqq.) The Angel of the schools lays down the principle that "the divine excellence of Jesus' person required in Him the fulness of knowledge, and He would not be the head of creation if at any time some creature surpassed Him in mental perfection." (Wilhelm and Scannell, p. 148). Following this principle, he teaches in the *Summa Theologica* (III, Quæst. ix, art. 2) that man reaches the beatific vision through Christ the Man-God. "Ad hunc finem beatitudinis homines reducuntur per Christi humanitatem secundum illud: 'decebat eum propter quem omnia et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummare,' et ideo oportuit quod cognitio beata in Dei visione consistens excellentissime Christo homini conveniret, quia semper causam oportet esse potiorem causato."

Following the same principle viz. that the soul of Christ must have what is most perfect in human nature, St. Thomas ascribes to Christ the fulness of infused knowledge (*Ibid.* art. 3). When it was objected that such knowledge was unnecessary and unprofitable when once Christ saw all things in the beatific vision, he still insists that the infused knowledge be found in Christ "non quasi via ad beatitudinem sed quasi per beatitudinem confirmata." (*Ibid.* art. 3, ad 2um).

But St. Thomas was not unmindful of the texts of Scripture which clearly state that Christ "advanced in wisdom" even as he advanced in stature and in age (Luke ii, 40, 52), nor was he ignorant of the commentary of many of the Fathers who seemed to see in the above texts a real growth in wisdom. This difficulty he treats in the *Summa Theologica* (III, Quæst. xii, art. 2). He freely grants that in the knowledge which comes from the beatific vision and in the knowledge which came through the "scientia infusa" there could have been no real advance. But there was a third knowledge in Christ which he styles "acquisita." He remarks that in his commentary (*In Lib. Sent.* iii, Dist. 14), he once held "nulla scientia in Christo augmentata fuit secundum essentiam sed solum per experientiam," but in the *Summa* (*Loc. cit.*) he changes his opinion and modestly puts it forward in this wise: "Sed quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sit quædam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum agentem, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere; et ex hoc sequitur quod in anima Christi aliquis habitus scientiæ fuerit qui per hujusmodi abstractionem potuerit augmentari."

Neither was Aquinas unmindful of the text in St. Mark (xiii, 32), which had so vexed the writers of the patristic age. He quotes St. John Chrysostom (III, Quæst. x, art. 2, ad 1um) as asserting "si Christo homini datum est ut sciat qualiter oporteat judicare quod est magis, datum est ei scire quod minus est, scilicet tempus judicii" His own opinion, based upon St John Chrysostom, he announces in this fashion: "Dicitur ergo nescire diem et horam judicii quia non facit scire, hoc eis noluit revelare." The Son knows even as the Father, but it is not knowledge which in the dispensation of God he may communicate to his disciples. The position taken by St. Thomas, based upon a knowledge of tradition and true psychological intuition, has not changed in all the after ages.

Scotus, in his commentary on the Master of the Sentences (Lib. iii, Dist. 14), not only grants that Christ had the knowledge which comes from the beatific vision but also admits a "scientia acquisita" in accordance with which Christ truly advanced in wisdom. He seems to disagree with St. Thomas when there is question of admitting "scientia infusa" and "scientia acquisita" in reference to the same objective truth.

St. Bonaventure in his commentary on Peter Lombard (Lib. iii, Dist. xiv, art. 3, Quæst 1, 2 seqq.), places the following principle: "Christus assumpsit quod dignitatis erat de omni statu, scilicet, de statu gloriæ et de statu innocentiæ et de statu lapsæ," and he argues of a consequence that Christ had the beatific vision and also that abundance of infused knowledge which belonged to man before the fall. When there is question of growth in wisdom and knowledge (Luke ii, 40), Bonaventure is not so bold as Thomas. He simply states "anima Christi quamvis non profecerit secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiæ proficiebat tamen secundum cognitionem experimentalem," and he is prone to conclude that Christ advanced in wisdom not as we do, but "secundum apparentiam." No variation from the position taken by St. Thomas occurs throughout the scholastic age down to the time of the Reformation.

The great theologians since the Reformation have followed closely the lines laid down by the Angelic Doctor.

De Lugo (*De Mysterio Incarnationis,* Disp. xviii, xix, xx, xxi,) asserts that all theologians hold that Christ enjoyed the beatific vision even before his passion, and he alleges John i, 18, in proof thereof. He freely admits that other interpretations of this text are possible, still he emphatically argues that no Christian may deny the beatific vision in the soul of Christ without rashness. He holds that the beatific vision in Christ is intimately connected with the hypostatic union. "Christo debebatur visio beata ratione unionis" (Disp. xix).

With St. Thomas Aquinas he insists upon the "scientia infusa", and he asserts that such knowledge must belong to Christ because of his character of "viator" (Disp. xx).

When there is a question of the "scientia acquisita" he again takes his place alongside of St. Thomas, and with the Angel of the Schools interprets Christ's growth in knowledge "de augmento reali scientiæ acquisitæ"; and he says that only in this way can we explain the opinion of so many of the holy Fathers who admitted in Christ a knowledge capable of increase even as ours is (Disp. xxi, Sect. 1).

There is nothing new in **Suarez** in reference to the main points of the dispute, though he treats the question with unusual fulness. (*In S. Thomam* III, Quæst. x, xi, xii. Ed. Vives, Tom. 18, Disp. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30). Regarding the "scientia acquisita" he not only agrees with St. Thomas, but finds in the Thomistic position the best way of interpreting the early Fathers who admitted real growth in the human knowledge of Christ (Disp. xxx, Sect. ii, n. 16).

Petavius first answers the difficulty that arises from the assertion of the Fathers that Christ really advanced in wisdom. He says: "Concessione quadam usurpasse ut Arianos abundantiori vi argumentationis obruerent" (*De Incarnat.* Lib. xi, Cap. ii, n. 8). When there is question of the beatific vision in the soul of Christ, Petavius unhesitatingly asserts that among Christians there is no controversy on this point. In proof of his position he alleges John i, 14, though he admits that there are no texts of Scripture which assert this truth in so many words (disertis verbis expressisque). In reference to the Fathers he states that only a few have given forth this truth explicitly (*κατὰ τὸν ῥητόν*); still both in Scripture and in tradition it is implicitly contained (*Ibid.* Cap. iv, n. 2). Aside from the arguments which he dérives from Scripture and tradition, he insists that the doctrine of the beatific vision in Christ is part of our Catholic belief, because of the "admirabilis omnium in eo Christianorum doctorum pariter imperitorumque consensio." He quotes John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, (*Contr. Lutherum de Cap. Bibl.* Cap. iii,) as follows: "Nemini dubium est Ecclesiam Sancto Spiritu regi nisi forte quis non crediderit Evangelio....Certum est ergo quod Spiritus ipse Sanctus quem et spiritum veritatis Christus appellat in Ecclesia perpetuo maneat, Ecclesiam instituens et ducens in omnem veritatem, eique annuntians et suggerens ac subministrans ac demum insinuans quidquid est Christi." In virtue of this abiding Spirit of truth in the Church "insinuans quidquid est Christi," Petavius holds that the universal consent of all the members of the Church on any great truth marks such truth as belonging to the deposit of revelation. "Quæ communis singulorum Ecclesiæ membrorum professio illum esse totius corporis sensum certissime demonstrat," a principle which every Catholic theologian must maintain with Petavius.

Strange as it may seem, Petavius while quoting St. Thomas' opinion on the "scientia acquisita," and giving to it the merit of probability, was unwilling to put himself on record as favoring the Thomistic contention. "De hac lite neutram in partem pronuntiare audeo." He also allowed that the opinion advanced by St. Thomas was useful in interpreting the difficult passages from the Fathers of which we have spoken above.

The illustrious **Thomassinus** (*De Incarnatione Verbi Dei.* Lib. vii, cap. 1-8), first runs through the opinions of the Fathers, marking especially those which seem to admit limitations in the human knowledge of Jesus. He holds that these somewhat harsh sayings of the early writers may be interpreted in good part, and then gives his whole attention to proving that Christ had in very deed the beatific vision from the dawn of his existence together with a wondrous knowledge which he terms "prophetic." He says naught of the "scientia acquisita" which Aquinas had made so famous, nor does he use the "scientia acquisita" as a means of interpreting the harsher sayings, especially of Leontius and Eustathius (New York Review, Vol. I, p. 604). Rather he prefers to say: "Nec inficias tamen iverim quin æstu disputationis abreptus aliquis, dum adversus Arianos Verbi deitatem animosius quam cautius defensat, incuriosius erga humanam naturam agens, aliquam inscitiæ labem illi passus sit imprimi."

From the eighteenth century onward to the middle of the nineteenth there was no break in the tradition put forward by St. Thomas and his commentators.

In our day St. Thomas is still supreme, as appears from the writings of **Franzelin** (*De Verbo Incarnato*), **Father Lepicier** (*De Incarnatione Verbi*, I, pp. 395-419), **Cardinal Satolli** (*De Incarnatione* pp. 180-216). Cardinal Satolli not only follows the path marked out by St. Thomas, but emphasizes particularly the principle which has guided the theologians in formulating the doctrines concerning the human knowledge of Christ. "Illud maxime subit, reperire a primo instante conceptionis actualiter omnia ea quae rationalis natura apta nata sit habere, nec non excelsiora status in quantum humana divinæ naturæ secundum hypostasim conjuncta sit."

RESUMÉ.

I. The constant tradition in Scripture and in the Fathers makes it impossible to interpret the Kenosis (Philippians ii, 6) as referring to the divine nature.

II. Catholic theology has ever admitted in Christ's human nature the limitations essential to a finite and created being, and consequently:

III. Catholic faith confirmed in the Council of Basle teaches that Christ as man saw not the Father as clearly as the Father sees himself.

IV. The same Catholic tradition confirmed in our day by the Syllabus of Pius X (Proposition 33) excludes any possibility of error in the human knowledge of Christ.

V. Scripture unequivocally gives evidence of a supernatural knowledge in the soul of the Man-God.

VI. This fulness of supernatural knowledge embraces the beatific vision in the soul of Christ. This doctrine is taught, *implicitly* at least, in Scripture and in patristic tradition, and it is held *explicitly* with such unanimity by theologians and faithful as to make it part of Christian faith (Cf. *Irish Theological Quarterly*, vol. I, No. 2, pp. 206-207).

VII. The same is true concerning the "scientia infusa" in Christ.

VIII. With a high degree of certainty we can assert with St. Thomas a real growth in the earthly knowledge of Christ because of the "scientia" called "acquisita."

IX. In the light of this "scientia acquisita" there is an easy way of interpreting the Fathers who admitted a real advancement in the human knowledge of Jesus Christ.

X. The patristic and theological tradition about the knowledge of the last Day we have given above. Concerning this we say that the Fathers who seem to admit a real ignorance of the day of judgment, did it "concessione quadam ut Arianos abundantiori vi argumentationis obruerent."

XI. Long before the days of Gregory the Great there was no ecclesiastical writer that did not hold categorically that Christ in very deed had knowledge of the day and the hour of judgment.

XII. The difficulty arising from the sorrow and suffering of the soul of Christ, and the reconciliation of this fact with the doctrine that Christ always enjoyed the beatific vision, still remains. The greatest theologians admit that we are in presence of a mighty mystery; but because the beatific vision in the soul of Christ is a doctrine in permanent possession, no Catholic teacher may solve the difficulty by denying that Christ, in every moment of His mortal life saw God as He is. (Suarez, Disp. 38 sect. 3).

XIII. Intimately bound up with the mystery of the Incarnation is the Catholic feeling throughout the ages that the fulness of all knowledge must be in Him who assumed the headship of our race that he might lead us to glory. "Quandoquidem advenerat Christus inter nos excellentissimus testis divinæ veritatis itemque perfectissimus dux ad beatitudinem et consummatus præceptor sanctitatis" (Billot, *De Verbo Incarnato*, Thesis xix, Quæst. ix-xii).

XIV. Equally strong has been the feeling in Christian hearts in all the centuries since Christ that the hypostatic union was incompatible with lack of knowledge in the soul of Him who was "full of grace and truth," and to whom "the Spirit had not been given by measure."

Quantunque alla natura umana lece
Aver di lume, tutto fosse infuso
Da quel valor che l'uno e l'altro fece.
Paradiso, Cant. xiii.

EDWARD J. HANNA.

CHURCH AND STATE FROM ULIAN TO THEODOSIUS

Maurice M. Hassett

The victory over orthodoxy of the Acacian party at the synod of Constantinople in 360[1] was destined to be as short lived as that of their Arian predecessors a quarter of a century before. The Emperor to whom it was wholly due died the following year and was succeeded by his apostate cousin, Julian, the younger son of a brother of the great Constantine. The early years of the new Emperor's life were passed at Nicomedia and Constantinople, under the eye of Eusebius of Nicomedia, then head of the Arian party. Eusebius and his followers were not the kind of personages to recommend Christianity to a youth of the temperament of the young Julian, yet in justice to the ambitious court Bishop it must be said that his shortcomings as a Christian prelate had probably little or no influence in determining his pupil to abandon Christianity. The apostasy of Julian was due primarily to his love of Greek literature. The gods of Greece, as portrayed in Greek literature, suited his peculiar taste better than the Christian God of the unclassical Gospels. His "conversion" to paganism was completed by the sophist Maximus of Ephesus who initiated him in the mysticism of the neoplatonist philosophy. It was only at the time of his rebellion against Constantius, however, that Julian allowed his real sentiments to become generally known. The sudden death of the Emperor left the last male survivor of the house of Constantine without a competitor for imperial honors and his hands were at length wholly free to attempt the restoration to his beloved gods of their former honors.

The accession of a ruler who hated all forms of Christianity quite impartially was a grievous blow to the so lately triumphant henchmen of Acacius of Caesarea. Julian, indeed, began his reign with a proclamation of tolerance towards all religions, but tolerance of their opponents was the last thing the heretics desired, and without the civil power, they were perfectly well aware, their cause was desperate.

The real attitude of Julian towards Christianity did not long remain doubtful. On his entry into Constantinople he summoned before him the heads of the various parties, and after assuring them that they were free to follow their individual inclination in religious matters, concluded with the statement that official Christianity was at an end. This announcement, if made in good faith, would probably have been, at that time, quite satisfactory to the orthodox, but the Emperor's impartiality soon proved of a more than dubious order. He revoked, indeed, the sentence of exile against the banished Bishops: an act which seemed in keeping with his pronouncement; but his real intention in this step was, according to the pagan historian Ammianus, Marcellinus, to promote discord in the camp of the enemy. The return of the orthodox and Semi-Arian Bishops would be followed by the organization in nearly every city of two Christian communities, orthodox and heterodox, the consequence of which would likely be still graver dissensions.[2] The anti-Christian bias of Julian in other matters also was not long in revealing itself. Under the previous Christian Emperors pagans continued to hold high and influential offices, but the philosopher apostate had no intention of following this principle with regard to Christians. The now despised followers of the Galilean were excluded from the imperial household and the high administrative offices; in the army such officers as the future Emperors Jovian and Valentinian had to endure a certain degree of persecution and of course total disfavor; and finally, the teaching of grammar, rhetoric and philosophy was interdicted to those who professed the Christian religion.

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[1] The New York Review, May-June, 1907, p. 698 sqq.

Ostracism of Christians during the fortunately brief reign of Julian was the order of the day. There was no open persecution, but the animus of the Emperor was very well known in pagan circles, and immunity for outrage against Christians was assured.[3] Yet the Emperor made little headway in his policy of predilection. Nobody but Julian any longer took the least interest in the gods, and the fall of the apostate (June 26, 363) in his campaign against the Persians was the deathblow of paganism. The great problem of the future was to be, not one of the relations of a reformed paganism to Christianity, but of the proper adjustment of the respective claims of the Christian Church and the Christian State.

While the principal officers of the army were debating the question of the imperial succession, after the death of Julian, the soldiers put an end to the discussion by proclaiming as Emperor Jovian, a

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[2] Ammian. Marcell. xxii, 5; cf. Duchesne, *Histoire Ancienne de l'Eglise*, ii, 329.
[3] Cf. Duchesne, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

Christian officer, who held the rank of commander of the domestic guard. The new Emperor, after terms of peace with the Persians had been agreed to, returned to Antioch, and was at once approached by the heads of the various parties of Christians. But Jovian, who knew nothing of theology, gave his interviewers to understand that his greatest desire was to see peace and unity reign among his co-religionists. He himself, however, was strictly orthodox. One of his first acts was to recall Athanasius, who had been exiled by Julian as an enemy of the gods. Having little confidence apparently in the Bishops who so speedily endeavored to win him, each to his own views, the Emperor wrote a flattering letter to the Bishop of Alexandria, asking for a brief exposition of the orthodox doctrine. Athanasius at once forwarded his reply which recommended the "faith confessed by the fathers at Nice."[4] Meletius of Antioch, who was orthodox, naturally agreed to this, but so also did Acacius of Caesarea, the man responsible more than any other for the wholesale deposition of orthodox and Semi-Arian Bishops under Constantius. The guiding principle of this accommodating prelate and his followers was to stand well with the head of the State; their own opinions, could they have them accepted, were of course what they preferred; but since for the moment the fates were against them—they needs must yield. Subsequently, under Valens, Acacius was among the first to return to Arianism.

Circumstances again in a very short time came to the rescue of this newest sect of political Arians, variously known as the Acacian or the Homoion party. Jovian died before he reached Constantinople, and the General Valentinian was chosen his successor. Valentinian, like his predecessor, was orthodox, but he at once associated with him, as head of the Eastern portion of the Empire, his brother Valens, who was destined to carry on the tradition of Constantius. The policy of Valentinian in religious matters, as soon appeared, was one of strict neutrality. In the beginning of his reign he proclaimed religious liberty for all, with the exception of Manicheans and astrologers, and better still he observed throughout his reign the spirit, if not always perhaps the strict letter, of his proclamation. So accustomed were some Bishops to the idea of imperial hegemony, however, that they could not at first believe the Emperor really intended to take no part in ecclesiastical matters, save in so far as concerned the preservation of order. Thus, while passing through Thrace on his way from Contantinople to Rome a delegation from that section of the Semi-Arian party led by Eleusius of Cyzicus, which was now practically orthodox, presented the Emperor with a petition asking that they might be allowed to hold a synod. Valentinian briefly answered: "I am but one of the laity, and have therefore no right to interfere in these transactions; let the priests to whom such matters appertain, assemble where they please."[5] How different would have been the reply of Constantius!

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[4] Theod. iv, 2, 3; cf. Socrates, *H. E.* iii, 24 ss; Sozomen, *H. E.* iv, 4 ss.

The conditions in Western Christendom were as a whole favorable to a policy of imperial abstention. With a few exceptions the Bishops had always been orthodox, and after the deplorable fall of Rimini they had lost no time in repenting their weakness. The only inharmonious elements left in the West were of little account. On the one side the uncompromising Lucifer of Cagliari, the Roman deacon Hilary and a few others would make no allowance for human weakness, and therefore would hold no communication with those who had yielded to imperial coercion. A few Arians on the other hand held Western sees, the most notable of these being Auxentius of Milan. Auxentius, one of the militant Cappadocians of the time of Constantius, had been forced on the see of Milan after the exile of the legitimate Bishop, Dionysius. Dionysius however, at the accession of Valentinian, had been for some time dead, and consequently Auxentius had no competitor for his see. This fact alone suggests that Auxentius was of a very different type from that of his countrymen, Gregory and George, who had ruled at Alexandria with such outrageous violence. Evidently he must have succeeded in winning the goodwill, or at least the toleration, of the Catholic Milanese, who had made no effort to secure an orthodox successor to Dionysius. But the two orthodox champions, Hilary of Poitiers and Eusebius of Vercelli, were not disposed to leave him in quiet enjoyment of a bishopric to which his canonical title was more than doubtful. The means they took to dislodge him, however, were just those which confirmed Auxentius in possession for life. About the time that Valentinian arrived in Milan the two Bishops had succeeded in arousing the Catholics to some sense of the unfitness of Auxentius, the outcome of which was a public demonsration against the Bishop. The Emperor was irritated by the disturbance and issued an edict imposing silence on the parties concerned. Hilary then took a course which would have been better taken at an earlier stage: he formulated his charges of heresy against Auxentius. Valentinian thereupon ordered two of his officers, with a dozen Bishops, to enquire into the accusations. But Auxentius, true to Arian traditions, knew how to satisfy the commission: he read before them what seemed an orthodox profession of faith, but which was orthodox or heterodox according to the position of a comma.[6] Hilary saw through the fraud, but Valentinian was satisfied and ordered Hilary, instead of Auxentius, to leave Milan.

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[5] Sozomen, *H. E.* vi, 7.

This is the only case of importance relative to a question of doctrine in which Valentinian took decisive action during his reign. His subordinates, indeed, were obliged to intervene in the troubles that arose at Rome over the disputed election of Pope Damasus, but this intervention was necessary for the preservation of order. As the troubles of this time at Rome are traceable directly to the meddling of Constantius with Church matters, a glance at the facts in the case will be instructive, since they reveal that the West was not quite immune from some of the evil consequences of Caesar's theological proclivities. The story of Damasus and Ursinus is also interesting because of the light it throws on certain conditions existing in the Roman Church towards the end of the fourth century.

The violent removal of Pope Liberius from the capital and the subsequent ill-treatment and exile to which he was subjected by the Emperor Constantius, had aroused general indignation among the Christians of Rome. Two of the ecclesiastics most pronounced in their attitude in favor of the exiled Pope were the archdeacon Felix and the deacon Damasus. Yet, in time the ardor of these two personages so far cooled that Felix accepted the unenviable position of anti-Pope from the hands of the heretical Acacius of Caesarea.[7] Damasus acquiesced in this arrangement. Most of the clergy, too, accepted the situation, but the people remained loyal to their exiled Bishop. At first, however, nothing could be done, but when Constantius visited Rome in 357 a petition was presented to him by Christian matrons of the noblest families asking the restoration of the legitimate Pontiff. The Emperor, knowing that Liberius had already bent to the storm, granted the petition, but his proposal that both Felix and Liberius should rule the Roman Church as colleagues was received in the circus with the greatest scorn.[8] In spite of his weakness Liberius was greeted with enthusiasm on his return from exile. Felix, however, remained in opposition, with a few followers, till his death in 365. His party then rallied to Liberius and the little schism was at an end. But the conciliatory policy of Liberius towards the schismatics was not at all pleasing to some of his own adherents, and his death (366) was the signal for open secession. The intransigeants, who formed a small minority, elected a Pope of their own views in the person of the deacon Ursinus, while the majority elected the repentant follower of Felix, the deacon Damasus.

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[6] Cf. Duchesne, *op. cit.*, p. 358, note 3.

[7] St. Jerome, *De Viris Ill.* 98.

[8] Theodoret, *H. E.* ii, 14.

The double election was the signal for riots in which some lives were lost. The Prefect of Rome took the curious step of leaving the city at this moment, and only later, at the instance of Damasus whose election he recognized, did he take action by ordering Ursinus to leave Rome. Ursinus, however, was rescued by his followers, who thereupon seized the Liberian basilica (St. Mary Major's), where they were beseiged by the Damasians. After a considerable number of persons had lost their lives the civil authorities again interposed and Ursinus was exiled. He continued, however, to give trouble during the whole pontificate of Damasus, which made it necessary for the Pope to call in the aid of the Prefect on several subsequent occasions. Ammianus Marcellinus comments on these events in a way which indicates the rapid interior development of the Roman Church in the previous half century. He attributes the strife for the papacy to the ambition of the two aspirants, and regards it as quite natural that ambitious ecclesiastics should endeavor by every means to secure a prize so splendid, from a worldly point of view, as the papacy already had become.[9] Yet, after admitting that the career of Pope Damasus as a whole leaves something to be desired, modern archaeological discoveries have made known the admirable work he achieved in beautifying the tombs of the martyrs in the Roman catacombs.

According to the historian Theodoret the Emperor Valentinian did, after all, on one occasion, take an important step which was a departure from the principle of non-interference where questions of faith were concerned, with which he began his reign. The senior Emperor, Theodoret states, promulgated an edict which, as was customary, bears also the names of the two other Emperors, Valens and Gratian, to the effect that the doctrine of the Trinity should be taught throughout the Empire. The edict is addressed to the pneumotomachian or Macedonian Bishops of Asia, whom Valentinian lectures severely on their supposed shortcomings. They must not "persecute those who diligently serve God," nor accept the religion of the sovereign just because he is the sovereign, and they are reminded of the principle "render unto Caesar." Duchesne, however, regards this document as an evident forgery. The style is not at all that of imperial documents, and Valentinian was not the man to censure the policy of his colleague to his subjects. Moreover, the edict supposes Valens to be a Macedonian, which he was far from being, and the Macedonian Bishops were the victims rather than the instruments of imperial persecution. The edict also is incoherent and contradictory. It begins with the statement that it is the Emperor's "imperial will that this Trinity be preached so that none may say 'we accept the religion of the sovereign'". Thus Valentinian is represented as ordering the Trinity to be preached, and at the same time he affirms that the Bishops must not receive their religion from the Emperor.[10]

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[9] Amm. Marc. xxvii, 3.

Circumstances in the Western Church were, therefore, almost wholly favorable for the carrying out of Valentinian's praiseworthy policy, but in the East it was far otherwise. Had Valentinian chosen to govern this portion of the empire himself it is difficult to see how even he, with the best intentions in the world, could have refrained from attempting to bring order out of the Eastern ecclesiastical chaos. New parties were constantly coming into existence, and to make matters still worse, rival claimants existed for a large proportion of the Eastern episcopal sees.

The religious question of the East in this reign opened with the council for the holding of which the Bishops of Bithynia and the Hellespont had asked authorization from Valentinian. These Bishops were of the type of Basil of Ancyra; that is, they were Homoiousians who were practically orthodox. They were regarded by the Acacian or Homoion party with as much dislike as the Catholics, and it was they who had suffered most severely in the wholesale deposition of the Acacian council of Constantinople (360). The Fathers met at Lampsacus and were in session for two months. The results of their deliberations were a condemnation of the Arian creed of Rimini-Niké and a new expression of their preference for the Homoiousian creed of the Dedication Synod of Antioch. All the deposed Bishops, they further decreed, should forthwith be reinstated in their dioceses and Eudoxius and his partizans were exhorted to repentance of their errors.

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[10] Theod. iv, 7; cf. Duchesne, *op. cit.* 308, note.

But once again it happened that while the orthodox were debating the Arians were securing their position with the sovereign. A deputation from the council of Lampsacus was sent to Valens whom they encountered on his way back to Constantinople, after accompanying his brother part of the journey westward. The Emperor received them in audience and heard what they had to say, but to their surprise and disappointment he coolly informed them that they must keep on good terms with the man whom they had recently exhorted to repentance: Eudoxius of Constantinople. Thinking that Valens was not *au courant* with the earlier history of Eudoxius and his doings in 360 at Constantinople, the deputies proceeded to enlighten him. But Valens was already won beyond recall to the cause of heterodoxy, and the representatives of the council of Lampsacus were ordered into exile as a reward for their efforts. Their churches were at once handed over to the partisans of Eudoxius[11] and the East thus became aware that a new Constantius reigned.

An edict of Valens now (365) directed that the Bishops banished by Constantius, who had returned under Julian, should again take the way into exile. The most distinguished victims of this order were Athanasius of Alexandria, who now for the fifth time suffered banishment, and Meletius of Antioch. Early in 366, however, Athanasius was recalled and passed the remaining years of his life in comparative peace.

The confidence of the Bishops of Lampsacus being thus rudely undermined, only one resource was left, namely, recourse to the Bishops of Western Christendom and the Emperor Valentinian. Three delegates were despatched with letters for Valentinian and Pope Liberius. The Western ruler, however, was then in Gaul and the delegates did not proceed farther than Rome. Liberius, regarding them as Arians, at first refused to receive them, but on receiving assurances of their orthodoxy he gave them audience. Their letters proved wholly satisfactory to the Pope: the Bishops whom they represented accepted the Nicene faith, wholly and entirely, and they condemned the creed of Rimini-Niké as well as all manner of heretics. Liberius thereupon admitted them to communion and gave them letters to this effect addressed to the sixty-four Bishops whom they represented. as well as to all other orthodox Eastern Bishops. On their way home the letters of the Pope secured them the support of the Bishops of Sicily; and the Bishops of Africa, Gaul and Italy also sent them letters of encouragement and sympathy.

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[11] Sozomen, *H. E.* vi, 7.

On the arrival of the delegates in the East a synod was held at Tyana in which the letters of the Western episcopate were received with general approval. Invitations were then forwarded to all the Bishops of the Orient requesting them to meet at Tarsus, in Cilicia, for concerted action. But here Eudoxius intervened, and procured from Valens an order prohibiting the council under severe penalties.[12] Another discordant note at this time was sounded by an assembly of thirty-four Asiatic Bishops held at Antioch in Caria. These prelates, after expressing their appreciation of the efforts of the moderate Semi-Arian or now neo-orthodox party in re-establishing communion with the West, yet formally rejected the term Homoousios, which had been accepted by the delegates to Pope Liberius. They insisted on adhering to the formula of Antioch.[13]

Notwithstanding their successes achieved with the support of Valens the Homoion party were still by no means so strong in the Orient as that which had followed Eusebius of Nicomedia at the beginning of the Arian controversy. Indeed, as we have seen, the great majority of the Eastern Bishops, through the mediation of Rome, had now returned to orthodoxy. The Anomoeans or old Arians, on the other hand, from whom the Acacians had separated at the Council of 360, now again began to be troublesome to the court favorites. The views of the two parties on the main question differed only slightly, but knowing the dislike of Constantius to the Anomoean doctrines the politic Acacius had adopted the term *Homoios* which, as a compromise, was entirely satisfactory to this Emperor. The Anomoeans on the other hand held obstinately to their opinion, and as Constantius was suspicious of the Homoions Acacius, in self-defence, was compelled to depose the deacon Aetius, the author of Anomoeanism. Yet that there was an understanding between Acacians and Anomoeans is indicated by the different treatment accorded the latter from that meted out to the Semi-Arians. The Semi-Arians, even after subscribing the Rimini-Niké formula, were deposed on various minor pretexts by the council of Constantinople, whereas the disciple of Aetius, Eunomius, was raised by Eudoxius to the see of Cyzicus in place of the deposed Semi-Arian, Eleusius.

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[12] Soz. vi, 12; Soc. iv, 12.

[13] Soz. *l. c.*

The death of Constantius changed the situation. Aetius returned from exile and, curiously enough, became a favorite of the Emperor Julian, who presented him with an estate on the isle of Lesbos. As the position of their own party at this time was precarious Eudoxius and Euzoius, the Acacian Bishop of Antioch, drew closer to the Anomoeans. But the rapprochement was only half-hearted. The Acacians would not openly commit themselves and in consequence the Anomoeans broke off negotiations and organized as an independent party. Aetius and several other members of the sect were consecrated Bishops to direct their adherents; they even sent a Bishop to Constantinople as a rival to their former friend Eudoxius. But the accession of Valens and his adoption of the Homoion views gave the victory to Eudoxius. Both Aetius and Eunomius became involved in the rebellion of Procopius, which completed the ruin of their party. Aetius died shortly afterwards at Constantinople, but Eunomius lived more than a quarter of a century longer in obscurity.

The war with Procopius, which lasted from September 365 to May 366, caused a suspension of the measures taken by Valens to achieve the supremacy of the Homoion party. After the execution of his defeated rival Valens again gave his attention to the religious situation and, in an Arian synod at Nicomedia, he compelled by threats of exile and confiscation Eleusius of Cyzicus, who had presided at the council of Lampsacus, to enter into communion with Eudoxius. Eleusius, on his return home, confessed his weakness and wanted to resign, but his people, who esteemed him highly, insisted on his retaining his office. He was soon expelled by Eunomius, sent by Eudoxius to succeed him. The Gothic war, which broke out in 367, again demanded the attention of the Emperor, who for three years was engaged in defending his frontier on the Danube. At the close of the war his hands were at length entirely free, and he set out for Antioch, decided in his intention of compelling conformity. Eudoxius of Constantinople died at this time (370) and his party elected Demophilus of Beroea, in Thrace, his successor. The orthodox, on the other hand, elected Evagrius who immediately paid the penalty of acceptance with exile.

But the expulsion of the orthodox Bishop did not by any means end the troubles at Constantinople. Those who remained faithful to him were so violently persecuted that, in desperation, they determined to appeal to the Emperor, though they must have realized how little such a course was likely to benefit them. Eighty clerical deputies set out for the court, then at Nicomedia, to state their grievances. Valens received them with ill-dissembled wrath, and after the audience gave instructions that all the petitioners should be banished. The eighty ecclesiastics were put on board a ship which was to take them to their respective destinations, but at sea the ship got on fire, by accident or design, and the entire deputation perished in the flames.[14]

From Nicomedia Valens proceeded to Antioch which for the time became the center of operations against the orthodox. Every Bishop who refused to accept the creed of the Emperor was banished. The province of Alexandria escaped for the moment; it was only after the death of the veteran defender of the faith, Athanasius, in 373, that ecclesiastical Egypt again experienced the doubtful blessing of a visit from a special representative of an Emperor. The brother and successor of Athanasius, Peter, was no sooner installed than the storm broke. The heretical Bishop of Antioch, Euzoius, once a deacon of the Alexandrine Church who had been condemned at Nice, came on purpose to preside at the worse than pagan orgies with which the imperial candidate inaugurated his pontificate. From Alexandria the persecution extended to the whole of Egypt. The Bishops of the patriarchate were given the choice of exile or submission, and eleven of their number took the former alternative. The Egyptian monks, well known for their orthodoxy and their loyalty to Athanasius in his misfortunes, were treated with particular harshness, but all the Catholics were treated in a manner truly barbarous.[15] After a short term of imprisonment the Bishop of Alexandria succeeded in escaping from these scenes and fled to Rome, whither he brought the news of the events accompanying his deposition.

Everywhere throughout the territory of Valens similar occurrences were the order of the day. One province, however, Cappadocia, seems to have formed an exception to the rule. Its immunity was due wholly to the personality of its metropolitan, the great Bishop of Caesarea, St. Basil. On the arrival of Valens at Caesarea Basil was summoned by the Prefect Modestus to subscribe to the Emperor's favorite creed as others had done, but Basil resolutely declined. Such audacity was a new experience to the official. Threats of "confiscation, banishment, torture, death," had no effect, which greatly surprised the Prefect. Basil, however, was left undisturbed, and Valens even assisted at the liturgy during his stay in Caesarea.[16]

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[14] Soc. iv, 15 s; Soz. vi, 14. Both these authors state positively that the ship was set on fire by the sailors, and the former adds that the order was given by the Prefect Modestus. It is difficult to accept this account of the matter, however. To murder deliberately eighty persons, merely for presenting a petition, would be little short of insanity on the part of the Emperor. Yet, Socrates says that Valens ordered the eighty executed in Nicomedia itself, and that Modestus planned the other mode of getting rid of them as the quieter. The punishment of exile was more than sufficient to meet the case; the unfortunate outcome may be explained by an accidental fire and a crew who thought more of their own lives than of those of their passengers. Cf. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders,* I pt. I. 206, note.

[15] Theod. iv, 19; Soc. iv, 20 ss; Soz. vi, 19 ss.

The ecclesiastical situation in the Orient remained unchanged till the year 378, when news of the troubles in Thrace, caused by the inhumanity of the imperial officers towards the Gothic refugees, reached the Emperor at Antioch. Before setting out for the seat of war he deemed it expedient to revoke the sentences of banishment against the orthodox Bishops, but his defeat and death, at the battle of Adrianople (August, 378) completed this politic rehabilitation, for an orthodox Prince now ruled the whole empire.

Three years before the events recorded the young Emperor Gratian had succeeded his father, Valentinian, in the West. On hearing of the death of his uncle Gratian issued an edict of religious toleration, from which were excepted, however, the Manicheans, the Photinians and the Anomoeans.[17] The measures taken by Valens for the restoration of the exiled Bishops were ratified by his successor, and the confessors of the faith returned in triumph. Peter of Alexandria was received with joy by his people and the Arian Lucius found safety only in hasty flight. St. Basil of Caesarea lived just long enough to see the triumph of orthodoxy; he died at Cæsarea January 1, 379, in his fiftieth year.

The reunion of the empire under one ruler proved of short duration. The Gothic triumph over Valens had demoralized the Eastern government, and Gratian saw the need of an able colleague capable of coping with the situation. He found the proper person in the brilliant soldier, Theodosius, to whom he assigned the territory of his uncle. Theodosius, like Gratian, was attached to the Nicene faith, and after his baptism by the orthodox Bishop Acholius he issued an edict, February 380, threatening the heretics with punishment and demanding that all should accept the faith which he himself professed. This faith was that "which Peter, the chief of the Apostles had, from the beginning, preached to the Romans, and which was professed by Damasus, Bishop of Rome, and by Peter, Bishop of

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[16] S. Greg. Naz. *Or.* 43, 48, ss; Soz. vi, 16.

[17] Soc. v, 2.

Alexandria."[18] The following year Theodosius issued a second edict depriving the Arians of the churches, which were to be restored to the Catholics; all heretics were, in addition, forbidden to hold religious services in towns.[19]

The position of the Homoion party was now desperate. Two orthodox Emperors reigned, and their former successes had been solely due to imperial patronage. The orthodox, too, had some difficulties to overcome, though these were unimportant as compared with those from which the change of rulers had delivered them. At Antioch the situation had long been complicated owing to the inexcusable rashness of Lucifer of Cagliari. The troubles in this patriarchal see dated back to the synod of Antioch of 330, in which the Eusebians had deposed the orthodox Bishop, Eustathius, A later Arian synod of Antioch (361) had appointed Meletius Bishop, under the impression that he was a whole-hearted member of their party. Meletius, however, disappointed expectations, for no sooner was he consecrated than he openly declared for orthodoxy and paid the penalty with exile. Meletius returned after the death of Constantius and was acknowledged by all the orthodox save a few who, faithful to the memory of the now deceased Eustathius, formed a schismatical opposition. Through the mediation of Athanasius, however, in the reign of Julian, there had been good reason to hope that the schismatics would be reconciled, but the meddlesome Lucifer perpetuated the trouble by consecrating a Bishop for the Eustathians in the person of the priest Paulinus. Later on Pope Damasus, who was badly informed on the Eastern situation, and Peter of Alexandria, who had no love for those in any way associated with the persecution of his brother Athanasius, recognized Paulinus as Bishop of Antioch; a fact which gave this personage an importance he never would have obtained otherwise. On his return from exile at the death of Valens Meletius presided at a council in Antioch of 153 Bishops who subscribed without hesitation the *Tome* addressed to them by the Roman synod of 369. Thus, at Antioch there were two orthodox Bishops, and the one recognized by Rome and Alexandria represented only a small minority.

The situation at Constantinople also was difficult. The Arians had enjoyed nearly undisturbed possession of this see for forty years, and the Arian Bishop, Demophilus, was in possession of all the churches. We have seen how the orthodox Evagrius fared under Valens. After the death of this Emperor, however, the orthodox of the capital again lifted their heads, and on their invitation Gregory of Nazianzus, the friend of St. Basil, came to Constantinople and accepted the position of their chief. Having no churches Gregory opened a chapel to which he gave the title *Anastastis* (Resurrection). The eloquent Cappadocian drew large numbers to the orthodox gatherings, a fact which alarmed Demophilus. The Arians attempted intimidation, but their day was over; the entrance of Theodosius to Constantinople was the signal for their expulsion from the churches and Gregory was enthroned in St. Sophia (November 26, 380).

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[18] Soz. vii, 4; *Cod. Theod.* xvi, 1, 2.

[19] *Cod. Theod.* i, 6.

The following year Theodosius convened a council of Oriental Bishops with a view to establishing harmony between the various parties into which this part of Christendom was divided. The invitation was extended to those Semi-Arian Bishops also, who, as we have seen, had again departed from orthodoxy at the synod of Antioch in Caria. These thirty-six prelates represented a new phase of Semi-Arianism, for while orthodox regarding the Second Person of the Trinity, they were Homoiousians in their doctrine on the Holy Ghost. They were known also as Macedonians, after the former Bishop of Constantinople.

The second Oecumenical council met at Constantinople in May, 381, under the presidency of Meletius of Antioch. The first business disposed of was that of filling the vacancy at Constantinople; Gregory of Nazianzus was appointed without difficulty. Soon afterwards Meletius of Antioch died and the new Bishop of the capital assumed the presidency of the council. The vacancy at Antioch caused by the death of Meletius next occupied the attention of the council. The recognition of Paulinus, the second orthodox Bishop of Antioch, was recommended by Gregory as an excellent means of ending the schism, but the proposal was bitterly opposed by the majority. Paulinus had been intruded into Antioch by an imprudent Latin Bishop, and still received the support both of the Alexandrian and the Roman Church. This was enough to render him ineligible to the always anti-Latin Bishops of the Orient, whether orthodox or heterodox. The idea of conciliation was one that did not appeal to the Eastern mind, and now that the orthodox, after a long period of exclusion, were enjoying imperial favor they were disposed to use their credit a little after the manner of the Arians in the preceding reigns. Gregory was disgusted with his colleagues, and talked of resignation. At this point there arrived in the capital the new Bishop of Alexandria, Timothy, with the Bishops of Egypt. This contingent ought to have supported Gregory in favor of Paulinus, but unfortunately they too entertained their prejudices, the strongest of which was against Gregory himself as a Cappadocian. The Alexandrians had a long memory and could not forget the doings of Eusebius of Nicomedia. Instead of aiding Gregory, therefore, Timothy questioned his right to the see of Constantinople, on the ground that as Bishop of Sasima his appointment was uncanonical. Gregory, thereupon, disgusted with all parties, gave up the struggle and left Constantinople for ever.

The name of Nectarius, an unbaptized imperial official, was selected by the Emperor, from a list of eligible candidates presented to him, as that of the most acceptable person for the now vacant bishopric; Flavian had previously been appointed successor of Meletius of Antioch. Nectarius now assumed the presidency of the council, although two of his superiors in the hierarchy, the Bishops of Alexandria and Antioch were present.

The more important business of the council was now taken up. The second canon enacted forbade the Bishops of one civil diocese to interfere in the affairs of another; this was aimed at Alexandria, whose former Bishop, Peter, had caused Maximus the Cynic to be consecrated Bishop of Constantinople in a manner wholly irregular. Maximus himself was declared not to be a Bishop at all and his ordinations were consequently pronounced invalid. The third canon gave the second rank in the hierarchy to the Bishop of Constantinople, on the ground that Constantinople was "New Rome." This was to base ecclesiastical rank solely on the civil importance of a see, which was of course the only pretext on which Constantinople could claim precedence over Alexandria and Antioch. Thus began the tradition of the new patriarchs, which contained in it the fruitful germs of future schisms. Yet, this canon when adopted was directed primarily against the Bishop of Alexandria.[20] The bad feeling between Egypt on the one side, and the rest of the Orient on the other, had existed since the beginning of the Arian troubles. And now, although both parties at length agreed on all questions of faith, neither was disposed to forget the past. As Alexandria outranked Antioch, which besides was weakened by internal dissensions, the latter see could not hope to compete with its rival. But Constantinople, with its prestige as New Rome, the capital of the East, had every chance of success against Alexandria first and old Rome afterward.

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[20] Cf. Duchesne, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

The question of the so-called Macedonian heresy was discussed also, and as the Bishops of the council of Antioch in Caria would not accept the orthodox creed they were, in the first canon, anathematized. The treatment of these prelates by the orthodox Theodosius, however, contrasted quite favorably with that which the orthodox and the Semi-Arians had received at the hands of Constantius and Valens. The Emperor employed all his powers of persuasion to convince them of their errors, but in vain. He then ejected all the dissident factions from the churches: which is exactly what any State of the American Union would do under similar circumstances. Even after taking this step, Theodosius called another conference of the various heads of sects, which proved partially successful: some were convinced but others remained obstinate. The patience of the Emperor was now exhausted, and he adopted more stringent measures against the latter; they were forbidden to have churches, to instruct in their creeds, and to consecrate Bishops. The leaders were sent into exile, or lost the "privileges enjoyed by other subjects of the empire." But while the terms of the law were harsh enough, though far less so than those of the enactments of Valens and Constantius, Sozomen states that they were never enforced strictly, because "the Emperor had no desire to persecute his subjects." Theodosius only sought "to enforce uniformity of view about God through the medium of intimidation."[21]

The relations of Church and State in the year 382, at which we have arrived, were therefore vastly better than they had been at any time during the previous half century. The West had so far been fortunate in escaping the dangers of imperialism in the Church, save for a short time in the reign of Constantius. But the East, torn with internal dissensions since the beginning of the Arian troubles, had made imperial intervention, as the only remedy at all likely to be effectual, a necessity. The heretical Emperors, urged on by ambitious heresiarchs, carried this intervention far beyond what the occasions demanded. They were not satisfied with the office of mediator and guardian of public order, and they employed material force without scruple to compel acceptance of their own religious opinions. Jovian, on the other hand, during his short reign, showed no inclination to adopt the means of persuasion employed by Constantius, nor did Theodosius resort to the violent methods of Valens. On the contrary, the new Emperor of the Orient brought from the West the tradition of Constans, Valentinian and Gratian, and although, from our point of view, his influence was sometimes carried beyond the limits which the civil authority ought legitimately exercise, his contemporaries would have been surprised had he acted differently.

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[21] Soz. vii, 12; Soc. v, 8 ss.

Maurice M. Hassett.

A VISIT TO A MODERN EXCAVATION

Hugh Pope, O. P.

The sky was wild-looking; black, threatening clouds came hurrying up from the west, pools of water in the courtyard told of the rain that had fallen in the night, and everything combined to foretell a wet and comfortless day. But our destination was Gezer, and our object a view of the excavations in progress there, so we paid little heed to the threatening clouds but wrapped ourselves up closely and sat back under the hood of the strongly-built carriage and prepared for the worst.

The clocks in the Holy City were striking six when we started off. Our driver was dismayed when we told him where we were going; he had come unprepared for so long a journey and shrugged his shoulders as he surveyed the sky and thought of his thin and not too new garments. However with native fatalism he resigned himself to the inevitable and comforted himself with countless cigarettes. The horses plunged forward, three of them abreast and none too easy to drive, for the near horse was unconnected with any shaft and a bit of rope served for a trace. The day is just breaking and we can hear the camels snarling in the neighbouring Arab encampment while their owners busy themselves in lighting their fires and preparing the morning coffee.

Then down comes the rain; we are sheltered, but the poor Arab is quickly soaked, while the horses steam in front of us. As we pass rapidly through the outskirts of the city two damp figures emerge out of the darkness and we recognise them as two Benedictine Fathers on their way to their house at Abu Gôsh, so, much to their joy we make room for them in the vehicle.

We soon leave the straggling houses behind us and are out on the open road. These roads about Jerusalem are generally very good, especially when, as in our case, the post travels by them, for we are on the post road from Jaffa to Jerusalem along which most of the traffic used to pass till the railway was opened, indeed the post still follows it.

The road winds as it descends for we are going from the highest point of the Jerusalem hills down into the shephelah or lowlands.

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[1] Jos. xv. 9. and xviii. 15.

On our right we see Lifta where there still flows the old fountain of Nephtoah which lay on the border between Judah and Benjamin. Like all Eastern cities Lifta looks beautiful from a distance as it nestles against the hill side but if we entered it we should probably be aghast at its miserable appearance of squalor and dirt. Its fountain is copious, as indeed it must have been of yore to mark the boundary line.

If the morning were clearer we should see further to our right Nebi Samwil towering up above us to the height of 2935 feet. It marks the site of Mizpeh and by its name is intimately associated with Samuel. The Crusaders thought it was Shiloh and they named it 'Mons Gaudii' for from its summit they first saw the Holy City on their way down from the north. If we could spare the time to climb the mountain we should have a wonderful panorama before us and a fine bird's-eye view of the road we are now following. We should then see how the hills roll down in terraces on to the Shephelah and how the latter slopes down into the green fields of the plain which in its turn passes into the sandy waste towards Jaffa. We should see Jaffa, too, in the dim distance with its gardens and orange groves, and beyond, there would always be the eternal but ever changeful sea.

The horses carry us on however and we are now near Kolonieh which shares with Abu Gôsh, Amwas and El-Kubêbeh the honours of being claimed as the site of Emmaus. Abu Gôsh itself soon comes in sight and the two Benedictine Fathers get down with drier habits than they had bargained for when they set out in the morning. As we come into the tiny village we are spectators of an interesting sight. To-day is the last day of the long fast of Ramadhan and the rejoicing and feasting are universal. A procession comes winding along the road and the wailing chant rises and falls on the breeze. We can see no bier and it is a feast day, else we should have thought the villagers were conducting a funeral, so lugubrious are their voices. The procession swings up past our carriage which has halted and we learn that they have just sacrificed a sheep in honour of Abu Gôsh and are now going to the little mosque near by. Some enter in but they are few in number, others, the majority, are content to stand outside and keep up the mournful refrain. And who, you will ask, was Abu Gôsh? Was he Saint or sinner? Is his name enrolled amongst the early companions of the Prophet? Nay, the Prophet knew him not, and though his Ouely, or dome-shaped memorial, stands before us glistening with whitewash he must undoubtedly be counted amongst the sinners. He and his brother and a large brood of his descendants terrorised the neighbourhood for many years till in the middle of the last century an end was put to their enormities. But the villagers venerate him and call their village by his name.

For a long time it was usual to identify this site, which formerly bore the name of Kiriath-et-Enab, with the Cariathiarim where the Ark rested after being restored by the Philistines.[2] But opinion has now veered to another site viz: Kiriath-Erma in the lower valley of Surar. The reason alleged is the proximity of Bethshemes to this latter site, for the Biblical account of the translation of the Ark from Bethshemes would seem to demand that they should be close together. But it is here precisely that a knowledge of the topography comes in. The men of Bethshemes called upon the men of Cariathiarim *to come down* and take back the ark.[3] This could be true of Kiriat-Erma in the Vale of Surar but it is eminently true of Kiriath-et-Enab, and when we read that the men of Kiriathiarim took the ark to the house of Aminadab in Gabaa, we feel that the probabilities are that it is the men of Kiriath-et-Enab or Abu Gôsh who are in question, for both Gibea, the modern Jebia, and Gibeon, the modern El-Jib, are close by.

If this identification be correct it is interesting to contrast the present Arab procession to the Tomb of the marauder Abu-Gôsh with that old-time procession of Priests and Levites who with solemn pomp and great joy of heart carried the Ark along perhaps this very line of route while the poet-king leaped and danced before them.

Our road slopes rapidly now for we are leaving the high tableland and are entering the narrow defile of the Wady Ali with its steep precipitous sides and its bare, desolate, rocky, hills. The whole surface is strewn with boulders, with chips and debris resulting from the action of heat and cold, drought and storm on the limestone which here lies exposed. Yet as we look at the surface more closely we cannot fail to note indications of terraces now broken down, of pockets of rich earth at intervals, and other signs of a culture long since passed away. Now, indeed, there are no trees, yet an occasional mighty root shows that these bleak and desolate wilds did not always present the same picture of stony waste and barren surface. The charcoal burners of the past, and the careless, thriftless Government of the present have combined to render the land of milk and honey a howling wilderness.

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[2] 1 Sam. vii. i.

[3] 1 Sam. vi, 21.

How impossible it is to give anything like an adequate picture of these regions! We have read so many descriptions and yet none of them gave us any idea of the unique character of the land. One lesson in Palestinian topography, however, is enforced upon the traveler as he makes his way down these valleys, and that is the extraordinary isolation of the Holy City and its ideal fitness as the capital of the chosen people and the treasure-house of God. For we have come down from the Holy City on the West even as the man in the parable went down from it to Jericho on the East; the path has wound in and out, now under crags, now with a precipice below; here are boulders, here a sudden turn in the road,—there are caves, and how many hidden foes lurk unseen? And as the path goes steadily down we realize how difficult it would be for anyone to mount it in the teeth of opposing forces. Who could withstand the onrush of the victorious Israelite as he swept down with irresistible impetus on the flying hordes who had ventured to pry into his domain?

And yet this is only the inner line of defence. These beetling hills of Judaea, so rugged, so inhospitable, so unscaleable, cannot be approached until the long parallel line of the rolling Shephelah hills has been occupied. Turn westwards and look at this Shephelah or lowland country, it is not a green plain, it is not a level sward across which the horse and foot can sweep, but a tumbled series of rounded hills with winding intricate valleys forming dangerous approaches and ambuscades. This is the secret of Jerusalem "girt about with mountains" and only when we grasp this key to the topography can we rightly understand the wars fought in Palestine.

As we continue our journey, the country opens out by degrees and we cross the broad plain of Ajalon running almost due North and South.

On our right, though not in sight, lies Amwas which many still regard as the Emmaus of the New Testament; but we do not turn aside for before us on one of the most westerly spurs of the Shepelah hills stands a white Ouely which marks the site of Gezer. How arid and bare all the country is in this winter season! It is hard to picture it green with dhurra and other crops, but harder still to imagine it a busy centre of life and population. A few Arabs are standing at the spring 'Ain Yerdeh', they are filling the troughs for their camels and asses and we revel in the patriarchal character of the scene; a thin line of green marks the course of the stream even at this season of the year but it is the only sign of green life which meets the eye.

Our gaze, however, is fixed on the Tell before us. How often we have scanned photographs of it, how often we have read the descriptions furnished first of all in the *Revue Biblique*, and afterwards in the Quarterly Reports of the Palestine Exploration Fund, and yet when our eyes light on it for the first time we cannot help an exclamation of surprize. Is that the site of mighty Gezer? Is that the scene of all those battles and sieges of which we have been reading? Was it here those letters were written which we find among the Tell-el-Amarna correspondence?

It seems incredible; a little white glistening Ouely, a few silt heaps due to the excavators, a tiny hut to the east where the indefatigable digger lives, and that is all! Yet as we look around, and more still when we study the position on a good map, we can readily understand the strategic importance of the site. The city stood, as we have seen, on the most westerly spur of the Shephelah hills, and was thus the key to Palestine. No invader could come up from Egypt without taking Gezer into account, a strategical point which is amply confirmed by Egyptian records, and they in their turn have been more than confirmed by the excavations on the site. And in the same way no Philistine invasion of the Shepelah and the valleys leading from it into the hill-country of Judaea could be undertaken unless the invader held Gezer, and conversely when Israel held Gezer they had the low countries at their mercy.

But we must hasten on to the Tell itself. We turn to the farmhouse on the left and receive a hearty English welcome from the genial Armenian gentleman who amazes his visitors by his equally fluent German, French and English. He is the administrator of the property and the crops on the Tell, and his cordial enthusiasm for the interests of Science has enabled Mr. McAlister to surmount many difficulties arising from vested interests.

He insists on our lunching with him and as we bring our own contribution to the feast we are made, if possible, more welcome still. For these explorers lead no holiday life; tinned meats, jams, and native bread must perforce form the staple of their diet and nothing but the healthy life they lead and the hard work they do would enable them to put up with the many privations they have to face. We leave our host and go in search of Mr. McAlister. It is the Feast of Ramadhan and consequently no work is being done. This is a disappointment for we would gladly have witnessed the men at work, but it has its advantages for we feel that we are not taking the busy explorer away from his work at some critical moment.

Disappointment awaits us, too, in another direction, for the society is now working under its second firman or permit and nearly all that was exposed to view under the first firman has of necessity been covered up. When we at home read accounts of excavations, do we ever think what becomes of the earth which has been removed? We are apt to forget it but the excavator cannot afford to do so. In the first place it cumbers other ground which is awaiting examination, in the second place the firman insists that the site be restored as nearly as possible to its original condition. And even if this were not so the excavator feels bound in the interests of his craft to cover up all the buildings he has exposed to view unless he wishes the thieving Arabs to remove every stone and brick and reduce them to lime or build them into their walls and houses if they possess such luxuries.

Mr. McAlister, however, has not covered up everything and he takes us first of all to the interesting Neolithic Troglodyte cave where the floor is marked with those strange cup-marks cut in the rock and arranged in the form of three concentric horseshoes. We have seen sketches and photos of these marks but the reality surpasses our expectations. In the first place there is no vestige of doubt about their artificial character and careful arrangement; secondly we note how they cover the whole surface of the floor; it would be impossible to walk about without crossing over some of them. But what can they be for? Many ideas have been put forward but the idea that they were graves has, we think, never been mooted. Yet the present writer when viewing recently the excavations now being conducted on the Palatine was much struck by the sight of some cup-holes, worked in the surface of the rock just in front of the House of Germanicus. They were undoubtedly deeper than those at Gezer and other Palestinian sites but still they could correctly be termed cup-holes, and they undoubtedly contained bones and human remains.

From the cave with the cup-holes we pass into the further caves at the back; the whole series can not be examined owing to a fall of the earth, but we see enough to convince us of the successive occupations of the cave in very early times; particularly interesting is the lower cave with its flight of steps which had been built over by later occupants so as to form a deep cistern out of it. What an insight it affords us into those truly primeval times when our forefathers for many generations were content with caves to live in even though they had tools and mechanical knowledge sufficient to enable them to construct well made flights of stone steps.

This is not the place to institute a comparison between the civilisations of Egypt, Babylon, Elam and Palestine but it is worth while to draw attention to the striking difference which recent excavations have established between the earliest period of Palestine and those of the other three countries named. The pre-dynastic vases found by Petrie in the tombs at Abydos, the debris from the lowest strata at Nippur worked out by Hilprecht, the art-work discovered by de Morgan at Susa, all bear witness to a degree of civilisation of which we find no traces in prehistoric Gezer. But we must not too hastily conclude that no traces of such early civilisation will be found in Palestine, for it appears to be an indubitable fact that the aforesaid predynastic vases show in many instances traces of Aegean influence. Is it credible that Palestine should have been passed over in this wave of high art from the Isles of the West? And yet, so far, the Mycenean vases found at Gezer and elsewhere in Palestine belong to the later Canaanite period. We can only hope that future excavations will do for Palestine what Petrie's investigations have done for Abydos, viz: put it *en rapport* with that very early Aegean civilisation which gave the tone if not the impulse to Egyptian art.

From the cave we proceed to another part of the Tell, to a clearing which Mr. McAlister carefully preserved in order to show a section of the three walls which at different periods defended the city. The three walls ran parallel to one another. The middle one is the older and the more primitive as we see at a glance. It is made of earth banked up on either side by a facing of small rough stones which form a sloping surface. It is probably due to the cave dwellers whose habitations we have been examining, and in view of other and later discoveries must date long before 2000 B. C. The next wall in point of time is the inner one which lies close to the former. It is well built and formed of roughly squared stones, The outer wall is the latest and probably dates from what may be termed the later Canaanite period viz: circa 1400 B. C. or perhaps it may belong to the early Jewish period.

A little further on we come to the *pièce de résistance*, viz: the eight megaliths which mark the site of the Canaanite temple and which, with the exception of the Moabite stone, may be regarded as the most important 'find' ever made East or West of the Jordan.

This is not the place to discuss them, they are well known now and full information regarding them is to be found in the Quarterly Reports.

The rain keeps pouring down but we are too interested to pay much attention to it as Mr. McAlister tells us he has kept his greatest recent 'find' till the last. Turning to the scene of this season's excavations we go down a rough flight of earthen steps constructed by the excavators as they went; we turn to the left and find ourselves in the entrance to a huge tunnel. A broad flight of steps leads down to an as yet unknown depth, and overhead is the arch of the tunnel hewn in the rock. We stand stupefied at the sight. Those who have seen the Tombs of the Kings outside the Damascus Gate will remember the magnificent flight of steps leading down to the courtyard. Those steps are probably not earlier than the first Christian era but these at Gezer must date at least 2000 B. C. It would be unfair to Mr. McAlister to describe this stupendous piece of work at greater length, but we look forward to a fairly full account of it in the Report for January.

Presently our host summons us to luncheon, over which we are regaled with many droll stories of the daily life of an excavator. Visitors are not many, but an occasional tourist happens on the scene and puts the stereotyped questions. Their scepticism regarding the dates assigned to the various epochs and strata is sometimes very amusing though by no means unnatural to the uninitiated.

After luncheon we go over to McAlister's hut where he shows us his latest 'finds' in the shape of pottery, scarabs, ex-votos, etc. An excavator's quarters afford a strange spectacle. Packing-cases seem to be the dominant feature. You sit on packing-cases, dine off them—not in the indigestible sense—make bookrests of them and of course bookshelves. And the books! A strange series they must appear to a passing tourist, Egyptian grammars, books on Scarabs, records of excavations, Hebrew dictionaries, guides, plans, Biblical commentaries, recent periodicals, all form a confused medley which makes one sometimes wonder what verdict the excavator of 2000 years hence would pass on such a 'find' if Mr. McAlister should be suddenly buried here in a sand storm and dug up by the Flinders Petrie of many years hence.

And in the middle of this chaos we see evidences of much hard work; maps, plans, elevations, sketches of various strata of ruins, are mingled with archeological treasures such as fragments of pottery, occasional complete vessels, scarabs, intaglios, portions of inscriptions and all the other odds and ends which such work necessarily gathers together. For we should never forget that while the explorer must often undertake hard manual labour, it is the head work which is the most onerous. Days may be spent in watching the progress of excavations, in directing the fellahin at their work, and in planning fresh lines of work for them, but the evenings must be devoted to the reconstruction of the history which the day's finds have brought to light. For this a deep knowledge of the Bible, of the history of the land, of the nations of old, of contemporary archeological work in other regions, are required. It is tempting to jump at a conclusion; it is alluring to see in one's find the greatest archeological treasure of the season, but such will o' the wisps must be avoided, and an unbiassed mind must be brought to the elucidation of each question. And this is all the harder from the fact that in most cases the excavator must necessarily start from a hypothesis which he must be prepared, however unwillingly, to discard when facts are against it. Then there is the report to be written up, and often this has to be done at a period when the work done only allows of guesses which the next hal hour s digging may completely rout.

Such is the life, such the work of an excavator according to modern demands. Botta and Layard, Rassam and Place have deservedly great names but they never did work such as our modern excavators do. They never had to write monthly reports, they never had to carefully register the various strata of debris in a mound, they never had to plan out and photograph every surface laid bare besides keeping a minute record of the position and provenance of every object found. Their work was pioneer work and therefore glorious, but modern excavators toil and study in the full glare of the public eye, and conclusions to which they come in January will be public property in April and will be eagerly dissected by hundreds of critical and highly trained scholars.

Nor is this all, for as we turn to leave Mr. McAlister's quarters we catch sight of something which gives a significant hint of the excavator's keenest source of anxiety. It is a little notice pinned over the door and informing visitors that these excavations cost the society £1,200 a year! How many hear of these excavations? How many read about them? How many wealthy tourists go and inspect them? Many perhaps and yet not half so many as could be wished. And of those who do read, who do pay visits, how many put their hands in their pockets? Very few indeed! And there is not a single penny contributed by Government! It is strange that the English-speaking peoples, who have ever been the pioneers in this kind of work, should be the last to support their learned men who in the interest of truth and of the Inspired Book devote years of toil and exile to such laborious work. The French, the Italians, the Germans are all now in the field, and others besides, and we welcome them, but one grudges them the munificent support they receive from their respective governments. But if our governments do not put their hands in their pockets that is no reason why wealthy individuals who spend large sums on comparatively trivial subjects should not contribute something of their superfluity to a work which is really great and which produces lasting results.

The rain has ceased and it is past three o'clock as we wend our way to our carriage which has just drawn up by the spring. We have a steady climb of six hours before us so we hasten to bid our adieux to the sturdy toiler in these almost desert wastes. We are soon mounting the pass and in the deepening shadows the mountain sides seem like walls covered with strange hieroglyphics. The darkness sets in rapidly and our road is wrapped in gloom as the horses toil painfully up the steep and often rugged path. As we lie back in the carriage and the fragrance of the driver's endless cigarettes is wafted back upon us there come crowding into our minds figures from the past history of Tell Gezer. Cave-dwellers, small and nimble, ply their rude flint implements, Egyptians of early Dynasties come and occupy their hill, Semitic invaders from the remote East pour over the land, and in rolls wave after wave of invasion. It comes now from the North, now from the South, a ceaseless tide, till at last there comes the rumour of a people from the other side of Jordan who are conquering and settling the land. Hebrews they are called, worshippers of one only God Who, so they say, has given them this fair land in possession. As Rahab said to the spies:

"I know that the Lord hath given this land to you: for the dread of you is fallen upon us and all the inhabitants of the land have lost all strength. We have heard that the Lord dried up the water of the Red Sea at your going in, when you came out of Egypt; and what things you did to the two kings of the Amorrhites, that were beyond the Jordan: Sehon and Og, whom you slew. And hearing these things we were affrighted and our heart fainted away, neither did there remain any spirit in us at your coming in."[4]

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[4] 1 Sam. 7. 1 and 2 Sam. vi. 3.

And so in our reverie the city passes into the hands of successive conquerors; now it is the Canaanites, then the Egyptians, then the Philistines, while later on the Syrians and the Maccabees fight for its possession, then the Romans come upon the scene; after them the Arabs, and last of all the Crusaders, until at the present day only a few poor Arabs are left to till its surface and raise their small crops where mighty kings fought and strove for victory.

We rest our horses for an hour at the coffee-house, which marks the commencement of the steepest part of the climb, and then, as the rain begins to fall once more, we find ourselves nearing the walls of Jerusalem. We have come from the remote past into the modern present. The kings of Uru-salim and Gezer undoubtedly exchanged letters and probably also plotted against one another, yet the city of the one is now the Holy City, while the stronghold of the other was only identified by an archeologist, who found a stone marking its boundary limits and the name of its then magistrate:

"The boundary of Gezer—of Alkios."

Hugh Pope, O. P.

STUDIES IN BUDDHISM (II)

A. Roussel, D. D.

HISTORY OF THE BUDDHA.

History, or at least tradition, has preserved the names of the first disciples of the Buddha. First of all must be mentioned Sariputta and Moggalana, whose conversion to Buddhism has been already noticed, and who distinguished themselves above all the others in devotedness to their new master; then the latter's cousin Ananda, who was charged with looking after the material wants of the group, and also the ex-barber Oupali, who is credited with having formulated and explained the earliest rules and regulations of the community, a fact indicating not only personal distinction and competency, but probably also nobility of descent. Rahoula, the infant son who, as stated in our previous study, was only in the cradle when Siddhartha set out on his journeyings in quest of the truth, came later on to join his father, taking rank also among those who were called the "great disciples," but he does not appear otherwise to have played a role of any importance. Writers who seek to establish similarities between the Buddhistic legend and the story of the life of Christ as narrated in the Gospels, affirm that Ananda corresponds to St. John, the beloved disciple of his master, and that Devadatta is the Judas Iscariot. The episode of the treason of Devadatta is told in the seventh book of the Cullavagga, and is regarded with suspicion by Oldenberg, who is inclined to admit as sufficiently authentic only the schism instigated by Devadatta, who like Ananda, was a relative of the Buddha. It is not unlikely that the orthodox annalist in order to render more odious the memory of the heresiarch invented the traitorous plot formed by him, with the assistance of Ajatasattu, son of Bimbisara. Both of these are credited with the design of doing away with the master who had come to be regarded as an obstacle to certain projects of reform in the new religion, and several attempts to that effect are said to have been made, but they were frustrated by timely miraculous intervention. The envoys sent to assassinate him are overawed by his majestic presence and converted by his words. A huge boulder which it was thought to precipitate upon him as he passed through a narrow valley, is stopped in its course by the coming together for that purpose of the two opposite mountain sides. The elephant made furious with the intoxicating "mada" and let loose upon the "saint" as he is passing through a narrow street simply stops before him and becomes tame at the sound of his voice. Such are some of the legandary tales related in this connection. A more sober and hence better attested tradition represents Devadatta as a rigorist who wished to force upon the Bhikkhus a regime of an austerity like to that of the Samanas, under the pretext that the mode of life followed by the master and his disciples, was too easy and not sufficiently detached from the world and its ways. On this point he formulated five propositions, the acceptance of which he endeavored to impose on the new community. He found not a few adherents who, in consequence, withdrew from the discipleship of the Buddha after the manner of the disciples, who according to St. John (vi, 61 seqq.) walked no more with Jesus, but from a very different motive, and far from saying *durus est hic sermo* in speaking of their master's teaching, their dissatisfaction was caused by its pretended laxity. The schism was, however, of short duration and the Buddhistic Judas came to a miserable end, as did later the "man of Kerioth," with this difference that instead of hanging himself, the earth opened and he was swallowed up alive.

Besides the Bhikkhus and the Bhikkhunes (the monks and the nuns) Buddhism enrolled from the beginning lay followers of both sexes, the Oupasakas and Oupasikas, viz. a group of pious, opulent persons, who ministered to the needs of the master and his disciples in their voluntary poverty. The existence of this "third order" recruited from among the wealthier classes, would seem to indicate, if not a theoretical, at least a practical preference in the new religion for the more privileged social castes. The mendicant monks too, would come in contact chiefly with the rich, especially as they begged for their own sustenance, and not for the purpose of relieving the wants of others. On this point Oldenberg remarks with justifiable severity, that "Buddhism never learned to have a message for the poor and lowly and the unfortunate, for those weighed down by any suffering or affliction other than the general pain and disappointment caused by the inherent instability of all things human." It is, of course, plain that the Buddhistic monks could not consistently address themselves to the indigent in order to receive from them alms, but it is less easy to understand why they did not come to their assistance and divide with the suffering poor the alms which they received in goodly abundance. For tradition informs us that the Bhikkhus knocked at the gates of the rich, and that they were generously received. Among the most zealous and efficient providers for the Buddha and his community, mention is made of the kings of Magadha and of Kosala, of Bimbisara and Pasenati, the two last being about his own age, and fervent admirers. Bimbisara also placed the titled physician of his palace at the service of the new community. Another noted benefactor was Anathapindika, the merchant prince, whose generosity towards the Buddha bordered on the extravagant, as is shown, for instance, in his purchase for him of the Jetavana, mentioned in the preceding article.

We have already noted that the new master was followed by immense multitudes. According to some of the accounts, hundreds, and sometimes even thousands, of disciples gathered around him and accompanied him on his missionary journeys. He received everywhere a royal welcome, together with his numerous following, and the towns exhausted their treasuries in order to entertain them fittingly. The groves and parks in which they took up their quarters were all at once transformed into enchanting retreats, studded with monastic cells provided with every desirable comfort. Such is, at all events, the idea that we gather of the preaching of the Buddha and of the conditions in which his religion was established from the ancient writings, which are regarded as Holy Writ by his followers. Even granting that these enchanting pictures are over-drawn, as they doubtless are, the fact that they are contained in the Buddhistic gospel, is a significant indication of the idea that was formed of the new religion from the beginning.

In India, at least prior to the invasion of the Arabs, women were not confined in harems, and they were allowed to go out without being veiled. They were, however, considered as perpetual minors, and Vyasa expresses well the mind of his countrymen in the famous stanza, borrowed from the Mahabharata, (*Anucasana*, xlvi, 14): "In childhood, woman should be subject to her father, in youth to her husband, and in old age to her sons if her husband be dead. She should never be her own mistress."

Buddha did not at first admit women to the religious life, although he consented to teach them his doctrine, as for instance, in the case of Ambapali, the courtesan of Vesala. He feared and mistrusted womankind as a perpetual snare, and a danger for himself and his followers. On this head tradition attributes to him the following discourse, which is far from being a model of gallantry. The Master is speaking to his favorite disciple Ananda, and he says: "When a flourishing field of rice is attacked by the disease called *nielle*, the prosperous condition of the field soon disappears, and in like manner, when in a religious movement, women are authorized to give up the world and become ascetics, all holiness of life soon disappears." On another occasion the same disciple Ananda put the question: "Master, what should be our conduct with regard to women?" to which the following answer was given: "You must avoid seeing them." "But what if one should happen to come into our presence?" "Don't speak to her." "But, Master, suppose we should happen to speak to her?" "Then, Ananda, beware!"

Such being the mind of the Buddha, he refused in the beginning to admit women to his newly founded order. It is related that only at the urgent request of Mahapajapati, his adoptive mother, he consented to found some communities of nuns, but he then and there predicted as a result the decay of the new religion. "If, O Ananda, in the religion and in the order that the Perfect One has founded women had not been allowed to leave their homes and embrace the wandering life of the monks, holiness of life would long be observed amongst us, the pure doctrine would have been maintained for a thousand years But now, since women have been admitted, holiness of life will not long be observed, and the doctrine of truth will not be maintained more than five hundred years" (Cullavagga x, 1). It is fair to conclude that this text was written five centuries after the time of Siddhartha, and that at that time a great relaxation of religious life had crept into the communities of Buddhistic nuns, and possibly also among the monks. For, if the first fervor had been maintained, the writer would never have thought of ascribing to his divine hero so sinister a prediction not verified by the facts.

It goes without saying that the authenticity of the discourses of the Buddha, with which the Cullavagga and other similar works are filled, is more than doubtful. Legend at least, if not history, has handed down to us the names of a few of the women admitted by the founder himself to a participation in the new light. Besides Mahapajapati and Ambapali already mentioned, we find in these relatively early annals of Buddhism the names of two others, to wit, Khema, formerly wife, and probably at the time of her admission, widow, of the prince Bimbisara, friend of the Buddha; and the quondam courtesan Vimala, who also put away her jewels and fine clothes, receiving in return the yellow habit and the alms cup. Albeit it does not appear that between the Founder and these holy women there existed anything like the relations at once so touching and so respectful, which are met with in the Gospel, and in this connection Oldenburg remarks that Buddhism never had a Mary Magdalen. Neither, we may add, do we find in its sacred records, any of these dialogues so sublime in their simplicity such as that of Jesus with the Samaritan woman. True, we come across certain conversations between the Buddha and some of the women who asked to be admitted to his community, but how different are they in tone and especially in doctrine from that of the Gospel! The most famous of these is that of Visakha with the Master. Visakha was a native of Savatthi, the capital of the Kingdom of Kosala. She was a lady of great distinction and used to be present at all the sacrifices and consequently at the banquets which accompanied them. She is described as surrounded by her numerous children and grandchildren—a most venerable matron—and often she provided lodgings for the Buddha and his disciples. One day, after having prepared for them a repast, she approached the Master and said: "My Lord, I have eight wishes which I beg you to grant me." The Buddha, as usual on his guard, replied: "The Perfect, O Visakha, are too virtuous to grant any and every kind of wish." She answered: "It is question only of what is allowed and irreprehensible." "If so, speak, O Visakha." "My Lord, I wish to furnish to the members of your community as long as I live, cloaks to protect them from the rain, to provide with food the monks who come here from afar, to provide food for all transient monks, for those of the brethren who are ill, and also for those who nurse them, to procure medicine for the sick, to distribute daily rations of boiled rice, to furnish bathing suits to the community of nuns." "What is your object in all this, O Visakha, and why do you thus approach the Perfect One with these eight wishes?" Visakha must have found the question rather naive, but she repeats her wishes over again explaining each one to her sublime interrogator. "A monk," she says, "who comes from afar is unacquainted with the roads and the streets, and it will be very fatiguing for him to go about collecting alms. But if he partake of the food which I wish to prepare for the new comers, he will get time to inform himself concerning the ways and byways, and then go out to gather alms. Such, my Lord, is the end I have in view, and the reason why I desire to prepare as long as I live food for the monks on their arrival from foreign parts."

The noble and generous matron explains in a similar manner each of her wishes, and the Buddha declares himself satisfied. After calling attention to this episode, Oldenberg justly remarks as follows: "Such was Visakha; such too, were the other pious benefactresses of the community. Their zeal, like their resources seemed to be inhaustible. They represent types of character taken from real life in the India of that epoch, and they cannot be passed over in silence when we wish to form for ourselves an idea of the various influences which contributed to make Buddhism what it was." This is true, and I may add that a few passages judiciously selected from these early documents throw more light on the real character of the Buddha and his work than any amount of discussion. Thanks to these writings indeed, we behold the men themselves in action and we listen to their words. In similar fashion, the Gospels in their extreme succinctness, teach us more about the Savior and his work than do the ponderous volumes that have been written—and are still being written—on the beginnings of Christianity. At all events, the method which endeavors to get as near as possible to the original sources in such matters, needs no apology, though, of course, these dramatic narratives in order to be of real value, should be contemporaneous with the events related or nearly so. If they are not written by witnesses of the events or by persons who have received the testimony directly from them, they must naturally be looked upon with suspicion, and that all the more in proportion to the amount of living details which they exhibit. It is hardly necessary to recall in this connection the legends of certain Christian saints, extremely picturesque, and which leave scarcely anything to be desired except the circumstance that the heroes of the same might have really existed.

THE BUDDHA AND HIS OPPONENTS.

Coming back on a point upon which he had already touched in passing, but which he thinks it well to emphasize, our author reminds us that we must beware of exaggerating the revolutionary character of Buddhism, and not conceive of it in a too strongly marked opposition to Brahmanism, as if the latter comprised not only a doctrine, but also an organized society of believers. And here again, we need to keep in view the distinction between the esoteric religion and the popular beliefs and practices. The learned Brahmans, or at least who pretended to be so, always affected a great veneration for the Vedas, though in reality they understood very little of the old Vedic texts.

They were much like the Hindu priests of our own day, who are continually appealing to the Vedas, but of these sacred writings they know little more than the name. Those among them—and they are few—who wish to acquire some knowledge of these mysterious books, address themselves to European scholars and universities. True, at the time of the rise of Buddhism the great classical epics and the Purenas were still studied, at least in part, but over and above the fact that the available texts were far from being fixed (since in the case of certain Purenas, for instance, the final redaction scarcely goes back beyond six or seven centuries), there could be found in them but little nourishment for the minds of that epoch. The Brahmans were unable to oppose to Buddhism a firm and definite teaching, resting upon a coherent doctrinal system. And thus when the followers of the Buddha, who, as we have seen, were recruited principally from among the Brahmans, were accused as innovators, they were able to challenge their opponents to find in the sacred texts any clear passages wherein they were condemned; or, if such were produced, the claim was made that the Brahmans did not understand them, and they were explained by the Buddhists in a sense favorable to their own views. The common people, on the other hand, were unable, as usual, to make any intelligent comparison of the doctrines in question; they compared, rather, the men representing the doctrines, and their lives, and from this point of view the Buddha and his disciples had the advantage. Indeed, the innovations real or imaginary, which were made matter for contention, were, for the most part, such as were pleasing to the masses. The haughtiness and splendor of Brahmanism were set aside, or at least very much attenuated; the followers of the Buddha manifested solicitude for the sufferings and misery of others, though this may often have been more apparent than real; appeal was made to all to become partakers of the true knowledge, etc.; all this tended to popularize a movement which the malicious characterized as a dangerous novelty, while its supporters maintained that it was only a return to true religion. Here as in other countries and in later times, it was demonstrated that a new philosophy or a new religion has little chance of success unless it seek a basis in the past and be proclaimed as a reform, as a return to the past and not a revolution. This, of course, refers to natural, not to revealed religion.

The Buddha compared the Brahmans of his time, those who remained obstinate in repudiating his doctrine, to a chain of blind men. "The one who is the first in the series sees nothing; the one who is last sees nothing, and those who are between are in the same condition." True, he did not pretend that all teachers before him had been blind, but according to him, his opponents were guilty of shutting their eyes wilfully against the truth which he brought them; they were blind in the fullest and worst sense in that they would not see.

Certain texts represent the Buddha as opposed to sacrifices, but it seems that on this point his opposition was directed not against the sacrificial institution itself, but against the abuses connected with it,[1] and though Oldenberg makes no distinction to that effect, it seems to us improbable that the Master would have openly opposed a belief which all peoples of antiquity and especially those of India had entertained concerning the necessity and the religious efficiency of sacrifice. As much too might be said with regard to the numberless sacred ablutions, which in all ages have been the custom in these countries, where they even form a part of the hygienic regulations. Yet were we to accept the assertions made in certain books, such, for instance, as the Therigatha, the Buddha, who in legend appears always devoid of any sense of humor, never tired of heaping ridicule and sarcasm on the belief and practice of the ablutions. "If," says he, "in order to become holy it suffices to be often plunged in water, then all the frogs, water-serpents, turtles and the other aquatic animals are sure to go to heaven.... What is necessary," he adds, "is to avoid the faults, too often committed by those who do so much religious bathing." Here as in the case of sacrifice, I am persuaded that the real object of the censure were the abuses and exaggerations connected with the practice.

In the Digha NiKaya (Kutadantasutta) there is a curious dialogue between the Buddha and a Brahman who questioned him as to the value of sacrifice. His reply is in the form of an apologue, a mode of teaching often employed by him and his disciples, and which has given us the largest collection of moral tales in existence. He tells the story of a king, who once resolved to immolate to his gods a hecatomb of animals, and who went to consult his Purohita or domestic chaplain about it. It may be remarked before going further, that in placing the scene of his tale in the remote past, the Buddha seems to insinuate that there is no question in his mind of introducing a new idea or doctrine of sacrifice hitherto unknown, but rather of reverting to the sane traditions of the past which had fallen into disuse. The Brahman who had put the question was, himself, according to the account, preparing to offer a great sacrifice, in which hundreds of animals were to be immolated, a circumstance which seems to indicate that we are dealing with a legend, and that it is brought in as the occasion to dramatize the teaching of the Master with a view to render it more effective.

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[1] For instance, those enormous, wholesale slaughterings of animals which are mentioned in this connection, but which probably for the most part, never existed outside the domain of legend, for the Brahmans also had great respect for our "dumb brethren" of the animal kingdom.

The Purohita or chaplain thus consulted by his prince, strongly exhorts the latter to first establish throughout his kingdom prosperity and security, and then, when his subjects will have thus been made happy, he may proceed to offer the sacrifice, but not a bloody one. Not only is it wrong to deprive an animal of life, but we should even abstain from the felling of a tree or the cutting of a blade of grass. The monarch, according to the counsel of his chaplain, may offer to the gods milk, honey and oil, which his subjects bring to him freely and without constraint. Long before the time of Buddha the practice of offering sacrificially the *soma*, a plant identified by some scholars with the *Sarcostemma acidum*, was known. The process consisted in pressing out the juice of the plant which was poured into the sacred fire in the morning, at noon and in the evening, whence it was called the sacrifice of the threefold pressing. After telling his story, the Buddha adds (and this shows clearly the underlying purpose of the document) that an offering more agreeable and meritorious than the one of which he had just spoken, would be a distribution of alms made to the monks, especially to himself and his disciples, as also the construction of dwellings for them. Again, something still better would be faith in the Buddha, in his law, and in his community; a still higher form of sacrifice would consist in the adoption of the religious life, when one having put on the yellow robe of the Bhikkhus shows himself indifferent alike to joy and sorrow, a state of mind which the Brahmans called the indifference to "contraries," and the absorption of the soul in meditation. Finally, the supreme degree of sacrificial value, its ultimate result, is the securing of "deliverance," when one can say: "I shall never return to this world."

This discourse of the Buddha, although containing many improbabilities, leads to the foregone conclusion, to wit, the conversion of the Brahman who gives up the idea of the proposed sacrifice, saying: "I put my faith in Buddha, in his law and in his community, and these animals I shall loose and set at liberty. May they find green grass to eat, pure water to drink and cool breezes to caress them."

One cannot help feeling the apocryphal character of these stories invented evidently by pious weavers of legends for the purpose of surrounding the figure of their hero with a halo of imperishable glory.

Oldenberg puts the question as to the how Brahmanism defended itself against its young and powerful rival, and answers it thus: "We have on that head little or no positive information." He quotes, however, a passage from the Maitrayaniya Upanishad, translated by Max Müller in his collection, entitled *The Sacred Books of the East* (v. xv), but at the same time he observes that the passage has only a hypothetical value. In it it is question of monks, whom the author describes as being dressed and accoutred in a repulsive grotesque fashion—one more befitting a band of "tramps" than the Buddhistic monks as we know them from other descriptions. If intended as a picture of them it can be nothing more than a caricature, and, in fact, according to Oldenberg, from the beginning of the rivalry between Brahmans and Buddhists the advantage of external appearance as well as of moral superiority was on the side of the latter.

This may be somewhat exaggerated or too absolute. If between the two bodies there existed a real antagonism, it would be hard to explain the success of the Buddhistic propaganda in the ranks of the Brahmans, especially as this success, though obtained it is said, (and even on this head also there is room for doubt) by dint of much controversial argument, it was achieved without the shedding of blood. It was a peaceful conquest, but experience shows that one system of doctrines does not overcome and supplant another peacefully unless between the two are found certain sympathies and affinities.

Jainism, which took rise at the same epoch, at first seems not to have entered into open hostilities with Buddhism, no doubt because there was room for both on Indian soil. The Jain writings, as also those of the Buddhists, speak of relations of friendship, or at least of good-will, as existing between neighboring monasteries of the two religions. Here and there, however, we come across directions not to confound the monastery with "the house on the corner"—a note which disturbs somewhat the harmony which is supposed to have existed between them.

There is one point on which Buddha is quite different from other founders of orders,—if indeed we can consider the Buddhist monks as religious, seeing that deliverance was almost their only divinity, as it was their only end. This point is in reference to bodily mortifications, which were always practised among the ascetics of India, and of which we find everywhere such fearful accounts. Indeed, we would think them fanciful were it not for the fact that the present-day fakirs prove that even the most incredible of these narratives find confirmation in actual reality. Not only did Buddha not prescribe bodily mortifications; he proscribed them as dangerous, or at least useless, laying stress on the avoidance of all excess and great watchfulness over the external senses. According to a familiar comparison of the Buddhists, man is a lute, of which the bodily and spiritual faculties are the strings. To produce true and harmonious notes, these must not be kept either too taut or too lax. This comparison recalls the story told of St. John, distracting himself by petting a partridge, to the great surprise of a hunter who could not understand how such a venerable old man could amuse himself like a child. If the bow be always bent it will lose its vigor.

However, since the Bhikkus ate and drank like ordinary decent people round about them, their rivals accused them of intemperance, of passing their time in continual orgies. Leuman quotes this Jain verse: "To lie on a soft bed o' nights, to take a good bumper in the morning, to eat at noon, and drink again at nightfall, and back to bed with the mouth stuffed with dainties, and at the end of all this the gaining of deliverance—behold the ideal of the descendant of the Sakyas." So did Christ's enemies speak of Him: "The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say: Behold a man that is a glutton and a wine-drinker." On the other hand, however, these same critics said that John the Baptist had a devil, because he came "neither eating nor drinking."

BUDDHA'S TEACHING: ITS FORM.

Buddha's teaching was exclusively oral; he never wrote anything, nor did his immediate disciples. In India at this period everything which had to be learned was committed solely to memory. Even those interminable epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, were not written but learned by rote. Memory is a faculty which is capable of great feats if it be persistently exercised. However, when the body of doctrine grew too unwieldy and the corresponding task for the memory too difficult, the work of memorising was divided up. They assigned to two, to ten, or to twenty, the task of learning in parts a Vedic collection or an Ithasa. Thus we read in the Bhagavata Purana (12, vi, 47): "The Brahmarshis, seeing that the time led to the shortening of life, energy, and intelligence, parcelled out the Vedas, under the inspiration of Acyuta, who dwelt in their heart." The process is like that of running off a deep river into a number of canals in order to render it fordable. Our own *Chansons de Gestes* were thus recited from memory long before being committed to writing; and we often find illiterate folk who can relate interminable stories without skipping a word; they seem to be stereotyped in their memories.

Buddha—such at least is the general opinion—did not speak Sanscrit, but the popular language of his times. This opinion is based on the fact that the most ancient Buddhistic monuments are in Pali. It is admitted that Buddha did not know this dialect, but it is claimed that the language he used must have been closely related to it. Here we are reduced to pure conjectures, since we know the preaching of Buddha only through books written long after his time. The Pracritic dialects of which Pali is one, are to Sanscrit what Italian is to Latin; the pronounciation is softened as far as possible by the suppression of consonants and the accumulation of vowels, which are so combined that the hiatus is not disagreeable to the ear.

A point on which our author lays special stress is his comparison of the preaching of Buddha with that of Christ, which he describes by the terms: "Simplicity of precepts, perfect naturalness of expression, great depth of meaning"—three things completely lacking in the Buddhistic teaching. This latter proceeds by syllogisms, or at least by reasonings, on the pretence of being based on science; but there is nothing more empty than this science, nothing more hollow than these reasonings, as we shall be able to prove when we study the famous Dhamma.

This method was not an innovation; it had been employed by the Brahmans from time immemorial. All the philosophical systems of Brahmanism, and before that of Vedism, have for their scaffolding, as frail as complicated, this method of argumentation which consists in piling words upon words, heaping formulas upon formulas to wearisome excess. Oldenberg gives in a note a sample of this sort of argumentation. The apostle of Ceylon, Mahinda, who lived about two centuries after Buddha, is questioning the King Devanampiya Tissa.

Makinda, the Thera, i e., the Ancient—such being his title of dignity—wishes to make certain that the monarch has sufficient power of mind to understand the Good Word. This is the dialogue between the apostle and the royal neophyte: "What is the name of that tree, great king?" asks the Thera, pointing to a near-by mango tree. "It is called a mango tree, master." "Now, great king, besides this mango tree, is there not any other mango tree?" "There are many other mango trees, master." "And besides this mango tree and those, are there still other trees, great king?" "There are such, master, but not mangoes." "And besides these other mangoes and trees which are not mangoes, is there yet another tree?" "Yes, master, this mango tree." "Good! great king, thou art intelligent."

This first trial was not enough, so Makinda makes the poor prince undergo a second, one which to us seems all the more useless since it is very much like the first one. Besides, it is very brief, unless indeed Buddhaghosha, the author of the Vinaya-Pitaka, in which this episode is found has abridged it (though as a general rule these repititions are inflicted on the reader with inexorable fulness). "Besides thy relatives and thy non-relatives, is there any other man, great king?" "Myself master." "Good! great king for no man is to himself either a relative or a non-relative." This time Makinda declares himself satisfied with the intelligence of the king, and hesitates no longer about teaching him the way of deliverance.

It seems that the words of Buddha were not always easily understood by the people, for his disciples often complain of the inattention of the auditors. This was because if one had not gone through the training of the Brahmanic schools it was no easy task to follow the word of the master in all its developments. Simple minds got lost in these tiresome repetitions even when they were really of the childish sort, such as we find in the sermon on the different kinds of affections. This sermon ends as follows: "He who has a hundred kinds of affections has a hundred kinds of sorrows; he who has ninety-nine kinds of affections has ninety-nine kinds of sorrows," and so to the bitter end. The conclusion, long drawn out, is the obvious one: "He who has one kind of affection has one kind of sorrow; he who feels no affection experiences no sorrow." (Udana, viii, 8).

Oldenberg also gives other samples of instructions more or less similar. After speaking of the monotonous sermons, which end invariably with the conversion of the auditors and their admission into the community or into the lay brotherhood, which I have called the Third Order, he goes on to say: "Here and there we come across a tale of the marvellous, the story of a miracle, fantastic but uninteresting." Indeed, it would be hard to equal the deadly dullness of these endless stories, which beget a heaviness of mind and body, which may suit indolent, somnolent oriental natures, but which are unutterably wearisome to us.

The form of the dialogue is met with fairly often in Buddhistic instructions, but very inferior to those of Socrates in Plato, although our author thinks proper to compare the two. There is nothing either childish or affected in the Maieutica of the Grecian sage, while the Hindoo philosopher is not free from these defects. However, this has not hindered him from reaching the masses, while the thought of Socrates influenced, at least immediately, only the elect few among a small nation.

Buddha also made use of parables—which are agreeable to the Hindoo taste. But here as elsewhere he is at times guilty of exaggeration, and always fails to preserve that careful mean which he recommended as a rule to others, and which in conduct he always kept. Oldenberg cites that of the pond, which will give a fair idea of the rest: "Imagine, O disciples, in a forest on the slope of a mountain, a deep valley with a pond, round which lives a great herd of deer. Hither comes a man who aims at the death, suffering, misfortune of these animals; he closes the easy and safe road from the valley and opens instead a false road, a swamp road. Henceforth, disciples, the great herd of deer will suffer danger and loss and will decrease. But if there comes a man who seeks the prosperity, the well-being, the happiness of the great herd of deer, this man opens the easy and safe road; he destroys the false road, he abolishes the marshy road, the marshy path; and then, disciples, the great herd of deer will prosper, grow, and increase. A parable, O disciples, I tell unto you, that you may know the meaning. And this is the meaning. The deep valley and the pond, disciples, are pleasures. The great herd of deer, disciples, are the living beings. The man, O disciples, who aims at the loss, suffering, misfortune of the great herd of deer is Mara, the Evil One. The false path, disciples, is the false path with eight branches· which are called: false faith, false will, false speech, false action, false means of existence, false application, false memory, false meditation. The marshy road, disciples, is enjoyment and desire. The marshy path, disciples, is ignorance. The man, O disciples, who aims at prosperity, well-being, happiness, is the Perfect One, the Saint, the supreme Buddha. The good and sure road, disciples, which can be traversed in safety, is the sacred road with eight branches, which are called pure faith, pure will, pure speech, pure actions, pure means of existence, pure application, pure memory, pure meditation. Thus, then, O disciples, by me has been opened the good, the sure path which can be traversed in safety; the false road has been destroyed, the marshy road is destroyed, the marshy path is abolished. O disciples, whatever any master could do who seeks the happiness of his disciples, who has compassion on them, through compassion for them, this I have done for you."

With the parables Buddha used also tales and fables. And here he needed only to consult popular traditions, as the folk-lore of India is by far the richest and the most moral. The Buddhistic writings are full of these tales, which were composed, not by a single man but by a whole people, during the course not of an individual existence but of many centuries—riches slowly accumulated and deposited in the memory of successive generations. One special kind of these fables in which animals are introduced with human qualities, and in which all converse, "even the fishes," as La Fontaine says—is that of the Jatakas, or the different births of Buddha. These are stories of competitions between animals, among which one is invariably distinguished above his fellows and is given the center of the stage. The conclusion is always the same: the virtuous lion, tiger, or elephant is, of course, the Perfect One. This form of teaching is attributed to Buddha, but it was especially employed by his disciples and historians. Oldenberg compares it with an analogous form used by certain Greek philosophers, and especially by Empedocles, who makes common use of expressions such as: Once I was a tree, an eagle, a fish. He remarks in this connection that when the Greek genius turns to the marvellous it preserves a certain sense of restraint, while the Hindoo genius knows no such limits, and indeed borders on the absurd. The literary ideals of the two peoples are found to be vastly different when studied in the works they have inspired. The motto of the one was: Not too much; the other almost seems to have adopted for its motto: Never enough.

These Hindoo tales are prose compositions; but they are frequently broken by short stanzas, written in well turned verses, with the purpose of pointing the moral of what has gone before. Their conciseness is in striking contrast with the prolixity of the stories, nor are they by any means deficient in real poetic merit. Here once more

Buddhism follows the example of Brahmanism, in which gnomic poetry had always been cultivated with success. In the Mahabharata especially are found these maxims enshrined in a verse, a *Sloka*, distributed at intervals through episodes of which they point the moral. Bergaigne has collected some of these sentences; in them we find almost invariably the highest and purest morality. It is Hindoo wisdom at its noblest and most elevated. The Buddhistic writers, who did not compose warlike or heroic tales after the fashion of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, used, instead of the epic *Sloka*, prose for the most part commonplace and unpolished; they kept the poetic form only in these stanzas, which are like bright and perfumed flowers lost in a tangle of weeds and brambles.

Ancient collections of these gnomic verses are still extant. The most celebrated is the Dhammapada, which Oldenberg rightly considers as the book which best expresses the ethics of Buddha, and which best serves to understand what he calls "the inner soul" of Buddhism. But the discussion of this point must be deferred. At present, we shall relate briefly the last days of the sage whose name is indissolubly attached to this system of morality, although before his time it had supplied the basis of Brahmanism, at least in its main lines.

Buddha had now reached the age of eighty years; forty-four had passed since he received his illumination and propagated the true way, that of Deliverance, of Nirvana. The hour had come for him to enter into the happiness which he had promised to those who accepted his teaching. From the Mahaparinibhana-Sutta we shall draw the account of the last days which the Perfect One passed in this world. I shall merely give an abridgment of this document, following Oldenberg. About the year 480 of our era, Buddha left Rajagaha and started towards the North. He crossed the Ganges at a point where they were then building a village, for which he predicted a brilliant future. This was Patalipoutta, the new capital of Magadha, called by the Greeks in their writings Palibothra, and now known as Patna. Buddha spent his last rainy season at Belouva, not far from Vesali. There he fell seriously ill. Seeing that he had not long to live, he wished to see once more his dicsiples, whom he had dismissed, in order the better to spend the rainy season in solitude and recollection. Ananda hastened to him and was given the task of bringing his companions.

A last trial remained for the Buddah to undergo. Mara, the Evil One, wishing to hinder this final interview, tried to persuade him that he was already ripe for Nirvana, and that he might better enter therein without further delay. Buddha spurned him as he had done at the beginning of his evangelical career: "Concern thyself not with me, O Evil One. A little while, and the Perfect One shall possess Nirvana; three months hence and the Perfect One shall enter into Nirvana." At this moment the thunder was heard and the earth trembled. When his disciples were united around him, he gave them his last instructions. Following is this discourse, as we find it in the book above referred to. It is evident that the author has amended it, if indeed he has not invented it. However, it is interesting as a revelation of the ideas of the Buddhists of the time.

"Learn well, O disciples, the wisdom which I have acquired and which I have taught to you. Walk in its way; exercise yourselves and grow therein, so that this life of holiness may last for the prosperity of many men, for the joy of many men, through compassion for the world, for the salvation, the joy, the prosperity of Gods and men. And what is it, O disciples, this wisdom which I have acquired and have taught to you, which I have made you learn and practise and exercise and grow in that this life of holiness may last for the prosperity of many, for the joy of many, through compassion for the world, for the prosperity, the salvation, the joy of Gods and men? It is the fourfold vigilance, the fourfold good observance, the four parts of the sacred power, the five organs, the five forces, the seven terms of knowledge, the sacred way of eight branches,—such, O disciples, is the wisdom which I have acquired and have taught to you."

The master continued: "Verily, O Bhikkhus, I say unto you: All things in the world are perishable; struggle without ceasing. A little while, and the Perfect One will possess Nirvana, three months hence, and the Perfect One shall enter Nirvana." He insists upon his approaching death. "My existence draws nigh to its close; the end of my life is at hand. I go away, and you remain; a place of shelter is ready for me. Watch without ceasing, and live ever in holiness; resolutely keeping your minds ready. He who without stumbling lives ever faithful to the word of truth, delivers himself from the hands of Birth and Death, and at one stroke comes to the end of all pain."

The Buddha went about begging for the last time in the streets of Vesali, and then turned his steps toward Kourinara, to-day, according to Cunningham, Kasia, to the east of Gorakhpur, on the Chota-Gandok. Buhler disputes this identification, but the point is not of much importance. Reaching Pava on his route, he accepted the hospitality of Counda, the son of a blacksmith. Here he partook of some pork, which caused indigestion. His illness increased; it was the end. He could only drag himself along to Kousinara. He spread his folded mantle on the ground on the banks of the river Hiranyavati under the Calas trees, which bloomed at once in flowers, though it was not the season. A heavenly melody was heard: it was the gods singing the praises of the Sublime One, who was about to join their ranks.

Ananda, however, wept at the thought of separation from a master whom he loved so much. Buddha sought to console him: "Do not go on thus, Ananda; weep not, nor despair. Have I not already told it to thee? From all that man loves, from all that attracts him, from all this he must separate, remove, detach himself. How, O Ananda, can that which is born, created, made, subject to change, be other than fleeting? It cannot but be so. But thou, Ananda, hast long honored the Perfect One with tenderness and kindness, with joy, without deceit, without restrictions, in thoughts, in words, in actions. Thou hast done well, O Ananda; persevere, and soon thou shalt be delivered from thy sins."

The principal inhabitants of Kousinara, the Mallis, of the caste of the Kshatriyas, to which the Buddha himself belonged, came to the woods of Calas to be present at his end. The monk Goubhadda, who also came to see him, became a convert—the last conquest of his personal teaching.

To Ananda the Buddha gave this final message, which was intended for all the disciples: "It may happen, O Ananda, that you are thinking: The Word has lost its teacher; we have no longer a master. You must not so think, Ananda. The doctrine and the rule which I have preached—that will be your master when I have passed away." The last words he uttered were those which we have already recorded: "Verily, O disciples I say unto you: All that is created is perishable; strive without ceasing."

A few moments later he entered into Nirvana. At that instant the thunder crashed and the earth quaked anew. Then was heard from heaven the voice of the god Brahma, who uttered these memorable words: "All the beings in the worlds will one day lay aside their bodily existence, just as to-day the Buddha, the Prince of Victory, the Supreme Master of the World, the Powerful, the Perfect One, has entered into Nirvana."

The body of Buddha was burned with royal splendors.

The element of celestial intervention in this legendary description of the death of Buddha is a new proof that the supposed atheism of primitive Buddhism must not be taken too literally. But we shall see more on this point in our next study, in which we shall take up the famous Dhamma and the doctrine of Buddha expressed therein.

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THE GOSPEL WITNESS TO ST. PETER

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Were we asked to express in a phrase the change that has of late come about in the field of biblical exegesis—the difference between the older and more recent methods, we would say that biological categories have been successfully applied to the matter in hand and that the old mechanical view of inspiration has given place to a higher organic concept. In the process doubtless something has been lost, but also something gained. Those who still feel unsettled with the organic view are naturally inclined to fear that little has been gained and much lost, but the younger generation of exegetes are buoyant with the trust that when finally the time comes to strike a balance in the results of the discussion, the gains will be found to have far more than justified the losses.

In the controversy concerning the prerogatives of St. Peter, for instance, appeal was formerly made to Scripture from the mechanical or quantitative viewpoint. Nor is there any need to deny that, in ages when this way of dealing with the Sacred Writings was common to all Christians, the apologists of Peter's claim were easily victorious. Men who had no scruple about accepting infant baptism, or the supremacy of bishops for which there was not one explicit text in the Bible, could not long hold out against the claims of St. Peter for which a solid phalanx of texts could be brought forward from the chief writers of the New Testament. Indeed when texts were summed up mechanically, and, so to say, arithmetically, there was a greater array for the claim of Peter to be the visible Vicar of Christ, than for the claim of Christ Himself to be the invisible Son of God. Men like Allies and Passaglia by putting together the main texts and gathering up the fragmentary allusions that remained, could set before the non-Catholic mind an array of proofs tempting enough to win the assent of such as hungered and thirsted for the truth.

With the coming of the new organic view of Holy Writ, mere arithmetical processes were set aside. Texts were no longer put together and summed up as in a problem of compound addition. When it was once agreed that some of the most important truths were suggested rather than proved, and were postulated by the context rather than demonstrated, it was felt not without anxiety, that a new method of appreciating and presenting Scripture proofs was needed by the apologist. The object of the present study on the Petrine claims is to illustrate the working and the results of this new method by applying it to a concrete instance.

The first condition is to arrange the Gospel witness chronologically. In organisms the logical order is best studied in the chronological. The Gospel witness is thus divided into four heads:

(1) The Witness of St. Mark.
(2) The Witness of St. Matthew.
(3) The Witness of St. Luke.
(4) The Witness of St. John.

The Witness of St. Mark.

It must be borne in mind that St. Mark's Gospel is, according to tradition, the Gospel of St. Peter. We are not surprised to find a most detailed account of the three denials[1] the most shameful episode in St. Peter's life, yet there is not even an allusion to the magnificent promise afterwards recorded by St. Matthew.[2]

There are, nevertheless, traces enough in the Gospel to show that the humble Apostle was given certain privileges by his Master.

It is to Peter's house at Capharnaum that our Lord first goes.[3] There He works His first miracle on the sick, healing Simon's wife's mother. St. Mark takes care to record our Lord's command "Wheresoever you shall enter into a house, there abide till you depart from that place."[4] As it is hardly credible that the Savior would set His own words at nought, modern commentators are probably right in thinking that during the Galilean ministry He made His home in the house of St. Peter. In this case a whole series of significant events took place which we have dealt with elsewhere.

No matter how resolutely the disciple of a hidden Master seeks to hide himself we can see that he was singled out in many ways. He receives a new name.[5] The secretary of Peter is careful to state that James and John received the same privilege. But if names are a witness to functions, the disciple who was called "Peter," the Rock, was privileged over the two "Sons of Thunder."

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[1] Mk. xiv, 66 seqq.
[2] Mk. vii, 29; Mt. xvi, 17 seqq.
[3] Mk. i, 29.
[4] Mk. vi, 10.
[5] Mk. iii, 16.

Again St. Peter is the spokesman of the twelve.—in professing that Jesus is "the Christ;"[6]—upon the Mount of Transfiguration;[7]—when the rich young man went away sorrowful.[8] Indeed the words of Peter on this occasion are singularly apt and touching. The little band of disciples had followed their Master when He had brought His Galilean ministry to a close, and had definitely taken up His abode in Judea. St. Peter had given up his house (οικια) at Capharnaum, dear to him as home, and hallowed by memories of One Who had dwelt under its roof. "And Peter began to say unto Him: Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee."

Jesus answering said: "Amen, I say to you; there is no man who hath left *house* (οικιαν) or brethren or sisters or father or mother or children or lands for My sake and for the Gospel, who shall not receive a hundred-fold as much."[9]

It is St. Peter who calls attention to the blighted fig-tree.[10]

We are not surprised at our Saviour's words to St. Peter in the garden: Simon sleepest THOU? Could'st not THOU watch one hour?

Watch YE; and pray that you enter not into temptation.[11] The Gospel fittingly ends with a very substantial proof of St. Peter's privilege afforded by the words of the angel to the women at the empty tomb. Go! tell His disciples *and Peter* that He goeth before you into Galilee.[12]

The Witness of St. Matthew.

It is impossible to tell whether the Matthean Logia are embedded in the present gospel of St. Matthew; or whether they were in the hands of the early Church before the first publication of St. Mark. Leaving these chronological points still unsettled we are on safer ground in saying that Matthew, scrupulous to record his own less worthy past, was evidently anxious to say of St. Peter what could not well be spoken by the secretary of St. Peter. There is just enough in the work of Mark to prove that St. Peter was granted a *privilege*; St. Matthew is at pains to show us that this privilege is a *primacy*.

It cannot be looked on as vital to our thesis to assume that the First Gospel as it stands is the work of Matthew, the publican. We are here concerned with the Petrine texts, which are of great weight no matter from what unknown writer of the first age they may have come. Nevertheless proof is still wanting that St. Matthew is not the author of these portions of the First Gospel not found elsewhere. If, however, the author of the Petrine texts is no other than the publican Matthew, light is thrown on hidden points of the proof.

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[6] Mk. viii, 29.

[7] Mk. ix, 4.

[8] Mk. x, 22.

[9] Mk. x, 28-30.

[10] Mk. xi, 21.

[11] Mk. xiv, 37-38.

[12] Mk. xvi, 7.

For this Matthew was a collector of taxes at Capharnaum. If salt was a government monopoly and fishermen like St. Peter used salt in great quantities, it is not too much to think that before his conversion St. Matthew may have been acquainted with St. Peter.

It is this fellow townsman of St. Peter who writes: "And the names of the twelve Apostles are these: the first (πρωτος) Simon who is called Peter."[13] The word πρωτος betokens at least a *primacy*.

It is St. Matthew who describes St. Peter walking upon the water to meet his Master.[14]

The best known text is found in the sixteenth chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel. "Thou art Peter; and upon this rock I will build My church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. And Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth it shall be bound also in Heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven."[15] In view of the fact that this gift of binding and loosing was granted, according to St. John, to the Apostles in common,[16] we need only remark that at the very least St. Matthew insists on St. Peter's primacy. HE is the Rock; he is the foundation of the house; he is therefore the FIRST course of masonry, on which the other courses rest.

That our Saviour meant a real primacy and not a mere metaphor, may be seen from one of the closing incidents of the Galilean ministry. It must be borne in mind that St. Matthew, the government official, whose peculiar office it is to speak of the "King" and the "Kingdom," speaks of St. Peter possessing the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. In the same way this tax collector is the only one to speak of the didrachma or capitation tax, which doubtless he himself had often collected from the household of St. Peter. The incident may be left to St. Matthew's own words:

> "And when they were come to Capharnaum, they that received the didrachmas came to Peter and said to him: "Doth not your Master pay the didrachma?" He said. "Yes."

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[13] Mt. x, 2.

[14] Mt. xiv, 28 seqq.

[15] Mt. xvi, 18, 19.

[16] Jo. xx, 22, 23.

And when he was come into the house, Jesus prevented him saying: "What is thy opinion Simon? The kings of the earth, of whom do they receive tribute or custom? Of their own children or of strangers?"

And he said: "Of strangers."

Jesus said to him: "Then the children are free. But that you may not scandalize them, go to the sea and cast in a hook; and that from which shall first come up take; and when thou hast opened its mouth, their shalt find a stater. Take that and give it to them for Me and thee."[17]

This incident took place in the house of Peter. So much was the Master identified with His disciples, that the tax collectors levied the tax, payable by Jesus, on the disciple in whose house he dwelt. No wonder that immediately the disciples came to Jesus saying "Who thinkest Thou is the greater in the kingdom of Heaven?"[18] It is hardly less significant that St. Peter asked, "Lord, how often shall my brother offend against me, and I forgive him?" and in answer to the question our Saviour spoke the gracious parable of the servant who would not forgive his fellow servants.

The Witness of St. Luke.

St. Luke's life and thought were so dependent on St. Paul that his gospel may almost be called the witness of St. Paul.

If we agree with Ramsay[19] that the last edition of the Gospel went forth from St. Luke's hands in the period between 78-81 A. D. while Titus was reigning as sole Emperor, the witness of the book is seen to be of great weight. St. Peter and St. Paul had long since sealed their faith with their blood. The momentary difference between them had passed away. They were lying together in the same soil; perhaps even in the same tomb. Rome, the See of Peter, was taking the lead. The sees founded by St. Paul were even submitting to the leadership of Rome. Enough of St. Paul's spirit of independence had passed into the soul of his "dear physician" to urge him to protest against any usurpation of authority. Yet far from uttering a protest his Gospel shows him to us as confirming the privilege and primacy of the Roman See.

All the main incidents of St. Peter's training, mentioned by St. Matthew and St. Mark, find a place in his work. Far from lessening their witness to the claims of St. Peter, he seems to have set himself the task of proving that the privilege and primacy supported by the first two evangelists carried with them not a mere honour but a real power.

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[17] Mt. xvii, 23-26.

[18] Mt. xviii, 1.

[19] *St. Paul the Traveller*, by W. M. Ramsay. London, 1903. 7th Ed. p. 387.

It is noticeable that all three synoptics give our Blessed Lord's visit to St. Peter's house at Capharnaum, and the miracle on St. Peter's wife's mother

According to what may be fairly considered the sounder text, St. Luke has the striking phrase "Peter and they that were with him."[20] To bring out the full force of this text we must compare the *πρωτος λογος* (Gospel) with the *δευτερος λογος* (Acts). It is clear that St. Luke paints two groups before and after the Ascension. The first group has Jesus as Visible Head; the second group, in default of Jesus, has St. Peter as Visible Head. "In those days Peter rising up in the midst of the brethren".[21] "But Peter standing up with the eleven".[22] "Now...they...said to Peter and to the rest of the Apostles."[23]

Another significant incident may be left to St. Luke's own graphic pen:

> "And He said to His disciples....Fear not little flock; for it hath pleased your Father to give you a Kingdom...Let your loins be girt and lamps burning in your hands; and you yourselves like to men who wait for their lord when He shall return from the wedding....Be you then also ready for at what hour you think not, the Son of Man will come.
>
> And Peter said to Him: Lord, dost thou speak this parable to us or likewise to all?
>
> And the Lord said, Who [thinkest thou] is the faithful and wise steward [ὀικονομος—house-ruler] whom his lord setteth over His family, to give them their Measure of wheat in due season? Blessed is that servant whom when his lord shall come we shall find so doing. Verily, I say to you, he will set him over all that he possesseth.
>
> But if that servant shall say in his heart. My lord is long a-coming; and shall begin to strike the menservants and maidservants and to eat and to drink and be drunk, the lord of that servant will come in the day that He hopeth not and at the hour that he knoweth not and shall separate him and shall appoint him his portion with unbelievers.[24]

Few incidents in the Saviour's public ministry seem to have made a deeper or more enduring impression on the mind of St. Peter. In the short letter which he wrote to the "strangers dispersed" through

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[20] Lk. viii, 45.

[21] Acts i, 15.

[22] Acts ii, 14.

[23] Acts ii, 37.

[24] Lk. xii, 32-46.

Asia, phrases from this answer to his question,—this sermon on his responsibilities—occur again and again. To feel the force of this passage, which we have shortened, the reader has only to consult such texts as I Peter i, 13; i, 24; ii, 18; iii, 8, 9; iv, 3, 4; iv, 7, 8; v, 1, 9. It is not too much to expect that an unprejudiced student of St. Luke's witness will see a confirmation of St. Peter's real *power* over his fellow-servants in the House of God.

A further incident, related by St. Luke alone, puts this point beyond doubt. It is given in the twenty-second chapter. St. Luke has a fashion of contrasting pairs; and in describing the incidents of the Last Supper he suggests a contrast between Judas and Peter. When our divine Lord foretold the betrayal, his disciples "began to inquire among themselves which of them it was who would do this thing." It was a painful discussion as to who was the least and last among them. "And there was also a strife amongst them, which of them should seem to be the greater." [μειζων]. If the Master intended to leave them all equal, and no one of them greater than the others, the strife could have been quelled by a word declaring their equality. But instead of this simple explanation St. Luke records our Blessed Lord's lengthy declaration of the duties of the greater:

> The kings of the Gentiles lord [κυριευουσιν] it over them; and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you, not so. But he that is the greater [ὁ μειζων] among you let him become as the younger [νεωτερος]; and he that is the leader as he that serveth.
>
> For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? Is not he that sitteth at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth. . . .
>
> And I dispose to you, as My Father hath disposed to Me, a Kingdom. . . .
>
> Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have YOU, that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for THEE that thy faith fail not; and thou being once converted confirm [στηριξον] thy brethren.[25]

The scene evidently left so deep an impression on the mind of St. Peter, that the phenomenon we have already remarked is repeated. Phrases from this last discourse of our Lord are found imbedded in the Epistle of St. Peter. The uncommon word κυριευω is used in the advice given to the ancients [πρεσβυτερους] by one who is a fellow-ancient [συνπρεσβυτερος]. "Feed the flock of God...neither as lording it [κατακυριευοντες] over the clergy.[26] The word νεωτερος rarely used, is found in the phrase. "In like manner, ye young men [*νεωτεροι*].[27] St. Luke is careful to recall that the Master was conscious of the onset Satan and the gates of Hell would make against Peter and the rest. That St. Peter remembered His Master's words, may be seen in the phrase: "Be sober and watch; for your adversary the devil as a roaring lion goeth about seeking whom he may devour. Whom resist ye, strong in faith. But the God of all grace...will perfect you [*στηριξει*].[28]

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[25] Lk. xxii, 25-32.

[26] I Peter v, 1, 3.

It can hardly be doubted that St. Luke, whilst describing the dispute about the primacy which jarred so painfully with the emotions of a farewell meal, had in mind a similar strife which had occurred during the last few days or perhaps the last few hours in Galilee.[29] The Saviour had on that occasion quelled the strife, not by protesting that all the apostles were, were to be, equal; but by setting before the "greater" one the example of a little child. When the distressing scene arose at the supper-table in Jerusalem, He renewed the same lesson of humility; but clearly pointed out on whom His choice rested and who it was that would confirm his brethren. St. Luke could hardly have made a clearer profession of faith that St. Peter had been chosen by Jesus Christ to have what may be called a primacy of power. And his last reference to St. Peter confirms this view: "The Lord is risen; and hath appeared to Simon.[30]

The Witness of St. John.

It is no part of our present task to question or affirm the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Nor would it be easy to say which theory of the authorship would give most support to the Petrine texts.

It is characteristic of this Gospel that it seldom gives us what may be found in the Synoptics. Its aim is not so much to repeat, as to complete. No doubt the Synoptic writings were before the author as he wrote. But times had changed, and with them the Christian consciousness, since the preaching of St. Peter was taken down by St. Mark. Foes had begun to appear within the church. Robber-shepherds had made a way within the sheep-fold to kill and to destroy. Many of the sayings of the Master, long forgotten amidst the din and strife of tumultuous days had been brought to memory by the perils of the latter times. There was already need of strengthening the hand of the supreme authority. And though St. John was an Apostle, and Clement, Bishop of Rome, was but the successor of an Apostle, yet Clement not John was the heir to the prerogatives of St. Peter. Such is the message of the closing chapters of the Fourth Gospel. It is not too much to see in the witness of the Gospel a further development of the Petrine proof. The privilege, the primacy of St. Peter is not merely one of power of *jurisdiction* over his fellow-apostles. He is the Shepherd commissioned to feed not merely the lambs, but the sheep who themselves feed the lambs.

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[27] I Peter v, 5.

[28] I Peter v, 8-10.

[29] Lk. ix. 46.

[30] Lk. xxiv, 34.

We may be allowed to draw this study to a somewhat abrupt close, in the hope that at some later date a fuller study of St. John may show still more the force of St. Peter's claims. Though we have left a sketch rather than a finished picture our patient reader may yet have seen what is meant by an organic conception of Holy Writ. The witness of the four Gospels to the claims of St. Peter has not been scheduled and valued by a mere arithmetical process. It has everywhere been taken as the expression of a living organism, the Church. For in the Church and not alone in the written word of the Church are to be found the wisdom and power of Him Who is "the power of God and the wisdom of God."

VINCENT McNABB, O. P.

RELATIVISM AND LOGIC

Prof. Giuseppe Calderoni

The history of philosophy, ancient or modern, presents to us the almost uninterrupted spectacle of the rise and fall of philosophical systems. Opinions once held in high repute give way to new ones; and these latter in their turn make place for still others; not unfrequently, indeed, those which were rejected and forgotten have returned in new guise and held the field once more. And the strange feature of the whole spectacle is that there was not one of these systems, no matter how odd or unfounded, but was held by many during its period of dominance, as being beyond the reach of attack.[1] So true indeed is this that not a few have drawn from it the conclusion that philosophy is a futile study, a mere mental exercise, without foundation or substance.

This view, however, has its origin in the fact that its partisans have not paid sufficient attention to the whole field of thought. They have given too exclusive consideration to the vicissitudes of speculation and the numerous aberrations of philosophical schools, and have thus lost sight of the fact that in the midst of all this heave and change of ideas and systems, a nucleus of thinkers has always remained faithful to certain fundamental principles which form the patrimony of the "traditional philosophy," a philosophy formulated by the genius of great thinkers and in accordance with the common sense of mankind. The fluctuations of the systems which vary from the traditional philosophy might well be compared to those of the waves of the sea, which seem to be the tossings of the entire sea, but which really have beneath them a mass of water that remains unperturbed.

And to-day we find ourselves in a period of the rise of a system, which, though not new, has taken on fresh developments in accordance with the tendencies of the times. After the recent downfall of the materialism and positivism which seemed to have won the victory, has come the turn of Kantian relativism, of neo-criticism, which may be said to be the dominant current in contemporary thought. The tendency towards relativism, at least in substance, is very ancient. It is sufficient to indicate the relativism of Protagoras, so splendidly refuted by Plato in his *Theatetus*; and the pronouncements of the eristic and sceptical schools down to David Hume, the immediate predecessor of Kant, who in his turn is the father of the present form of relativism.

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[1] On this point cf. Bonatelli, *Discussioni Gnoseologiche*.

Although relativism as we find it to-day is in substance anything but new, there are many who vaunt it as a conquest of modern thought, and proclaim it as a system which alone possesses a safe and solid basis. They tell us that it has buried the traditional philosophy without hope of resurrection, and is destined to sit upon the throne of the great discoveries of modern genius, to hold henceforth undisputed sway in the speculative order.

The story of philosophical thought shows that we are exposed to facile enthusiasms and to the discomfitures which inevitably follow in their train. Modern relativism, built up on the basis of Kantism, shows, no less than the old relativism, weak foundations and serious rents which presage its not distant downfall. The mild form of partial scepticism on which it is based cannot help developing, by force of its principles, into full scepticism; its weak supports and the latent but intrinsic contradictions which affect it will bring about its ruin when the inexorable axe of logic is applied to it.

* * *

Modern relativism grants in substance the logical or formal value of the principles of reason; but it denies their ontological or objective value; that is to say, it holds these principles to be true inasmuch as they are in harmony with the laws which govern our intelligence, but it denies or rather doubts their truth as regards the objective nature of things: we do not know whether by virtue of these principles we obtain a knowledge of the nature of things. Accordingly, it denies the value of metaphysics, which, relying on these principles, claims to examine the noumenal world, the world of essences and natures, because metaphysics attempts to deal with matters which lie beyond the range of our experience. It grants, however, the validity of knowledge which is based on experience, or in other terms, can be proved by it; and accordingly it concedes the validity of the positive sciences, which have their foundation in experience; and also the veracity of feeling with its moral, social, and religious tendencies.[2]

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[2] All relativists are not agreed as to the extent of the validity of our powers of knowing. Brevity prevents me from giving here the many degrees and differences that are to be met with in the writings of the advocates of the system. For a more thorough exposition of this matter consult the work of Prof. Chiesa, *La base del realismo e la critica neo-Kanziana*, pp. 16, 17; publ. by Desclée, Lefebvre.

Now in these points are contained the elements of the destruction of the system.

They would deny the ontological value of the principles of reason and thus exclude the possibility of a knowledge of the noumenal world and of metaphysics, but they are ready to grant the knowledge of the phenomena, and on this ground the system accepts the validity of the natural sciences. But I would observe that you cannot have sciences without principles; and the principles of these very experimental or positive sciences are so closely connected with the metaphysical principles that if the latter be rejected the former are of no avail. All generalisations are ultimately dependent on the principles of metaphysics. If after repeated experiments with falling bodies, I reach the conclusion: "Heavy bodies when left unsupported fall to the ground," I do so in virtue of the principle that, the laws of nature remaining constant, the same antecedents will have the same consequences. But is not such a principle metaphysical, or, as they say nowadays, metempirical? Can it be said that experience has taken in nature in all places and times? But if this law of falling bodies derives its force from a principle which is not the direct outcome of experience, if it is based in fine on a metempirical principle, then the law itself, if we would be logical, is destitute of ontological and objective value. And so too the principal of the conservation of energy affirms that nothing is created and nothing destroyed, that there are only transformations of energy. But we are enabled to establish this law not by mere experience but by the aid of a principle of reason, that of causality by which we establish the causal nexus among a series of phenomena. Experience gives the crude material for rising to generalisations and laws; the principle gives the form.

Take away the ontological value of the principles of reason, and you destroy the ontological value of the principles of the positive sciences and with it the correspondence of these sciences with the world of phenomena; nay, more than that, it would be impossible to be sure of the very reality of the phenomena. The affirmation of the very fact that we have experiences is a fruit of the application of the principles of reason. The bare physical or sense impression is not enough; even animals have that. The assertion of any sort of reality, even that of phenomena, involves the use of metaphysical principles, especially the principle of contradiction. Such an affirmation would be empty and arbitrary if the principles on which it is based have only a subjective and logical value.

If the theory of relativity be accepted, the force of logic leads inevitably to the ruin of those empirical sciences which it would save from shipwreck, no matter whether they be considered with reference to the real or to the phenomenal world.

And already there are indications of a destructive tendency in this very direction. In a recent work, *Per la filosofia dell' azione,*[3] Landro writes: "The process (referring to the physical sciences) even in the part which is occupied with the external establishment of the facts, carries with it a number of subjective co-efficients which form only another of the many manifestations of our mental activity" (p. 24). "The chemical or physical fact in its primitive form, the crude fact, as Poincaré calls it, undergoes, through scientific observation, a process of working over, by which it takes on new characteristics and loses others. It may be said that it loses its individuating notes to enter into categories.

The student registers the phenomenon which takes place outside of him; but in the very act by which he notes its occurrence, he sets its boundaries, selects a particular aspect of it, introduces it into one of the cells into which his knowing faculty is divided. In this way the scientist really creates the fact; not the crude fact, but the scientific fact: that is, the crude fact transformed by the reconstructive action of the rational soul. Science arises from the statement and the synthesis of the scientific facts, that is, from the natural facts, subjected to the reflex consideration of the inquirer. Of necessity the laws of science do not escape the emptiness of the process from which they proceed, and their apparent value is a constant concealed but real, *petitio principii*" (p. 27). "Recent critical examination of the sciences does not get beyond the postulate of innatism. What it supposes antecedently to experience is the activity of the spirit, the ability to transform the crude data of the senses and to make them the object of scientific definition. The traditional philosophy has admitted this initial power of the soul by which the particular is raised to the universal. Contemporary science only draws attention to the fact that the action of the mind in the formation of a scientific fact is one which deforms reality while elevating it, and leaves an inevitable trace of subjectivism on all our reflex thought" (p. 29). "The really precious result of the revision to which science has subjected itself is the modest, but honest, recognition of its own limited possibilities. Poincaré puts it strongly: 'Not only can science not make us know the nature of things; nothing can make us know it; and if a super-man could do so, he would not be able to express it. Not only can we not divine the answer; if it were given to us, we could not understand it; I ask myself indeed if we really understand the question.' These words are a resumé of the whole revolution made by recent criticsm in the sphere of the experimental sciences" (p. 31).

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[3] Scuola tipog. cooperativa, Citta di Castello, 1907.

Nor can we hope a better fate for the mathematical sciences. These are based on the relations which exist between quantities. But the knowledge of relations is based on the knowledge of the entities between which the relations exist. And if the objective knowledge of these entities can be disfigured in the process to which they are subjected by our minds, we may be the victims of a delusion, and the relations which we think we perceive may be merely subjective appearances. "Thought presents to us with irresistible evidence cause and effect, substance and accident, the sphere and the cube, the circle and the square, etc., in complete antithesis to each other, and tells us that it is absurd and inconceivable that these notes should co-exist in the same thing at the same time and under the same respect. The sphere is naturally conceived as opposed to the cube, an effect as opposed to a cause, etc. Now, if to this logical and natural opposition (for it is impossible to think the contrary) there be not a corresponding real opposition; if, in other words, there can exist a cubical sphere or an effect not really distinct from the cause; if that which seems evidently absurd can exist in the realm of fact, then we are victims of a deception which is based on thought itself; and if there can be one such deception, there can be two, ten, a thousand, any number of them; every form of certitude, even mathmetical, becomes suspect, and the road to absolute scepticism is inevitably opened."[4]

And as a matter of fact, doubt has already been raised concerning the objective value of mathematics. "Poincaré states at length the conventional character of mathematical theorems. He examines the processes in constant use in algebraical operations and reduces them to a single line of proof...which runs as follows: we establish first of all a theorem for n equals 1; then we show that if it holds good of n equals 1, it holds good of n, and from this we conclude that it is true for all whole numbers. But on what rests this mode of reasoning? Its essential character lies in the fact that it contains, reduced to a single formula, a chain of hypothetical syllogisms: the number of which is indefinite, as is the series of the numbers to which the reasoning may be applied. And since we cannot make this application completely, it is evident that our mathematical calculations no less than our physical theories rest on an incomplete induction. With this difference, however, that induction applied to the physical sciences is always uncertain since it implies the belief in a universal order outside of us; while mathematical induction possesses an irresistible power, since it is but the assertion of a fundamental property of the mind: that of creating the object of research, mathematical quantity, and of determining the methods for its study."[5] As for geometry, Poincaré remarks that if one starts out with a different set of postulates from those of the Euclidean Geometry (which are, by the way, indemonstrable) it is possible to construct a different and quite consistent geometry, as has been done by Lowatschewsky and Riemann. And he concludes: "At any rate the axioms of geometry are nothing but conventions; our choice among the possible conventions is guided by the experimental facts; but it remains free and is not limited except by the need of avoiding contradictions ...In other words these axioms are merely dressed up definitions.... Hence the question: Is the Euclidean Geometry true? has no sense. One geometry is no truer than another: it is simply more or less handy; since it is simple, and in accord with the properties of the natural solids with which we construct our instruments of measurement."[6]

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[4] Chiesa, *op. cit.* p. 92.

Relativism, though it would not desire to be stamped with the note of scepticism, develops, little by little, not only into external scepticism, that is, regarding the external world, but into internal scepticism, that is, regarding the internal world, in as much as we cannot pass any certain judgment even regarding the latter. By means of consciousness we know our own states, ways, and mental phenomena, and, therefore, its activities constitute what can be called internal experience. But consciousness, while it reveals to us such states and phenomena, tells us nothing regarding their internal value. It is one thing to feel a state, to experience a fact, but quite another thing to pass judgment on them. When we proceed to this, even when we begin to reason about consciousness, we move a step forward. From being simple experimenters, we become judges;

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[5] Landro, *op. cit.* p. 21.

[6] Apud Landro, p. 23.

and as such we make consciousness itself, and what is contained in it, objective, in as much as we say they exist and analyse them by discussion and criticism. But how is this possible except by the aid of reason and the application of its principles? And if these are, according to relativism, the sources of relativity of knowledge, how are we to avoid the relativity of the conclusions, and, therefore, of all the sciences that have reference to the internal world? We say, consciousness cannot lead us into error. This is very true, but it is a truth which is not immediately *given* in consciousness; it supposes a line of reasoning based on the principle that in the direct results of experience there cannot be error. But is not this a metaphysical principle? Can mere experience cause us to jump to such a principle? And this being granted, what further than relative value can there be for the statement that consciousness cannot lead us into error? And then how are we to avoid that agonizing fear of being continually in error regarding our internal experience, even regarding self-existence, which is also a fact which we have on the testimony of consciousness? And indeed we have come to this stage. Remacle[7] says: "There is illusion in every state of consciousness... because to know it is evidently not to know it as it is. The necessary conclusion is that there are two kinds of Idealism, one which we may call external, understanding by the term that which refers to the world outside us, and the other internal or that which deals with the world within us."

We have seen that if we do not mitigate the laws of logic, then, granted the principles of relativism, we must of necessity end in complete and unqualified scepticism. And thus that system which claims the advantage of fixing the limits of human knowledge finishes by denying any knowledge to man, if by knowledge we understand the cognition of the real (noumenal or phenomenal) as it is, and not as it appear to us. Hence a consequence ruinous to relativism; for just as absolute scepticism is a denial of itself, and pulls down with one hand what it builds up with the other, so too relativism affords its own denial, for by conclusion after conclusion, it is resolved into absolute scepticism. Passing over for the present the many contradictions that the system is heir to by reason of the sceptical element with which it is affected, let us stop here to consider some of its weak sides or some of the vital errors that undermine it.

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[7] *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1893.

Relativism claims that there is no conformity between the laws of thought and reality; or, at least, that we know not whether this conformity exists or not. But such a supposition is unreasonable. No universal tendency of nature is deprived of the reality of the corresponding object. This is a truth which is shown by the facts. Now in the opinion of the relativists, humanity has a natural and irresistible tendency to consider true metaphysics legitimate, and not to regard the object of intellectual knowledge as illusory. Now how is it that here alone we must have universal error? You will say that very often we are not in a position to test the conformity of our judgments with reality, for this is possible only when we can introduce the touchstone of experience. But if when we have the actual test of experience we find that every correct judgment conforms to reality, why should we hesitate when the confirmation of immediate and direct experience is not within our power? You will say that the test of experience shows the correctness of judgments only in regard to the order of phenomena, but not in regard to the real order, about which the question is really concerned. I answer that against this we have always the fact that there is in us an order of faculties faithfully representative of reality and in conformity to it; and this granted, it is unreasonable to deny or even to doubt.

On the other hand, would any judgment regarding the reality and the conditions of the order of phenomena be possible without the co-operation of the principles of reason? The mere experience of the phenomena, as we have already noted, tells us nothing of it. It is like an old manuscript which has to be read and interpreted; and it is reason that reads and interprets, in as much as it is provided with its own powers, its own principles, and its own natural laws. Upon careful consideration it will be evident how insufficient are the grounds set forth by the relativists for distrusting the veracity of our intelligence and admitting a mental elaboration, and suspecting a lack of conformity of the concepts and principles of reason with reality. The said elaborations would be due to the forms and laws of thought itself which manipulate, so to speak, the data of experience, so as to render the concept different from the real condition of things.

Now these forms and laws are either *a priori* or *a posteriori*; in other words they are native to human intelligence or they are acquired. If native, they are either put there by a First Cause who thereby has made man naturally intelligent; or, excluding the intervention of a First Cause, they are, as Spencer would have it, the outcome of heredity, the mental acquirements of ancestors transmitted to their descendants. But in the first supposition it would be foolish to fear that these forms and laws should distort our concepts; for why should the Author of nature create man in such a way as to make him subject to an inevitable hallucination? Such an act would not be worthy of His greatness. The explanation by heredity really belongs in the *a posteriori* class, for, as Spencer says, the mental forms, though innate in the individual, are acquired by the race. Ultimately, therefore, in any hypothesis which we have to deal with as an objection, the laws, forms, and principles must be considered as having been acquired in some way. But if this is so, the mental elaboration which concepts are supposed to undergo is left without support. By what instrumentality would such an elaboration take place? Is it done by virtue of the logical forms? According to the supposition there are no logical forms antecedent to experience. Can it be accounted for by the structure of the bodily organism? But the organism can impress the mind only according to the modifications which itself receives, and how can these be different from the way in which reality acts on it? It is for the relativist, who appeals to logical forms to explain the lack of conformity between ideas and reality, to prove the existence of such forms; for this is the very foundation of his system.

Kant indeed offers an explanation of these forms—an explanation, be it noted, in the metaphysical order, established by means of an analytic *a priori* process, which process he himself has declared insufficient to lead us to absolute knowledge. He analyses the ideal concepts, and as a fruit of this analysis finds that they possess the notes of necessity and immutability, hence he concludes that since these notes cannot be derived from real things (which are contingent and mutable), the concepts must have been modified in the making by certain logical forms which constitute a part of the original endowment of the mind. Thus, making use of a process which is confessedly invalid, he establishes the validity of the conclusion.

But aside from this serious flaw in the process, if the concepts possess (as they do) the notes of immutability and necessity, this fact by no means implies that they are *a priori* forms of our understanding, or that they cannot have been derived from reality. This inference would be legitimate only if it were shown that the universal and necessary element can nowise exist in singular contingent facts. True, this element is not to be found in the characteristics by which they are individual and concrete; but it does exist in the general properties of their nature. A stone is certainly not immutable and necessary with regard to the concrete notes which make it to be this definite stone: these notes could change and be other than they are. But we find the immutable and the necessary in the notes which constitute its nature. The stone could not be a stone if it did not possess the elements indispensable to make it such. And it is in this respect that our mind can select from among the contingent and changeable notes which determine the individual thing, the immutable and necessary element, without any need of reccurse to subjective forms.

Kantism cannot find any immutable and necessary element in things, since these are mutable and contingent; it places this element in the mind of man—as if we were not mutable and contingent. In this respect ontologism was much more logical. It believed that the characteristics of necessity and immutability which ideas possess could not be derived either from the objects themselves or from the thinking subjects, and, therefore, concluded that we contemplate them in God. Besides, if it be form which gives to the idea its character of necessity, whence arises that of contingency? It will be answered: from the respective form or category. Very well; then the supposed forms of thought are validly applied to reality, or they are not. In the first case our knowledge is an adequate representation of the real, that is to say, it is absolute; in the second case, we are involved in full scepticism. How can we get to know that what we think contingent (for example, the phenomenon) is actually contingent? And how can Kant assert categorically that the necessary is *in no way* in the real things, when we are ignorant whether the application of the forms of thought is in harmony with the real conditions of the object?[8]

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Latter-day relativism is entangled in manifold contradictions; such is the penalty which must be undergone by every sceptical or half-sceptical system.

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[8] The most recent relativists reject the idea of logical forms that are *a priori* and assert the elaboration of the concept by the mind, which deforms thought and gives it a subjective character. But this supposition needs to be proved; it is contrary to what we witness in the universal ordering of nature, the arrangement of which evidences wisdom, order, and truth. Why then is it that here alone the mind must be condemned to feed itself with illusions?

The relativist admits the phenomenon as being certain—whether as an objective fact, or, as some would have it, a subjective fact, here amounts to little. He admits as certain that outside of us, or at least inside of us, something exists. With this he implicitly admits as certain the principle of contradiction; since without it the categorical assertion: Something exists, would be without firm foundation. Therefore in one instance at least the principle of contradiction must be considered as having ontological and objective validity. In the system, however, no principle possesses more than a mere logical value. It is of no use to say that the apprehending of the phenomenon is a matter of immediate experience, for (I must insist once more) it is one thing to have experience of a fact and another thing to express a judgment concerning its reality. The latter process is a function of the intelligence making use of its own principles.

The relativists present their system as true and certain. It is set up in opposition to other systems; relativism is true, the others are not. Now, borrowing the distinction from the relativists themselves, we ask: Is relativism true *in se,* or is it true only for us? in other words: Is it in conformity with reality, or is it a creation of our own minds? If the former, then there is such a thing as absolute knowledge—and this destroys the fundamental tenet of the system, that all knowledge is relative. If the latter, then relativism is relegated to a place among the other systems, which, according to it, have only a relative value.

Moreover, relativists do not restrict themselves to merely affirming the truth of their system; they make use of argument to prove it. And argument means going from principles to conclusions. But according to them the principles of reason have only a relative value. Hence their conclusion: All knowledge is relative, would be at once absolute and relative—absolute, because posited by the system absolutely and unconditionally; relative, because based upon relative premisses.

The relativist asserts that nothing outside the region of phenomena is knowable, that the substance or noumenon lies outside our mental reach. But still he talks about it like any other man. How can he talk about substances if their reality does not somehow find a way into his mind and make itself known? How can he discuss a thing which lies beyond the reach of his mind and in the region of the unknowable? A barbarian who knows nothing about the cosmic ether can neither affirm nor doubt nor deny it.[9] The relativist, in face of the undeniable fact that mankind is convinced that it gets hold of objective truth, concludes that mankind is the victim of a general deception. And in this case the error arises out of man's very nature, and therefore is universal and unavoidable. But then how can the relativist rise above nature and render himself superior to its fatal demands? Is he not a man like others? And if he does succeed in escaping from the common error of humanity, then there is possibility of knowledge free from illusion and deception, knowledge which at least in some departments can arrive at objective truth; there can be some phases of mental activity safe from the intrusion of the elements which beget error. The mind in forming judgments concerning itself has at last broken its bonds and set itself free from the unbroken series of errors to which nature has condemned it.

Nor can it be said that we have departed from the question at issue by changing from the discussion of judgments about the external world to judgments about the internal world, about the Ego, whose facts can be studied in themselves by direct introspection. The conclusions which the relativist reaches concerning these internal facts are not the result of immediate intuition, but of a secondary process which requires long and laborious reasoning, and the use of the identical laws and principles which govern the mind in the enquiry into any other field of knowledge. But this is a conclusion which is ruinous to relativism. If in their mental operations both the relativist and the non-relativist make use of the same laws and principles, then if they are sound and valid for the former they cannot but be so for the latter. There is no middle way: either deny absolute value to the system, or admit the absolute character of knowledge.

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[9] The mistake of the relativists in this question owes its origin to a great extent, in my opinion, to their not distinguishing between what is of immediate and direct cognition and what is not. In the epistemological problem we should remember that there are entities of which we have immediate knowledge, viz. phenomena, and others, viz. noumena, of which our knowledge is only mediate and indirect. Now we perceive the phenomenon, but we perceive it as not existing *in se*; hence the need of something on which, so to speak, it rests and depends. This entity is what we are accustomed to call *substance*. Furthermore, the phenomenon is invested with certain characteristics and conditions which determine its nature. And as these characteristics and conditions reveal the nature of the phenomenon, so also do they give us a key to the nature of the substance from which the phenomena proceed.

In a word, as the reality of the phenomena demonstrates the reality of the substance as a necessary basis of the phenomena, so too the nature of the phenomena gives us the clue to the nature of the substance on which the phenomena depend.

Modern relativism, as we have seen, is subject to manifold contradictions in this first part of the system which asserts the relativity of knowledge. And it is not lacking in contradictions in its second part in which, on the principles of the philosopher of Koenigsberg, it establishes the truth of the feelings, with their moral, social, and religious implications, in the hope of saving from destruction the most sacred treasures of humanity.

True, our feelings and their tendencies do indicate a motion of our soul; but they do not afford a warrant of the validity of their object. Feelings and tendencies can betray us into error; they can be out of harmony with reality. The opponents of relativism do not deny that the universal tendencies of nature are echoes of nature which inform us of the agreement between themselves and the truth of the objects which attract them. But we arrive at this principle only after the application of the test of reason. The relativist who denies the value of reason destroys his own position and can no longer establish, except illogically, the warrant for realities which he wishes to derive from feelings and tendencies. Here too, we find a desire to affirm a truth with that reason which has been declared impotent to get at truth. Either admit the value of reason or give up the value of the feelings.

This too shows the inconsequence of the recent school of the philosophy of action, or of immanence, which has come forward as the defender of neo-criticism. It denies to reason the capacity of attaining certain truth in the metaphysical order, thus closing the way to that body of knowledge which would put it in possession of the treasure of religious truths; and it wishes that belief and practise in morals and religion should be founded on the exigencies and needs of the human spirit. Passing over the fact that not all men confess to feeling these needs, we ask what warrant there is, outside that given by the process of reason, for being certain that these needs and demands, in so far as they are felt, are in conformity with truth. Is it not possible that the whole matter might resolve itself into another case of mental illusion?

Nor is it any use to say that there is question of making religious beliefs harmonise with the needs of contemporary thought. We must inquire whether such demands are just and in conformity with the truth. When sensism holds sway, must one become a sensist? The conclusions which are rejected to-day will be received to-morrow. Certainly it is unbecoming the philosopher or the Christian apologist to change his views to suit the changes of fashion. It is now some years since Franchi wrote: "The neo-Kantian schools are now preaching with great enthusiasm a return to the critical philosophy (Zurück auf Kant) as a barrier against the waves of atheism and materialism which threaten to overwhelm and smother in their muddy waters moral and religious philosophy and even civilisation itself, by extinguishing every ray of belief in God as an eternal and infinite Being, and Soul as a spiritual substance. To this school may be applied the warning of Dante: *Mala via tiene*! The undertaking is a noble one, and most opportune at the present time; but it is not by the critical philosophy that it will be accomplished. Indeed, it is this very critical philosophy that has done more than any other system to precipitate thought first into the abyss of German pantheism, and then of French positivism. And hence spring all the other diseases of its present condition, including the monstrous pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, which stands as a monument to the weakness and desperation of the nineteenth century....Is this the system to which we must return to heal and strengthen philosophy? What would be said of a medical system which would prescribe to a dying man as a cure another dose of the poison that is killing him? No, this is not the way to give fresh life and energy to philosophy. The weakness of the system is due to the fact that it has lost all faith in things spiritual and divine. And a school that directs its forces primarily to the task of proving that the objects of faith have no reality of any kind, that they are illusions, dreams, chimeras, and that the arguments advanced to prove the real existence of God and the human soul run into sophisms, contradictions, and absurdities—such school can prescribe no remedy. Therefore the only anchor of salvation is that school in which there is harmony—not discord—between science and faith; that school in which the chief aim of reason is to multiply and strengthen, elucidate and defend the proofs put forth for the truths of faith, and for its vital importance and supreme necessity in the private, domestic, and social life of man; that school which deems an honor the task of proving that whatever truth is established by science is not contrary to faith, and whatever it would establish as contrary to faith is contrary to reason itself; in a word, the anchor that is left us is that school which holds fast to the pure and fundamental teaching of Christian philosophy."

GIUSEPPE CALDERONI.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST:

THEORY OF HEATHEN MYTHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS

Gabriel Oussani, D. D.

INTRODUCTION.

One of the most insinuating and, we must admit, specious objections raised against the historical character of Christ's Virgin Birth is based on the so-called analogies and parallel legends and myths said to be found in Roman, Greek, Buddhistic, Arabian, Babylonian and Egyptian mythologies. The objection may be stated as follows: Among the many legendary traditions and myths of these ancient nations there was a belief in the divine origin and conception of many of their gods, heroes and kings, and of their virgin birth, if not identical, certainly very similar to that related of Jesus. Therefore, the Gospel doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth is either borrowed from these Oriental mythologies, and, consequently, is mythological and legendary in character, or, if not dependent and borrowed from these, must be at least classed in the same category of religious myths and legends which have sprung up in parallel cases among many other nations of antiquity.

To any mind of ordinary training, and not grossly lacking in common sense, even granting the correctness of the first premise, the conclusion cannot fail to appear illogical and unwarranted; for, strictly speaking, such parallels, unless they can be shown to have positively influenced the Gospel narrative of Christ's Virgin Birth, cannot offset the historicity of the Evangelical records in question. The comparative study of religions and mythology has repeatedly shown that accidental and sometimes even substantial similarities do not necessarily involve causality or derivation, and, still less, identity. As Prof. Rhys Davids remarks: "For such purposes, comparisons are no longer of any service; and they will be of worse than no service if we imagine that likeness is any proof of direct relationship, that similarity of ideas in different countries shows that either the one or the other was necessarily a borrower. . . . It would of course be going too far to deny that coincidences of belief are occasionally produced by actual contact of mind with mind; but it is no more necessary to assume that they always are so, than to suppose that chalk cliffs, if there be such, in China, are produced by chalk cliffs in the Downs of Sussex. They have no connection one with another, except that both are the result of similar causes." (*Hibbert Lect.*, 1881. p. 3). In like manner, according to our adversaries' system of reasoning, even Christ's divinity would resolve itself into a borrowed myth, as among many nations of antiquity kings, heroes, religious leaders and reformers were readily deified. So too, many of Our Lord's miracles would be barred from the domain of history and reduced to legends as similar wonders are attributed to heathen heroes and deities. Even the heroic deeds and victories of an Alexander, of a Cæsar, of a Charlemagne, of a Napoleon would resolve themselves into fiction and imitation, as similar deeds and triumphs are found to have been achieved by Egyptian, Assyrian and Babylonian kings and conquerors several centuries and millenniums earlier.

So much in the abstract; for mutual borrowing of legends, beliefs and fictions is a historical fact, but it cannot be declared as such unless it can be proved to have taken place in this or in that case. The existence among many ancient nations of beliefs similar to that of Christ's Virgin Birth, even if they can be proved as such, may reveal, after all, a certain tendency, a certain universal aspiration toward a supreme religious truth and feeling; but to conclude that, consequently, the doctrine of Christ's Incarnation and Virgin Birth is borrowed from those and necessarily mythological and legendary in origin and character is, to say the least, entirely unwarranted. This ill-founded conclusion misses the truth in two directions. In the first place it fails to take into account the real significance of those deep-rooted and wide-spread convictions of the pagan world which point to a permanent necessity of the human heart. They voice the inappeasable desire of the universal human spirit for the manifestation of God in some tangible and intelligible form, viz: that if He is to reveal Himself to men at all, He must do so in accordance with the laws of the human mind, and must meet the spiritual necessities of the men to whom He would make Himself known. The notion of a kinship between God and man is one of the fundamental doctrines of theism. In the second place, the weakness and absurdity of the heathen faiths consists, not so much in the principle of incarnation as in the specific applications which have been made of it. If the idea of incarnation is borrowed from heathen religions, the person of Christ is not borrowed, and if there ever was a creature who can have any claim to divinity that creature is Christ who has admirably shown in His earthly life all the necessary evidences of divinity. If heathenism *alleges* that in her great men God has in some sense been present, the proof of such an allegation must rest primarily upon the character of the person concerning whom such allegations are made. But it is a fact that no heathen religion has claimed as yet for her heroes and leaders what Christianity claims for Christ, and if they did their claim could not be historically substantiated, as in the case of Christ, and, consequently, it is open to challenge and doubt.

But let us argue on safer and more positive ground. And in the first place, we flatly deny the assumed existence of such heathen parallels if not in all, certainly, in many cases. Second, if these so-called parallels are to be historically admitted they are either not parallels at all, or, if partially so, they are neither *ad rem* nor convincing. And finally, if these same parallels are substantially such, they cannot be shown to have influenced the Gospel narrative, or that the latter has borrowed the idea and the belief from them, a condition which, as we have already remarked, is necessary in order to successfully attack the historical character and originality of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

In our former study on the subject (Nov.-Dec. p. 313 sqq.) we pointed out how Lobstein, who among the many determined opponents of Christ's Virgin Birth is *facile princeps*, flatly rejects the hypothesis of heathen mythological influence on the Gospel narrative, and his arguments in this direction are not without force or effect. Here are his own words: "It is therefore unnecessary to resort to the hypothesis of pagan influences or of Hellenic or Oriental factors in order to explain the origin of the belief in the supernatural birth of Christ. The tradition consecrated by our Gospels, the myth with which faith in the divine sonship of Jesus is poetically invested, has its roots deep down in Israel's religion, transformed by the new faith. The dogma of the supernatural birth is the result of the union of traditional interpretation with the Christian principle. Recent researches, completing and enriching observations made long ago, have collected numerous and often striking analogies between the biblical myth and legends of Greek or Eastern origin. Yet in such analogies it would be rash to see direct imitations or positive influences. The aversion which primitive Christianity felt for polytheistic paganism was so deep-seated that before supposing the new religion to have been influenced by pagan mythologies, we must examine with the utmost possible care the points of resemblance which are sometimes found to exist between beliefs and institutions. No doubt the history of the Church abundantly proves that between the worship or doctrine of paganism on the one hand and advancing Christianity on the other, there was mutual action and, so to speak, slow and constant infiltration, but nothing warrants historical criticism in considering the tradition of the miraculous birth of Christ as merely the outcome of elements foreign to the religion of Biblical revelation."[1]

Seydel, Soltau, Schmiedel and Usener, to mention but the most modern and authoritative ones, hold on the other hand that the Gospel of the Infancy of Jesus is, in its origin, a *non-Jewish, heathen* story, adopted by the early *Gentile Christians.* Gunkel, followed by Cheyne and others, also thinks that it is based on a story of non-Jewish, or pagan, origin but current in Jewish circles and borrowed from those by some early *Jewish Christians.* As was to be expected, the theory of Seydel, Soltau, Schmiedel and Usener is branded as improbable by Gunkel and Cheyne whose own views are respectively rejected by the former scholars. Harnack believes in none of these theories, for, according to him, the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth is of purely Jewish and Old Testament origin. His explanation of the Matthew and Luke narratives is that they are mutually dependent on a traditionally current misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Isaianic prophecy concerning the *Virgo concipiens* or *'alma.*

In our former study we already discussed and refuted both Lobstein's and Harnack's theories, and it is our purpose to discuss and refute in the following pages those of Seydel, Soltau, Schmiedel, Usener, Gunkel, Cheyne and their many followers and imitators.

Schmiedel and especially Soltau insist that the Gospel narrative of Christ's Virgin Birth is influenced by, and based on Greek and Roman mythology, while Usener, and still more so Lillie and Seydel insist that it is borrowed from Buddhism. Gunkel, Cheyne and the rest of the coterie of the pan-Babylonian school, on the other hand, contend that it is derived from Egyptian, Arabian and Babylonian myths and legends.

I.

THE THEORY OF ROMAN MYTHOLOGICAL AND LEGENDARY ELEMENTS IN THE GOSPEL NARRATIVE OF CHRIST'S VIRGIN BIRTH.

For the sake of completeness and accuracy, and in order to be absolutely fair in the presentation of this first category of objections, we shall reproduce these alleged parallels in the words of Soltau, their ablest exponent. Our author insists on three main points, viz.: (1) The generation of Jesus through the Holy Spirit (Luke i, 26-56) and Math. i, 18-27); (2) The Angels' song of praise (Luke ii, 8-20); and (3) The story of the journey made by the Magi from the East (Math. ii, 1-12). "These three ideas," Soltau tells us, "by means of which the history of the childhood of Jesus was in the end so embellished, have *prototypes in heathen narratives*, they may indeed be of purely *heathen origin*". As to the first point, Soltau presents his evidence as follows: "In more ancient times it was one of the chief ideas of Greek fable to trace back the origin of heroes, benefactors of the people, to the deity, even in a bodily sense. In very many instances Zeus was accounted to be the begetter of remarkable men; but the same assumption was made with regard to other gods also (Apollo, Mars, Mercury)....It is well known, for instance, what stress Alexander laid upon the fact that he was given out in the temple of Jupiter Ammon to be a son of Zeus. The honor secured him special authority in Egypt; it was the presupposition upon which the certainty of his rule over the minds of those who were subject to him rested. In order to make the idea still more palatable to the Greeks, he spread abroad amongst the Hellenic peoples the anecdote to the effect that he was not the bodily son of Philip, but was begotten of a serpent—the serpent cohabiting with his mother Olympias. The same story is told of Scipio Africanus (Gellius, *Noct. Att.*, 6). The serpent, especially among the Romans, was the symbol of the Genius, the protecting spirit of the family. The marriage-bed was sacred to the Genius of the family. When, in the case of such marriages as were for a long time unfruitful, a birth at length ensued, the happy event was ascribed to this protecting spirit of the family.

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[1] *The Virgin Birth of Christ,* New York, 1903, p. 75-76.

"Augustus also availed himself of this superstition on the part of the mass of the people, in order to get them to believe in his higher origin. On the one hand, he caused sacrifices to be offered everywhere to the Genius of the Emperor; on the other, he was careful that the fable should be widely diffused, to the effect that his mother Atia was once, while asleep in the temple of Apollo, visited by the god in the form of a serpent, and that the tenth month afterwards he himself was born. Augustus also did everything else in his power to promote this belief that Apollo was his father. Soothsayers and poets, if they wished to win the favour of the Emperor, were obliged to treat the idea in their writings.

"Was it to be wondered at, then, that kindred ideas grew up with regard to the origin of Christ, also, and that they found credence? This, at any rate, is clear: the belief in the Virgin Birth of Jesus could not have originated in Palestine; anyhow, it could never have taken its rise in Jewish circles. The Spirit (רוח) of God is in Hebrew feminine. In the Gospel of the Hebrews, Jesus calls the Holy Spirit his mother". (*The Birth of Jesus Christ*, 45-48).

As to the second point, he says that the purely *heathen origin* of the Angels' song of praise (Luke ii. 8f.) is quite evident. "No Jewish Christian would really have understood the idea that the birth of the Messiah heralded the dawn of a reign of peace *for the whole world* and of happiness for all mankind. Now, recent discoveries of inscriptions in Asia Minor have shown us the originals to which these ideas go back. In many towns of Asia Minor, as in Priene and Halicarnassus, edicts have been found (preserved in inscriptions) in which orders are given as to the celebration of the birthday of Augustus. These edicts date from the years 2 B. C. to 14 A. D. In them Augustus is glorified as saviour (σωτήρ) of the whole human race, as one in whom Providence (πρόνοια) has not only fulfilled, but even surpassed the wish of all men. "For," we read in one of them, "*peace* prevails *upon earth*; harmony and order reign; men are filled with the best hopes for the future, with joyful courage for the present." We see here that the rejoicings at the birth of Augustus found expression in the same way as, we are told in Luke ii, 10f., the joy at Jesus' birth did. This and similar descriptions of the happiness of the world after the appearance of Augustus cannot, therefore, have been unknown to the Evangelist when he wrote the words found in Luke ii, 8-20. The writer transferred them to the times when *his* Saviour was born; for no one who decides the question from a scientific standpoint could really doubt the priority of the Asiatic inscriptions to the first beginnings of a history of the childhood of Jesus. Everyone who compares the originals will feel the agreement to be really surprising. Even the word "gospel" and the name 'saviour" occur in the inscription in honor of that Augustus who had at length bestowed upon the world once more the blessings of "peace upon earth and among men good pleasure"—blessings longed for so ardently. And the words were, as a matter of fact, no mere expression of flattery; they reveal the true sentiments of men after the terrible struggles of the civil wars" (pp. 34-36).

Finally, as regards the third point, viz. the adoration of the Magi, Soltau tells us that we must keep three ideas separate. These are: (1) the star which shone before the Wise Men; (2) the journey to the West, and their return by another route; and (3) the adoration of the new king and the presentation of gifts to him. "Of these three portions of the story, the idea of the presentation of gifts might perhaps be traced back to Old Testament prototypes. Isaiah lx, 6, amongst other passages, was in the mind of the Evangelist. But, apart from this, there can be no doubt that none of the other details grew up upon Jewish soil, but are all *based upon heathen mythology.* As regards the star of the wise men, the star of Jacob in Leviticus xxiv, 17 was, it is true, pointed to in earlier times; but this was certainly incorrect. For in the passage referred to it is a man that is intended, not a phenomenon in the sky. On the other hand, the mythological idea of connecting the coming of great men with the appearance of a shining star was widespread in the heathen world.

"Shining phenomena in the sky were supposed to have been seen, at the time of their birth, in the case of Alexander the Great, of Mithridates, of Caesar, and of Augustus. It would seem to be particularly worthy of note that, as Suetonius tells us (*Augustus*, 94), in explanation of the wonderful signs observed at the time of the birth of Augustus, the interpreters of signs are supposed to have declared that they announced the birth of the *lord of the world.* Accordingly, the idea of referring this account, also, to the *true Lord and Saviour of the world* naturally occurred to the Church writer. The sign in the sky at once suggested the idea of introducing into the narrative the interpreters of signs, the Magi. It did not, however, at the same time suggest the Magi's change of residence and their act of adoration. These had a quite different and peculiar origin. There is a remarkable parallel to the history of the Magi, also, in the history of the Roman Empire. The parallel has so far been neglected only because people had been accustomed to move back the date of the composition of the First Gospel to a rather early period. But after this view had proved to be erroneous, and it appeared that the history of the childhood in particular, as contained in the First Gospel, must be estimated to be one of the latest portions of this Gospel, there was nothing to prevent people from supposing that it was the journey of the Parthian King Tiridates and his Magians from the East in the time of Nero (66 A. D.) which gave the first occasion for adding the new incident to the story of the birth of Jesus. . . .

"This historical event, then, upon which the Gospel story is founded, was as follows:—In the year 66 A. D., the Parthian King Tiridates, having journeyed with a great following through the towns of Asia Minor to the West, then offered homage to Nero in Rome. Here he worshipped Nero as his god, as the Sun-god Mithras, and then returned by another route through the cities of Asia. It is true that the later Greek reporter, Dio (about 220), describes the act of adoration in the Roman forum in the most precise terms, without speaking expressly of the Magi; but Pliny, the contemporary of Nero, in his *Natural History* (*Historia Naturalis*, xxx. 6) tells us particularly of the Magi and of the priestly character of the journey" (pp. 37-41).

From the above considerations and parallels, Dr. Soltau thus explains the origin of the Gospel of Christ's Infancy: "There was a tradition which transferred the birthplace of Jesus from Nazareth to the town of David, but in doing so allowed the fact that Joseph was the father to stand. In the earliest recast of this a few fabulous elements of *Hellenistic origin* were inserted towards the end of the first century A. D. All these insertions, which were three in number, referred what had been handed down and proclaimed in honour of the Roman Emperor, especially of Augustus, to the true Saviour of the world. Thus, the announcement of blessing in the case of Augustus was made use of in Luke ii, 14; the supernatural birth of Augustus was in Luke i, 5f., Matthew i, 19f., transferred to Jesus; and, finally, the journey of the Magi with the intention of seeking out the new light of the world in the West became an ovation on the part of the wise men to the Child Jesus" (pp. 49-50).

CRITICISM OF THE PRECEDING THEORY.

Soltau's elaborate presentation of these Roman parallels, attractive and fascinating as it may appear, is entirely subjective, fanciful, even bordering on the ridiculous and the absurd. The following remarks we trust, will suffice to demonstrate our contention.

I. There is no mention or even allusion to a virgin-birth in the supposed parallel narrative of Augustus' supernatural origin; a circumstance which forms, after all, the central fact of the Gospel narrative, and the main point at issue.

II. Even among the Romans, inside and outside of Rome, the idea of Augustus' supernatural origin was never believed in by the people, and, was in fact, ridiculed by the wise. Hence, it cannot have impressed the Evangelists, still less the early Christians, whether of Jewish or gentile origin. The Romans knew perfectly well who were the parents of Augustus, and the poets and the people at large knew still better that the idea was simply one of the many flatteries in which the ambitious Emperor most delighted.

III. The first Palestinian Christians, for whom Matthew is attested by universal Christian tradition to have written his Gospel, were of Jewish origin, and consequently not only far from disposed to accept as true these heathenish fables of a supernatural birth, but would be, moreover, entirely opposed to such a belief, as being completely at variance with the Old Testament ideals and teaching. Birth out of legal wedlock was *ipso facto* immoral, infamous and abominable. And if it were possible for such a belief to have impressed itself upon the Roman mind, it would have been equally impossible for the same to appeal to the Jewish temper. Supernatural generation, viz. generation through the mutual sexual cooperation of gods and godesses was, we know, a very common belief among the ancient polytheistic nations, who regarded it as a natural and legitimate form of pastime among the various gods and goddesses to procreate sons and daughters, little gods and goddesses, *ad infinitum.* But that Yahweh, the only God, pure spirit and free from all human passions, should imitate the example of the abominable gods of the gentiles, was in the eyes of the Jews simply absurd and blasphemous.

IV. The attribution of a divine origin to Augustus and to the other heroes of antiquity was put forth in order to advance a certain cause and to attain a certain end, namely, the glorification of these personages; whereas, in the case of our Gospels, the supernatural origin of Jesus is not put forward in order to glorify Him, as He was neither king, nor hero, nor a great military leader, nor did He ever claim to be any of these. He was rather, a poor and obscure mortal, a servant of the people, the most humble and unpretending of His countrymen, and openly antagonistic to all forms of worldly power, majesty and glory. Hence, if the supernatural origin of Jesus has found its place in the pages of our Evangelists, it was solely due to the reason that it was a fact, a fact which, although doubtless at first absurd and objectionable to the earliest Jewish Christian community, yet on account of its unique nature and importance for the work of redemption, had to be recorded, notwithstanding the adverse and unfavorable impression it was sure to make on some readers of the Gospel narrative. In the case of Augustus the thought was the father of the belief, while in the case of Jesus it was the simple, plain record of the fact that gave rise to the belief. For it was only when Augustus had become emperor that he, or rather, the poets started to tell the story of his divine origin; and so it was in the case of Alexander and the other heroes of antiquity. It is also quite evident that neither Augustus himself, nor any of his contemporaries believed him to be a real descendant of the gods; while Jesus, during His very lifetime, repeatedly emphasized His own divinity, in which He himself believed, long before the accounts of Matthew and Luke concerning His divine conception and Virgin birth were written.

V. The parallel, furthermore, breaks down altogether when we compare the diametrically opposed character of the divine generation as attributed to Augustus and to Jesus. The first is not only grotesque, revolting and ridiculous but also presupposes, at the same time, a carnal relation of the god in material form with the woman; while in the case of Jesus, the whole conception of the miraculous event is so spiritual, transcendental and elevating that any comparison with the former becomes absurd.

The above five considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, can be easily applied to all other cases of kings and heroes, whether Roman, Greek, Egyptian or Oriental, for whom legendary traditions and fictions have claimed a supernatural origin.

VI. As to the Song of the Angels, on which Soltau so earnestly insists and out of which he tries to make so much, it is sufficient to say that it would be as easy, in fact easier, to prove that the expressions of the inscriptions in question are borrowed from the Old Testament, in which they repeatedly occur, as to prove that the Evangelists borrowed them from the inscriptions. Would it not be, perhaps, more logical and natural to suppose that the Evangelists, imbued as they were with the Old Testament phraseology and expressions, borrowed them from their own Sacred Books, with which their own hearers and readers were so well acquainted, than to suppose them to have imitated and copied a few insignificant Greek and Latin inscriptions scattered in some obscure corner of Asia Minor, and of whose very existence the Evangelists could have hardly known? The Messianic Psalms, and the writings of the Prophets are replete with the same and similar expressions concerning the saving and redeeming character of the Messiah, of his reign of peace, of the vastness of his world-wide empire and the extension of his dominion. It is quite true that in the inscriptions to which Soltau refers reference is made to the Emperor as a saviour, that the day of his birth is described as a day of glad tidings for the world, that peace is spoken of as a prevailing blessing, and that the Emperor's benevolence and benefactions are duly celebrated. But it is not too much to say that every one of the words so much emphasized by Soltau may be paralleled from the Old Testament and the Apocryphal books. The word "Saviour," for example, finds a place, and a very frequent place, in passages which may be cited from these two sources; the expression "to bring glad tidings" is found again and again in the Old Testament, and sometimes in close connection with the thought of the salvation of God; and, to say nothing of the fact that if we adopt, in Luke ii, 14, the probable rendering of the Revised Version, Soltau's parallel is apparently destroyed, the thought of good will towards men, expressed by the same Greek word as in the angels' hymn, finds a place in the Old Testament, as, for example, in Psalm cv. 4 (cf. Ps. v. 12; and l. 18). And how about the first clause of the same angelic hymn: "Glory to God in the highest," a clear specimen of Jewish phraseology, which Soltau passes over without any remark? And, after all, were the angels perhaps not supposed to use such human expressions as may be uttered and used by other mortals in like cases and circumstances? Were the Romans, perhaps, the only privileged nation which could have possibly coined and appropriated such expressions? Or is there anything in the evangelical song of praise that savors of an exclusively heathenish character? And where can the sublime and beautiful *Gloria in Excelsis Deo* be found or paralleled in those obscure and laconic Augustan inscriptions of Asia Minor? Following Soltau's system of reasoning nearly all the New Testament writers might be shown to have been diligent students of the inscriptions of Halicarnassus, for the same ideas and words occur in them. Dr. R. J. Knowling rightly remarks that it really seems as if no absurdities are too great to be pressed into the service of those who deny the facts relating to our Lord's birth.[2]

VII. Soltau, furthermore, contends that the angels' song is of heathen origin, and that the Evangelist was familiar with the inscriptions in question and thus transferred them to the Saviour. Now, both these assumptions are groundless. As to the first, viz. that the angels' song is of heathen origin, we may safely say that it is contradicted by two patent facts: (1) its connection with the doctrine of angels, which, in the form given it in the Infancy narrative, is a distinctly Jewish conception;[3] (2) the song of the angels is a fragment of a poem originally written in Hebrew with the distinctive Hebrew parallelism still remaining. Soltau, by a strange irony of fate, has unfortunately chosen one of the most ancient and characteristically Hebraic portions of the New Testament as exhibiting late heathen influence. Dr. Briggs has already pointed out that Luke's narrative of the infancy of Jesus, which is fuller than that of Matthew, is composed of seven short poems about which the prose narrative gathers in a very harmonious way. These poems are: (1) the Annunciation to Zacharias (Luke i, 13-17), a trimeter poem in the original Hebrew in two strophes of different lengths evidently incomplete in the translation; (2) the Annunciation to Mary (Luke i, 28, 30-33, 35-37, 38.) four pieces of trimeter poetry of different lengths connected by seams, evidently incomplete in their present form; (3) the Annunciation to the Shepherds (Luke ii, 10-12, 14), two pieces of trimeter poetry evidently extracts from a larger piece; (4) the Song of Elizabeth (Luke i, 42-45); (5) the song of the Blessed Virgin, or the *Magnificat* (Luke i, 46-55), a trimeter poem, more complete than the others; (6) the Song of Zacharias, or the *Benedictus* (Luke i, 68-79), of the pentameter movement, divisible into five or two strophes, and the most complete of all the seven poems; and finally, (7) the Song of Simeon (Luke ii, 29-32, 34-35), the *Nunc dimittis*, a trimeter poem and incomplete. "All these seven poems," Dr. Briggs remarks, "are a series of annunciations and of songs of gratitude and praise, all with marked characteristics of Hebrew poetry, not only in form but in the style and substance of thought. They are not complete in themselves, but extracts from poems. This raises the question whether they were not originally parts of larger poems, rather than each from different and independent poems. Six of them have the same trimeter movement, and may be all from the same poem. One of them is a pentameter, like the pentameter preserved in Matthew (Chap. i. vv. 20-21), and therefore both of these may be from the same poem. May we, therefore, think of two long poems, each giving a poetic account of the birth and infancy of Jesus? Or are we to think of a number of little poems each taking up a different theme? It seems more probable that we have to think of two original poems of this kind, the one chiefly used by Matthew, the other chiefly used by Luke. At all events, so far as Luke is concerned, his story of the infancy is nothing more than a prose setting for these seven poetic pieces given by him. These poems were certainly originally in Hebrew; they were also certainly before him in written documents, one or more. They were written sources as truly as the original Mark, and the original Matthew—all alike in the Hebrew language. They must have been composed before the destruction of Jerusalem, either in the Christian congregation of Jerusalem, or the Christian community in Galilee; therefore by early Christian poets who had access to the family of Jesus, certainly to His brother James the head of the Jerusalem Church, and possibly also to the Virgin Mother of our Lord, and to others who could speak as eye-witnesses or ear-witnesses of these matters embodied in verse. Making every allowance for the poetic form, style, and conception, these poems are sources of the highest value, and of the first degree of historic importance, as belonging with the original Hebrew Gospels of Mark, Matthew, and John, rather than with the later Gospels of Matthew, Luke and John, as we now have them." (*New Light on the Life of Christ*, pp. 163-165).

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[2] *Our Lord's Virgin Birth and the Criticism of to-day*, London, 1904, p. 48.

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[3] On the angelology of Luke, and its distinct Old Testament character and features see Sweet, *The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, Philadelphia, 1906, pp. 189-190.

So much for the first assumption of Soltau, concerning the heathen origin of Luke's narrative of the Virgin Birth. As to the second assumption viz.: that Luke was familiar with the Augustan inscriptions of Asia Minor, which he is supposed to have imitated or copied, it is simply a supposition which he has to prove, and which he cannot prove, as Luke's narrative is entirely of Hebrew colouring, and it is very improbable that he ever knew of these inscriptions, still more copied or imitated them. If all critical hypotheses were as arbitrary as the above suggested by Soltau, the fact would argue a grave lack of common sense on the part of our modern critics.

VIII. As to the episode of the Magi, out of which Soltau makes so much capital, it is not too much to say that he makes unwarrantable demands on our credulity. The episode of Tiridates' visit to Nero was too recent (having occurred in 66 A. D.) and of too little significance to have possibly influenced the Evangelist, or to have undergone so much transformation in order to pass into the Gospel narrative of the infancy. And how explain the connection between Herod and these Wise Men of the East? Or how account for the massacre of the innocents of Bethlehem, the memory of which must have been still alive and fresh in the minds of the Bethlehemites, and which was caused indirectly by the Magi's visit to Herod and the infant Jesus? And was not the flight of the Holy Family to

Egypt the direct consequence of the same events? Now, all these happenings are historical facts and, as far as we know, by none reasonably doubted or denied; but if the episode of the Magi is fictitious, then all these facts must be relegated likewise to the realm of fiction, an assertion which no sane critic has as yet attempted to prove. If the Magi's visit is a legend and myth then the other two central facts must be legendary and false, as all these events are mutually and vitally connected together. And how is it possible that our Evangelist should invent such an atrocious and bloody story in order to bring into his narrative a visit which never took place, yet with which such an epoch-making event is closely associated? And how account for the Star in connection with the coming of the Wise Men to Bethlehem, as such a phenomenon is totally absent in King Tiridates' visit to Nero? And does Soltau believe that Tiridates' visit to Rome was such a phenomenal and epoch-making event as to have left such an imperishable record on the history of the age, or in the memory of those few insignificant Palestinian Jews and Christians or on the Evangelist? The whole hypothesis is so fantastic as to border on the farcical. To our mind, it is considerably less objectionable and far more scientific to say that the story was entirely fabricated by the Evangelist than to derive it from the journey of Tiridates to Rome.

IX. Furthermore, Soltau's whole contention depends for its plausibility on the assumption, first, that the account of the visit of the Magi in Matthew is late, which is contradicted by the Christology of the entire section; second, that the writer was familiar with the incidents of Roman court life, for which there is not the slightest foundation; and, third, that the writer would have accepted with equal facility ideas from the Old Testament, current mythology, and Roman history, which is contradicted by every single implication of the passage. In view of the facts of the case the explanation as an able writer has expressed it, "has not a leg to stand upon"[4]

X. Finally, according to Soltau, the foundation upon which the two narratives, which now stand at the beginning of Matthew's and Luke's Gospels, were built, was that "toward the end of the first century, Bethlehem was regarded as the real birthplace of Jesus" (p. 28), and that "the idea that the Holy Spirit begot Jesus can have no other than a Hellenic origin" (p. 48), which idea "did not certainly arise until toward the end of the first century, or cannot have come to be commonly held" (*ibid*). Soltau's system and hypothesis are certainly inconsistent and utterly indefensible. For, as Dr. Sweet aptly remarks, we would have here a very curious and improbable process, viz.: "that there came into existence near the end of the first century a conviction that Jesus must be born at Bethlehem. From this beginning, by an elaborate process of building up, detail upon detail, through the addition to the primitive tradition of detached fragments from all imaginable sources culminating finally in the fiction of the Virgin Birth, which is itself a complicated, manufactured article, the completed fable came to be, and yet the beginning and the ending of this whole process is dated at the same time. The conviction that Jesus must be born at Bethlehem arose about the end of the first century, the Hellenic conception of the miraculous birth arose about the end of the first century, and yet between the two lies a process of development, which it would require at least a half century to consummate....One can see plainly enough where the difficulty lies. The process of building up an elaborate legend from such humble beginnings as a simple belief that Jesus was born at Nazareth of Joseph and Mary, into the story as we now have it, by adding details borrowed from Old Testament stories, heathen mythologies, and Imperial inscriptions and edicts, requires time and a great deal of it. The process must be supposed to have begun late because sufficient time must be allowed for the sharp outlines of the "genuine tradition" to become blurred—this accounts for the beginning of the process at about the end of the first century. It is unsafe to carry the process of formation too far into the second century for we begin to have some definite results as to the establishment of the canon of the New Testament and the formation of church creeds; hence the completion of the process is put about the end of the first century. But it is clearly impossible that such a process as the theory describes could have occupied less than half a century. If the foundation of the legend was laid, as Soltau affirms, in the dogma of the Bethlehem birth about the end of the first century, then the capstone of the virgin birth could not have been in place before A. D. 150. But, as a matter of fact, we have indubitable evidence that the virgin birth had recognized credal standing in all the principal churches long before that date" (*op. cit.* 90). Add to this the fact that the infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke cannot be shown to be later than the two Gospels themselves, and in the hypothesis that the sections in question are later additions, they cannot be proved to be additions inserted later than the end of the first century.

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[4] Sweet, *The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ.*

Hence we may safely conclude, (1) that the parallels adduced by Soltau are not parallels at all; (2) that these so-called parallels cannot be shown to have influenced the Evangelists, or to have furnished them the basis of the infancy narratives; (3) that both Matthew's and Luke's narratives are of strictly Jewish coloring and far removed from any heathenish origin and character; (4) that even admitting the probability of Soltau's hypothesis, it remains certain that in all these Graeco-Roman parallels there is no mention of a virgin birth in the New Testament sense of the term; and finally, had Soltau's arguments any demonstrative value, the great trouble with them would be that they would prove too much and, accordingly, prove nothing.

II.

THE THEORY OF GREEK MYTHOLOGICAL AND LEGENDARY ELEMENTS IN THE GOSPEL NARRATIVE OF CHRIST'S VIRGIN BIRTH.

Not less futile is the attempt made by Soltau, and also by Usener, Seydel, Hartland, Schmiedel, Holtzmann, Gardner, Robertson, Hacker and others, to detect Hellenistic influences in the Gospel account of Christ's Virigin Birth. We have already seen Soltau's views on this point.[5]

Usener is of the same opinion. According to him, the Gospel idea that Jesus was conceived and born of a virigin is something entirely new and foreign to the Jewish mind. "Here," he says, "we unquestionably enter the circle of pagan ideas. Even the Church Fathers were unable to shut their eyes to this. The idea is quite foreign to Judaism, whilst for Graeco-Roman antiquity it continued in full activity till after the Augustan age. . . .The expression in Isaiah VII. 14, could not possibly have given occasion for the shaping of this birth-story. The context of the passage says nothing about an unexpected Messiah, and speaks merely of a young woman, not of a "virgin" as the word is in the Latin Vulgate. The efforts which have been made to disprove the unwelcome intrusion of heathen mythology into the substance of the Gospels have been ineffectual. It is dangerous to cite evidence that proves the opposite of what it is asked to establish."[6] Dr. J. M. Robertson, who, by the way, denies

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[5] *Op. cit.* pp. 45-47.

[6] *Encyclopedia Biblica*, art. "Nativity," col. 3350-51.

in toto the historical character of Christ Whom he regards as myth, asserts that "Though the mystical character of the birth-legend is recognized by all who consent to apply rational tests to the Gospels, it remains important to keep in mind the nature and extent of the documentary proof that the myth is borrowed from Paganism. If that be lost sight of, the conditions of the composition of the Gospels cannot be properly realized. Strauss saw the birth-story to be a myth, but failed to note how emphatically it belonged to the surrounding Pagan world, seeing there rather analogies than sources.

"Now, the Virgin-Mother myth is universal in Paganism, and certainly has no recognized place in orthodox Judaism before the Christian era. The so-called prophecy of Isaiah (VII. 14) could never have been read as an announcement of a long-distant Parthenogenesis by the most insane Talmudism had not the myth of Virgin-birth first obtruded itself from the Pagan side. If, indeed, Judaism was to develop its slowly-formed Saviour-myth at all, it could scarcely avoid the datum that he be born of a Virgin-Mother. All the Saviour-Gods of Paganism were so reputed, either in respect of the mother being a mortal while the father was a God, or in that the mother too was a Goddess, and as such termed a virign by way of adoring flattery, as all male Gods were termed beneficent, whatever might be the cruelty of their supposed deeds. It was perhaps in the same spirit that those goddesses who were specially distinguished as virgins Athene and Artemis and Persephone, at times received the title of mother; but the converse was a more familiar usage. There, as above noted, Here, wife of Zeus and Queen of Heaven; Cybele, the "mother of Gods;" Leto, mother of Apollo and Artemis; Demeter, the Earth-mother, who, as such, equates with both Ceres and Vesta; and Venus herself, were all "Virgins" as much as Isis, who was at once sister and wife (and in a late version the mother) of Osiris, and was fabled to have been deflowered in the very womb of her own mother. And Dionysos in particular came to figure indifferently as son of Demeter, the Mother, and of Persephone, the "Maiden," styled "pure."

"All of these Goddesses in turn became associated with the *Virgo Caelestis*, the Virgin of the Zodiacal sphere, who, with her extended branch or ear of corn, was, no doubt, with other ancient figures of fruit-holding Goddesses, the kernel of the myth of Mother Eve and her apple, besides lending herself to the Jewish "prophecy" of the Messianic "branch." Demeter was the "corn-bearer," the "sheaf-bearer," the "leaf-bearer," and the "fruit-bearer." And as regards the special machinery of the Joseph and Mary myth—the warning in a dream and the abstention of the husband—it is a simple duplication of the story of the relations of the father and mother of Plato, the former being warned in a dream by Apollo, so that the child was Virgin-born." (*Christianity and Mythology*, London, 1900, pp. 317-318.

The numerous alleged virgin-birth parallels, found in Greek or Hellenistic hero-stories and legends, have been collected in Hartland's *Legend of Perseus*, Usener's *Religion-Geschichtlicher Untersuchungen*, 70-75; Seydel's *Evangelium von Jesu*, 110-133; Robertson's *Christianity and Mythology*, 317-319; Soltau, in the extracts appended to his book *The Birth of Jesus Christ*; and Frazer, in the new edition of his *Golden Bough*, Part IV. (Adonis Attis Osiris), p. 79, 219 sq. and 236 sq. These stories refer to the well-known fables of Hermes, Dionysus, Aesculapius, Hercules, Danae, Melanippe, Auge, Antiope, Semele, Cybele, Adonis, Hephaestus, Perseus, and last but not least to that of Plato related by Diogenes Laertius in his account of the life of the great Greek philosopher.

CRITICISM OF THE PRECEDING THEORY.

It cannot be denied that in these fables we find a divine origin ascribed to all these heroes, legendary or historical. But this is not the question at issue. The question at issue is I. Whether these Greek birth-stories are strictly parallel to that of the Virgin Birth of Jesus; and II. Whether these Greek legends and superstitious beliefs can be shown to have formed the basis of the gospel narratives in question, or to have influenced them in any way. Now, the second proposition has been dealt with at length in the preceding pages. It is strange, however, how Soltau can believe that Matthew and Luke could have copied or imitated Hellenistic legends concerning gods, goddesses, and heroes, when he himself states that these same legends were ridiculed and laughed at by the people. It would have been a staggering blow to the early Christians to be told that the Infancy narrative of Jesus was nothing but a plagiarism of Greco-Roman legends which were stupid, ridiculous and anything but edifying! The men who wrote the Gospels, had, to say the least, too much good taste and good sense for that. The differences, moreover, between the gospel narrative of Jesus' virgin birth and those of Hellenic mythology must not be overlooked. The early Church Fathers, who had to deal with these same objections, were perfectly aware of this great contrast. "God's own Son," says Tertullian, "was born,—but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His paternal origin. It was not His lot to have as His father, by incest with a sister, or by violation of a daughter, or another's wife, a god in the shape of a serpent, or ox, or bird, or lover, for his vile ends transforming himself into the gold of Danaus. There are your divinities upon whom these base deeds of Jupiter were done."[7] Origen, equally emphatic: "Since Celsus has introduced the Jew disputing with Jesus, and tearing in pieces, as he imagines, the fiction of His birth from a Virgin, comparing the Greek fables about Danae, and Melanippe, and Auge, and Antiope, our answer is that such language becomes a buffoon and not one who is writing in a serious tone".[8] Thus also Justin and Aristides.[9]

But the principal objection against these so-called parallels is that they are not, not a single one of them, parallels at all. It is a fact that not one of these stories has anything to do with a Virgin Birth in the sense with which alone we are here concerned, and which forms the most striking feature of the gospel idea of Christ's birth. The gods of whom these scandals are narrated are conceived as beings like in form, parts and passions, to mortal men. A god, inflamed by lust, sometimes in the form of a beautiful youth, sometimes in that of a bull, of a bird or of a serpent, surprises a maiden, and gets her with child by natural generation. There is nothing here analogous to the Virgin Birth of the Gospels. "The stories themselves," as Prof. Orr remarks, are incredibly vile. The better minded in Greece and Rome were ashamed of them. Plato would have them banished from his Republic. They were, as Tertullian tells us, the subjects of public ridicule.[10] It is a strange imagination that can suppose that these foul tales could be taken over by the Church, and, in the short space before the composition of our Gospels, become the inspiration of the beautiful and chaste narrative of Matthew and Luke!"[11]

As to the specific cases of Plato, Alexander and Augustus, it is sufficient to remark that as a matter of fact, the fathers and mothers of these personages were perfectly well known, and the flattery which ascribed to them a divine parentage deceived nobody. The people knew perfectly well that these legends were not to be accepted as narratives of fact. And even if they were, there is yet no real analogy with the Virgin Birth of the Gospels. A quite worthless fable (invented only after Plato's death, and suggested by the afterthought of his mental greatness and superiority) made Plato a son of Apollo. But this is not connected with the idea of his mother being a virgin. Furthermore, as Dr. Gore remarks, none of the pagan writers cited refers to Plato as born of a virgin,[12] and there is no evidence that any such story of the birth of Plato was known in the days of Speusippus, Plato's nephew; and even if Plato's mother is regarded in any of the accounts as a virgin, yet the authorities are so conflicting that it would be most precarious to build upon their statements. Diogenes Laertius, who is well known for his tendencies to mythomania, in his account of the life of Plato, mingles together history and legend, truth and fiction, in a wholesale manner;[13] and the origin of the birth story in this case is most probably to be sought for in the eagerness with which in the Grecian world similar stories gathered around great and illustrious names.[14] Diogenes himself lived and wrote in the second or third century after Christ, that is to say, seven centuries after Plato, and he is practically the only writer who attributes to Plato a divine origin and makes out of his mother a virgin. Nowhere is our critics' partiality more flagrant than in this case. Diogenes Laertius' fable originated seven centuries after its supposed event; that of Matthew and Luke but few years after Christ, and yet the first is placed on the same footing as the other! The fifty years space of time elapsed between the death of Christ and that of the final redaction of the narratives of Matthew and Luke is regarded by our critics sufficiently long to invent, develop and fabricate legendary stories concerning the birth of Christ; while, on the other hand, seven centuries distance between Plato and his fabulous and mytho-maniac historian, Diogenes Laertius, is easily passed over. We are aware, of course, of the fact that our critics are far from attaching any historical value to Diogenes' assertion concerning Plato's virgin birth and divine origin; but it is not less true that their lack of historico-critical discrimination between the two cases is as regrettable as pernicious and discouraging. We are even told that Diogenes Laertius, story is based on older pre-Christian sources such as Speusippus' *Funeral Banquet of Plato*, Clearchus' *Panegyric on Plato*, which is said to belong to Plato's generation, and Anaxilides', *History of Philosophers*. (John M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology* pp. 318-319). But our critics are apparently forgetful of the fact that their reading between the lines is not warranted by the text itself of these quoted authorities, some of whom have either not come down to us at all, or have been preserved only in fragmentary and mutilated condition. We challenge, furthermore, the authorship and genuinness of these alleged quotations. In the case of Alexander, it is clear that the legend, which, according to Soltau himself, was invented by the priests, distinctly affirms that he was begotten by a serpent cohabiting with his mother; and no suggestion whatever is made of the virginity of the latter. The same may be said of the case of Augustus' mother who, while asleep in the temple, was visited by Apollo who thus became the father of Augustus. Here, again, there is no question of a virgin birth. The principal fables regarding the birth of these Greek and Roman heroes are not so much concerned with the mothers as with the fathers of the same. To the Greeks and the Romans, the idea that a woman could bring forth children without sexual intercourse with some male agency was unthought of. To them the birth of a child presupposes carnal relations, the only difference being that while in the case of ordinary mortals the father of the child is an ordinary man, in that of the heroes, semi-gods and emperors the father is, instead, a god, who, in human or animal guise, performs the function of husband and father. It is evident, therefore, that the critics have signally failed in establishing a parallel.

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[7] *Apologia*, 21.

[8] *Contra Celsum*, i. 37.

[9] In their respective *Apologies*.

[10] *Apologia*, 15.

[11] *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York, 1907, p. 169.

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[12] *Dissertations Connected with the Subject of the Incarnation*, p. 291.

[13] On the worthlessness of Diogenes' writings and stories see Croiset, *Histoire de la littérature Grecque*, vol. V. pp. 819-820. "Dans tout cela, ni plan réfléchi, ni pensée philosophique; et nul mérite, ni d' écrivain, ni de critique. Diogène a dépouillé d' autres ouvrages, c'est tout son rôle." op. laud. p. 820.

[14] R. J. Knowling, *Our Lord's Virgin Birth and the Criticism of to-day*, p. 47.

We may fitly conclude this study with Dr. Sweet's eloquent and masterly statement of the central point of this whole controversy. "The view of the relationship," he says, "between heathen myths and Christian facts also misses the truth by a failure to realize the significance of the central fact of Christianity; namely, the person of Christ Himself. The weakness of the heathen faiths consists, not so much in the principle of incarnation as in the specific applications which have been made of it. It is the distinction of Christianity that it takes this universal religious category and makes application of it to the supreme spiritual and ethical personality of history. This fact, at least, must be kept in mind throughout the entire discussion. If the categories under which Christ is interpreted are borrowed, which certainly is not proved, Christ Himself is not borrowed. Christ Himself is a fact, incontestable, primary, and original. Christianity rises at once by sheer ascent to the summit of originality by the assertion that the incarnation of Deity, for which universal man has longed and of which he has so persistently dreamed, was actually accomplished in Jesus of Nazareth. For, while the assertion is contradicted by the external circumstances of His career, by the reality, the simplicity, the humility of His human life, it is established, so far as any such transcendant assertion can be established by proof, by the ethical perfection, the spiritual completeness, and the historic supremacy of Jesus.

"The assertion that Christianity is a plagiarized and masquerading heathenism, is absurd in view of the fact that at precisely the vital point—the character of the personality upon whom the claim of authority depends—Christianity is conceded to be without a measurably successful competitor among heathen faiths.

"And, be it remembered, this is really the essential point at issue. Heathenism alleges that in her great men God has in some sense been present. The proof of such an allegation must rest primarily upon the character of the person concerning whom such statements are made. It seems to me perfectly evident that the heathen religions do not affirm concerning their great leaders and prophets all that Christianity claims for Christ, but even if they did, the proof must be framed from the life history of the person in question. Christ is Christianity's challenge to the world. Christ is the basis and the proof for every assertion which we make concerning the nature of God and His relationship to humanity. The supreme fact of Christianity is Christ. Our interpretation of Him in terms of metaphysics is a secondary and derivative question. We may have inherited or borrowed our metaphysics,—the question, however, is, have we inherited or borrowed the person whom we thus interpret? If Christ Himself is original, unique, supreme, our contention is established, and we may look with comparative indifference upon attempts to criticise our modes of apprehending and interpreting Him."[15]

In our next study we shall discuss the so-called Buddhistic birth-stories in their relation to the Virgin Birth of Christ.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

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[15] *Op. laud*, pp. 156-158.

CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY

Albert Reynaud, Ph. D.

Philosophy is not a popular thing. It lies under suspicion of being of small actual account. Under any of its aliases, or departments—metaphysics, psychology, mind, ethics, and what not—it has an abstract squint, in place of the "feel" of a real thing. And yet one of the deepest questions which it puts is, what is a real thing. We seem able to get along without it. For all practical purposes of daily life, we don't think of it at all. So it seems. And yet again, when we think a little, everybody, however unconsciously, has a philosophy of his own about things, their relations to each other, and their truth. Just as everybody has speech and the power of reason. It may be very uncouth, inconsistent and unrelated, part with part. We may not know just the right name for our notions, and we probably hardly use the names twice the same way and with the same precise meaning.

It is not translatable into money-signs; nor needful for pleasure purposes; nor do we readily see just where it does come into the facts of our daily activities. Yet again, to think this of life—does it not already involve a philosophy of a certain kind? And when we have the slightest inkling of what philosophy does mean, can we pick up a novel—nay, a daily newspaper—which does not teem, at least implicitly, with philosophical assumptions? Some may call this the philosophy of common sense; or the philosophy of practicality; or that of present day conventions. How wonderously variegated, indefinite, contradictory and incomplete:—and when we sit down to reflect, how unsatisfactory to a mind which really wants to know the truth. Yes, there is a natural philosophy for bread and butter purposes. Indeed, there is a natural philosophy of higher truths, however badly got up, which many sophisticated systems simply spoil in the mending.

Scientific philosophy tries to bring order out of this chaos; to reason out the wherefore of these crude assumptions; to inquire into their correctness or incorrectness—to know the truth. It is a reasoned and reflex attempt of the mind to render an account to itself, of itself and of things outside itself. To live a higher life than the brutes who live by instinct; to live by mind, which implies reason and reflection. To the consciousness of mind we owe the respect and duty to reason right; as to the consciousness of conscience we owe the duty to do right.

But this too is a philosophy.

If we take a broad view of humanity we find, so far as history goes, that it has always had its philosophers—its leaders in philosophical thought. Again, taking it in the broadest sense, all religious systems involve a philosophy. Even the pagan, or the atheist, had and has his own. Greater than the sword of conquerors, or the successes of the merchant princes—war or commercialism—History is dominated by the facts, or the fetiches, of the unknown God. The body of humanity may be coerced for a time by the physical power of the one. Its mind, even subconsciously, is forever affected by the moral power of the last.

Nor in its way is anything more interesting than the study of this subconscious influence of philosophy on the human race; none more wondrous than its occult and far-reaching effect even on dull minds; more inspiring than the efforts in each succeeding stage of time to soar above the immediate things of sense to the principles behind them; of the human mind to satisfy the craving, beyond bread, of an unquenchable and everlasting *why*. Its very vagaries, its labored profundities of speculation, have perhaps sometimes the greater attraction from the novelties they attempt. Men flock like bees around a new word, dreaming to find new honey in it. About these new words a generation will cluster, and form a hive for the time. Sometimes, insensate, they build a temple on them for human worship. A life spent in iteration of that word makes of the man a hierophant, and of his thought, a creed. So, for instance, the word evolution; from which scarcely a page of print on anything is free.

Observations, discovery, reflection, inference, speculation, add to the fund on which thought feeds. It seeks to assimilate it into a system of philosophy. Genius expends its ability to spell out better or more accurately or from new viewpoints, the accumulated data. New conditions bring forth new theories and readjustments of correlation—social, political and economical changes, discoveries in physical science, in historical knowledge, in means of investigation, in critical judgments and tests—lead to further views and statement. By no means are all these wise, or true, or good. But they evince the titanic effort of the mind to lift the Atlas of matter and of sense above its shoulders—to clear its sight; and to invest itself with the power to reason right. These things are some of the charms of philosophy—the *redde rationem* of the human mind.

II.

So much being said of the ground, effect and attractiveness of philosophy, it may be allowed to speak of its limitations and deficiencies; of the aberrations to which, unguided, it leads the human mind. Alas! a large chapter in history and of the subtler phases of human life. Lists of mind-giants with feet of clay; of shibboleths of one generation or two, turned into anathemas in the next. Reason without the chrism of Religion and Revelation often comes near as it can to spell insanity.

The suggestion is sometimes made of the need to embody into one harmonious system of concepts (*salvis salvandis*) various systems of concepts held out by the mind-builders of the past down to this day. It implies that they can be *universalized* in some great synthesis of world-wide acceptance.

The notion is alluring. It has some of the enchantments of evolution. It has features which have caused a yearning in many minds before. It bears witness to that centripetal force of the human mind towards unity—the synthesis of truth.

There is no readier word upon the tongue than the word synthesis. And it is a noble word. But human life, and so human thought, mark zymotic lines upon the page of history. Like a chart of temperatures, and stock market quotations, they zig-zag up and down. Mathematically, we can perhaps average them. Eclectically we can bind them together into one volume. Historically we can note their day and duration. But philosophically we cannot make two blacks into one white.

Truth cannot by any chemistry, mathematics or mechanism, reconcile contradictories. And it is, I think, some injustice to the ablest thinkers of the human race to assume that the system of thought to which they devoted a life's labor did not, in the main, *cohere*. It is an entirety. You cannot take a fragment here, and a fragment there, of that system, and disregard the rest, without bringing down the whole structure. The greater the thought, in its way, the more thorough and sincere in its main positions, so much the more is it enmeshed in the entire fabric. The higher the thought, so the more vital and primary. In the highst philosophy we deal with vital and primary principles and facts.

The thinker believes, or he does not believe, in things beyond the senses. He is deist or atheist, pantheist or agnostic. He believes in soul, or only in matter. He is pagan or Christian. Upon this, towards this, all his lesser thoughts, however unconsciously, converge. From his main position on this, they radiate. Is there a God? Is matter all we know? Are we and all things self activized? Are we free but answerable; or mechanically determined? Is there a hereafter and is immortality true? What is right and wrong, and what is truth? These are some of the problems with which every philosophy more or less has dealt—even if indirectly and under other names. How reconcile the differing answers, differing at least in so many respects, into any synthesis?

Many indeed have felt the attractiveness of embodying into a system the results of observation and the growth of physical sciences. There are concepts emphasized by later thought which sometimes did not stand out with all the same force or precision in older teaching. Mainly minor, however, and in the main related to physical observation. There are plain blunders, especially in physical knowledge, to be excerpted from the older teaching. In this lesser sense there is room for what might be called a new synthesis. There is always room for a hearty recognition of the labors and inquiries to which mighty minds have addressed themselves.

But on the main lines that make for life or death; for faith or despair; for right or wrong; for truth or error—philosophy is either divine or pagan.

III.

From a little reading of and some love for philosophy, and observation of the strange paths into which human speculation has led; and with all respect for those who have devoted themselves to the building of systems of philosophies—we come to this thought.

You cannot dissociate philosophy from religious truths, or it is irreligious. Because the higher truths, or if you like, the greater inquiries of philosophy, are coincident in the main with religious truths. It is Christian, or it is *un*-Christian. I will boldly say more. It is Catholic, or it is anti-Catholic. Because the Catholic Church has a philosophy; while our dissenting brethren have scarcely agreed on any one. But in any philosophy the preconceptions of religious men dominate their philosophy. So, too, with the non-religious, the irreligious, the materialist and the agnostic. These preconceptions run through the whole web and woof of their system. It makes for them; or it makes away from them. While, as I said before, I do not think it quite fair to those whom men have deemed great thinkers to dismember their thought; neither do I think it quite *honest* to say that you "abstract" altogether from any religious trend, or otherwise. It is there; for or against; *and on purpose.* Thus, I have found small comfort in "Theodicies" that claim divorce from any Theology; less, perhaps, in psychologies that "prescind" from the data of divine revelation; none at all, in Ethics which purport to walk straight with God and Christianity left out.

No synthesis lies there. To patch up these various systems into one, is a surgery of vital elements and essential principles. It is a synthesis of dismemberment; and not of life. It can't work.

Here, perhaps, one may see a just ground of the insistence of the Pope for a return to St. Thomas. His was a Christian philosophy, a Catholic philosophy.

Again; the data of the supernatural, of our deepest and noblest reflections, our Christian heritage—are facts. just as well as the data of physical science. They are part of our total equipment. Some may come within the powers of our unaided intellect. But their greatest cogency after all rests on the fact of God's witness. Philosophy must be reduced to a mere physical science, if it fail to take account of them. The groundwork of our belief in them, as of our belief in anything, is an ontological, psychological, ethical fact. It cannot be divorced from philosophy. They shed light on our other truths; they correlate them for us.

Without losing their religious sacredness or certitude philosophy can reverentially examine them; it can brush briars away from their path; expose the otherwise unexplainedness of things; beat down hostile views; and manifest their harmony with all else we know. It is plainly within its scope to examine the criterions of credibility, and to show that certitude is attainable and exists. Ah! there is a vital point in philosophical systems. But let it pass. Why dislocate truths so closely related? But again, for right results on the fundamental positions, it requires a right philosophy and a Christian philosophy.

No; to dissociate philosophy as a system of thought and principles from the dominant force and light of Religion, is to open the door to every aberration which the agile human mind can conceive. That those without the aid of God's revelation, or plainly rejecting it, have sometimes groped in reverential, nearing and admirable suggestion,—yes. That their thought sometimes, with splendid labor, has hit upon sidelong approaches towards religious truths—yes. That discoveries in physical sciences, and results of patient observation, acute comment and criticism, may (mostly in minor ways) require some absorption in Christian philosophy,—yes.

But you cannot synthesize, eclecticize or universalize into one, systems which clearly, often expressly, are based on disregard of the truths of Faith, or in absolute indifference to them. Opinion-belief may wag every whitherwise. Faith is of God. And Catholic philosophy is a handmaid of God's truth.

ALBERT REYNAUD.

THE FRANCISCAN MOVEMENT IN THE PROTESTANT AND RATIONALISTIC WORLD

Leo. L. Dubois, S. M., Ph. D.

I

No Saint has ever received such a tribute of admiration from the Protestant and Rationalistic world as St. Francis of Assisi. This fact is all the more striking as St. Francis, among all Saints, was a most devoted son of the Catholic Church and always showed the greatest veneration for the Holy Father. Not only that: his life was ever in close touch with the supernatural; wherever he went miracles became so common that they ceased to be wondered at. He was animated by the most vivid spirit of faith and this spirit passed into the hearts of all those who came near him. That he should have gathered such a following among Protestants and Rationalists seems at first an anomaly. A short account of the prime movers in this Protestant veneration of St. Francis, together with its main causes may not be uninteresting if only to show us what great minds even from without the fold have admired our Saint, and what is the loadstone that draws all hearts to the Poor Man of Assisi.

1. It is a popular impression that Paul Sabatier inaugurated this non-Catholic Franciscan movement. Forty years before he published his *Vie de St. François d'Assise* German Protestants were already at work on the subject. E. Vogt published his *Die heilige Franz von Assisi, ein biographischer Versuch* as early as 1840,[1] therefore even a year ahead of the long famous, but now superseded work of the Abbé Chavin de Malan.[2] In 1856 Karl Hase published *Franz von Assisi, ein Heiligenbild,*[3] and it is his work which, later translated into French by Ch. Berthoud,[4] gave occasion to Renan to publish his own study on St. Francis. In 1870 G. Voigt translated part of Jordan of Giano's Chronicles in his *Die Denkwuerdigkeiten des Minoriten Jordanus von Giano.* Until 1885[5] this was the only avail-

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[1] Tuebingen.

[2] *Histoire de S. François d' Assise,* Paris, 1841.

[3] Leipzig.

[4] *François d' Assise,* Paris, 1864.

[5] When these chronicles were published *in extenso* in the first volume of the *Analecta Franciscana.*

able text of these Chronicles which are such an important authority on the progress of the order in Germany and the crisis of 1219, while St. Francis was on his journey to the East.

On their side the English non-Catholic writers were not idle. In 1849 Sir James Stephens wrote an excellent essay on St. Francis in his *Essay in Ecclesiastical Biography*,[6] and J. S. Brewer published in 1858 in the first volume of the *Monumenta Franciscana*[7] the text of Thomas of Eccleston's Chronicles. Matthew Arnold with all his rationalistic tendencies wrote beautiful pages on St. Francis in his *Essays in Criticism*, published in 1865.[8] The life of St. Francis by Margaret Oliphant[9] is also well known

But it is particularly since 1884, the year of the centenary celebrations of St. Francis' birth, that Protestants and Rationalists vie with Catholics in their efforts to sing the praises of the little Poor Man of Assisi. The essay of Ernest Renan already referred to and published in his *Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire religieuse*,[10] Felice Tocco's *L'Eresia nel Medio Evo*[11] dealing extensively with the Franciscan movement, and the clever biography of Ruggero Bonghi, *Francesco d' Assisi*,[12] were published in the same year, 1884, while the following year saw the publication of the excellent works of Henry Thode[13] and of Karl Mueller, professor of theology at the University of Halle.[14]

A. Harnack's weighty references to St. Francis and the early Franciscan history must also be mentioned. In his *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, he consecrates some thirty pages to Franciscan matters,[15] and he also speaks of them at length in *Das Moenchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*.[16]

The work of the French Academician Emile Gebhart, *L'Italie mystique*[17] had probably more influence on the Franciscan movement among non-Catholics than is generally attributed to it. The view-point which he takes in the treatment of such subjects as Joachim of Fiora, St. Francis and the Franciscan apostolate, the exaltation of Franciscan mysticism, the Eternal Gospel, the Spirituals and the Fraticelli; then the ideas which he brings out, of contrast between the ideals of Francis and those of the Church, of the enthroning of Jesus, through the action of Francis, in the conscience of the people, instead of the Church and the priests, of the universal priesthood, as understood by St. Francis, of his supposed infractions of the discipline of the Church, of the absence of external worship in the Franciscan spirit—all this brings us very near to Paul Sabatier's life of St. Francis.

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[6] London.

[7] London, 1858.

[8] Cf. chapter on "Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment" in 1869 edition, pp. 183-210: Boston, 1865, pp. 174-199.

[9] London, 1871.

[10] Paris.

[11] Firenze.

[12] Città di Castello.

[13] *Franz von Assisi und die Anfænge der Kunst der Renaissance in Italien*, Berlin, 1885, 2nd ed. 1904.

[14] *Die Anfænge des Minoriten Ordens und der Bussbruederschaften*, Freiburg, i. B., 1885.

[15] Freiburg, i. B., 1890, Vol. III, p. 306, pp. 364-391.

[16] Giessen, 1903, pp. 49 58.

[17] Paris, 1890.

2. From the non-Catholic point of view by far the best known writer on St. Francis is Paul Sabatier.[18] Born in France (Cévennes) in 1858, he studied at the Faculty of Theology of Paris and was appointed vicar at the Church of St. Nicholas, Strassburg, in 1885. A few years later, he returned to his native country where he was pastor for a short time. His poor health forced him to abandon the active ministry and it is then that he began his literary career. He lives now at Chantegrillet, near Crest, Drôme, France, though Assisi seems to be a second home to him.[19] His famous *Vie de St. François d'Assise*, crowned by the French Academy, was published in 1894. The Pope, though he had shown by a congratulatory letter to the author that he admired the spirit which moved one outside the fold to pay this tribute of affection to a Catholic Saint, still, after mature consideration, placed his work on the Index of Prohibited Books. This life was soon translated into most modern languages and the French original went through ten editions within a few months and has now reached over thirty editions.

We must distinguish two parts in Paul Sabatier's work. In the first the author analyzes the sources of St. Francis' history with the acuteness of a true historian. The accusation of partiality brought against Thomas of Celano, the first historian of St. Francis, may be exaggerated; yet it has some foundation.[20] On the whole this study of the sources was by far the best ever published by any Catholic or non-Catholic writer. As to the second part of Paul Sabatier's work, the life proper, it has a distinctly Protestant tendency. The author is a liberal Protestant, and a belief in the supernatural, as we Catholics understand it, would be sought in vain in his life of St. Francis. So also, miracles are admitted only as extraordinary events which we cannot fully understand, but which are nevertheless natural. The miracle as a suspension or change of the laws of nature, or as a special intervention of the first cause is simply said to be immoral.[21] St. Francis indeed is represented as a devoted child of the Catholic Church, but no occasion is lost to speak of him as almost a prophet of the Protestant reformation and liberty of conscience. He was "a heretic without suspecting it."[22] He had come to preach a new religion, no longer the religion of Rome but that of humanity. Because he divined the superiority of the spiritual priesthood, he refused to be ordained priest.[23] The Roman Church or rather the "Roman Curia" hampered and narrowed down his ideal and put obstacles in the way of his reform. Hence the work of Francis has had only a partial success.

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[18] He should not be confounded with Auguste Sabatier, who was professor at the Faculty of Protestant Theology in Paris, wrote several works on religious questions, and died a few years ago.

[19] Last Spring M. Sabatier tried to secure the historical house of Bernard of Quintavalle, St. Francis' first companion. There followed protestations against such a holy shrine falling into non-Catholic hands; the price went up in proportion with the publicity given to the affair, with the result that M. Sabatier gave up the idea of buying this house, and, a few months ago, secured a fine villa at Assisi. *Saturday Review*, July 6th, 27, etc., 1907.

Paul Sabatier did not rest after this achievement. He threw himself heart and soul into the work of publishing the sources and documents relative to Franciscan history. In 1898 he published as a first volume of the *Collection de documents pour servir a l'histoire religieuse et littéraire du moyen Age*, the *Speculum Perfectionis* which caused as much commotion in the critical world as his *Vie de St. François* had four years before. He contended that the *Speculum Perfectionis* was the earliest document on St. Francis' life, written by his intimate companion as a protest against the innovations of brothers too friendly to the Church, and he found in it the confirmation of the theories advanced in his first work. The early origin and, though to a less extent, the polemic character, of the *Speculum Perfectionis* were immediately denied by most Catholic critics, while a few Catholics and all non-Catholics sided with Paul Sabatier.

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[20] Cf. the writer's article "Thomas of Celano the Historian of St. Francis of Assisi" in the *Catholic University Bulletin*, April, 1907.

[21] 29th edition, p. 401.

[22] *Ibid.* p. xiv, 94.

[23] *Ibid.* p. 8.

However, his opinions have since then been largely discarded and to-day only a few hold them.

Until a year or two ago, Paul Sabatier continued publishing at frequent intervals documents and studies on St. Francis, either in the *Collection de documents pour servir a l'histoire religieuse et littéraire du moyen Age* already mentioned, or in his *Opuscules de critique historique*, a series reserved for shorter works. Among the principal of these publications from P. Sabatier's pen may be mentioned: *Fratris Francisci Bartholi de Assisio Tractatus de Indulgentia S. Mariae de Portiuncula,*[24] *Actus B. Francisci et Sociorum ejus,*[25] *Regula Antiqua Fratrum et Sororum de Poenitentia seu Tertii Ordinis S. Francisci,*[26] *Description du manuscript franciscain de Liegnitz,*[27] *S. Francisci Legendae Veteris Fragmenta quaedam,*[28] *Description du Speculum Vitae B. Francisci et Sociorum ejus,*[29] *Nouveaux travaux sur les documents franciscains,*[30] *Examen de quelques travaux récents sur les opuscules de St. François,*[31] *Examen de la vie de Frère Elie du Speculum Vitae.*[32]

A new edition of the *Vie de St. François d'Assise,* revised according to the fresh data obtained from the newly published documents and from recent studies, has long been announced. But Paul Sabatier now seems to have abandoned, at least temporarily, the Franciscan field to launch into the question of Church and State in France and of Modernism. Since the publication of his *A propos de la Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat,*[33] no important Franciscan work has come from his pen and the *Collection de documents pour servir a l'histoire religieuse et littéraire du moyen Age* has been suspended for an indefinite period.

3. Paul Sabatier has had many admirers and faithful followers among non-Catholics, particularly in England; others after him have also written on St. Francis, but on more independent lines, and even in opposition to his views. Hence a considerable non-Catholic Franciscan literature which is still daily increasing has been the result.

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[24] Paris, 1900.

[25] Paris, 1902.

[26] Paris, 1901.

[27] Paris, 1901.

[28] Paris, 1902.

[29] Paris, 1903.

[30] Paris, 1903.

[31] Paris, 1904.

[32] Paris, 1904.

[33] 3me edition, 1906.

Many Churchmen like Dr. Creighton, late Bishop of London,[34] and Rev. J. H. McIlvaine, D. D., of Calvary Church, Pittsburg, Pa.[35] have made St. Francis the subject of their lectures and sermons. Staff Captain Douglas of the Salvation army presented him to the followers of Gen. William Booth as a model of the Salvationist spirit,[36] and W. P. Swainson, editor of *The Tolstoian*, as a model of mysticism for "practical idealists."[37] T. Edmund Harvey studied him from the Quaker standpoint and for the benefit of Quakers.[38] Rev. Augustus Jessop, Rector of Scarning, England,[39] Rev. James Adderley,[40] Canon W. J. Xnox Little,[41] Canon Rawnsley,[42] have written valuable works or essays on St. Francis and Rev. H. G. Rosedale published the text of Thomas of Celano's two legends of St. Francis.[43] Physicians, like Dr. A. Bournet,[44] university men and critics like Raffaele Mariano, member of the Academy of moral and political sciences of the Royal Society of Naples,[45] Dr. Ed. Lempp,[46] Prof. John Herkless, D. D., of the University of St. Andrews,[47] Dr. Edmund Wauer, professor at the Vitzthumsehen Gymnasium of Dresden,[48] A. G. Little, ex-Professor of the University of Wales, and, for several years, president of the British branch of the International Society of Franciscan Studies,[49] Dr. Friedrich Glaser, of the University of Munich[50], Walter Goetz, lecturer in history at the University of Munich,[51] H. Boehmer, professor at the University of Bonn,[52] Nino Tamassia, professor of History of Law, and of Ecclesiastical Law at the University of Padua,[53] etc., etc., have published books on St. Francis or the Franciscan movement that would do credit to any historical subject.

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[34] *English Historical Review*, Vol. V, No. 20.

[35] *St. Francis of Assisi. Six Addresses in Lent.* New York, 1902.

[36] *Brother Francis, or Less than the Least.* Red Hot Library. London, 1895.

[37] *Francis of Assisi, Saint and Mystic.* London, 1903.

[38] *St. Francis in History and the Life of to-day: A Study from the Quaker Point of View.* London, 1904.

[39] *The Coming of the Friars and other Historical Essays.* New York and London, 1889.

[40] *Francis the Little Poor Man of Assisi.* New York, 1901. Cf. also Adderley and Marsons: *Third Orders.* London, 1902.

[41] *St. Francis of Assisi: His Times, Life and Work.* London and New York, 1897. 2nd edition, 1904.

[42] *Sacrum Commercium.* London, 1904.

[43] *St. Francis according to Brother Thomas of Celano.* London, 1904.

[44] *St. François d'Assise, Etude Sociale et Médicale. Bibliothèque de Psychologie normale et pathologique.* Lyon and Paris, S. D.

[45] *Francesco d'Assisi e alcuni dei suoi piu recenti biografi.* Napoli, 1896.

[46] *Frère Elie de Cortone.* Paris, 1901; also articles in the *Zeitschrift fuer Kirchen-Geschichte* of Brieger.

[47] *Francis and Dominic and the Mendicant Orders: The World Epoch Makers.* New York, 1901.

[48] *Die Anfaenge des Klarissenordens in den Slawischen Laendern*, Leipzig, 1903. *Entstehung und Ausbreitung des Klarissenordens besonders in den deutschen Minoritenprovinzen*, Leipzig, 1906.

[49] *The Grey Friars in Oxford*, Oxford, 1892. *The Sources of the History of St. Francis of Assisi. English Hist. Review*, Oct. 1902. *Initia Operum Latinorum quae Saeculis xiii, xiv, xv attribuuntur.* Manchester, 1904.

Many feminine Protestant authors have also made St. Francis the subject of their writings. A good many of these are more or less sentimentalist, sharp in mind, but too much inclined to consider St. Francis with the eyes of the heart and imagination rather than with the eyes of reason, too apt also to follow blindly the lines traced by Paul Sabatier. There are some, however, whose volumes are not without merit, like Mlle. Arvède Barine,[54] Miss Anne Macdonell,[55] Anna M. Stoddart,[56] Emma Gurney Salter,[57] Lina Duff Gordon,[58] etc., etc.

This list could be drawn out to greater length; yet the principal non-Catholic works on St. Francis and Franciscan history have been mentioned. But it has not been enough for individual writers to join in the movement: an "International Society for Franciscan studies" was created in 1902 at Assisi, whose aims are: 1. to found an extensive Franciscan library; 2. to offer to Franciscan students the means of research in the city which is the natural center of Franciscan studies; 3. to put these students in relation with the persons who may best help them; 4. to compile a catalogue of Franciscan manuscripts in the various parts of Europe. Much of the organization of the Society was due to Paul Sabatier. Yet, as the aim was of universal interest, many Catholics of note joined it: Franciscan Friars, secular priests, bishops, prominent Catholic laymen, etc. The impression went around afterwards that the Society was more or less anti-

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[50] *Die Franziscanische Bewegung.* Stuttgart and Berlin, 1903.

[51] *Die Quellen zur Geschichte des hl. Franz von Assisi.* Gotha, 1904.

[52] *Analecten zur Geschichte des Franciscus von Assisi.* Tuebingen and Leipzig, 1904.

[53] *S. Francesco d'Assisi e la sua Leggenda.* Padova and Verona, 1906.

[54] *Saint François d'Assise et la Légende des Trois Compagnons.* 3me ed. Paris, 1901.

[55] *Sons of Francis.* London, 1902. *The Words of St. Francis.* London, 1904. *St. Douceline.* London, 1905.

[56] *Francis of Assisi.* London, 1903.

[57] *Franciscan Legends in Italian Art.* London, 1905; besides the translations of the *Legend of St. Francis* by the Three Companions, and the *Life of St. Francis* by St. Bonaventure, in the series of the *Temple Classics.* London, 1904.

[58] *The Story of Assisi.* London, 1905.

Catholic, and that its secret purpose, or, at least, spirit, was to study St. Francis as man to the exclusion of the Saint. Accordingly many of the Catholics who had given their names at first then withdrew. This withdrawal seems unfortunate and it is a matter of regret that Catholics have not by their influence shaped the Society into at least a fair organization for the study of St. Francis under all points of view. By keeping aloof from the movement, we force it, as it were, to be non-Catholic and exclusive, not to say anti-Catholic.

As it is, the Society has been the source of some good in the line of Franciscan literature. The main branch has published regular reports and valuable catalogues of libraries.[59] Lately it has decided on the erection of a commemorative bronze bas-relief near the original spot wherefrom St. Francis blessed his native city a few days before his death.

The British Branch of the Society, with its headquarters in London, has also been quite prolific, and not only have we from its reports, *Occasional papers* and the translations in *The Temple Classics* of some important Franciscan sources, but it is also to its influence that we must trace the activity in the Franciscan field of many of the English writers, particularly the women, mentioned above. Last November, the British Branch, largely at the instance of Prof. A. G. Little, changed its name from "International Society for Franciscan Studies; British Branch" to that of "British Society of Franciscan Studies," thereby declaring its autonomy; and promised the publication of several important works of English Franciscans.

The international review *Bullettino critico di cose francescane* under the direction of Luigi Suttina, is also the special fruit of the non-Catholic Franciscan movement. Unfortunately, this review, started in 1905, lasted only a short time. There are still attempts to revive it and the first number for 1906 appeared only a few months ago.[60] Yet its success becomes quite problematical. The publication[61] of the Catholic quarterly *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* on which Father Paschal Robinson, well known among English-speaking Franciscan students, has been appointed co-editor, may soon replace altogether its non-Catholic predecessor.

4. One more fact should be mentioned here—the introduction of practical Franciscanism into Protestant life. Not only are books

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[59] Particularly Prof. Leto Alessandri: *Inventario dell' antica biblioteca del sacro Convento di San Francesco in Assisi.* Assisi, 1906.

[60] October, 1907.

[61] *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum.* The first number appeared Jan. 1908.

written on Franciscan matters by Protestants, but there is in the Anglican Church a Franciscan Order and a Third Order and we are told that "the members of the Salvation Army in India largely use as their book of devotion and rule of life, the manual of the Third Order" of St. Francis.[62]

The Anglican Third Order has been particularly flourishing. Founded in 1891, the first six members were admitted in Durham by Canon Body. Miss E. E. Marshall,[63] was largely instrumental in promoting it and wrote several books on the subject.[64] At the London Diocesan Conference of 1892, the following resolution was brought forward for consideration: "That a wide-spread society, under episcopal sanction, somewhat on the lines of the Third Order of St. Francis, would tend to the encouragement of Church workers, to the better organization of Church work, and to the strengthening of the Church of England."

Shortly after, the Anglican Third Order was already established in several British colonies, in Guiana, Grenada, Barbados, and in Australia, and the General Secretary of its Council could "venture to say that the Tertiaries already prevail everywhere, so that the task is really to create order out of chaos, and to include in one grand organization (The Tertiaries or Third Order) the multitude of Churchmen and Churchwomen who have already embraced."[65]

The efforts of Leo XIII to restore the Third Order as expressed in his Encyclical *Auspicato*, are brought to mind when we read the words of Rev. W. Herbert Mayers, before a diocesan Synod in 1900: "I am convinced," he says, "that the principles of the Third Order are such, that if we could get it to be recognised, and if we could get our Church members to imbibe the spirit of this ancient order of the Church, most of the difficulties that face us in the Church would wane or vanish altogether."[66]

Finally, we may add that Father Paul James Francis, S. A., already well known as the editor of *The Lamp* and whose name has appeared lately in our American dailies as the leader in the movement among the Episcopalians for corporate reunion with the Catholic Church, professes to be a Franciscan in every thing except actual adhesion to the Holy See.

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[62] *Franciscan Annals.* Nov. 1906, p. 348.

[63] Whitecliffe Lodge, Ripon, Yorkshire, England.

[64] *The Dawn Breaking.* London; *Some Thoughts on the Third Order of St. Francis.* London, 1897; *The Anglican Third Order.* Coventry, 1901; *The Parochial or Third Order.* Oxford, 1901.

[65] *St. Francis of Assisi and the Third Order in the Anglo-Catholic Church.* By F. P. Luigi Josa, Oxford, 1903. p. 130.

[66] *The Parochial or Third Order*, p. 47.

II

Such wonderful activity in the Franciscan field, such a spirit of research, such minute examination of almost every act of the Poverello cannot be the effect of mere chance. There must be some deep underlying reason to account for the fact of the wide-spread interest in Franciscan studies among Protestants and Rationalists.

1. The first cause of this movement is St. Francis' personality itself which is not only most captivating, but also fully unveiled to us by a wealth of documents. "What is attractive in his life, is that, thanks to reliable documents, we reach the man behind the wonder-worker."[67] It is the man, evidently, not the Saint, that has brought to St. Francis so many admirers outside the Catholic Church. Of a childlike, imaginative, and emotional nature, he was always happy, joyous, exuberant with life; an enthusiast, he was confident of success; an idealist, an artist, he understood instinctively the beauties and harmonies of all created things and their relation of love to their Creator, and "he invited all to glorify, praise and bless Him;[68] a poet in mind and speech, he saw love and beauty everywhere, and in every being the image of something higher and greater, of something divine; he spoke in touching figures, and his words coming from a passionate heart inflamed the hearts of his hearers; friendly to the poor, to those who suffer, to the little and to the humble, he lived in closest sympathy with all creatures; the birds, the lambs, the wolves, were all his brothers and sisters, and they obeyed his brotherly requests; in fact fire itself ceased to burn at his bidding.

It is this lovely nature coupled with holiness and the power of working miracles which captivated men in his own time and drew around him the army of followers which soon filled the world. He was the type of the real Italian of the thirteenth century; in a word, he was a representative character, the ideal man of the times, and this is why he was so popular then, more popular than any other saint or wonderworker of his time. It is this also that makes him popular now. It is only a short time, since the period of history known as the Middle Ages began to find any appreciation outside of

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[67] P. Sabatier: *Vie de St. François*, p. viii.

[68] I Cel. 80.

Catholic circles; but it is already a favorite study to-day. Men recognize that St. Francis is a type of that age, and by understanding him better, they interpret more correctly the age of which he was the product and the representative. "We find in him the key to all that is best in the Middle Ages, even as in him the Middle Ages seem to have recognized their noblest ideal."[69]

Then again, St. Francis stands as a leader in the center of a great historical period, a period of dissatisfaction, hatred, enmities, strife, both in private and in social life. A crisis was at hand. It was the end of an old and the beginning of a new civilization: the feudal system was dying out, and the modern democratic organization was shaping itself. St. Francis stood on the dividing line and, through the gentle but powerful influence of his word and example, calmed the minds of the people and did much to avert from the world the evils attending such social crises.[70]

Above all, he is the center and leader of a religious movement in which Protestant admirers of St. Francis see the dawn of the reformation. "He brought the Gospel within the reach of all and showed how its application to daily life could bring about a heavenly happiness here on earth. He convinced them by practical examples that there were no exigencies, no difficult situations, that could not find their key and solution in the simple observance of the Gospel. Under his influence the religious life of the cloister spread over all the world and the Beatitudes became the privilege, not of a few, but of all simple-minded Christians."[71]

2. Another reason that has turned many eyes towards St. Francis is the study of arts, letters and of civilization in general.

It is a debated question among the Protestant admirers of St. Francis whether he originated the revival in art which began about his time. But all contend that he had the greatest influence on the movement.[72] St. Francis was possessed of an artistic temperament. He loved nature and all God's creatures. His views of the truths and mysteries of our religion were not speculative and abstract, but concrete and practical, and his plain appeals to the people were full of comparisons and figures taken from God's beautiful world; his emotional, imaginative nature manifested itself in all his actions and captivated all those around him. He became the popular Saint of Italy, and the inspiration of artists, painters, sculptors, and architects. Not only is he the favorite subject of more paintings of that age than any other Saint except the "Madonna," not only did art develop more particularly in the splendid monuments erected on his tomb, in Franciscan churches, and in other shrines consecrated to him, but his spirit gave life and feeling to the art of the times. We no longer see Byzantine art with its regluar and conventional forms that left no room for initiative or naturalness; we have now living figures, original in tone and imaginative in treatment, suggestive scenes from the lives of St. Francis, of Our Lord, of the Blessed Virgin, mystical representations of the Saint's virtues, as his marriage with Lady Poverty to whom he had never been unfaithful. The ancient Grecian art disappears before the young Italian art.[73]

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[69] Prof. W. E. Collins: *International Society for Franciscan Studies. British Branch, Occasional Paper* no. ii.

[70] H. Thode: *Franz von Assisi*, p. 4.

[71] P. Sabatier: *Vie de St. François*, p. 177, 319 etc.; H. Thode: *Franz von Assisi*, p. 521, etc.

[72] Cf. the works of Ed. Hutton, E. M. Salter, H. Thode, etc. referred above. E. Renan calls St. Francis "the father of Italian art."

"The birth of Italian painting," says John Addington Symonds,[74] "is closely connected with the religious life of the Italians. The building of the Church of St. Francis at Assisi gave it the first great impulse; and, to the piety aroused by St. Francis throughout Italy, but mostly throughout the valley of the Appenines, it owed its animating spirit in the fourteenth century."

Art becomes now the manifestation of Christian affection and sentiments; it is the expression of the popular ideas, of feelings common to all Christian hearts. At the same time it brings nearer to the people those mysteries in which they believed. The Gothic Churches became the books of the people and, as St. Francis had taught by examples, by dramatic narrations, so the Franciscan artists taught by mural paintings and sculptures and brought nearer to the hearts of the faithful Our Savior, His Blessed Mother, the Poverello, and the other Saints of the Church. Such was the ambition of the artists of this new Italian School, of Niccola Pisano, of Giovanni Pisano, of Guido da Sienna, of Cimabue, and of Giotto, who prepared the way for Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michael Angelo.

Again, if we trace Italian literature to its source, we reach St. Francis and find in him the inspiration for its most remarkable products during the thirteenth century.[75]

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[73] On the difference between these two styles cf. John Ruskin: *Modern Painters*. Boston, 1894, Vol. iii, pp. 248 seqq.

[74] *Renaissance in Italy*, Part III; *The Fine Arts*. London, 1877, p. 195.

[75] Cf. editions already quoted of M. Arnold, pp. 174-199; H. Thode, pp. 385-424; R. Mariano, pp. 174-181 etc.

His method of preaching, simple and intelligible to all, without any other ambition than that of touching hearts, paved the way for a popular literature. Latin as a means of expressing the ideas of the people fell more and more into disuse; the young Italian language taking its place, first in the friars' religious instructions and exhortations and then in popular literary productions. Who has not read the delightful *Fioretti* so thoroughly representative of the Italian people and so thoroughly Franciscan?

But it is particularly Italian poetry that received the inflow of St. Francis' spirit. It is the poet that Matthew Arnold admires in St. Francis: "Prose could not satisfy this ardent soul, and he made poetry....The beginnings of the mundane poetry of the Italians are in Sicily, at the court of kings; the beginnings of their religious poetry are in Umbria, with St. Francis. His are the humble upper waters of a mighty stream; at the beginning of the thirteenth century it is St. Francis, at the end, Dante."[76]

St. Francis' poetical temperament not only manifested itself in his own poetical utterances, particularly the *Laudes Creaturarum*, better known as the *Canticle of the Sun*,[77] one of the most ancient productions of Italian poetry, but it also inspired his followers. Fra Pacifico was poet laureate before joining the order and, certainly, St. Francis put no check on his poetical pursuits, for he saw in all his disciples the "Joculatores Domini," who went around singing the praises of the Lord and of Poverty, in the same manner as the Troubadours of his time went from castle to castle celebrating the exploits of heroes and the virtues of fair ladies.

Two true Franciscan poets, Giacomino da Verona, and still more Jacopone de Todi, "the mad penitent of Todi," form the link between St. Francis and Dante. Like Dante, Jacopone puts theology into popular garb and, under the vivifying fire of his poetical genius, the most sublime ideas take popular expression and are sung in the fields, on pilgrimages, in Churches. From the mystical poetry of Jacopone to the *Divina Comedia;* the ascent is easy. Dante knew Jacopone and his lyric compositions in which he found more than one inspiration. Nor was the great Italian epic poet ungrateful to the Umbrian

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[76] *Essays in Criticism.* Boston, 1865, p. 189.

[77] See, however, in the *Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana*, xxv, xxix, xxxiii, the opinion of I. della Giovanna, who with a few other critics, placed the *Canticle of the Sun* among the doubtful writings of St. Francis.

Saint who had by himself and through his sons prepared his way, for he celebrated with emotion the praise of him

> . . . ."la cui mirabil vita
> Meglio in gloria del ciel si cantarebbe".[78]

It would be interesting to English readers to trace the influence of St. Francis on English literature through Dante, Boccacio, and Petrarch on one hand, and Chaucer on the other. The influence cannot be denied; in what degree it was felt, would be a subject worthy of study.

Hence it is no wonder that artists and critics, litterateurs and students of civilization have become interested in St. Francis. For Catholics he is a great Saint, and that is enough; but for non-Catholics, he is an attractive personality, a representative character, the fountain-head of true Italian art and literature.

3. Would that we could stop here and say that there is no other influence pushing on the non-Catholic Franciscan movement! Unfortunately some publications, or passages in works otherwise praiseworthy, show that another motive has been at play, or at least that an occasion has been welcomed to make an attack on the Catholic Church. The Middle Ages were ages of faith of heroism, of devotion to a cause; they were the age of the Crusades, of knighthood, of great deeds. But there was also another side to this picture; there were bold heresies, crime, revolution against the Church, and against the state, a deep feeling of dissatisfaction with the old civilization; hence many complaints, criticisms, attacks against existing institutions and rulers. Religion already felt the upheaval that was to break out in the sixteenth century, and the monarchical system was no longer firm on its base. Could St. Francis and the movement created by him have been entirely foreign to these feelings?

Some writers find in him a representative, to a certain extent, of this spirit of dissatisfaction, a religious reformer opposed to the Church and its hierarchy. A great resemblance, they say, can be established between him and the heretics of his time, the Cathari and particularly the Waldenses, and he is made one of the first Joachimists. Some go so far as to look for a relationship between him and Buddha and suggest some secret influence of the Oriental Sage on the Umbrian Saint.[79] Others show in him the democratic revolutionist who fought on the side of the people against the Lords of Perugia, the friend of the townspeople, of that Third Estate which was destined to become the future free republics; they make him almost the leader against the old ideals of monarchy and let the readers understand that he had a secret antipathy for the privileged classes of lords and clergy.

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[78] Dante, *Parad.* xi.

[79] Cf. the writer's article on "St. Francis and Buddha" in the *American Catholic Quarterly*, April, 1907.

Besides, the Franciscan order, in its beginnings, was not exempt from the difficulties and strainings attendant on the foundation of all great institutions. The two parties of Mitigants and Spirituals existed already in fact, though not in name, before St. Francis' death. Brother Elias was not the only one that caused scandal in the order. All this makes excellent working material and interesting reading for the non-Catholic world, and it contributes its share to the Franciscan movement outside the Church. What is, for instance, G. Coulton's volume[80] but a collection of facts with a view to bring out the dark side of this agitated period.

Add to this a good deal of sentimentality in favor of poor Francis, so lovely, so sweet, and yet persecuted, or at least hampered by the "intolerant" Catholic "Curia," as it is called contemptuously, and you will have the main elements that have caused this furore for Franciscan history.

III

1. Hence one of the first results[81] of this non-Catholic movement has been the criticism, at times very bitter, of the Catholic Church, its methods, its organization. Without the Church the reform movement created by Francis would have been far more successful; but the Church has interfered, and not only hampered the liberty of conscience of the Poverello and retarded the emancipation of which he was the prophet, but reduced him to the simple condition of a canonized Saint, and transformed his movement into an order very much like the old orders which defend and protect the Church and its hierarchy against the encroachments of progress and liberty of conscience.

2. Yet this unfortunate result is amply counterbalanced by others which have turned to the glory of St. Francis and of the Catholic Church. These results may be classified as literary, historical and moral.

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[80] *From St. Francis to Dante.* London, 1906.

[81] Cf. "Non-Catholic Work in Franciscan Studies" by R. E. in *The Catholic World,* Sept. 1906. pp. 721-732.

Many of the documents on St. Francis which were rare or difficult to obtain, have been republished and are now in the hands of every Franciscan student. For instance, ten years ago, practically the only available documents were the lives published in the *Acta Sanctorum*, that is, the First Life of Thomas of Celano, that of the Three Companions and that of St. Bonaventure. The First Life of Thomas of Celano edited by Rinaldi and Amoni had long been out of print and there was no other edition of the life of the Three Companions. Hence of these three documents, only the life by St. Bonaventure could be had separately, and as every one could not have under his hand the *Acta Sanctorum*, the study of Franciscan history was the privilege of the few. Besides, in the *Acta Sanctorum* there were missing some very important documents: the Second Life of Thomas of Celano which was then out of print, the Annals of Jordanus of Giano unpublished yet, the *Speculum Perfectionis* not yet disentangled from the *Speculum Vitae*, etc....These works and many others are now accessible to all. This is largely the result of the present non-Catholic movement in Franciscan studies; not however that non-Catholics alone have published such works, but it is, to a great extent, the pressure of this non-Catholic movement that has aroused Catholics and incited them to contribute their mite towards the publication of these documents. The two lives of Thomas of Celano, for instance, had been promised by Father Edward d'Alençon several years ago; but their publication being delayed beyond endurance, Rev. H. G. Rosedale brought forth an edition,[82] which was very imperfect indeed, but which forced Father d'Alençon soon after to give to the world his excellent work.

Then again, these sources have been studied, compared and translated, until a very abundant literature has already been created. The value of these Fransiscan sources is better understood. Thirty or forty years ago one could write a life of St. Francis on the sole authority of Wadding; to-day, no one would dare attempt such a work without being perfectly acquainted with the early documents.

As a consequence the history of St. Francis and of his time is far better known now than it was half a century ago. The Saint had been studied—not the man. Not only the first biographers, but many of those who came after them and until very recently, saw only the Saint and miracle worker in St. Francis. Now, the man, the poet, the reformer, have been brought out; this has been done sometimes in a more or less one-sided view and to the detriment of the Saint and of truth; but the equilibrium will be re-established little by little, and we already know more of Francis owing to his modern biographers and in spite of the false coloring which at times is given to the facts. We also know better the origins of the institutions created and inspired by him, particularly of the Third Order; we understand better the early history of the Order, the doings of Brother Elias, the formation of the two hostile parties in the Order. A new light has been thrown on the influence of St. Francis on literature, art, civilization, etc.

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[82] Cf. the interesting controversy regarding this edition in the *Saturday Review*, May 12, 1906, and following numbers.

But as neither St. Francis and his influence, nor the history of his order could be understood without a thorough knowledge of the times in which he lived, the century of St. Francis, also, has been studied with renewed interest. The heresies, the democratic movements, the fall of the feudal system, have been canvassed one after the other. The "Middle Ages" from a term of contempt has become a favorite study with many, and this correction of a false view must be, at least partly, attributed to the study of St. Francis. The period is admired and loved for its spirit of activity, aggressiveness, enthusiasm, universal sympathy and devotion to all that is great and noble.

By being better known the Middle Ages have become a model and lesson to us. The ideal of St. Francis and of his disciples has appeared to us in all its beauty. We compare it to ours and we wonder whether our much vaunted standard is really superior to that of the poor and childlike St. Francis. As an individual, he was better and happier than we are and the study of his life and deeds cannot fail to incite in us a desire to be more like him and to imitate him. We soon learn by sad experience that the world is not a synonym of happiness and that our sore hearts will find far more comfort in drawing nearer to God than in the enjoyment of the short-lived pleasures of this life. So St. Francis has also tried to reform the world and his attempts have not been without success. How did he accomplish his reform? Through the modern methods? Through violent opposition of parties, the preaching of revolution, of the rights of man, etc.? No, but by justice and kindness. He taught men their duties as well as their rights. He put the love of God and of our neighbor, before every thing else, and tried to reform men, not institutions, the individual, not the organization. Are not his methods those that will bring us success? We have here food for reflection. These are still the methods of the Catholic Church. Is she right?

LEO L. DUBOIS, S. M.

THE STORY OF ASSYRO-BABYLONIAN EXPLORATIONS

Gabriel Oussani, D. D.

To give in a few articles, a complete or even a fair account of the rise, progress and results of Oriental Archeology in the last fifty or sixty years of excavations would be an impossible task. Such an account would fill volumes, and what a record it would be:—Narratives of travels, romantic adventures, perilous undertakings, unflagging intellectual labors, startling discoveries, and historical and literary anecdotes innumerable. Indeed, the wonders have been so numerous and so startling that they almost transcend the limits of literary sobriety. But such discoveries have been, and are yet, so frequent that we are actually growing to be accustomed to them. We have come to expect a tale of wonders in each succeeding report from the camps of our travelers and excavators, out amid the solitary and desolate ruins of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Elam, Palestine, Syria or Arabia. And a legion of other no less patient and competent workers are diligently engaged in collecting, editing, translating and studying the immense literary and archeological treasures which have been constantly accumulating in our libraries and museums. The mysterious East has showered on us its gifts and hidden treasures with a truly Oriental generosity. Discoveries which, a quarter of a century ago, would have stirred the whole civilized world are nowadays matters of ordinary occurrence. Indeed, the materials for study have increased much more rapidly than the supply of competent students to handle them. In spite, however, of this deficiency no other science has made such rapid and substantial progress, no other department of intellectual activity has scored more scientific conquests and trophies in such a short period of time; and it is not less certain that within a decade or two our knowledge of those ancient West-Asiatic peoples will be greatly increased and enriched by fresh researches and discoveries.

In this and in the following issues we shall endeavor to sketch in bare outlines the progress as well as the principal results achieved in the various fields of Oriental Archeology, such as Assyriology (Assyria, Babylonia and Elam), Egyptology, Palestinian and Syrian (including Hebrew, Aramean, Canaanite, Moabite, etc.), Hittite and South Arabian archeology.

I

HISTORY OF THE ASSYRO-BABYLONIAN EXPLORATIONS AND DISCOVERIES.[1]

PART I.

In 1849, Sir Henry Layard, the foremost pioneer of Assyro-Babylonian explorations, in the preface to his classical work entitled *Niniveh and its Remains* remarked that, previously, with the excepception of a few cylinders and gems preserved elsewhere, "a case hardly three feet square" in the British Museum "enclosed all that remained not only of the great city, Niniveh, but of Babylon itself!"[2] At that time, few, indeed, would have had the presumption even to imagine that within fifty years Assyria and Babylonia would have given us the most venerable, primitive, and extensive literature of the ancient world. What, fifty years ago, belonged to the world of dreams is, at the present time, a striking reality; for we are now in possession of the priceless libraries of the ancient Assyrians and Babylonians, of their historical annals, civil and military records, state archives, diplomatic correspondence, text-books and school-exercises, grammars and dictionaries, religious hymns and sacred songs, bank accounts and business transactions, laws and contracts, as well as an extensive collection of geographical, astronomical, mythological, magical and astrological texts and inscriptions.[3] These precious monuments are scattered in the public and private Museums and tra collections of Europe, America and Turkey-in-Asia.[4] The total number of Cuneiform tablets, cylinders and inscriptions, so far discovered, is approximately estimated at not less than three hundred thousand, which, if published, would easily fill 400 volumes in 8o of 400 pages each.[5] Unfortunately, only about one fourth of these inscriptions, so far discovered, have been published; but these contain more than eight times as much literature as is contained in the Hebrew of the Old Testament.[6] The British Museum alone has published 440 folio, and over 900 quarto pages of cuneiform text,[7] and considerably more has been published in France, England, Germany and America in books, reviews, and archeological publications.[8] The British Museum alone has more than 100,000 cuneiform texts,[9] the Louvre more than 30,000, the Imperial Museum of Berlin more than 10,000, that of the University of Pennsylvania more than 20,000 and the Imperial Ottoman Museum at Constantinople[10] many thousands more awaiting the patient toil of the Assyriologists. The library of the famous Assyrian King Assurbanipal (668-636 B. C.) at Kouyundjik, originally discovered by Rassam[11] and afterwards unearthed by Layard and Smith, must have contained over one hundred thousand tablets.[12] At Tello alone (Layash) M. de Sarzec found more than 30,000[13] while Dr. Hilprecht estimates the number at Nippur to be about

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[1] The term "Assyriology" is nowadays universally employed to denote that branch of Oriental studies which relates to the history, archeology, mythology, languages and literature of Assyria, Babylonia and Chaldea; and secondly to all those monuments and inscriptions which are inscribed in the Assyro-Babylonian language and script in their different dialectical and scriptural varieties such as those found in North-West Mesopotamia (the Kingdom of Mitanni), in Van in Armenia, in Elam and Persia, in Tell-el Amarna, in Egypt, and in some parts of Syria and Cappadocia. The use of the term in these latter cases is scarcely justifiable; but its universal acceptance, and, above all, the lack of a better term, are sufficient reasons for maintaining it. The appellation is based on the fact that the first, most important and most numerous of the Cuneiform inscriptions were found in the land of *Assyria*,—in the neighborhood of the modern city of Mossoul. The following account of the various explorations and discoveries in Assyria and Babylonia, down to 1877, is based mainly on the accounts and publications of Layard, Botta, Rassam, G. Smith, Kaulen, Vigouroux, Hommel, Brunengo, S. J.; Harper, Rogers, Hilprecht and Fossey. The titles and dates of these publications will be given in the course of this article.

[2] "Introduction," page xxv, quoted by Driver in his essay on *Hebrew Authority*, page 3.

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[3] It is noteworthy that in variety, antiquity and importance no other literature of the ancient world can possibly compete with that of Assyria and Babylonia. It is strange, however, that, although the language of the Assyro-Babylonian monuments and inscriptions is, phonetically and linguistically considered, one of the most decayed Semitic dialects, the Aramaic excepted, and while Arabic has more faithfully preserved the original features of the primitive Semitic speech, nevertheless, the former has given us the most ancient and voluminous literary productions, and the latter, notwithstanding the important discoveries of Halevy, Glaser and others, gives evidence of a very small and insignificant literature before the Christian era. Arabic literature, properly speaking, does not go much further back than the sixth or fifth century after Christ, or about one century before Mohammed.

[4] The British Museum in London has the richest collection of Assyro-Babylonian monuments and inscriptions. The so-called *Kouyunjik Collection* alone fills a catalogue of five large volumes in 4o. (Cf. Bezold's *Catalogue of Cuneiform Tablets in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British Museum*, London, 1880-89). Next in importance is that of the Louvre in Paris, most of which belongs to the Gudea period (about 4,000 B. C.), discovered by the late M. de Sarzec. Then come those of Constantinople, Philadelphia, Berlin, and New York.

[5] Comp. Menant *Bibliothèque de Ninive*. Paris, 1880, p. 30. Vigouroux *La Bible et les Découvertes modernes*. 6th ed. Paris, 1896, Vol. I, p. 191.

[6] Price, I. *The Monuments and the Old Testament*, p. 62.

[7] Cf. H. Rawlinson's *Inscriptions of Western Asia*, London, 1861-1891, in five vols. in folio, with the collaboration of Hinks and G. Smith; and *Cuneiform Texts in the British Museum*, by Pinches and King, of which 20 parts have already appeared. Comp. also *The Historical Inscriptions of Assyria*, by King and Budge, the first volume of which, containing the annals of Assurbanipal, appeared four years ago, London, 1904.

[8] The various publications of Assyro-Babylonian texts and translations will be given further on.

[9] The Assyro-Babylonian monuments and inscriptions in the British Museum are arranged in several very large rooms, while thousands of inscribed bricks are still enclosed in large cases awaiting future workers and decipherers. Comp. Vigouroux, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 154.

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[10] In a decade or two the Constantinople Museum will undoubtedly have the largest and most important collection of Assyro-Babylonian antiquities. By a very stringent resolution of the Sultan and of his Minister of Public Instruction, the right to excavate is granted to European and American expeditions on condition that the monuments and inscriptions found must go to Constantinople as exclusive and inalienable property of Turkish Government, only duplicates being allowed to go to the European and American Museums. The disposition of the Law is as follows: Article III. "All the antiquities discovered in the Ottoman territory, be it on the surface, underground, or exhumed, picked up in the sea, the lakes, the rivers, the streams, or the valleys, are the property of the Government." Article VIII. "The exportation of antiquities found within Ottoman territory is absolutely forbidden." Article XII. "The antiquities excavated with an official permit belong to the Imperial Museum, and the excavators have only the right to take drawings or moulds." A complete English translation of the Turkish law on archeological excavations can be found in Dr. Peters' *Nippur*, Appendix D: Vol. I, pp. 303-309; and in Harper's *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature*, pp. xvii-xxiv. The severity of these laws is undoubtedly due to the influence of Hamdy Bey, the Director of the Stamboul Museum, himself one of the most accomplished modern explorers and archeologists.

[11] Mr. Rassam himself tells us that beyond a few notices, "no record has appeared anywhere of the share I have had in Assyrian and Babylonian discoveries; the consequence was, that not many years afterwards some of my acquisitions were attributed to others, and, actually, the Assyrian legend of the Creation and Deluge tablets, which I found in Ninive, in Assurbanipal's palace, in 1853, were credited to Mr. George Smith's exploration, which he undertook for the proprietors of the *Daily Telegraph* twenty years afterwards, because, forsooth, he was the first Assyrian scholar who had deciphered them! Even in the present ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in which historical records ought to be strictly correct, the following appears in a note in Vol. VXII, page 512, referring to Assurbanipal's palace: 'In this palace is the famous library-chamber from which Layard and George Smith brought the tablets now in the British Museum.' Whereas, when I discovered them, the former had ceased his connection with the Assyrian excavations, and the latter could not have been more than nine or ten years of age!" *Asshur and the Land of Nimrod*, by Hormuzd Rassam. New York, 1897, page v-vi.

[12] Comp. Sayce, *Smith's Chaldæan Account of Genesis*, London, 1880, p. 15 and p. 2; Birch, *Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archeology*, tom. I, 1872, p. 5; Ménant, *La Bibliothèque des palais de Ninive*, Paris, 1880; Rogers, *History of Assyria and Babylonia*, Vol. I, pp. 170-171.

[13] Rogers, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 238. G. Duncan, in the *Biblical World*, Chicago, 1903, Vol. XXII, p. 116; Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*. . . pp. 247-48 and 257.

250,000.[14] Sometimes large slabs from six to ten feet in height are found and these slabs as well as the many cylinders, statues, seals and objects of art contain not only pictures of kings, priests, gods, sacrifices, legendary and mythological representations, lively scenes of battles and sieges; they are also, in the majority of cases, covered with inscriptions. These monuments and inscriptions date from prehistoric times, or before 5000 B. C., down to the first century before the Christian era.[15] But this is not all, for according to the unanimous opinion of modern Assyriologists, by far the largest and probably the most important part of the Assyro-Babylonian literature is still buried under the fertile soil of those wonderful lands, awaiting the fortunate spade of the future explorer. This will not appear surprising when we consider that out of the more than one hundred mounds and ruins, so far identified in Assyria and Babylonia as containing the remains of buried cities, only a very small number have been explored, and of these scarcely more than half a dozen with thoroughness. The soil of Mesopotamia unquestionably holds in store for us still greater and more valuable treasures than those already found.[16]

Furthermore, the prominent part assigned to these Assyro-Babylonian discoveries in connection with the exegesis of the Old Testament is, of course, of capital importance for us, as it opens up the whole question of the influence of the Assyro-Babylonian religion, civilization and literature upon those of the ancient Hebrews. This Babylonian influence can be traced, not only in Israel, but through all Western Asia, from the mountains of Armenia to the deserts and oases of Arabia, and from the Caspian and Persian-Elamite regions to the Mediterranean shores, many centuries before the conquest of Palestine by the Israelitish tribes.[17]

As we have already remarked,[18] the meagre and often unreliable information about Assyria and Babylonia, which has come down to us through the Persian, Greek, Latin and Arabic historians and geographers, has contributed little or nothing to the advancement of our knowledge of these countries. The early European travellers in the region of the Tigris and Euphrates valley, such as Benjamin of Tudela[19] (1160 A. D.), John Eldred[20] (1583 A. D.), Anthony Shirley[21] (1599 A. D.), Pietro Della Valle[22] (1614-1626), John Cartwright[23] (1610 A. D.), Casparo Balbi[24] (1590 A. D.), John Otter[25] (1734 A. D.), Niehbur[26] (1765 A. D.), Beauchamp,[27]

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[14] *Biblical World*, loc. cit; Hilprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 524 and 529.

[15] The latest Assyrian inscription thus far discovered bears the name of the Parthian King Pacorus who reigned between 77 and 111 after Christ. Comp. Maspero, *Histoire ancienne des peuples de l'Orient*, 5th edit., Paris, 1893, p. 711, note; and Oppert, *Mélanges d' archéologie égyptienne et assyrienne*, tom. I, p. 23-29.

[16] Comp. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 14; and Lagrange, *Etudes sur les Religions Sémitiques*, Paris, 2d edit., 1905, page 67.

[17] Comp. the writer's article in the *Open Court* of Chicago, "Is the Bible in Danger," 1904.

[18] Article cit., page 780.

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[19] He is probably the first European traveller who has left us any authentic record of his visit to Assyria and Babylonia. Benjamin of Tudela was a Jewish Rabbi of distinction. He made in 1160, an extensive journey through France, Italy, Greece, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, etc., and returned by way of Arabia, Egypt and Sicily, after 13 years of travel. He wrote his narrative in Hebrew, and it was published for the first time in Constantinople in 1543. In 1633, it appeared with a Latin translation at Leyden, and afterwards in French and English, thus becoming well known in Europe. The object of his long journey was to study the social and religious conditions of the Jewish Communities of Europe and Asia, and his remarks and impressions are of peculiar interest. He visited Ninive, Mossoul, Bagdad, Hillah and the ruins of Babylon, but his visit was of a superficial character. Cf. *Itinerarium Beniamin Tudelensis. Ex Hebraics Latinum factum Benedicto Ario Montano interprete.* Antverpiæ 1575. For English translations see Thomas Wright, *Early Travels in Palestine*, London, 1848; and A. Asher, *The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela*, London and Berlin, 1840. The latest and best edition of the Hebrew text of Benjamin's travels is that of M. N. Adler, *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, Critical text, translation and Commentary*, London, 1907. Comp. also Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-88; and Fossey, *Manuel d' Assyriologie*, tome I, Paris, 1904, page 6-7. Shortly after Rabbi Benjamin, another Spanish Jew, Rabbi Pethachiah of Ratisbon, visited Mesopotamia. The account of his journey was afterwards set down by one of his disciples.

[20] This traveler and merchant is probably the earliest English writer who has left us the record of his visit to the Tigris and Euphrates valley. From his relation it appears that Eldred did not visit the ruins of Ninive; but of Babylon he speaks with precision and details. Comp. *The voyage of M. T. E. to Trypolis in Syria...and from thence...to Babylon and Bassora.* London, in fol; see Rogers, *op. cit.* pp. 89-92. Another Englishman, Sir John Mandeville (1322-56), made a journey to these regions but did not visit the sites and the ruins of Ninive and Babylon. He was contented to report what he had heard concerning them. So Marco Polo, the famous Venetian traveller, appears to have cared nothing for the ruins, and though he visited both Mossul and Bagdad, never refers to them.

[21] *Sir Anthony Shirley, His Relation of His Travels into Persia, etc.*, London, 1613. He speaks of the ruins of Babylon and Ninive with eloquence, for he saw in them the fulfilment of the awful prediction of the Hebrew prophets, Comp. Evetts, *New Light on the Bible and the Holy Land*, New York, pp. 1-2.

[22] Pietro della Valle, *Viaggi di Pietro della Valle il Pellegrino...descritti da lui medesimo in LIV lettere familiari...all erudito, e fra pin cari, di molti anni suo Amico Mario Schipano*, Roma, 1650-8. He visited Alexandria, Cairo, Aleppo and Bagdad, where he married a Caucasian girl; also Persia, where he was received with honors by Shah-Abbas. In one of his letters, dated 10 December, 1616, he gives a full description of the ruins of Babylon, which he confuses with Bagdad. He visited also, in 1621, the Achemenian ruins at Persepolis and Nakshi Rustam and left us a description of the trilingual inscription which two centuries later opened the way for the decipherment of the Cuneiform inscriptions. On his return he brought with him from Hillah some bricks which he sent to Rome. "One of these was pre-

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sented to Athanasius Kircker, the Jesuit, who wrote a learned treatise on the Tower of Babel," for he believed that the brick in question "had formed part of the original Tower of Babel," Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 98. This is undoubtedly the very first Babylonian antiquity which came into Europe. The Tablet given to Kircker is now at the famous Museo Kirckeriano in Rome, which was originally formed by the Jesuits, but was afterwards appropriated by the Italian Government.

[23] *The preacher's Travels: wherein is set downe a true journall to the confines of the East Indies, through the great countries of Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Media, Hircania and Parthia. With the author's returne by the way of Persia, Susiana, Assiria, Chaldaea and Arabia.* 1611. Cartwright's relation contains more accurate descriptions than those of his countrymen J. Eldred and Anthony Shirley. Comp. Rogers, pp. 94-97.

[24] *Viaggio nelle Indie Orientali.* Venice, 1590.

[25] *Voyage en Turquie et en Perse. Avec une relation des expéditions de Thomas Kouli-Khan,* 2 vols. Paris, 1748. Between the period of Gasparo Balbi and Otter's travels there took place several journeys undertaken by Augustinian, Jesuit, Carmelite and Franciscan friars and missionaries, some of whom visited the sites covered with the ruins, while others were content to report what they had heard. Vincenzo Maria di S. Caterina di Sienna, procurator general of the Carmelite monks, and Emmanuel de St. Albert, a Dominican, are among the more conspicuous ones, Comp. Hilprecht *Explorations in Bible Lands*. . .pp. 17-19; Rogers, *op. cit.* pp. 98-104, and Fossey, *Manuel d'Assyriologie,* pp. 12-13.

[26] Carsten Niebuhr, already famous for his successful travels in Arabia, Persia and Mesopotamia, was attached as mathematician to the expedition sent to Arabia by King Frederic V. of Denmark (1761-1767). Niebuhr was the first to take exact copies of the Achemenian inscriptions at Persepolis. He visited Basrah, Bagdad, Hillah, Kufah and other ruins of Babylonia; then he passed through Kerkuk, Erbil, Mossul, Nabi-Yunus, Mardin and Diarbekir of all of which he gives accurate and sober descriptions. He complains of the fact that he could not remain longer at these sites to make a more thorough study of the ruins, and he calls earnestly for others to continue the work which he had to leave unfinished. *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Laendern.* Kopenhagen, 1778. Comp. Rogers, pp. 104-105; Fossey. pp. 13-14; Hilprecht, 18-19; Goodspeed, *History of the Babylonians and Assyrians*, New York, 1902. page 16, and Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian literature*, pp. XXV-XXVI.

[27] Abbé De Beauchamp is "Our last and best informed witness from the close of the eighteenth century, who deserves, therefore, our special attention. Well equipped with astronomical and other useful knowledge, he resided at Bagdad as the Pope's vicar-general of Babylonia for some time between 1780-1790. The ruins of Babylon, in which he was deeply interested, being only sixteen to eighteen hours distant from Bagdad, he paid two visits to the famous site, publishing the results of his various observations in several memoirs" (In *Journal des Savants*, Mai, 1785 and Dec., 1790.). Hilprecht, *op. cit.* pp. 19-21. Rogers, 105-108. Abbé Beauchamp's relation is of unique interest and shows a remarkable bent for original and independent archeological investigations. Comp. Fossey. *op. cit.* pp. 14-15.

In the very interesting and elaborate account of the Dominican and Carmelite missions in Bagdad and Mossul, during the last three centuries, written by Mgr. Altmayer, Apostolic Delegate of Mesopotamia, and the Revs. Fathers Bernard and

Oliver,[28] and others,[29] down to the end of the eighteenth century, have left us a rather vague and superficial account of their personal visits and impressions.

Subsequent travelers, however, such as Claudius James Rich[30]

Galland, of the Dominican Order, and published in the first volume of a sumptuous work entitled *La France au dehors: Les Missions Catholiques Françaises au XIXe Siécle, Paris*, 1902. pp. 223-271, I was unable to find any reference to Abbé De Beauchamp and to his mission to Bagdad as Papal Delegate. At page 236 we read that "De 1773 à 1781 (the year in which Abbé De Beauchamp went to Bagdad) l'Eglise latine de Bagdad ne revit plus d'évêque. Un seul fut préconisé en 1781. Ce fut Mgr. Mirondot du Bourg, Bénédictin, qui reçut même du pape Pie VI la faveur du pallium, mais n'en mérita pas moins les censures de l'Eglise pour avoir pris part à la consécration de Gobel, l' archevêque assermenté de Paris. Il ne songea du reste jamais à se rendre dans son diocèse. L'administration en fut devolue, pendant ce long intervalle, aux Supérieurs des Carmes de Bagdad, qui portèrent successivement le titre de Vicaires Apostoliques." Of Emmanuel de Saint-Albert, mentioned above, it is stated that he became the sixth latin Bishop of Bagdad in 1729, and that he was "Jeune d'age mais de grande science et vertu" p. 232.

[28] Guillaume A. Olivier, a French physician, visited the ruins of Niniveh and Babylon at the close of the eighteenth century. He was sent to the East for the purpose chiefly of scientific study. The information he gives is very meagre, and, consequently, did not add anything new to that Niebuhr and Abbé Beauchamp had already gathered. Comp. *Voyage dans l' Empire Ottomane, l'Egypt et la Perse*, 6 vols. Paris, 1801-1807.

[29] Sir Harford Jones Bridges, (1800) J. M. Kinneir (1808-1810), the French botanist Michaux and others.

[30] With James Rich a new era was opened for Assyro-Babylonian explorations. He is in fact "the first methodical explorer and surveyor of Babylonian and Assyrian ruins." A native of France (being born at Dijon, in 1787) but educated in Bristol, England, he soon manifested an extraordinary ability for Oriental studies and archeological investigations. He is said to have been acquainted with Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, Persian, Turkish, Arabic and even to some extent, Chinese. At the age of 24 he was appointed resident of the East India Company at Bagdad. In 1811 he visited for the first time the ruins of Babylon which made a deep impression on his enthusiastic and energetic spirit. In 1815 he made a second visit. He began excavations at Mujailibeeh, planned all the mounds and located them by astronomical observations, took several specimens of inscribed bricks, and sent several of them with some Babylonian inscriptions to the British Museum. In 1820, he visited Mossul and Niniveh where he spent over four months. He visited and sketched with plans every one of the great mounds which might be considered as forming a part of the ancient city of Niniveh. He began excavations at Nabi-Yunus, opposite Mossul, where he found several terra-cotta inscriptions which he sent to the British Museum. Then he studied the mound of Kuyunjik, Nimroud and Qal at Shargat. In 1821 he visted Persepolis where he made more exact copies of the Achemenian inscriptions. After so many years of noble and useful work he died of cholera, at Shiraz, on his way to Bagdad, at the age of 34. His first *Memoir on the ruins of Babylon* was written in 1812 in Bagdad, and published in Germany in 1813. In 1816 he himself translated it into English. In 1818 he published his second memoir. Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Kurdistan and on the site of Ancient Niniveh* was published by his widow, in 2 vols, London, 1836. Comp. Hilprecht. *op. cit.* pp. 26-36. Rogers, *op. cit.* pp. 113-120. Fossey, *op. cit.* pp. 16-18. Hommel, *Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens.* (Italian version) Milano, 1895. pp. 90-92.

(1811-1821), J. S. Buckingham[31] (1816), Sir Robert Ker Porter[32] (1817-20), Captain Robert Mignan[33] (1826-8), G. Baille Fraser,[34] (1834-5) The Euphrates Expedition under Colonel Chesney[35] (1835-7) James Felix Jones,[36] Lynch,[37] Selby,[38] Collingwood, Bewsher, and others of the first half of the nineteenth century, made a more searching and scientific study of the Mesopotamian region.[39] But the real pioneers and founders of early Assyro-Babylonian explorations are Emile Botta (1842-45), Sir Austen Henry Layard, (1840-1852), Victor Place (1851-5), H. Rassam (1850, 1878-82), Loftus (1850), Jules Oppert, Fresnel and Thomas (1851-52), Taylor (1851), and Sir Henry Rawlinson, who have not only opened but paved the way for all future researches and explorations.

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[31] *Travels in Assyria, Media and Persia, including a journey from Bagdad by Mount Zagros, to Hamadan, etc.* London, 1829; and *Travels in Mesopotamia, including a journey from Aleppo to Bagdad... with researches on the ruins of Niniveh, Babylon and other ancient cities.* London, in 2 vols. 1827. In these three volumes Buckingham gives a full description of Tel-Hermus, Nabi-yunus, Erbil, Akarkuf, Mujailibeh, Kasr, Uhaimir, Tak-i-Bustan, near Kirmanshah, Behistun, etc... where he speaks of an inscription containing from two to three hundred lines of Cuneiform writing. His remarks are full of interest and originality. In his excursion to the ruins of Babylon he was accompanied by Mr. Bellino, a well-informed secretary to the English Residency at Bagdad. Comp. Hilprecht, *op. cit.* pp. 36-44.

[32] Sir Robert Ker Porter was an artist "who had made his name famous in England by many a canvas depicting the glory of England in war, and the history of the people in Church and State. He had the unique distinction of having been court painter at St. Petersburg. A man of talent, if not even a man of genius, a man of great social following in Great Britain and Russia, where he had entered the highest circles and even married a Russian princess." (Rogers, p. 121-122). He made extensive journeys to the ruins of Babylon in which he was greatly assisted by Mr. Bellino. The results of his observations, and admirable sketches of the ruins were published in two sumptuous volumes under the title *Travels in Georgia, Armenia, ancient Babylonia, etc.* London, 1821-22, which on account of their style and the beautiful illustrations by his own brush, attracted great attention in England. Comp. Rogers, *op. cit.* pp. 121-123, and Hilprecht, *op. cit.* 44-51.

[33] *Personal Narrative of Travels in Babylonia, Assyria, Media, and Schythia*, London, 1827, in 2 volumes; and *Travels in Chaldaea, including a journey from Bassorah to Baghdad, Hillah and Babylon, performed on foot in* 1827, *with observations on the sites and remains of Babel, Seleucia and Ctesiphon.* London, 1829.

[34] *Travels in Koordistan, Mesopotamia, etc., with sketches of the character and manners of the Koordish and Arab tribes*, London, 1834; and *Travels in Koordish, Mesopotamia....etc. including an account of parts of those countries hitherto unvisited by Europeans*, London, 1840, in 2 vols.

[55] On this famous expedition, undertaken under the special patronage of King William IV. in the years 1835-37, in order to explore the basins of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, and to examine the adjacent countries of the Mesopotamian valley, Comp. Col. Chesney's narrative *The Expedition for the survey of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris*, London, 1850, in 2 vols. *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition.* London, 1868; W. Ainsworth, *Researches in Assyria, Babylonia and Chaldaea, forming part of the labours of the Euphrates Expedition*, London, 1838; and the same author's *A personal narrative of the Euphrates Expedition*, London, 1888, in 2 vols. Comp. also Hilprecht, *op. cit.* pp. 57-63.

[36] Comp. Hilprecht, *op. cit*, pp. 63-66.

[37] *Op. cit.* p. 67.

[38] *Account of the ascent of the Karun and Dizful rivers and the Ab-i-Gargar canal, to Shuster in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, tom. XIV., pp. 219-246.

The year 1842, however, marks the real beginning of a triumphal era in Assyro-Babylonian explorations. In that year the French Government created at Mossul, in Assyria, a vice-consulate, and at the instigation of the great French Orientalist, Jules Mohl,[40] Emil Botta, nephew of the well-known Italian historian, Carlo Botta, was selected to fill the place.[41] Soon after his arrival at Mossul Botta began excavations at the mound of Kuyunjik, not far from Mossul, where the results proved rather meagre and discouraging.[42] In 1843 he determined to begin excavations at another ruin called Khorsabad (Dur-Shargina or palace of Sargon) where within three days inscriptions and antiquities began to be found.[43] Encouraged by the result, he sent a letter, the first of a series, dated 5 April, 1843, to Mr. Mohl, which did not fail to have its effect on the French Government and people.[44] Meanwhile, the excavations went on slowly but persistently, notwithstanding the many difficulties Botta had to face from the part of the local Turkish Pasha, at whose instigations the sublime Porte finally ordered that all excavations should stop.[45] But in 1844 the French Ambassador at Constantinople secured a Firman, or royal permission, to resume excavations. Botta did not delay in resuming his researches. He succeeded in unearthing a large collection of Assyrian inscriptions and antiquities, including the colossal winged bulls, which were shipped to France and deposited in the Louvre where they are still admired as one of the principal ornaments of that Museum.[46] A complete account of Botta's excavations was published in five superb volumes in folio by the French Government in 1849 and adorned with many beautiful drawings and plates by Flandin, an architect who had accompanied Botta. This gave to the learned public the first scientific account of Assyrian explorations.[47]

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[39] Hilprecht, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68. To these we must add the names of others such as H. Willock; J. Shiel; F. Forbes; J. Ross; E. Borê; F. C. M. Texier; C, A. De Bode; Hyslop and others.

[40] One of the greatest Persian scholars of Europe, editor and translator of the great Persian epic of Firduzi, the Shah-nameh, or book of kings, in 6 superb volumes in folio, secretary of the Asiatic Society of Paris for more than 25 years, and one of the most enthusiastic students of Oriental researches. He was born in Stuttgart, 25 October, 1800, became a naturalized French citizen in 1842, died in Paris the 4 January, 1876. Comp. E. Renan's *Rapport*, in the *Journal Asiatique*, July, 1876, pp. 12-27.

[41] According to Vigouroux (*La Bible et les découvertes modernes*. vol. I. p. 154) and G. Brunengo (*L'impero di Babilonia e di Ninive*. Prato, 1885, vol. I. p. 11), he was the son; according to Hilprecht (*Explorations*.... p. 73), the nephew of the great Italian historian. He was born in Turin, Italy, 6 Dec. 1802, died in Achères, near Poissy in France, 24 March, 1870. He was a naturalist by profession, but with a natural gift for diplomatic and consular service. In 1840 he was appointed French consul in Alexandria, and in 1842 at Mossul. In 1846 he was sent as consul-general of France to Jerusalem and in 1857 to Tripoli, in Barbary, where he held his consular office till the year 1868 in which year he retired to private life.

[42] Nevertheless he found numerous fragments of bas-reliefs and cuneiform inscriptions, but, as he himself tells us, "nothing in a perfect state was obtained to reward the trouble and outlay."

[43] The village of Khorsabad is situated on the left bank of the river Khosar, about five hours to the northeast of Mossul.

[44] Botta's letters were published in the *Journal Asiatique*, series IV, vol. II, pp.

61-72; 201-214; vol. III, pp. 91-103; 424-435; vol. IV, pp. 301-314; and vol. V, pp. 201-207. Botta's letters made a considerable impression in France; and although his first excavation was carried on chiefly at his own personal expense, the French Government, at the request of the French Academy of Paris, granted him the necessary funds for the continuation of his researches.

[45] The difficulties which occidental explorers have to face from the Turkish Government and people, as well as the obstacles which they have to overcome in order to placate the jealousy, fear and superstition of the Arabs can be only appreciated by reading the accounts of Botta, Layard, Rassam, de Sarzec, Haynes and Hilprecht. The explorers were at first looked upon as spies, then as magicians or as thieves. The monuments, statues and objects of art discovered were popularly believed to be the relics of the giant Nimrod, and hidden gold and silver treasures of past generations. Most of the mounds and ruins were considered as sacred and unapproachable.

[46] The large mass of materials discovered by Botta were packed and shipped by rafts down the Tigris to Bassorah, whence a French steamer, especially sent for the purpose, carried them safely, in 1846, to Havre and thence to Paris.

[47] *Monuments de Ninive; découverts et décrits par M. P. E. Botta, mesurés et dessinés par M. E. Flandin.* 5 vols. one of text and 4 of plates (400 in number). Paris, 1849-1850. Botta's letters were afterwards published in a separate volume by T. Mohl Paris, 1845, and translated into English, London, 1850. Comp. also his *Mémoire sur l' Ecriture Cunéiform Assyrienne*, Paris, 1848. Flandin has also published his souvenirs in his *Voyage archéologique a Ninive.* I. "L' architecture assyrienne." II. "La Sculpture Assyrienne," in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, 15 June and 1 July, 1845. (tom X. pp. 1081-1106; tom. XI, pp. 88-111). On Botta's excavations cf. Vivien de Saint-Martin in the *Revue Germanique*, 1862. pp. 5-43; 481-523, and 15 April, pp. 457-482; Hilprecht, *op. cit.* pp. 73-81; Rogers, pp. 126-138; Vigouroux, *op. cit.* vol. I. pp. 153-157; Goodspeed, *History of the Assyrians and Babylonians*, New York, 1902. p. 18; Fossey, pp. 30-31; Harper, *op. cit.* p. VI Brunengo, *op. cit.* vol. I. pp. 11-14 and Price, *the Monuments and the Old Testament*, pp. 45-48.

In 1840, Austin Henry Layard,[48] destined to become the Schliemann of Assyro-Babylonian explorations, and a man "gifted with extraordinary literary accomplishment, love of fine arts, interest in archeology and passion for travel," visited Hamadan in Persia, and Mossul in company with Edward Ledwich Mitford. In 1842, he met Botta and visited the many Assyrian mounds and ruins, the sight of which, he tells us, excited so greatly his curiosity and enthusiasm that from that time he formed the design of thoroughly examining and excavating these singular ruins which made upon him a deeper impression than any Greek or Roman ruin. In 1842 he went back to Constantinople, where he met Sir Stratford Canning (afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), then British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte. After having succeeded in awakening the enthusiasm of the British Ambassador, he went to England where he succeeded in collecting £160, of which £60 were given by Sir Stratford Canning. Armed with this insignificant sum, he went to Constantinople, and thence to Mossul, where he immediately attacked the mound of Nimroud (the ancient Calah) which he had formerly determined to excavate. His enthusiasm can be estimated from the record he has left us of how he passed the night before the first spade was struck into the ground.

> "I had slept little during the night. The hovel in which I had taken shelter, and its inmates, did not invite slumber; but such scenes and companions were not new to me; they could have been forgotten had my brain been less excited. Hopes long cherished were now to be realized or were to end in disappointment. Visions of palaces underground, of gigantic monsters, of sculptured figures and endless inscriptions floated before me. After forming plan after plan for removing

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[48] Born in Paris, 5 March, 1817, of a family originally French, which had established itself in England during the reign of Louis XIV. In 1839, he made a journey by way of Persia, Asia Minor, Syria and India to Ceylon, of which he has left us a very interesting narrative, *Early adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia, including a Residence among the Bakhtiyari and other Wild Tribes before the Discovery of Niniveh*, London, 1888, in 2 vols. In 1849 he was appointed as attaché to the English Embassy at Constantinople. Between 1852 and 1877 he was several times elected member of the English Parliament. In 1866, he was elected as a trustee of the British Museum and in 1877-80 was appointed English Ambassador at Constantinople, after which he retired to private life. In 1894, (3 July) he died in London at the age of 77. A brief sketch of Layard's early life and adventures is found in the introduction to the 2nd edition of his *Early adventures* written by Lord Aberdare, London, 1894. Comp. also Edward Ledwitch Mitford *A Land March from England to Ceylon forty years ago*, London, 1884 in 2 vols. Mr. Mitford was Layard's companion during his first journey to Asia. Layard's "Autobiography and letters" were published in 2 vols. in 1903. London.

the earth and extricating these treasures, I fancied myself wandering in a maze of chambers from which I could find no outlet. Then, again, all was reburied and I was standing on the grass-covered mound. Exhausted, I was at length sinking into sleep when, hearing the voice of Awad (his Arab host), I rose from my carpet and joined him outside the hovel. The day had already dawned; he had returned with six Arabs, who agreed for a small sum to work under my direction."[49]

Layard's first excavations lasted but a month (from the end of October to the beginning of December, 1845). After a short visit to Bagdad, the excavations were resumed, but were again interrupted by the fanaticism of the Arabs aided by the Wali, or governor, of Mossul. In February, 1846 they were again resumed with unexpected success, so great that it can only be realized by reading Layard's own dramatic account of it.[50] He unearthed many objects of art, inscriptions, statues, bas-reliefs, colossal winged-bulls, rooms, corridors, underground palaces. The discoveries were so valuable that they excited the jealousy of the Turkish local authorities, against which he, as well as Botta and all their successors, had continually to struggle, often indeed in vain. In the meanwhile, the news of Layard's discoveries reached England and Europe, where they secured him popular fame. His most sanguine dreams were thus fully realized. The palace he had discovered was that of King Shalmaneser, the conqueror of Samaria (727-722 B. C.). Its contents were quietly shipped to England and deposited in the British Museum. In 1846, Layard was again granted permission to continue his excavations. The English Government, in token of acknowledgment granted him a fund for his work. Consequently, in October of the same year the work was resumed and a winter campaign was carefully planned. The new excavations were still more successful than the first, and here room after room was unearthed, with walls covered with pictures, scenes of hunting, of wars, of processions and thousands of inscriptions. Many cylinders, one Obelisk, statues and objects of art were all carefully removed and shipped to England. Soon after, he attacked another mound, that of Qal 'at Shargat, (the ancient city of Asshur,) and that of Kujunjik (one part of ancient Ninive). Here his success was not less satisfying and complete. On June 24, 1847, Layard left Mossul for England to arouse interest in his work and thus secure funds for further excavations. During his short stay in England, he published his two classical works[51] which created a profound sensation. In August, 1849, he sailed again to Mossul, provided with more generous funds and accompanied by Hormuzd Rassam, a native of Mossul, then resident in England; also by Mr. F. Cooper, an artist, and Dr. Sandwith, a physician. In this last expedition Layard concentrated all his efforts on the mounds of Kuyundjik and Nabi-Yunus.[52] These he discovered to be the palace of King Sennacherib and ancient Ninive respectively. The discoveries of this expedition were even greater than those achieved in his former attempts. Shortly after, he renewed his excavations at Qal 'at Shargat, Nimroud, and Khorsabad where he discovered the palaces of King Sargon (722-705 B. C.) and Essar-Haddon (681-668 B. C.). The treasures, there found, including several thousand Cuneiform inscriptions, were also sent to England, by way of Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, and now form one of the main attractions of the British Museum.[53] From Mossul he made several excursions to Bagdad and to the various sites and ruins of northern and southern Babylonia where he made some excavations but without much result.[54] In 1852, Layard returned to England after having achieved the greatest triumph of his long and noble career as traveler, explorer, statesman and archeologist. His name shall always hold a prominent place in the story of archeology, a place to which he is entitled not only by reason of the good fortune which attended his efforts, but still more for the zeal, self-sacrifice, energy, wisdom, and honesty he displayed in carrying on his work.[55]

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[49] *Niniveh and its Remains*, vol. I. p. 25.

[50] *op. cit.* pp. 65ff.

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[51] *Niniveh and its Remains, a Narrative of a First Expedition to Niniveh,* London, 1848 in 2 vols., *Discoveries in the ruins of Niniveh and Babylon,* London, 1853. Numerous complete as well as abridged editions of these two works of Layard have appeared in England and America. Layard also published *The Monuments of Niniveh, from Drawings Made on the Spot,* series I., 100 plates, London, 1849. *A Second Series of the Monuments of Niniveh,* etc. 71 plates. London, 1853; and *Inscriptions in the Cuneiform Character from Assyrian Monuments,* 98 plates, London, 1851.

[52] A prominent mound and village opposite Mossul where Mohammedan tradition locates the tomb of the prophet Jonah (hence the name Nabi-yunus, which means "the prophet Jonah").

[53] It is difficult to form an adequate idea of the immense number of monuments, tablets, inscriptions and objects of art found by Layard during his several expeditions to Assyria unless one reads his own books or visits the British Museum. Layard had uncovered, examined and sent to England what he had discovered in more than one hundred rooms and in more than four palaces and one Royal Library. When we remember that the cataloguing of less than half of this royal library of Niniveh required five large volumes, we can imagine the extent of Layard's achievement, and also the greatness of the work yet to be done in connection with this lirary. As a solution of the difficulty mentioned above as to who was the real discoverer of this library, Hilprecht says that the "Library was stored in two palaces and discovered by both Layard (south-west palace) and Rassam (north palace)." *Explorations in Bible Lands.* p. 121, at the end of the foot-note.

[54] Rogers, *op cit.* p. 158, Hilprecht, *op. cit.* p. 126. It is important to add that Layard made several visits and even several attempts to explore many other ruins in Assyria and Babylonia such as Nuffar (Nippur), Bahshiqa, Karamles, Lak, Shemamyk, Sherif-Khan, Abu Marya, 'Arban, around the river Khabur, Bavian, Keshaf, Mohamur, Gla, El-Qasr, Tel-Ermah, Boraij, Sheddadi, Shemisani, Mahlaibiyeh, Tel-Kaukab, Tel- 'A'far, Van, Tel-Mohammad (probably the palace of Hammurabi)

In 1851, the French Government, encouraged by the results of the excavations of Botta and Layard, sent to Mossul Victor Place, an architect of great skill, to act as vice-consul and at the same time to resume Botta's work.[56] The results of Place's expedition were comparatively not very great, except on the side of art and plans.[57] He succeeded between 1851-55, in excavating the greater part of the palace at Khorsabad, the outside wall and seven monumental gates, where he found a large quantity of sculptures and terra-cotta inscriptions. These were shipped in 4 *keleks*, or rafts, to Bassorah; but, unfortunately, two of them were sunk by the Arabs near Kurna, between Bagdad and Bassorah. The treasures of the remaining two were safely landed at Havre.[58]

Birs-Nimroud, El-Uhaimir, Muqallibeh, Zibliyeh and other minor localities. Furthermore, he made excursions to the Nestorian mountains and to the region of the Yezidiyeh , or Devil-worshippers, of both of which he has left us a most detailed and interesting account.

[55] On Layard's excavations and discoveries comp. in particular Hilprecht, pp. 88-126; Rogers, 138-159; Fossey, 32-35; Brunengo, 15-20; Vigouroux, pp. 178-79; Hommel, pp. 95-104 (Italian Version); Harper, vi-viii; Price, 48-51. D. Philipson, *Five Lectures on Cuneiform Discoveries*, Cincinnati, Chicago, 1889. Lecture II. pp. 13-23 etc.

[56] Place was born in Paris in 1822; died in Paris in 1875.

[57] The results of Place's explorations were published by him in his *Ninive et l'Assyrie, avec des essais de restauration par F. Thomas*, Paris, 1866-69, in 3 volumes. Place made also several excursions into Qal 'at Shargat, Tell-Shemamik, Nimroud, Erbil, etc. comp. his "Lettre à M. Mohl sur une Expédition faite a Arbèles," in *The Journal Asiatique*, series IV., vol. XX. pp. 441-470. Mr. Felix Thomas, a well-known architect, painter and traveler, who accompanied Place during his explorations, was born in Nantes, Sept. 29, 1875, and died the 15 of April, 1875. (Comp. de Girardot, *Félix Thomas, architect*, Nantes, 1875). Thomas's restorations of the Assyrian ruins, palaces and temples are very well done.

[58] "Unfortunately, a large part of the antiquities excavated by Victor Place at Khorsabad met with a sad fate. Together with sixty-eight cases of the finest bas-reliefs from Ashurbanipal's palace at Qoyunjik, which Rawlinson had allowed him to select for the Louvre, and including all the results of Fresnel's expedition to Babylon, they were lost on two rafts in the Tigris on their way from Bagdad to Basra in the Spring of 1855. But notwithstanding this lamentable misfortune, Place was enabled to submit to the public all those results which he had previously brought on paper in another magnificent work published by his liberal government." Hilprecht, p. 84; Hilprecht's allusion to Rawlinson in this connection is due to the fact

"Place's excavations, though they did not yield anything like the rich harvest reaped by his predecessor, were by no means insignificant. They were especially productive in those small objects of clay and stone, glass and metal, which in a welcome manner supplemented our knowledge of the life and customs of the ancient Assyrians. Place discovered no less than fourteen inscribed barrel cylinders with historical records. He found a regular magazine of pottery, another full of colored tiles, and a third containing iron implements of every description in such a fine state of preservation that several of them were used at once by his Arab workmen. He unearthed even the water-closets, the bakery and the wine-cellar of the King, the latter easily to be identified by a number of pointed jars resting in a double row of small holes on the paved floor, and discharging a strong smell of yeast after the first rain had dissolved their red sediments."[59]

In 1851, William Kennett Loftus, attached as geologist to the staff of the British Commissioner, Colonel Williams, the hero of Kars, made a short trip to the ruins of Babylon.[60] His attention became especially concentrated on the massive ruins of Nippur, Hammam, Warka and Muqayyar which he found covered with fragments of stone and broken pottery. Loftus was the first European traveler to visit the numerous South-Babylonian mounds and ruins, all of which he carefully described and minutely located. Aided by Colonel Williams, Loftus began excavations at Warka (the ancient Erech, the sacred burying-place of the ancient Babylonians), where he found hundreds of coffins. The majority of these, being made of argil, were dissolved at the first contact with the air, others, however, were shipped in good condition to the British Museum.

In 1853, after a short visit to England, Loftus returned to the ruins of Babylonia for the second and last time. He was sent there in company with W. Boutcher and T. Kerr Lynch, by the newly

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that the Turkish Government had granted at the same time equal permission to Place and H. Rawlinson to excavate in any ground belonging to the state. In consequence of this the interests of the two explorers threatened frequently to clash. At Qoyunjik and Kalat-Shargat the tension became very acute but it was finally settled in an amicable way. Comp. Rassam, *Asshur and the Land of Nimrod*, New York, 1897, pp. 12-27, and Hilprecht, *op. cit.* pp. 83-84.

[59] Hilprecht, pp. 82-83.

[60] Loftus was born in 1821 at Rye, died at sea on his way from India to England (in 1858) at the age of 37. In 1849-52 he acted as geologist to the commission which was charged to settle the limits of the Persian-Turkish frontiers, and a few years later was appointed by his government as an attaché of the British Embassy at Constantinople.

formed "Assyrian Excavation Fund" of London. He resumed his excavations at Warka where he met with considerable success. As Hilprecht tells us "Important portable antiquities of early Babylonian times were unfortunately not disclosed by the explorer. Yet his excavations were by no means entirely lacking in literary documents and other valuable archeological objects. As most conspicuous among them may be mentioned no less than a hundred so-called contract tablets of the Neo-Babylonians, Persian and even Seleucide dynasties. . . .a few syllabaries and two large mushroom-shaped cones of baked clay covered on their flat tops and stems with Cuneiform legends; an interesting small tablet in serpentine with pictures on the one side and four lines of early Cuneiform characters on the other; a limestone slab with an imperfect inscription in South-Arabian writing—the first of the kind discovered in Babylonian ruins; a brick with stamp in relief of an elevated altar surmounted by a seven-rayed sun; several terra-cotta figurines; a thin silver plate embossed with a beautiful female figure; fragments of a bivalve shell, the exterior of which shows fine carvings of horses and lotus flowers, etc."[61] Nevertheless, as the same writer further remarks, Loftus' excavations were of real importance only for the history of architecture and for a study of the burial customs prevailing during the Persian, Parthian and later occupations of Babylonia.[62]

The "Assyrian Excavation Fund," of which we have spoken, was formed to gather popular subscriptions and to continue excavations in Assyria and Babylonia on a more systematic basis and on a larger scale. Sir Henry C. Rawlinson, whose name shall survive in the annals of posterity as that of a great diplomat, soldier, traveler, scholar, explorer, linguist and the first real decipherer of the Cuneiform inscriptions, was chosen to carry on the task.[63] At that time

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[61] *Op. cit.* pp. 149-150.

[62] *Op. cit.* loc. cit. Loftus himself has left us a complete account of his exploration in Babylonia in his *Travels and Researches in Chaldaea and Susiana*, London, 1857. Besides Warka, Nippur and Muqayyar, Loftus started excavations also at Senkere, Tell-Sifc Sherif-Khan, Abu-Shahrain, Suk-es-Shuyukh, Buwariyyah, Wuswas, el-Uhaimir and other places, where he found several very valuable archeological objects including many cuneiform inscriptions and tablets. Comp. Hilprecht, pp. 139-157; Rogers, 159-163; Hommel, pp. 128-130; Fossey, 36-38; and Brunengo, 23ff.

[63] Henry Creswicke Rawlinson was born in Chadlington, Oxfordshire, 11 April, 1810, died in London, 5 March, 1895. In 1827 he entered the military service of the East India company. In 1833 was appointed major in the government service in Persia. In 1840 became political agent at Kandahar in Afghanistan,

Sir Henry Rawlinson was British Resident and Consul General at Bagdad, and his first act was to send J. E. Taylor, British vice-consul at Bassorah, to Muqayyar (probably the ancient Babylonian city of Ur). Taylor's excavations did not attain any considerable success, although he found several cylinders and tablets. Later on, Taylor conducted excavations at Abu-Shahrain (the ancient Eridu), and Tel-el-lahm, but without important results.[64]

In the months of Sept.-Oct.-Nov. of the year 1854, Rawlinson himself undertook the task of excavating the ruins of Birs Nimroud (the ancient Borsippa), which for a long while had been the one ruin above all which he desired to excavate. Here he found several cylinders with inscriptions of the period of King Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 B. C.). From the inscriptions it became clear that the ruins in question represented the old tower, or temple, of Borsippa which was called the "Temple of the Seven Directions (Spheres) of Heaven and Earth."[65] Rawlinson made several journeys to the ruins of

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and, in 1843, in Arabia. One year later, he was transferred to Bagdad as Consul General. In 1849, after an absence of 22 years, he returned to England and, in 1850, was promoted to be lieutenant colonel, and Consul General at Bagdad. In 1855 he resigned, and in 1856, returned to England where, in 1858, he was elected member of Parliament and in 1859 appointed British ambassador at Teheran in Persia with the title of major general. During the years 1865-1868 he was again elected member of Parliament, in 1871-78 President of the Geographical Society of London, and in 1878 trustee of the British Museum. A complete account of H. C. Rawlinson's life and work was written by his brother, Rev. G. Rawlinson, (the well-known author of the *Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*), *A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson*, London, 1898. Comp. also Vigouroux, *op. cit.* p. 162, note.

[64] On Taylor's excavations Comp. Hilprecht, pp. 171-178, Rogers, pp. 163-164; Fossey, 41-42, and Hommel, 137-139. In Muqayyar, Taylor discovered the famous temple of the Babylonian Moon-god, Sin (to whom Mount Sinai was sacred, and after whom it was called Sinai), in this temple he discovered several fine barrel cylinders and large inscribed bricks, which demonstrated that the temple was originally built by King Ur-Gur (about 2700 B. C.) and, was restored 2000 years later by King Nabonidus. He also discovered several clay coffins, vases of different sizes and shapes, many small objects in stone, metal and clay. At Tell-el-Lahm, Taylor discovered several coffins and a few bricks and inscriptions. At Abu Shahrain (the ancient Eridu) he discovered several rooms and the remains of an old temple with a few inscribed bricks. Taylor's reports were published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1855. vol. XV, under the titles "Notes on the ruins of Muqeyer," pp. 260-276, and "Notes on Abu Shahrain and Tel-el-lahm," pp. 414-415, with 9 plates and 3 maps.

[65] Cfr. Rawlinson, "On the Birs Nimrud or the Great Temple of Borsippa," in the *Journal of the R. Asiatic Society*, vol. XVIII. (London 1861) pp. 1-34, but especially pp. 1-17. See also Hommel, *op. cit.* pp. 140-141, and Hilprecht, 184 ff. The famous tower of Borsippa, which formed the most conspicuous part of the tem-

Assyria and Babylonia, but his principal merit consists in the valuable help and advice which he never failed to accord to all travelers and explorers, French and English, who sought his counsel or support. Rawlinson's share in deciphering the Old Persian and Cuneiform Assyrian inscriptions will be treated later on.[66]

In the year 1851, there was organized in France a new scientific and artistic expedition to Mesopotamia, the object of which was to resume excavations on a vast scale. At the instigation of that great lover of Oriental studies, Jules Mohl, the French Government agreed to give 70,000 francs for the purpose. The members of the expedition were Fulgence Fresnel, formerly French consul at Jidda,[67] Jules Oppert, the father of Assyriology in France, and a most talented scholar, (then professor of German at the Lycée, Reims),[68] and Felix Thomas, an architect.[69] On October 1, 1851, they left Paris and on March 1, 1852 reached Mossul, where they met Victor Place who had succeeded Botta as vice-consul, and who was actively engaged in excavating the ruins of Khorsabad. From there they proceeded to Bagdad where after a long delay, they started for Babylon, es-

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ple Ezida, dedicated to Nebo, son of Merodach, consisted originally of seven stages differently colored: the first in black, (sacred to Saturn); the second, reddish-brown or orange (sacred to Jupiter); the third, red, (to Mars); the fourth, gold-plated (to the sun); the fifth, yellowish white (to Venus); the sixth, dark blue (to Mercury); and the seventh, silver-plated (to the moon). The lowest stage was two hundred and seventy-two feet square, and about 26 feet high. "As the successive stages rose to the height of about one hundred and sixty feet, they gradually receded, becoming smaller and smaller, the seventh stage being occupied by the richly decorated shrine of the god Nebo, the Guardian of Heaven and Earth, to whom the temple was dedicated." Comp. the model prepared and arranged by Sir H. Rawlinson in his above quoted article.

[66] On H. Rawlinson's excavations in Assyria and Babylonia Comp. Hilprecht, pp. 70-71, 97, 182-186 and 188; Rogers, 172-173; Hommel, 139-142, and Fossey, 35-36, etc.

[67] Born in Mathieu (Calvados), 15 April, 1795, died in Bagdad (Babylonia), 30 November, 1855.

[68] Jules Oppert was born in Hamburg, 9 July, 1825. He was professor of Assyrian philology and Archeology in the College de France, a chair which he occupied from 1874 down to 1905, the year of his death. Oppert's researches and contributions to Orietntal and especially Assyro-Babylonian studies are very numerous and characterized by marked originality. He was one of the first to solve the mystery of the complicated system of Cuneiform writing; also the author of the first Assyrian grammar (published in 1861.), and the founder and father of Assyriology in France. A complete list of his very numerous books, articles, pamphlets and contributions has been compiled by Dr. Muss-Arnolt, of the University of Chicago, in Haupt and Delitzsch's *Beitræge zur Assyriologie* Vol. IV. Leipzig, 1899.

[69] Born in Nantes, 29 September, 1815, died the 15 of April, 1875.

tablished their headquarters at Jumjuma and began actual excavations at the Qasr on July 15, 1852. The results. owing to the many difficulties they had to overcome, were rather modest, but they discovered a large number of varnished tiles, representing men, animals, plants, ornaments, and Cuneiform inscriptions. Shortly after, they attacked the ruins of Tell 'Omran ibn 'Ali where they found many inscribed bricks of Nebuchadnezzar the Great, and a large number of terra-cotta vases, clay figurines, glass vessels, instruments in copper and iron, and a few gold objects. Shortly after, they began excavations at the mound of Babil, situated at the extreme northern end of that vast complex of ruins, but the results were insignificant. Preliminary and superficial excavations were also undertaken in Tell-Ibrahim, El Uhaimir, El Bandar and a number of lower elevations, several miles to the east of Babylon, but the results were rather discouraging.[70] In 1854 Oppert left Babylonia and returned to France by way of Mossul where he made a thorough study of the ruins of Khorsabad and Niniveh. Fresnel died in Bagdad in November, 1855. The large collection of antiquities and inscriptions was shipped together with those found by Place. Unfortunately, however, the rafts were overturned and the whole collection was lost in the river Tigris, a few miles above its junction with the Euphrates, on May 23, 1855.

"It was a long series of difficulties and adverse circumstances which this French expedition had to encounter from the beginning to the end. Owing to the very limited means at their disposal, Fresnel and Oppert had not been able to do much more than to scratch the surface of the vast mounds, without contributing anything of importance to our knowledge of the ancient topography of Nebuchadnezzar's metropolis. The great city of Babylon was practically still unexplored when the French expedition quitted the ruins. But notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, scientific results were by no means lacking."[71]

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[70] The work of this French Expedition in Babylonia lasted about two years. The principal merit of its work consisted in accurate and extensive typographical researches on the west side of the Euphrates, as far as Kerbela and Kefil, locating and describing a number of Babylonian and Mohammedan ruins previously unknown.

[71] Hilprecht, page, 170. Oppert's relation of the work and result of the Expedition was published by him in his famous *Expédition Scientifique en Mésopotamie*, Paris, 1859-1863 in two volumes and an Atlas (21 plates). In this work Oppert laid down the first scientific principles of the Cuneiform language and system of writing,

In 1852, Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, a native of Mossul, but for many years resident in England,[72] and formerly Layard's most faithful and intelligent assistant in his excavations at Niniveh, was sent by the British Government to resume Layard's work in Assyria. He was supposed to undertake the new excavations under the general direction of Sir Henry Rawlinson. Rassam began excavations at the northern corner of Kuyunjik whence he kept steadily extending his labors to the other parts of the mound for fully a year and a half, with the happy result that a great number of tablets, obelisks and cylinders were brought to light and sent to the British Museum. Rassam claims the credit of first discovering the famous Library of King Assurbanipal (668-626 B. C.) which yielded several thousands of historical, religious, chronological, grammatical, lexicographical and astronomical tablets now in the British Museum. It is the general opinion of Assyriologists that hardly half of this famous library has been unearthed, and it is probable that many thousands more of Cuneiform inscriptions are still buried there. In 1854, Rassam returned to England, and Loftus, who had finished his researches in Babylonia, was sent to Assyria to resume Rassam's work.[73] "Rassam was fitted for the work of excavator as few who had ever dug in these mounds. He knew land and people from his birth up; he had served a long and useful apprenticeship to Layard; he was devoted to the business he had in hand, and eager to give every energy to its successful accomplishment. In one respect he was unfortunately not so well equipped as the brilliant Oppert, who was then busy among

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illustrated by a translation of the largest and most important inscriptions then discovered.

Fresnel's report was first communicated in two long letters to Jules Mohl and published in the *Journal Asiatique*. The first series V., vol. I. (1853), pp. 485-548 (dated Hilla, December, 1852, and vol. II. (1853), pp. 5-78; and the second in vol. VI. of the same series (1856), pp. 525-548, dated Hilla, June, 1853. Comp. also Hilprecht, pp. 163-171; Fossey, pp. 40-41; Rogers, 164-165; Brunengo, 32-34; Vigouroux, 180-183, and Hommel, 130-132.

[72] Mr. Rassam comes from an old and well-known Assyrian, or, as it is generally called in the East, Chaldean family of the city of Mossul. The family, as well as Mr. Rassam himself, belonged to the Chaldeo-Nestorian Church. He afterwards became a Protestant, apparently as a means for success as English representative at Mossul. Many of Mr. Rassam's relatives are still in Mossul, where he himself is well known and remembered. He married an English lady, and made England his permanent residence. In 1884, he was sent on a political mission as special envoy of England to King Theodore of Abyssinia where he succeeded in establishing and promoting diplomatic and commercial relations between England and Abyssinia.

[73] See further below.

the mounds of Babylon. Oppert knew all that was then known of the Cuneiform writing, while Rassam knew nothing of the language in which the ancient records of his country were written."[74]

But in spite of his lack of the philological equipment of his Western compeers, Rassam's discoveries, in his several expeditions to Assyria, "were the greatest which had yet been made either in Assyria or Babylonia. By the exercise of a skilled judgment and the fortunate combination of circumstances he had actually uncovered the long-buried library of the Royal City of Niniveh—the library which Assurbanipal had gathered or caused to be copied for the learning of his sages. Here was a royal storehouse of literature, science, history and religion brought to light, ready to be studied in the West, when the method of its reading was fully made out. Well might Rawlinson join with Layard in applause over this happy and fortunate discovery, which had linked Rassam's name forever with the history of Assyrian research."[75]

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[74] Rogers, *op. cit.* p. 166.

[75] *op. cit.* pp. 170-171. A complete account of Rassam's explorations and discoveries during his several expeditions to Assyria and Babylonia was published by himself, for the first time, in 1897 under the title *Asshur and the land of Nimrod, being an account of the discoveries made in the Ancient ruins of Niniveh, Asshur, Sepharvaim, Calah, Babylon, Borsippa, Cuthah and Van*, New York, 1897. Comp. also Hilprecht, pp. 83, 98, 114, 130-131, 201-202, 206-9, and 260-279; Rogers, vol. L. p. 154, 157, 166-170 and 234-236; Hommel, pp. 152-158; Fossey, p. 45, 47, 51, 59; T. G. Pinches, "Mr. Rassam's Assyrian Treasures," in the London *Academy*, 1878 Vol. XIV. pp. 202-203; 252-253; "The bronze gates from Balawat and their chased pictures," in the *Athenaeum*, April, 1879 p. 480, July pp. 23-24; H. Rassam, "Recent Assyrian and Babylonian Research," in the *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute or Philosophical Society of Great Britain*, 1880; Pinches, "Remarks upon the recent Discoveries of Mr. Rassam at Aboo-Habba," in the *Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archeology*, 1881. Vol. III. pp. 109-111; Pinches, "The bronze gates discovered by Mr. Rassam at Balawat," *ibidem*, vol. XII. 83-118; H. Rassam, "Excavations and discoveries in Assyria," *ibidem*, vol. VII. pp. 37-58; Rassam, "Babylonian cities , with comments by Prof.Delitzsch and an appendix by M. Boscawen," in the *Journal of Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, vol. XVII. 1883; Rassam, "On Recent discoveries of ancient Babylonian cities," in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archeology*, London, 1883, Vol. V, pp. 83-84; Pinches, "The antiquities found by Mr. Rassam at Abu-Habbah (Sippara);" in *T. S. B. A.*, vol. VIII. pp. 164-172; Rassam, "Recent discoveries of ancient Babylonian cities," *ibidem*, vol. VIII. pp. 172-197; Rassam, "History of Assyrian and Babylonian discoveries," in the *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 1894, July, pp. 86-101; and finally his interesting book on *Biblical Lands, their topography, races, religions, languages and customs ancient and modern*," London, 1896 (originally published in the *Transactions of the Victoria Insittute*, vol. XXX).

With Rassam and Oppert the first period of Assyro-Babylonian explorations comes to a close. The emulation of the French and British Governments and savants had been productive of brilliant results. Numerous Assyrian and Babylonian monuments and inscriptions were now to be found scattered through the various European Museums. The materials, accordingly, were abundant, but the knowledge of their contents was still scanty. Neither the system of writing not the language of these monuments and inscriptions was as yet understood. Hence the attention of scholars was directed towards solving these important linguistic problems before going any further into additional explorations and excavations. An account of the various attempts of scholars to solve the mystery of the Cuneiform system of writing of the Old Persian and Assyro-Babylonian inscriptions will be given later on; and for the present we shall continue our brief account of the second period of Assyro-Babylonian explorations which begins with the year 1872; the time between the end of the first and the beginning of the second period, i. e. from 1855 to 1872, being a time of respite for the excavator but of hard toil for the decipherer.

But first of all we must sketch the earlier career of the man whose work is the main glory of this second period of discovery. In the year 1860, the trustees of the British Museum entrusted to Sir Henry Rawlinson the execution of a plan proposed by him, i. e. of publishing the most important Cuneiform texts in the British Museum in an accurate and trustworthy edition. In this arduous work Rawlinson was assisted by Edward Norris, secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society and the author of the first Assyrian dictionary, and George Smith a talented engraver and a very enterprising and promising student of Biblical and Oriental archeology. At a later date, Smith was succeeded by Theophilus Pinches, now one of the veterans among English Assyriologists.[70] A few years later, G. Smith developed into a very successful interpreter of Assyrian texts, and in this capacity, in the year 1867, he was attached to the Assyrian department in the British Museum. Full of enthusiasm for this new branch of Oriental research, he soon realized its importance for the study of the Old Testament. Immediate success confirmed his expectations; for he first discovered the name of King Shalmaneser and that of Jehu in one of the Cuneiform inscriptions. Afterwards he discovered the names of Azariah, King of Judah, Pekah, King of Israel, and Hosea, King of Israel. These early and brilliant results were followed by others. In 1870 the Assyrian language was fairly understood by the few scholars who had devoted their energies to its solution. These scholars were H. Rawlinson, S. Birch, E. Norris, Hinks, G. Smith and Prof. Sayce, in England; E. Schrader and Frd. Delitzsch, in Germany; and J. Oppert, J. Menant and F. Lenormant in France. In 1891, Smith published, for the first time, in a superb octavo volume, the historical inscriptions of King Assurbanipal with interlinear transliteration and English translation.[77] But in 1872, "while working among some fragments brought home by Rassam, Smith picked out a broken clay tablet, upon which he soon read unmistakable parallels to the biblical account of the deluge. The piece thus found was soon followed by three duplicates and other lesser fragments. From these he ascertained that the first part found was the eleventh in a series of twelve tablets, and that it gave the history of a great hero whom Smith called Izdubar. He published the announcement of his discovery, and Assurbanipal was forgotten, few probably thinking of the great King who had made the library out of which these newly found tablets had come. But England did not know how to be calm in the presence of such a discovery as this. When Smith had translated enough of the tablets to make a somewhat connected story of the deluge, as the Babylonians told it, he read a paper on the subject before the Society of Biblical Archeology on December 3, 1872. The meeting was large and enthusiastic. Sir Henry Rawlinson presided, Smith presented his translation, and then enthusiasm had sway when it was pointed out by Dr. Birch that this had immense importance for the study of the Bible. . . .Then Mr. Gladstone spoke, showing how valuable all these discoveries were for the study of the origins of Greek culture, which he said had come from that East by way of Phoenicia. This was appreciated, but it was not exactly what the company most desired to hear, and to that phase Mr. Gladstone's last sentence returned, concluding with the magic word "religion." The cheers broke forth then with a good will, and at a late hour the company went away to spread abroad this marvelous story of the discovery of an early narrative which all thought illustrated, and many believed confirmed and corroborated, the biblical story in Genesis.[78]

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[70] The work was published in five volumes in folio under the title of *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, vol. I., London, 1861; vol. II., 1866; vol. III., 1870; vol. IV., 1875; (a second edition of which appeared in 1891, prepared by Pinches); vol. V., Part I, 1880; Part II., 1884.

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[77] *History of Assurbanipal, translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions*, London, 1871.

The English public became excited by the result, and the proprietors of *The Daily Telegraph* perceived the opportunity and seized it. They offered a thousand guineas to pay the expenses of an expedition to Niniveh on condition that Smith should lead it, and send letters to the paper describing his experience and discoveries. On January 20, 1873, a month after Norris' death, Smith set out upon his enterprise, reached Mossul on March 2nd, and after a short visit to Babylon, began excavations at Nimroud. In the month of May, he attacked the mound of Kuyunjik where he found a new fragment of the Deluge story which fitted into the ones previously discovered.[79] He found also several other inscriptions of Esarhaddon, Senaccherib and Assurbanipal. Shortly after, he found two more fragments of the Deluge tablet, and on June 9th the excavations were stopped and Smith returned to England.[80]

On November 25, 1873, however, he was sent again to Mossul by the trustees of the British Museum, and on January 1, 1874, he immediately began excavations at Kuyunjik with the most successful results.[81] On April 4th of the same year he returned to England;[82]

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[78] Rogers, vol. I., pp. 229-230.

[79] This fragment "contained the greater portion of seventeen lines of inscription belonging to the first column of the Chaldean account of the Deluge, which fitted into the only place where there was a serious blank in the story."

[80] These antiquities were shipped to England but they were seized by the custom house officials in Alexandretta. It was only after many energetic protests from the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the Deluge fragments were released and sent to London.

[81] In this second expedition, notwithstanding the many difficulties he had to overcome, Smith discovered "over 3,000 inscriptions from the royal Library of Niniveh, including mythological, astronomical, chronological and grammatical texts, prayers, hymns, and litanies, syllabaries and bilingual tablets of the utmost importance." Among these numerous inscriptions there were fragments of the Chaldean story of Creation, of the Deluge, portions of the great national Chaldean epic of Gilgamesh, the legend of the seven evil spirits, the legendary account of Sargon's birth and rescue (analogous to that of Moses and of Romulus and Remus), the hymn to Ishtar, reports of eclipse, geographical lists of Assyrian and Babylonian cities, historical inscripitons of Adadnirari I. (about 1325 B. C.), of Mutakkil-Nusku (about 1175 B. C.) of the Cassite King Agumkakrime (about 1600 B. C.), a new fragment of the synchronous history of Assyria and Babylonia in the thirteenth century B. C., of Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, Ashurbanipal and Sinsharishkun, the last Assyrian ruler. Comp. Hilprecht, p. 198.

[82] It was after her return from the second expedition that this brilliant young Assyriologist set himself to the study of the priceless antiquities he had brought from Assyria. In 1873, he published his *Assyrian Discoveries*, London, in which he

and in March, 1876, was sent again by the British Museum to resume his excavations. He proceeded to Bagdad for the purpose of securing some Oriental antiquities which were offered for sale. "But ignorant of the laws of health, by which Europeans are so closely bound in the Orient, he worked too much, rested too little, and was careless in the providing of good food suitable for the climate. At times he rode for days eating only crusts of bread. Beset behind and before with difficulties, and not permitted to excavate, he had to content himself with visits to numerous mounds, which he sketched or planned. On his way back he fell ill of fever, and died at Aleppo, August 19, 1876, (at the age of thirty-six). Smith's death came to the little world of Assyrian students as a thunderclap out of a clear sky. In England he was looked upon by scholars and people alike almost as a prophet; in Germany, where a new and vigorous school of Assyriologists had begun its work, men were thrown into confusion by the severity of the loss which they felt. It was indeed a sore blow to the new study; but science dare not linger. The ranks closed up at the British Museum by the appointment of Mr. W. St. Chad Boscawen, and the trustees sought a man to begin again the excavations which Smith and his predecessors had laid down."[83]

The choice fell on Mr. Rassam, who had previously distinguished himself as an explorer in Assyria and Babylonia. The selection was a most fortunate one, for, although Rassam knew nothing of Assyrian or Semitic philology, except his knowledge of Arabic, his native tongue, he was very familiar with Oriental people, life and habits, and endowed with a fine common sense for archeological researches and discoveries. In October, 1877, Rassam set out for Mossul where he received by telegraph from Sir Henry Layard, then British ambassador at Constantinople, the news that the firman was granted. He began excavations at a new mound, called by the natives Balawat, about fifteen miles east of Mossul, where he discovered the beautifully inscribed and adorned bronze plates which had covered at one time the palace gates of King Shalmaneser. Later on he began ex-

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gave a full account of his two expeditions, and, in 1875, he published his famous book *The Chaldean Account of Genesis*, containing the translations of Babylonian legends and myths parallel to those of the earlier chapters of Genesis, a work which stirred the whole scientific world. No less than five editions were published within a few months.

[83] Rogers, *op. cit.* pp. 233-234; also pp. 227-234; Hilprecht, pp. 190-201; Fossey, pp. 45-47; Hommel, 152-154; Brunengo, vol. I. chapter IV, V and VI; and Delitzsch, *Wo lag das Paradies*, Leipzig, 1881, pp. 266 ff.

cavations at Kuyunjik and Nimroud where a small number of interesting inscriptions was found. Rassam further made extensive journeys over portions of Babylonia, and among other results identified the site of Sippara. He visited Babylon and made some small excavations there, returning by way of Van to England.

Rassam's first excavations in Assyria took place, as was noted above, in 1852-4, about the time when Victor Place was conducting his excavations at Khorsabad. Rassam's excavations were carried on under the general direction of H. Rawlinson.[84] Prior to this, Rassam was employed by Sir H. Layard as superintendent during two of his successful explorations in Assyria, during the years 1846 and 1849-51. In the expedition of 1852-54 Rassam excavated twice at Qal 'at Shargat where he discovered the two famous terra cotta prisms, containing in about 811 lines of Cuneiform text the annals of King Tiglath-Pileser I (1110-1100 B. C.). These played an important role in the history of Assyriology, having been selected by the Council of the Royal Asiatic Society of London for a public test as to the correctness of the deciphering of the Assyrian Cuneiform writing, and translated by the four pioneers of Assyrian studies: H. Rawlinson, Hincks, Oppert and Talbot. He also discovered, at Nimroud, the temple of Nebo and six large statues of the god, the stele of Samsi-Adad IV. (825-812 B. C.), and fragments of an inscribed black obelisk of Ashurnasirpal II. While at Kuyunjik he found the white obelisk (nearly ten feet high and covered with bas-reliefs and inscriptions), of Ashurnasirpal II., and several other inscriptions and objects of art.

His second expedition took place in 1877-1878; the third in 1878-1879; the fourth, in 1880-1881; the fifth and last, in 1882. During all these expeditions, which he undertook under the auspices of the British Museum, Rassam extended his excavations to the most important ruins of Assyria, Babylonia, and Van in Armenia. viz: Kuyunjik, Nimroud, Qal 'at Shargat, Balawat, Abu-Habbah, Deir, Tell-Ibrahim, Tel-Dailam, Tunyurmah, Birs-Nimroud, Telloh, etc. The numerous and very valuable inscriptions, monuments and objects of art he found in all these localities can easily compete, both in importance and number, with those discovered by Layard or any other explorer of Assyro-Babylonian antiquities. He discovered the famous bronze gates at Balawat (about fifteen miles to the east of Mossul), the ancient Imgur-

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[84] Cf. Rassam, *Asshur and the Land of Nimrod.* New York, 1897. pp. 12-27.

Bel, where King Ashurnasirpal II (cir. 1060 B. C.) had built his palace. "These ornamental bronze plates had once covered the cedar gates of a large Assyrian palace. Each leaf... consisted of seven panels eight feet long, and richly embossed with double rows of figures surrounded by a border of rosettes. The bronze plates represent a variety of subjects taken from the life and campaigns of Shalmaneser II [860-825 B. C.]." At Kuyunjik and Nimroud be found several thousands of Cuneiform terra-cotta inscriptions, the decagon prism inscribed with the annals of Ashurbanipal [668-626 B. C.], four fine barrel-cyclinders of Sennacherib, covered with inscriptions, the famous library of Ashurbanipal, several thousand cuneiform terra-cotta inscriptions, and a great number of bas-reliefs, cylinders, seals, statues, foundation stones and objects of art.

In Babylonia Rassam's excavations were not less successful or valuable. At Babil he discovered four exquisitely built wells of red granite, about 150 feet deep, at Jumjuma he discovered thousands of Babylonian contract-tablets, belonging to private individuals and to business firms, among which the famous business firm of Egibi and Co. In this locality, a few years before, Arab brick-diggers had found about 3,000 similar contract-tablets which were purchased by G. Smith for the British Museum. Here also he discovered the broken cylinder of Cyrus, in which this famous king mentions his capture of the city of Babylon (539 B. C.). At El-Birs (the ancient Borsippa), and in the mound of Ibrahim-al-Khalil, he unearthed a fine collection of inscribed tablets and about eighty chambers and galleries of a large building (the famous temple of Ezida, sacred to Nebo); which, as we have already remarked, was partly explored by Rawlinson. At Abu-Habba, after eighteen months of energetic excavating, he discovered one of the most important and ancient buildings of Babylonia, i. e. the temple of Shamash, the sun-god. In it he found the pictorial representation of the god, and of King Nabu-apal-iddina, [about 850 B. C.) as well as the two large barrel cylinders of Nabonidus, the famous Chaldean priest, king and archeologist. Nabonidus related on these cylinders the story of the temple in which they were found, how it was restored by him, and how he found the foundation stone first laid by Naram-Sin, the son of Sargon of Agade, who had reigned 3200 years before him. According to this calculation, we learn that this great ancient monarch lived about 3750 B. C., a date somewhat controverted by later Assyriological investigations. Here he found also about twenty thousand inscribed clay tablets, of commercial and of literary character, such as sign-lists, grammatical exercises, astronomical and mathematical texts, letters, hymns, mythological fragments, and a new bilingual version of the Babylonian story of Creation; also numerous fragments of vases and statues engraved with the names of Manishtusu and Urumush, two ancient Kings of Kish; the fine mace-head of Sargon I., father of Naram-Sin, the monument of Tukulti-Mer, King of Khana, the lion-head of Sennacherib, several boundary stones, and more than thirty terra-cotta cylinders bearing Sumerian and Semitic records of the building operations of Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, Nabonidus and other Babylonian and Assyrian rulers.[85] At Telloh where, a few years later, de Sarzec made his epoch-making discoveries, Rassam discovered several monuments and inscriptions of the Gudea period.

In a future article we shall give an account of the still more wonderful excavations and discoveries carried on in Assyria, Babylonia and Elam by de Sarzec, W. H. Ward, Peters, Hilprecht and Haynes (of the University of Pennsylvania expedition), Scheil, O. P., Koldewey, Moritz, Weissback and Delitzsch (of the German Oriental Society), de Morgan, Dr. Bank (of the Chicago University expedition), Capt. Cross (of the French expedition), and Drs. Thompson and King, of the British Museum, covering the period between 1878-1907.

Gabriel Oussani.

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[85] According to Rassam, the number of chambers in this particular temple or edifice must have amounted to nearly three hundred, one hundred and thirty of which were partially or completely unearthed by himself.

STUDIES.

DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

AN EXEGETICAL STUDY (V).

Francis E. Gigot

The writings of the New Testament which we have hitherto examined, ascribe to Our Lord one and the same unqualified opposition to divorce. This is the plain and unambiguous testimony of our earliest Synoptic Gospel, that of St. Mark. In Mk. x, 2-12, Jesus not only regards the Mosaic toleration of divorce as a legal concession made because of the hardness of the Jewish heart and in spite of God's primitive ordinance, but He rules it out from among His disciples, explicitly declaring to them that the marriage of either consort after divorce is an adultery. Equally clear and distinct is the witness of our latest Synoptic writing, the Gospel of St. Luke. Viewed in itself and in its context, Lk. xvi, 18 attests that Our Lord proclaimed as tainted with adultery all remarriage after divorce, and that in doing so, He alone proved Himself faithful to the spirit of the Old Testament dispensation. Lastly, in writing to the members of the Corinthian Church, St. Paul sets forth in no uncertain terms Christ's actual opposition to divorce. According to I Cor. vii, 10, 11, marriages contracted by Christian partners are regulated by the Lord's command in virtue of which they are indissoluble. It is indeed true that immediately afterwards (I Cor. vii, 12-16), the Apostle speaks of cases where the marriage bond may be broken and remarriage be allowed after divorce. But he does so simply,—as is evident from his words,—because the marriages which he has now in view do not come under the command of "the Lord:" had he regarded such unions as contracted by members of Christ, he would never have treated them otherwise than indissoluble because of the absolute will of Christ in this regard (Cfr. I Cor. vii, 10, 11).

To all these passages then, the Catholic apologist has a right to appeal as proving that the present teaching of the Roman Catholic Church is the very same as the one ascribed to Jesus in early documents of Christianity. Indeed, his position would be readily admitted by all non-Catholic interpreters of Holy Writ as well, were it not for the fact that in two passages of our first Gospel (Mt. v, 31, 32 and Mt. xix, 3-12), the significant clause "except for fornication" is actually placed on the lips of Christ Himself. In view of this exceptive clause, it is oftentimes claimed that Jesus regarded "marriage as in itself indissoluble, except by death or by that which in its very nature is the rupture of marriage,"[1] viz.: adultery; and that St. Mark and St. Luke did not mention adultery as an exception, because it was understood as a matter of course. It behooves us therefore to look closely into these passages of St. Matthew's Gospel, and to determine accurately their real meaning. To reach this end more effectively, we shall study them separately, and devote the present paper to a careful examination of Mt. v, 31-32, alone.

The following parallel columns present side by side the original Greek and the literal English rendering of this important passage:

Mt. v.

31. Ἐρρέθη δὲ·	31. It was said also:
Ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ	Whoever shall put away his wife,
δότω ἀυτῇ ἀποστάσιον.	let him give her a bill of divorce.
32. Ἐγω δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι	32. But I say to you that
πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ	Every one putting away his wife
παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνεῖας	except because of fornication
ποιεῖ ἀυτῆν μοιχευθῆναι	makes her commit adultery,
καὶ ὃς ἐὰν ἀπολελυμένην γαμήσῃ	and whoever shall marry one put away,
μοιχᾶται	commits adultery.

I. Purpose of Writer of Mt. V, 31-22

It can be readily seen that while our first Evangelist intends to set forth in this short section Our Lord's teaching concerning divorce, he distinctly gives that teaching of the Master only in the second verse of the passage: "But I say to you," etc. Hence, one anxious to ascertain the doctrine which the writer of the present section ascribes to Jesus regarding that great ethical question, might be tempted to neglect Mt. v, 31 as foreign to his object, and to determine Christ's mind concerning divorce, by means simply of Mt. v, 32. In point of fact, many interpreters who deal with this passage of our first Synoptist, treat the contents of Mt. v, 32 as if they were practically independent of those of the immediately preceding verse, and infer from Mt. v, 32 thus separately considered, what they think ought to be regarded as the personal teaching of Our Lord concerning divorce. Such a method of interpretation is decidedly incorrect It is plain to the attentive reader of the section before us, that the two verses of which it is made up should not be explained apart from each other. Our first Evangelist manifestly bound them together under the form of an antithesis, and thereby meant that their respective contents be understood as in opposition to each other. Mt. v, 31 quotes an older saying concerning the practice of divorce:

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[1] J. Monro Gibson, *The Gospel of St. Matthew*, p. 270. New York. Armstrong. 1901. Cf. H. A. Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Gospel of St. Matthew*, p. 132. New York. Funk and Wagnalls. 1884; etc.

> *It was said also*:
> Whoever shall put away his wife,
> let him give her a bill of divorce;

Mt. v, 32 sets over against it a more recent saying of Christ concerning the same important topic:

> *But I say to you that*
> Every one putting away his wife
> except because of fornication
> makes her commit adultery,
> and whoever shall marry one put away,
> commits adultery.

The opposition thus contemplated by the Evangelist between the two sayings which he quotes in Mt. v, 31 and Mt. v, 32 respectively, can be readily determined in a more precise manner. The antithesis in Mt. v, 31-32 is not an isolated one. In this very same chapter v of St. Matthew's Gospel, there are five other antitheses[2] with which Mt. v, 31-32 can be easily compared, inasmuch as they are all built on the same lines as Mt. v, 31-32. In each and all of them, an older saying to be immediately contrasted with a more recent one of Jesus to His disciples, is invariably introduced by the same formula: "It was said" (ἐρρέθη), as is used in Mt. v, 31a; and in each and all of them, exactly as in Mt. v, 32a, the more recent and contrasted saying of Christ is invariably introduced by the words: "But I say to you." Now, the exact kind of opposition which our first Evangelist had in mind to express by means of the formulas: "It was said," and "But I say to you," in these five other antitheses is perfectly ascertained. In each and all of these antitheses, the first expression: "It was said" serves unquestionably to introduce not a strict quotation of the Mosaic Law, but a solemn declaration of the sense in which the text of the written Law of Moses had been understood by Jewish tradition,[3] and was expounded by Jewish teachers in the synagogues.[4] As regards the second expression: "But I say to you", which is found also in each and all of these five antitheses, it is no less unquestionably employed each time to introduce a saying of Jesus, wherein He, the Master teaching His own disciples, finds fault openly with the sense in which the text of the written Law had been hitherto interpreted and enforced by the official teachers of the Jews. Thus then, in these five cases, St. Matthew employed these two introductory formulas with the intention of setting forth by means of an antithesis the opposition which existed between two interpretations of the written text of the Mosaic Law, the one given by the Jewish authorities, and the other by Our Lord. And in view of this, it is only natural to conclude that our first Evangelist employed these same two formulas with the same intention in the antithesis found in Mt. v, 31-32:

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[2] These antitheses are Mt. v, 21-22; 27-28; 33-37; 38-39; 43-48.

[3] This is true even of the saying: "Thou shalt not commit adultery," found in the antithesis in Mt. v, 27-28. This saying is indeed made up of the very words of the Mosaic command in Exodus xx, 13, and Deut. v, 17; yet it sets forth the Mosaic words in their Jewish traditional sense, whereby the *actual* commission of adultery was the only sin forbidden by the written text of the Mosaic Law.

Mt. v.
31. *It was said also*:
Whoever shall put away his wife,
let him give her a bill of divorce.
32. *But I say to you* that
Every one putting away his wife
except because of fornication
makes her commit adultery,
and whoever marries one put away,
commits adultery.

This conclusion as to the exact intention of our first Evangelist in writing Mt. v, 31-32 is put altogether beyond question by the study of his purpose in framing the series of antitheses which he has embodied in one and the same chapter of his Gospel, and in the midst of which he has inserted the antithesis found in Mt. v, 31-32.[5] St. Matthew's purpose in that regard is not left in any way to our surmising. Just before setting forth all those antitheses, our first Evangelist records the following declarations of Jesus:

Mt. v.
17. Do not think that I came to destroy the Law or the Prophets;
I came not to destroy, but to fulfil.
18. For amen I say to you:
Till heaven and earth pass away,
one yod or one tittle shall not pass from the Law,
till all things be accomplished.

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[4] In all these five antitheses the verb ἐρρέθη is preceded by ἠκούσατε: "*You have heard* that it was said," a fact which proves that each time there is question of an authoritative saying of the Jewish expositors in the synagogues and distinctly remembered by their hearers.

[5] This antithesis is preceded by two, and followed by three, other antitheses.

> 19. Whoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments
> and shall so teach men,
> shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven;
> but whoever shall do and teach,
> he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.
> 20. For I say to you that
> Unless your righteousness exceed (that) of the Scribes and Pharisees,
> you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.

The Evangelist's line of thought in these verses can easily be made out. Jesus was charged by the official expounders of the sacred Text, with destroying it because he required for entering into the Kingdom of heaven a righteousness different from that of the Scribes and Pharisees, that is different from the one that was secured by a strict fulfilment of that sacred Text as interpreted by Jewish oral tradition. This oral tradition was held by all as setting forth so perfectly the contents of the written Text, that all that was required from a teacher of the Law was to proclaim the oral tradition most faithfully and to carry it out scrupulously.[6] To affirm therefore,—as Jesus was actually doing,—that the traditional interpretation of the Law when faithfully promulgated and acted upon by the Scribes and the Pharisees was unable to secure admission into the kingdom of heaven, was to affirm this also of the Law itself and consequently to destroy it. It is plainly in view of this accusation against his Master that our first Evangelist has written Christ's declarations in Mt. v, 17-20 and has prefixed them to the authentic sayings that immediately follow in our first Gospel. Our Lord's declarations in Mt. v, 17-20 amount to this. "I came not to destroy, but to fulfil. It is really to fulfil, that I require a higher righteousness, the higher including naturally the lower 'righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees'. It is to fulfil, that in my interpretation of the written text of the law I include small particles of it,—ever a yod or a tittle of it,—which have been lost sight of by those who framed the traditional interpretation propounded by the official teachers in the synagogues. It is to fulfil, that I declare that only the one who faithfully promulgates and acts upon this inclusive interpretation of the text of the Law can be called great in the kingdom of heaven, or even can hope for admittance into it." Such is the obvious meaning of Our Lord's declarations in Mt. v, 17-20; and in order that he may enable his Jewish readers to realize for themselves the manner in which Jesus' teaching fulfilled the Law down to its "yod and tittle," differently from the teaching of the official expounders of the Law, our first Evangelist gives at once the series of antitheses among which is found Mt. v, 31-32. It is therefore from this standpoint that it behooves us to interpret the two members of the antithesis in Mt. v, 31-32, if we wish accurately to realize the doctrine which St. Matthew ascribes therein to the Jewish authorities and to Our Lord respectively. These two members set the two doctrines contrasted, in such an opposition that the first,—that of the official expounders of the Law,—must be taken as an imperfect interpretation of the written text of the Law concerning divorce, and that the second,—that of Jesus to His disciples,—must be taken, on the contrary, as the one which fulfils that same sacred text down to its very "yod or tittle."

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[6] With regard to the teacher's duty concerning the *oral* law handed down by tradition and considered by the Jews as rendering impossible every unwitting transgression of the Law of Moses, A. Edersheim pertinently remarks: "Nothing here could be altered, nor was any freedom left to the individual teacher, save that of explanation and illustration" (Sketches of Jewish Social Life in the Days of Christ, p. 288).

II. Mt. V, 31-32 points back to Deuter. xxiv, 1-4.

It must indeed be granted that in reference to some of the antitheses grouped in the fifth chapter of our first Gospel, it is difficult to point out the exact passage of the written text, of which the Evangelist regards the traditional Jewish saying as a defective, and Christ's opposite saying, as a perfect, interpretation. But, it can readily be seen that the case is quite different with the antithesis in Mt. v, 31-32:

Mt. v.
31. It was said also:
Whoever shall put away his wife,
let him give her a bill of divorce.
32. But I say to you that
Every one putting away his wife
except because of fornication
makes her commit adultery,
and whoever marries one put away,
commits adultery.

Both members of this antithesis plainly bear on the question of divorce, and the classical passage of the Mosaic Law, in which centered the discussions of Shammai and Hillel (first cent. B. C.) and of their respective schools (first cent. of our era) concerning the practice of divorce, is undoubtedly the one which is found in Deuteronomy xxiv, 1-4, and the full text of which reads literally as follows:

Deuter. xxiv.

1. When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, and it cometh to pass, if she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found in her some indecency (ערות דבר), that he writeth (וכתב) her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out (ושלחה) of his house,

2. and she departeth out of his house, and goeth and becometh another man's [wife],
3. and the latter man hateth her and writeth (וכתב) her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out (ושלחה) of his house; or if the latter man who took her as his wife, die;
4. her former husband who put her away (שלחה) is not allowed to take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled (הטמאה); for this is an abomination, before Yahweh, and thou shalt not cause to sin the land which Yahweh thy God, giveth thee [as] an inheritance.

On the basis of this text, the Shammaites and the Hillelites were still at variance in Our Lord's time as to the cause that would justify a man in putting away his wife. The former maintained that the husband might do so only because of unfaithfulness; the latter, on the contrary, affirmed that he might act thus for practically any cause. Hence, it was only natural that when Deuter, xxiv, 1-4 was read in the synagogue, the official expounders of the Law should promulgate what had been settled by tradition as to the full meaning of the text, viz.: what we find recorded by our Evangelist in Mt. v, 31:

Whoever shall put away,
let him give her a bill of divorce.

And it is manifestly because Our Lord is conceived by St. Matthew as finding fault with such traditional interpretation of that same text of Deuteronomy, that He is represented as declaring in Mt. v, 32:

But I say to you that
Every one putting away his wife
except because of fornication
makes her commit adultery,
and whoever marries one put away,
commits adultery;

for in these lines, the mention of the cause of fornication and of the commission of adultery, points distinctly back to particulars found in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4,[7] and apparently ignored by Jewish tradition. We therefore see what is the precise opposition intended by our first Evangelist in writing the antithesis in Mt. v, 31-32. The opposition which he contemplates is one which exists between two rival interpretations of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, and the latter of which alone fulfils in his eyes the wording of that Mosaic passage.

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[7] The expression "after she is defiled" which is used of the marriage of a divorced woman in Deuter. xxiv, 4, is the one applied to adultery in Levit. xviii, 20; Numbers v, 13, 14, 20.

III. Mt. V, 31, in the light of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4.

Having thus made out the exact standpoint from which St. Matthew quotes the two sayings which form the antithesis in Mt. v, 31-32, we now proceed to determine their respective meaning in the light of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, that is of the written text of the Law to which they both point back. We naturally begin with the Jewish saying which is set forth first by our Evangelist:

Mt. v, 31b c.

Ος αν απολυση την γυναικα αυτου	Whoever shall put away his wife,
δοτω αυτη αποστασιον	let him give her a bill of divorce.

This is the traditional pronouncement concerning the practice of divorce, the natural meaning of which the official expounders of the Mosaic Law considered as stating adequately the requirements of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4:

Deuter. xxiv.

1. When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, and it cometh to pass, if she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found in her some indecency, that he writeth her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out of his house,
2. and she departeth out of his house, and goeth and becometh another man's [wife],
3. and the latter man hateth her and writeth her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out of his house, or if the latter man who took her as his wife die;
4. her former husband who put her away is not allowed to take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled: for this is an abomination before Yahweh, and thou shalt not cause to sin the land which Yahweh, thy God, giveth thee [as] an inheritance.

Immediately after the public reading and translating of this section of the Law in the synagogues,[8] the Jewish teachers proclaimed the saying recorded in Mt. v, 31, thereby making it known officially to their hearers that all that was required by this Deuteronomic passage from a man who was determined to put away his wife, was that he should give her a bill of divorce. And indeed it must have been in their eyes an easy matter to show how the saying handed by tradition, was the strict equivalent of the Mosaic enactment concerning divorce in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4. According to them, Moses in this passage does not forbid divorce, but regulates its practice. After, as before, this enactment, a man may lawfully put away his wife, since in this very decree Israel's lawgiver speaks of the dismissed wife as "going and becoming another man's [wife]" (Deuter. xxiv, 2), as susceptible of being put away by this latter man (verse 3), in which event she may still remarry, except however, "her former husband who put her away" (verse 4). But after, differently from before, the decree contained in Deuter. xxiv, 1, 4, whoever is determined to part for ever with his wife cannot do so lawfully without supplying her with a bill of divorce, since this supplying is distinctly mentioned by Israel's lawgiver in connection with the two men whose action he describes in the framing of his decree:

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[8] As the Hebrew language had become unknown to the people at large, having given place to the Aramaic, an interpreter stood by the side of the reader in the synagogue and translated verse by verse into the vernacular.

(*Case of the first man*).	(*Case of the second man*).
1. When a man taketh a wife	2. and she departeth out of his house and goeth
and marrieth her, and it cometh to pass	and becometh another man's [wife]
if she find no favor in his eyes,	3. and the latter man hateth her
because he hath found in her some indecency,	. . . . . .
that *he writeth her a bill of divorce*	and *writeth her a bill of divorce*
and delivereth [it] *into her hand,*	*and delivereth* [it] *into her hand,*
and putteth her out of his house,	and putteth her out of his house,
. . . . . .	or if the latter man die, etc.

In the case of the two men spoken of in these lines, the bill of divorce is mentioned as a prerequisite for the woman's dismissal, and in the case of both the first husband and the man who married her after she had been put away, it is only upon the giving of that bill, that she is assumed to be free to look for another man. Hence, the Jewish expounders of the Law could readily claim that this Deuteronomic passage simply required for a man's lawful dismissal of his wife, that he should give her a bill of divorce, as is exactly set forth in the traditional saying:

Mt. v, 31.

It was said also:
Whoever shall put away his wife,
let him give her a bill of divorce.

The wording: "whoever" (ος αν) in that saying, represented correctly, according to them, the mind of the great lawgiver of Israel, since in framing his decree, he had embraced all the possible cases of a lawful dismissal, viz. that of a man who puts away a woman who had never been married before to anybody else, and that of a man who dismisses one who had been put away from a husband. Again, the expression "let him *give her* a bill of divorce" (δοτω αυτη) used in the saying handed by tradition, included manifestly both the *writing for her*, and the *delivering into her hand* of that document, which are specified for the two dismissals spoken of in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4. Finally, they could easily maintain that the traditional saying is not a defective interpretation of the Mosaic decree, although differently from Deuter xxiv, 1-4, it contains no reference to the cause of fornication (ערות דבר, literally: *the nakedness of a thing*). For this purpose, they had only to appeal to the differences noticeable in the respective wording of the two cases described by the framer of the Deuteronomic decree. The second man is indeed represented like the former husband as determined to put away the woman with whom he is living, and his action is assumed to be no less lawful than that of the former. And yet, while the first husband is said to be in that frame of mind "because he hath found in her some indecency", of the latter man it is simply written: "and the latter man hateth her". The omission of the clause: "because he hath found in her some indecency" in this second case was of course a deliberate one on the part of Moses, and hence should be treated as implying that he regarded the giving of a bill of divorce, irrespectively of the only cause which he had precedently mentioned, as sufficient to make a wife's dismissal perfectly lawful. This inference would appear to the Jewish jurists all the surer, because in describing the conduct of the second man, the Mosaic legislator had said:

> Deuter. xxiv, 3.
>
> and the latter man hateth her
> and writeth her a bill of divorce
> and delivereth [it] into her hand,
> and putteth her out of his house,
> *or if the latter man die*, etc.

The addition of the clause: "or if the latter man die," in this second case, was easily construed as showing that the simple supplying of a bill of divorce by a man,—independently of any cause, since the mention of a cause is now dropped,—placed the latter man before the mind of Moses in exactly the same condition as that of a dead husband. And in point of fact, it is because of this additional clause in Deuter. xxiv, 3, that the Jews had it that "a woman is loosed from the law of a husband by only one of two things: a bill of divorce, or the husband's death".[9] In understanding then the words of the traditional saying:

> Whoever shall put away his wife,
> let him give her a bill of divorce,

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[9] The Talmud of Jerusalem, treatise *Qiddushin*, chap. i, pp. 193, 202, (French Transl. M. Schwab, tome ix).

as allowing a man's dismissal of his wife under the sole condition that he would give her a bill of divorce,—for whatever cause he gave it,—the official teachers of the Law felt quite sure that they were setting forth an adequate interpretation of the Mosaic enactment in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4. It is this conviction on their part, which accounts for the manner in which such authorized expositors of the Mosaic Law as Philo (about 20 B. C.—A. D. 40) and Josephus (about 38-100 A. D.) give the requirements of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4. The latter, for instance, says expressly: "He who desires to be divorced from his wife for any cause whatever (and many such causes happen among men) let him in writing give assurance that he will never use her as his wife any more; for by this means she may be at liberty to live with another man, although before this bill be given, she is not permitted to do so: but if she be misused by him also, or if, when he is dead, her first husband would marry her again, it shall not be lawful for her to return to him."[10] It is this conviction too, which caused official expounders of the Law to look upon divorce in the light of a privilege granted only to the Jews, not to the Gentiles;[11] to consider the giving of a bill of divorce as the simple and safe means that severed the marriage tie no less effectively than death itself, and to act accordingly.[12] It was this conviction on their part finally, which naturally accounts for the fact that the official teachers of Israel accused Our Lord of destroying the Law in its enactment concerning divorce, and that our first Evangelist felt it necessary to refute them by setting forth in Mt. v, 32, Christ's different interpretation which alone he knew to fulfil the text of that passage of the Mosaic Law, down to its "yod or tittle."

IV. Mt. V, 32, a Fulfilment of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4.

The foregoing examination of Mt. v, 31 in the light of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4 enables us then to realize how the Jewish authorities, when promulgating and enforcing their traditional saying concerning the practice of divorce, actually thought that they were setting forth fully the meaning of the Mosaic enactment regarding the same point. They required simply the supplying of a bill of divorce from the man who wanted to put away his wife, because they thought that the giving of the document,—for whatever cause given,—was the only thing prescribed for this purpose by Deuter. xxiv, 1-4; and they regarded the wife thus dismissed, as a woman free to marry another man, because in their eyes, Deuter. xxiv, 1-4 treated her as such.[13] And yet, they were indeed very far from having realized the exact meaning of the Mosaic enactment. The text of this passage whose least provisions they considered as embodied in their traditional saying, contains an expression the bearing of which on the practice of divorce they had undervalued, and the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated for realizing the sense in which our first Evangelist understands the Mosaic text in Deuter. xxiv:

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[10] Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book iv, chap. viii, § 23.

[11] Talmud of Jerusalem, *loc. cit.*, p. 197.

[12] Josephus, *Life* (75, 76) describes his own freedom in dealing with the marriage tie.—A. Edersheim (*life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, vol. ii, p. 332, footn. 5) pertinently remarks: "Two disgusting instances of Rabbis making proclamation of their wish to be married for a day (in a strange place, and then divorced), are mentioned in *Yoma* 18b."

> 1. When a man taketh a wife and marrieth her (ובעלה), and it cometh to pass, if she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found in her some indecency (ערות דבר), that he writeth her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out of his house,
> 2. and she departeth out of his house, and goeth and becometh another man's (האיש אחר),
> 3. and the latter man (האיש) hateth her and writeth her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out of his house, or if the latter man (האיש) who took her as his wife, die;
> 4. her former husband (בעלה) who put her away is not allowed to take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled (הטמאה): for this is an abomination before Yahweh, and thou shalt not cause to sin the land which Yahweh, thy God, giveth thee [as] an inheritance.

This most important expression is: "after that she is defiled", wherewith the Mosaic lawgiver qualifies in Deuter. xxiv, 4 the marriage intercourse of a divorced woman with a man different from her first husband. The verb טמא "to defile", used in that expression, is the one which he has employed in his description of the commission of adultery in Leviticus xviii, 20; and Numbers v, 13, 14, 20.[14] Whence it clearly follows that in the eyes of the framer of the decree in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, the one put away spoken of in the preceding verses (Deuter. xxiv, 1-3) is truly the wife of the husband who has dismissed her and who is still living: he conceives of her as one bound by the marriage tie, despite the fact that he has described her dismissal by that husband "because he hath found in her some indecency", and by means of a bill of divorce, and therefore speaks of her marriage intercourse with "another man' as an adulterous defilement. And this throws at once a vivid light upon what St. Matthew regards as the exact meaning of the Mosaic enactment in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, concerning a husband's dismissal of his wife. The case of dismissal distinctly dealt with by the lawgiver of Israel is that of a man who thinks that he has a perfect right not to consider himself responsible for the subsequent remarriage of the wife whom he is determined to put away. This right the lawgiver allows in the supposition that the man in question has really the grievance alleged: "if she find no favor in his eyes, *because he hath found* in her some indecency" (ערות דבר) literally: "the nakedness of a thing," a euphemism signifying a charge (*causa*) or proof of conjugal infidelity.[15] To deter such a man, however, from acting upon his right and thereby exposing the dismissed wife to what he regards as an adulterous intercourse with another man under the cover of a second marriage, the Deuteronomic writer declares expressly that the dismissing husband will not be allowed to live again with her, as husband and wife, "after that she is defiled." Viewed then from the standpoint of the expression: "after that she is defiled," used of a remarried divorced woman, the straightforward meaning of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, according to St. Matthew comes to this: the remarriage of a woman divorced because of her alleged unfaithfulness and by means of a bill of divorce. is an adulterous union for which a dismissing husband is responsible unless the cause of dismissal supposed in the lawgiver's words (viz. unfaithfulness), be really verified in her case, and the man who marries her shares, of course, directly and necessarily in the guilt of that union.

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[13] Cfr. Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book iv, chap. viii, 23.

[14] Cfr. Ezechiel xxiii, 17.

Bearing this in mind, one can readily see how our first Evangelist would naturally represent in Mt. v, 31-32, the Jewish authoritative saying as a defective interpretation of Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, and the opposite saying of Christ as a perfect fulfilment of that Mosaic passage. The Jewish saying:

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[15] It is indeed true that the Jewish authorities did not understand the expression ערות דבר "the nakedness of a thing," as meaning directly conjugal unfaithfulness. It remains true, however, that this expression, in the time of our first Evangelist, could be taken in that sense, since Shammai (1st cent. B. C.) and his school (1st century of our era) thus took it when they declared that only an illicit relation on the part of a wife could justify her husband in divorcing her. (Cfr. Talmud of Jerusalem, treatise *Gittin*, chap. ix, 11 in French Trans. by M. Schwab, tome ix, p. 82). That the expression: ערות דבר was actually thus understood by our first Evangelist is plain from the fact that its exact corresponding expression: πορνείας λόγος in Mt. v, 32 denotes exclusively conjugal unfaithfulness. The precise meaning of the Hebrew expression in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4 will be studied in our next article.

> Mt. v, 31.
>
> It was said also:
> Whoever shall put away his wife,
> let him give her a bill of divorce,

is an altogether wrong interpretation of Deut. xxiv, 1-4, since it supposes that in that passage Moses allowed a man's dismissal of his wife for any cause, and simply required him to supply his dismissed wife with a bill of divorce whereby she might be permitted to marry again.[16] Our Lord's opposite saying to His disciples:

> Mt. v, 32.
>
> But I say to you that
> every one putting away his wife
> except because of fornication
> makes her commit adultery,
> and whoever shall marry one put away,
> commits adultery,

sets forth accurately the particulars contained in Deuter xxiv, 1-4, which have a bearing on the lawfulness of a man's dismsisal of his wife, or rather sets them all forth more expressly and fully. In Mt. v, 32, as in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, the commission of adultery is mentioned as the result of the marriage of one put away by her husband: the Deuteronomic expression: "after that she is defiled," finds its most explicit equivalent in Christ's words: "makes her commit adultery," "whoever shall marry one put away, commits adultery." In Mt. v, 32, even more distinctly than in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, that commission of adultery, is represented as the personal sin of the remarrying divorced woman: in saying that she *commits adultery*, Jesus conveys fully the idea implied in the Hothpa'al form of the Hebrew verb טמא in the Deuteronomic phrase "after that she is defiled," literally: "after that she has allowed herself to be defiled," of course adulterously, as we have seen. In Mt. v, 32, more explicitly than in Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, the dismissing husband is conceived as responsible conditionally for her sin of adultery, his responsibility in that regard being dependent on the presence or absence of the one condition mentioned in the Mosaic text, viz. the wife's unfaithfulness, which is evidently stated more plainly in our first Gospel: "except because of fornication," than in the Deuteronomic passage: "if she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found in her the nakedness of a thing." Finally, Our Lord's last sentence: "and whoever marries one put away, commits adultery," brings out explicitly the fact that the man who marries a divorced woman, directly and necessarily commits adultery with her, a fact which the Deuteronomic lawgiver had simply left implied in his expression: "after that she is defiled."

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[16] Cf. the words of Josephus quoted already from his *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book IV, chap. viii, 23.

Well then could our first Evangelist feel entitled to consider Our Lord's saying concerning divorce as fulfilling the text of Deuteronomy xxiv, 1-4 differently from that of the official expounders of that same text in the synagogues. Well could he set it over against that of the Jewish teachers in one of those antitheses which he grouped in the fifth chapter of his work as so many illustrations that Jesus "had not come to destroy but to fulfil" by setting forth a doctrine which embodied the requirements of the Law to "its yod and tittle," and which if acted upon secured a righteousness greater than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, a righteousness necessary to enter into the kingdom of heaven.

V. Doctrine ascribed to Jesus in Mt. v, 32.

Having thus determined the relation of fufilment in which Mt. V, 32 stands to Deuter. xxiv, 1-4, it becomes very easy to point out by way of conclusion the precise doctrine concerning divorce which our first Evangelist ascribes to Jesus in His saying:

> Mt. V, 32.
> But I say to you that
> Every one putting away his wife
> except because of fornication
> makes her commit adultery,
> and whoever marries one put away,
> commits adultery.

It is the doctrine of One, who like the Mosaic lawgiver, looks upon remarriage after divorce as an adulterous defilement: the dismissed wife "commits adultery" if she remarries, and "whoever marries one put away, commits adultery."[17] It is the authoritative teaching of One who has come "not to destroy but to fulfil" the Law, by declaring solemnly to His disciples that even the very highest apparent ground (viz. conjugal unfaithfulness) for divorce, is but a condition which makes lawful the permanent separation of husband and wife.[18] It is a doctrine entirely opposed to that contained in the Jewish traditional saying:

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[17] In view of the fact that the expression "after that she is defiled" in Deuter. xxiv, 4 places the marriage intercourse of a divorced woman in the same category as adultery, Keil significantly remarks: "The marriage of a divorced woman is thus treated implicitly as tantamount to adultery, and the way is prepared for the teaching of Christ on the subject of marriage: 'whoever marries one put away commits adultery' (Mt. v, 32)."

> Mt. V, 31:
>
> It was said also:
> Whoever shall put away his wife,
> let him give her a bill of divorce.

while in the eyes of the Jewish teachers, any reason was valid for a man to divorce his wife, and his giving of a bill of divorce severed the marriage tie as perfectly as death, Jesus, on the contrary affirms that no reason is valid for that purpose, and does not mention the giving of a bill of divorce which could be necessary only in the supposition that divorce could be practised.[19] Finally, it is the very doctrine of an absolute rejection of divorce which we have already found embodied in the other early documents of Christianity that we have examined, the very doctrine of an absolute rejection of divorce distinctly taught by the Catholic Church down to the present day.

Here therefore we might end our examination of Mt. V, 31-32. Owing, however, to the importance of the topic treated, we shall in a forthcoming article deal with several points barely touched, or not touched, upon, in the present paper, and thereby render our study of Mt. V, 31-32 as thorough and satisfactory as we can in its various aspects.

Francis E. Gigot.

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[18] As distinctly admitted by B. Weiss (*Die Vier Evangelien*, p. 36. Leipzig. J. C. Hinrich, 1905) with regard to the exceptive clause, except because of fornication: "Von einem Ehescheidunsgrunde is nicht die Rede, wie der bedingungslose Parallelsatz zeigt."

[19] "The bill of divorce," says pertinently H. J. Holtzmann (*die Synoptiker*, 3d. edit., p. 211), "was to allow the remarriage of a woman who was in possession of the said document. The possibility of obtaining such an object, however, is annulled by the declaration that *whoever marries a dismissed* woman, *commits adultery* himself, because according to divine right she is not free, but is the wife of another."

THE POWER OF THE KEYS (I)

Edward J. Hanna, D. D.

Dr. Henry Charles Lea (*History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church,* Vol. I, p. 4) writing concerning the power to forgive sins as exercised in the Latin church, expresses his position in the following words: "In the teachings of Jesus externals were of no importance, man dealt directly with God....Repentance, love, humility, pardon of offenses or charity sufficed to win forgiveness. It required the ingenuity of theologians for thirteen centuries to build up from this simplicity the complex structure of dogma and observance on which were based sacramental absolution." According to Dr. Lea the growth of the penitential system in the Catholic Church has no warrant in the teaching of Christ. Of a certainty Dr. Lea is not unmindful of the texts which refer to "binding and loosing" (Matt. xvi, 19; xviii, 18); nor of the text of St. John which speaks of the power to forgive and to retain. (John xx, 22, 23), but of these he says: (p. 108) "Whatever sense may be attributed to this grant of power, the primitive church evidently regarded it as personal to the holy men whom Christ had selected as his mmediate representatives."

Those who treat historically the gradual unfolding of the penitential system in the Catholic Church ever feel (1) that history far from disproving, confirms wonderfully, the doctrine as defined by the Council of Trent. (2) That whenever growth is admitted it is in virtue of principles divine which were to be found in the Church from the days of the Apostles. (3) That consequently he who would know what Christ really did for his Church, must learn it from the Church in which the spirit of truth ever abides, "annuntians et suggerens ac subministrans ac demum insinuans quidquid est Christi." (John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, Contra Lutherum de Cap. Bibl. cap. iii). See also Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. II, p. 386.

That there has been a gradual development in the doctrine and in the use of the sacrament of penance no one may deny. The practice of absolving from venial sin (Council of Trent, Sess. xiv, can. 7), the practice of freeing from censure and from punishment due to sin in virtue of the "power of the keys," the practice of "reservation" (Council of Trent, Sess, xiv, can. 11) may have been taught with greater clearness in one age than in another. Surely too, Christian writers throughout the early centuries of our era might have written with some hesitation on such matters as the kind of sorrow requisite for forgiveness in the tribunal of penance, the length and severity of satisfaction, or the possible repetition for indefinite times of sacramental absolution. These and similar facts prove that the early theologians did not always realize to the full all that was implicitly contained in the teaching of Christ and of his Apostles concerning the penitential system as it is now known and has been practiced for centuries in God's Church.

Though the Catholic theologian admits some growth in penitential doctrine and discipline, still he can always claim that this growth is no mere human invention, but is based upon a warrant all divine. The Catholic theologian can also claim that in virtue of this divine warrant there existed in the Church from the beginning, the power to forgive and to retain sins, and that this power, as is clear from the words of Christ, was judicial (Council of Trent, Sess. xiv, can. 3 and 9).

The classical texts are those quoted above (Matth. xv, 19; Matth. xviii, 18, and John xx, 21-23). To Peter are given "the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; to Peter and to all the Apostles is granted the power of binding and loosing. In the light of such passages has the Catholic Church no warrant when she claims that she was endowed by her divine Founder with supreme power both legislative and juridical, when she derives from the words of Christ the right and power to pardon sin, to free man from the penalties which he incurs because of sin? What Peter and the Apostles bind upon earth is reckoned as also bound "in heaven." The Apostles do on earth what is done by God himself in heaven.

The words "to loose" and "to bind" (*λύειν* and *δέειν*) according to Dalman, can be referred only to אסר and שׁרא in the Aramaic.[1] Concerning these words the learned Leipzig professor writes as follows: "As may be seen j. Ber. 5b, e. g., these are the technical forms for the verdict of a doctor of the law who pronounces something as "bound" (אסיר j. Ber. 6c) i. e., "forbidden," or else as "loosed" (שׁרי j. Sanh. 28a), i. e., "permitted"—not of course, in virtue of his own absolute authority, but in conformity with his knowledge of the oral law. Consequently the statement of Jesus would mean that his disciples—in virtue of their knowledge of his oral teaching—will be able to give an authoritative decision in regard to what the adherents of the theocracy may do and may not do." And if it be objected that *λύειν* and *δέειν* do not mean in Matthew's Greek "permit" and "forbid," Dalman adds (Ibid. p. 215) that "here no emphasis falls on "permitting" and "forbidding" as such, but only on the final significance universally attached to the word of him who has authority to "permit" and "forbid."

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[1] *The Words of Jesus* considered in the light of post-biblical Jewish writings and the Aramaic language. English Translation by D. M. Kay, B. D., B. Sc. p. 214.

This is brought out more clearly from a consideration of the parallel phrase used by Christ: "I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven." In Isaias xxii, 22, Sobna receives upon his shoulder the key of the house of David, and he opens and no one shuts, he shuts and no one opens. Nor does this mean (Cf. Dalman ibid) that Sobna becomes merely the doorkeeper in the palace of David, but that he is in supreme control of the king's domestic concerns. And in the same sense does the writer of the Apocalypse apply similar words to Christ (Apoc. iii, 7 seqq.) "These things saith the Holy One and the true One, he that hath the key of David; he that openeth and no man shutteth; shutteth and no man openeth." In virtue of the authority described in these words, Christ has the power to pronounce sentence upon the status and value of any community, while no other power whatever can avail in opposition (Dalman Ibid). "In the same sense," continues the Leipzig professor, "Peter, Matt. xvi, 19, has the keys of the theocracy, and, as keeper of the keys, is the fully authorized steward of the house of God upon earth. Since, moreover, it is the community of Jesus that is here concerned, in which Peter is to exercise this office, and as no sort of limitation to a defined sphere is indicated, it follows necessarily that the control of teaching and of discipline is regarded as entrusted to him. Peter had just shown that he understood his Master better than the others. He, therefore, shall it be, who will one day assume in the fellowship that position which Jesus then occupied in relation to his disciples. Again, in Matt. xviii, 18, the same plenary power is vested in the disciples collectively, in the case when the special application of that authority is made in respect of the discipline of the community."

But are we justified, in virtue of these words, in attributing to Peter and to the Apostles the power to forgive and to retain sins, which power is expressly conferred in the Fourth Gospel? "He breathed upon them and said: Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whose sins ye shall forgive they are forgiven them; and whose sins ye shall retain they are retained" (John xx, 21-23). Again the illustrious professor sees no reason why such application should not be made. "For exclusion from the community on account of some offence includes the "retaining" of the sins; the readmission of the sinne includes the "remission" of his sins" (Ibid. p. 216).[2]

Evidently Jewish-Aramaic sources give warrant for the doctrine defined by the Council of Trent (Sess. xiv, cap. 1), and from the same sources we may confidently infer that the texts under discussion imply the exercise of a distinctly judicial act, and not a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring sins to be forgiven" (Sess. xiv. can. 9).[3]

Early Christian tradition insists that Christ bestowed upon his Church the power to forgive sins, and it insists also that such power is exercised by the priesthood in virtue of Christ's grant. True it is that when there is question of pardoning sin, baptism is more frequently mentioned, for baptism was the great sacrament—the sacrament of regeneration and initiation into the family of Christ. True also it is that the ideal of sanctity was high in the first Christian communities, and the men and women of Apostolic times were considered as "fellow citizens with the saints and the domestics of God, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and the prohpets, Jesus Christ himself being the foundation stone" (Ephes. ii, 19-20). Chosen, then, to be "unspotted in God's sight" (Ibid. i, 4), chosen to be the "first fruits" of the Gospel, having been illuminated and having tasted the heavenly gift, the early Christians found it hard to conceive how a man could fall away and be again renewed into penance, for whoever is born of God committeth not sin (I John iii, 9). But the first fervor gradually cooled, and even serious sin was found in the very communities established by the Apostles. The question, therefore, of dealing with sin among the brethren forced itself upon the community as an important practical issue. It is to be noted that when there is question of repentance, especially in connection with the Eucharist and the restoring of the lapsed to church communion, the office of the priesthood seems to be invoked.

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[2] שרא "to loose" is used figuratively in various connections in Jewish Aramaic, viz. (1) to loose from a ban; (2) to deliver a person who has been spellbound by sorcery, to free from the spell; (3) the same word has also the sense of "forgive" as is proved by the following instances. According to Midr. Ps. xix, 7, 2, David said to God: "The transgressions wherein I have trespassed before Thee, I pray Thee, forgive me" (תשרי לי)! And the answer received was: "Lo! it is forgiven unto thee; lo! it is remitted unto thee" (הא שרי לך והא שביק לך x, 7). The month Tishri is called by this name, according to Vay. R. 29, because at that time God "forgives, remits, expiates" (תשרי, תשבוק, תכפר) the sins of His people. Those who have beaten Tarphon (c. 110), not knowing who he was, call to him, j. Shebi. 35d: שרי לן, "forgive us." In Jerus. I. Num. xiv, 18, God is called שרי לחובין, "One who forgives the guilty." Dalman, *Op. cit.* p. 217.

[3] Cf. Lightfoot, *Horæ Hebraicæ*; Buxtorf, *Lex. Chaldaicum*; Knabenbauer, *In Matth.* ii, p. 66; Maas, *St. Matthew*, 183, 184, et al.

Clement I in his epistle to the Corinthians not only exhorts to repentance, but begs the seditious to "submit themselves to the presbyters and receive correction so as to repent" (Chap. 57), and **Ignatius of Antioch** at the close of the first century, speaks of the mercy of God to sinners, provided they return "with one consent to the unity of Christ and the communion of the Bishop." The clause "communion of the bishop" evidently means the bishop with his council of presbyters as assessors.

The **Didache** in iv, 14 and again in xiv, 1, commands an individual confession in the congregation. "In the congregation thou shalt confess thy transgressions," or again: "On the Lord's day come together and break bread...having confessed your transgressions that your sacrifice may be pure." On these passages Hemmer (*Les Pères Apostoliques*, I-II, p. lx) remarks as follows: "Il ne donne aucune indication spéciale sur la façon de procéder. Aussi ne peut-on édifier sur ces textes aucune théorie sur les formes de la pénitence dans l'antiquité." This may be granted, but the texts are certainly significant, considering the date of the Didache, which Harnack places between 131 and 160.

Somewhat later[4] **Hermas** in the *Pastor* insists strongly upon moral reform and upon penance. In the days of Hermas there was evidently a school of rigorists who insisted that there was no pardon for sin committed after baptism (Simil. viii, cap. 6). Against this school the author of the *Pastor* takes a resolute stand. He teaches that by penance the sinner may hope for reconciliation with God and with the church. "Go and tell then to everyone that they may repent and they shall live unto God. Because the Lord having had compassion on all men, *has sent me* to give repentance, although some are not worthy of it on account of their works (Simil. viii, cap. 11). Hermas, however, seems to give but one opportunity for such reconciliation, for in II, Mandate ix, Chap. 1, he seems to state categorically that "there is but one repentance for the servants of God," and further on in chapter 3 he says the Lord has had mercy on the work of his hands and hath set repentance for them; "and he has entrusted *to me* power of this repentance. And therefore I say to you, if any one has sinned...he has opportunity to repent once." Repentance is therefore possible at least once in virtue of a power vested in the Pastor by God.

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[4] According to Harnack, the *Shepherd* in its present form dates from about the year 140, but parts of the work are probably still older.

The entrusting of the pardoning power to the ministry of the priesthood is expressed more clearly in the **Canons of Hippolytus.** The bishop consecrating a brother bishop is directed to pray thus: "Grant him, O Lord, the power to forgive sin" (xxii, Duschesne, Christian Worship, p. 526).

And even earlier, **Dionysius of Corinth,** putting himself against certain growing Marcionistic traditions, not only taught that Christ has left to his church power of pardon, but that no sin was so great as to be excluded from the exercise of that power. For this we have the authority of Eusebius, who (*Hist. Eccles.*, iv, 23), says: "And writing to the church which is in Amastris, together with those in Pontus, he commands them to receive those who come back after *any fall, whether it be delinquency or heresy.*" We perceive here a reaction against a too strict discipline, a reaction already noticed in the *Pastor* of Hermas.

Clement of Alexandria seems to contemplate an established form or penance admitting after the tradition of the *Pastor* one repentance. "For God being very merciful has vouchsafed in the case of those who, though in Faith, have fallen into transgression, a second repentance, so that should any one be tempted after his calling he may still receive a *repentance* not to be repented of." He seems to be unable to conceive of another trial, for he adds: "Continual and successive repentings for sin differ nothing from the case of those who are not believers at all, except only in their consciousness that they do sin." (*Stromata*, Bk. II, chapter xiii). The existence of a regular system of pennance is also hinted at in the work of Clement, *Who is the Rich Man that shall be saved*?, where he tells the story of the Apostle John and his journey after the young bandit. John pledged his word that the youthful robber would find forgiveness from the Savior; but even then a long serious penance was necessary before he could be restored to the church. And when Clement concludes that "he who welcomes the angel of penance...will not be ashamed when he sees the Savior," most commentators think he alludes to the bishop or priest who presided over the ceremony of public penance.

But, strange as it may seem, this granting of one chance of repentance met in the early church with serious opposition, especially where there was question of apostasy or adultery, as may be gathered from the *Philosophoumena.*

Pope St. Zephyrinus (198-217) following the Roman tradition, had somewhat mitigated the rigor of the early penance and had permitted those who were guilty of adultery and fornication to return to the communion of the church after they had gone through the regular penance. **Callixtus** (217-222) with the deeper knowledge of his times than that possessed by most men of his day, showed himself still more inclined to mercy; he showed a desire to open the way of indulgence to those who had been adjudged guilty even of apostasy and murder. It is well to remark that he was accused by Hippolytus and his sympathizers of wishing *to pardon every kind of sin* (*Phil.* Bk. ix, chap. 6). The attack of Hippolytus, unjust as it is uncharitable, shows not only the difficulty of putting down the excessive rigorism which the early Christian ideal had engendered, but also, even at this late date, a most imperfect knowledge of the revelation of Christ in reference to the power to forgive and to retain (*Philosoph.* Bk. ix, chap. 7). He does not seem to deny absolutely the power to forgive, but he circumscribes it with strange limitations.

Tertullian's writings belong to the very beginning of the third century. Naturally the tone of his apologetic as a Catholic differs from the tone he assumed after he joined the sect of the Montanists. As a Catholic he wrote *De Poenitentia*, where in clear terms he asserts the right of pardon granted by God to his church. "These poisons of the Evil One God foreseeing, although the gate of forgiveness has been shut and fastened up with the bar of baptism, has permitted it still to stand somewhat open. In the vestibule he has stationed a second repentance for opening to such as knock: but now once for all, because now for the second time; but never more because the last time it had been in vain. For is even this once enough? You have what you now deserved not, for you had lost what you had received. If the Lord's indulgence grants you the means of restoring what you had lost, be thankful for the benefit renewed, not to say amplified; for restoring is a greater thing than giving, inasmuch as having lost is more miserable than never having received at all. However, if any do incur the debt of a second repentance, his spirit is not to be forthwith cut down and undermined by despair. Let it by all means be irksome to sin again, but let not to repent again be irksome: irksome to imperil oneself again, but not to be again set free. Let none be ashamed. Repeated sickness must have repeated medicine. You will show your gratitude to the Lord by not refusing what the Lord offers you. You have offended, but can still be reconciled. You have One Whom you may satisfy, and Him willing." (*Ante Nicene Fathers*, Eng. Translation, Vol. III, p. 663).

As a Montanist he does not deny the power to pardon, but he restricts it greatly, and charges Pope Calixtus who simply followed the Roman tradition, with grave dereliction of duty because he presumed to pardon especially the sins of the flesh. In *De Pudicitia*, chapter x, he refers to the Shepherd of Hermas and takes him to task because he favored the pardon of adulterers. He freely grants in chapter xi that our Lord pardoned the adulterers, but he states that such power belongs to Christ alone. He thinks to prove his contention (chapter xii) by reference to the Council of Jerusalem (Acts xv). St. Paul's dealings with the incestuous Corinthian perplex him not a little (chapter xiii seqq.), still he yields not. Pope Zephyrinus had issued a decree granting forgiveness for adultery to such as performed the required satisfaction (*De Pudicit.* cap. i). Against this decree he launches the vial of his wrath (cap. xxi). Here he represents the Pope as asserting that the church has power to forgive sins because to the church in the person of Peter was given the power to bind and to loose, were given also the keys of the kingdom of heaven. "You therefore (Zephyrinus) presume that the power of binding and loosing has derived to you, that is, to every church akin to Peter." Tertullian of course denies that the power granted to Peter descends to the church, and rather holds that it descends to spiritual men, but it may be remarked in passing that he has affirmed the opposite in *Scorpiace*, chapter x, where he says: "For though you think heaven still shut, remember that the Lord left here to Peter and through him to the church, the keys of it, which every one who has been here put to the question, and also made confession, will carry with him." At all events, the whole contention brings out clearly (1) that in the days of Zephyrinus and Calixtus there was an established traditional position that the church had a commission to forgive all who did penance; (2) that she did it in virtue of the power of the keys granted to her by Christ; (3) that her pardoning power extended to all serious sins, even such as adultery and apostasy, and (4) that this forgiveness was understood as a real blotting out of sin, not a mere restoration to the communion of the church—all this in spite of the opposition of a rigorist party, which in its mistaken zeal for the maintenance of the original Christian ideal, limited strangely the pardoning power given by Christ to his church.

EDWARD J. HANNA.

DISCUSSION

THE TELEOLOGICAL METHOD IN ETHICS

In a very interesting article in the last number of the Review, Father Plater, S. J., declares that my arguments in the issue of Jan.-Feb., 1907, "are a protest, not against teleology, but against bad teleology." This estimate is substantially correct; nevertheless I cannot appreciate as highly as he even good teleology. I refer to its theoretical more than to its practical value. My criticism of the teleological method with reference to the ultimate end, was that the ultimate end, even conceived as the glory of God, does not immediately constitute a complete criterion of conduct. It is, of course, a material standard or norm, inasmuch as all actions that are morally good will *de facto* promote the attainment of the ultimate end; but it is not in all cases a *discriminative norm,* nor is it in any case the *formal* norm or determinant. As regards the ultimate end, therefore, the teleological method seems to me to be affected by these well-defined limitations. With this view Father Plater does not agree. He contends (pp. 159, 160) that, since a consideration of the ultimate end shows lying, theft, and impurity to be less conducive thereto than the opposite virtues, the ultimate end is therefore sufficiently discriminative and enlightening concerning the morality of these actions. I admit that the antecedent of his inference is correct, and therefore that I overstated my thought in the paragraph which he cites on page 159; but I maintain that, in order to justify the inference itself, he must show that a knowledge of the ultimate end will forthwith enable us to perceive that lying, for example, is not merely *less* conducive to the ultimate end than veracity, but that it is *in every case* so impeditive of the ultimate end as to be *immoral* and *prohibited.* It seems to me, consequently, that the question of the discriminative value of the ultimate end is not simply, as stated by Father Plater, "whether the end can show us which line of conduct is more conducive to love of God." (That is, the ultimate end). The Catholic woman who has leisure and opportunity to attend a week-day Mass, but prefers to spend the time in useless but harmless reading, chooses the course that is less conducive to love of God, yet this action is not therefore necessarily bad. Neither is every lie proved bad by the fact that lying in general is less conducive to the ultimate end than its opposite, veracity.

The teleology of Aristotle, continues Father Plater, condemns lying and impurity in every case, because they impede the perfection or development of man's nature, and "his development towards his last end." This method seems sound and logical. But it is no longer the teleology of the *ultimate* end. It takes as the discriminative norm of action the proximate end, namely, the perfection of the spirit or of rational nature. From the fact that lying and impurity are impeditive of this proximate end of man, it rightly concludes that these actions stand in the way of his ultimate end likewise. Hence the method that we are now considering does not determine the morality of actions by referring them to the ultimate end immediately and directly. Moreover, although the proximate end of man, the perfection of his rational nature, distinguishes right from wrong as thoroughly as does rational nature itself, it seems to constitute a less immediate standard than the latter. For an act appears as conducive to or impeditive of the perfection of rational nature, only because it is in or out of conformity with rational nature. Hence the method seems to lack something in directness.

In order to compare an act with rational nature, we must, indeed, examine what the act does, that is, we must see how its *objectum* is related to rational nature; but this relation does not seem to me to be teleological. It is immediately and primarily a relation of proportion. For example, the essential evil of lying consists primarily in a deordination, a contradiction between the inner and the outer man, and only secondarily in its damaging effect upon the perfection of rational nature. It is precisely this relation of proportion that constitutes the essence of *bonum morale*, and distinguishes it from *bonum utile* and *bonum delectabile*. We have teleology only when we consider the conduciveness of the act to the *welfare* or *perfection* of rational nature, not when we compare the act directly with rational nature itself. To compare the *objectum* of an act with rational nature in order to see whether it agrees or disagrees with the latter, is not precisely the same as to inquire into its *effects* upon the welfare of rational nature. The former process is not, strictly speaking, teleological at all.

When Father Plater says that to aim at conforming conduct to a type is a purposive act, and therefore implies the method of teleology, he seems to confound the motive of the act (in the mind of the actor) with the *process* by which its morality is evaluated. All acts must be purposive, since they must be directed to some particular end or ends; and the motive as well as the object and circumstances of the act must be referred to some standard in order to determine its moral quality; but this standard need not be conceived as some general end of conduct which the act promotes or impedes. Although a person may purpose to conform his conduct with rational nature, the process by which he compares it with this standard involves a relation of agreement with type rather than of conduciveness to an end. He may, and in many cases must, conceive the relation as one of harmony and co-ordination, not of utility and subordination. It would seem, therefore, that the method of evaluation is not teleological, although the act is perforce directed to some particular end or ends.

While admitting that the perfection of rational nature is the natural end of conduct, and that it enables us, though less directly, to discriminate right from wrong as well as rational nature itself, I cannot follow Father Plater when (p. 161) he refers to it as the *ultimate* end. It is the proximate end. Consequently, I can still maintain that the ultimate end (the possession of God by knowledge and love in a future life) is not a complete discriminative norm of conduct. And my complaint against many Catholic authors is not merely that they lay too much stress upon utilitarian motives and consequences, but also that they say so much about the ultimate end and so little about the proximate norm of conduct as to convey the impression that the former will always and readily furnish sufficient guidance concerning the moral quality of particular actions

Finally, Father Plater urges in favor of the teleological method this contention: "Bare intuition into the goodness or badness of an act apart from any consequences at all is, if not unthinkable, at least unworkable." If by consequences he means what the act does immediately, its *objectum*, I agree with him; if he has in mind the *effect* of the act, a separate event in the world of changes, I am forced to dissent. A lie which saves a valuable life is shown to be bad when compared immediately with rational nature. That it will impede the perfection of rational nature is only an *inference* from its disagreement with rational nature. The relation between an act and rational nature is much more definite and workable than "Kant's empty form."

Much of the foregoing argument may seem to be mere logomachy, but it is not intended to be such. Father Plater's position differs from mine on two points. At least, that is my understanding. In the first place, he seems to hold that the ultimate end when directly appealed to will show us what actions are right and what actions are wrong. This I cannot admit, but I do admit that the proximate end will afford such guidance. Secondly, he would estimate the morality of acts by ascertaining their conduciveness to an end. I would compare them with a standard conceived as simultaneous with, not logically posterior to the act itself. It seems to me that this method gives us a relation of proportion and therefore of morality formally considered, while the method of teleology suggests primarily a relation of utility. Nevertheless I agree with Father Plater as to the practical worth of Aristotelian ethics, at least in this pragmatic age.

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NOTES.

Our Notes in this issue are borrowed from *The Catholic Who's Who and Year-Book,* issued by Burns & Oates, under the editorship of Sir F. C. Burnand. It contains a great deal of well-digested information concerning Catholics who have gained scientific, literary, professional or social distinction. We have selected some of the names in which our readers may be supposed to be especially interested. As they comprise less than one per cent. of those in the book, there is still a generous treat in store for those who purchase the volume. The compilers have limited themselves almost entirely to Catholics in the British Isles and in the Colonies. We have omitted the few sketches of American scholars, since the list is so incomplete. Otherwise, omissions are few, though the name of Dr Walter McDonald, of Maynooth, should have found a place in the volume.

ARENDZEN, REV. JOHN, D. D.—Educated at Oscott; graduated in Theology at Munich, and Philosophy at Bonn; degree for original research at Cambridge; expert in Arabic; Professor of Holy Scripture at Old Hall, and Diocesan Missioner; author of many articles in Cambridge and Continental learned journals, chiefly on the old Testament; published the Syriac text of the Apostolic Church Order 1901.

AVELING, REV. FRANCIS, D. D., Prebendary and Cathedral Chaplain —born 1875; educated at Bishop Ridley College, at Bishop's College University, at Keble College, Oxon., at Canadian College, Rome, and Faculty of Applied Science, McGill University; ordained at Quebec 1899; served missions at Tottenham and Horseferry Road, Westminster; late Rector of Westminster Cathedral Choir School. Author of *Science and Faith* and *The Immortality of the soul* (both in "Westminster Lectures" series, of which he is editor)—*The God of Philosophy*—*The Philosophers of the Smoking-Room;* editor of "Expository Essays in Christian Philosophy" series; contributor to *Dublin Review.*

BAKER, ELIZABETH ANSTICE.—Born 1849, fourth daughter of the Hon. John Baker, and sister of Sir Richard Baker, K.C.M.G., K.C.; convert. Author of *A Modern Pilgrim's Progress*, and other works.

BARRY, REV. WILLIAM, scholar, theologian, and man-of-letters.—Born in London, 1849, by descent a Norman-Celt of the South-West of Ireland. From Oscott he passed to the English College, Rome, where he had Cardinals Franzelin and Tarquini for masters of Divinity, and was examined for his degree by Father Perrone. He was ordained in Rome, where he remembers the sittings of the Vatican Council and the entry of the Italian troops by the Porta Pia. A Vice-Presidency of the Birmingham Seminary was followed by his appointment to the Chair of Divinity at Oscott; later he was engaged in mission work at Wolverhampton, and his subsequent charge at Dorchester has given him such leisure for literary labours as free him from giving up to a parish talents that were meant for mankind. Dr. Barry has studied Hebrew and Persian literature, and is master of Greek, Latin, French, German, Italian and Spanish; he has lectured in America and at the Royal Institution, and was the deliverer of the Centenary address on Edmund Burke, both in Dublin and London, in 1897. His first novel, *The New Antigone*, was published anonymously in 1887, and its success has since been repeated by *The Place of Dreams—The Two Standards*, and *Arden Massiter;* he has contributed a *History of the Papal Monarchy* to Mr. Fisher Unwin's "Stories of the Nations" series, and has written stories of Newman and Renan for the "Literary Lives" series. In *Heralds of Revolt* he has collected of some of his essays; while his *Tradition of Scripture* and other works have been translated into various languages. To be various yet expert in all that he undertakes is Dr. Barry's achievement—a rare one in the history of literature; this faculty, and the light robe in which he is able to cloak profound learning, constitute him the most brilliant *Quarterly* reviewer and *Dublin* reviewer of his generation.

BELLOC, HILAIRE, M.P.—Born 1870, only son of Louis Swainton Belloc, French barrister, by his marriage with Bessie Rayner Parkes; from the Oratory School he passed to Balliol College, Oxford. As the French citizen he then was (he naturalized as an Englishman in 1902), he was called away from a scholastic career of exceptional brilliance to serve in the French Army. He subsequently began journalism in London, and was quickly known as one of the most brilliant accessions to London Letters, contributing particularly to *The Speaker* and *The Daily News;* more lately he has been a frequent contributor to *The Tribune*, and has done much to develop the literary possibilities of *The Morning Post*. In 1904 he was chosen as Liberal candidate for South Salford, and was returned at the General Election in 1906. He married in 1896, MISS ELODIE AGNES HOGAN, a Californian. Mr. Belloc's first success in the book world was his *Bad Child's Book of Beasts*, published in 1896, since when he he has become known to the serious historian by his studies of *Paris*, and of *Robespierre* and *Danton* and by the literary public generally by his *Path to Rome*, his *Caliban's Guide to Letters*, his Algerian studies, and other delightful works. In 1906 he joined the Catholic Education Council as a nominee of the Bishops.

BENSON, REV. ROBERT HUGH.—Born 1871, at Wellington College, fourth son of Archbishop Benson of Canterbury; educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge (M.A); took Anglican Orders, and held curacies in East London and at Kemsing, near Sevenoaks; joined the Anglican Community of the Resurrection, Mirfield, 1898; received into the Church at Woodchester Priory 1903, and ordained in Rome in the following year. Since Tobie Matthew, son of the Archbishop of York, became a Catholic in 1606, probably no son of an Anglican Archbishop, other than Father Benson, has joined "the Italian Mission" (as Archbishop Benson lightly named it), and certainly none has done so with so high a sense of responsibility and so entire a devotion of his time and interests to the service of the Church. Like his brothers, Mr. A. C. Benson, and the author of *Dodo*, he has a ready pen at his command, which is also a pen of suggestive power, as is shown in *The Light Invisible*, *By What*

Authority (a novel treating of the Elizabethan period), *The King's Achievement* (a story of the suppression of the Monasteries), and other works, of which his astonishing fecundity allows us to say that they are almost too numerous to name. In the *Religion of the Plain Man* he has simply set forth the reasons of the faith that is in him. Of this persuasive little manual, it has been said that the title page itself contains an argument in the mere name of the author with all its hereditary associations.

Bishop Edmund (who was received into the Church 1877) has shown his almost unrivalled powers as an historical and liturgical writer by his authorship of *The Genius of the Roman Rite* (1899), and his joint authorship, with Abbot Gasquet, of *Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer*. To Mr. Bishop the Abbot dedicates his book *Henry III and the Church* (1905) as "my old and tried friend, to whom I owe more than words can express"; and from Pope Leo XIII he had a gold medal. Of his many contributions to periodicals may be named, as illustrating at once his learning and his candour, his series of *Tablet* articles in examination of the miracle popularly associated with the Holy House of Loretto.

Braye, Lord (Alfred Verney-Cave, J.P., D.L., Knight of the Sovereign Order of Malta).—Born 1849, son of Rev. Edgell Wyatt-Edgell, and Henrietta, Baroness Braye, whom he succeeded as 5th Baron 1879, the creation being of 1529. He was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford, and was received into the Church in 1870, since which event he has taken a deep interest in Catholic affairs, especially in those which affect higher education and an expert study of the Holy Scriptures. This last department of research he has endowed by the gift of valuable scholarships. In 1882 he framed a well-rewarded petition to the Holy See on the subject of English University Education for Catholics, while his preface to *The Position of the Catholic Church in England and Wales during the last Two Centuries* (an essay by Mr. Thomas Murphy which secured the prize of fifty guineas offered by the Fifteen Club in 1891)exhibited him as a layman who could give to serious views a very agreeable expression. Lord Braye took part in the South African War with the Leicestershire Militia, of which he has been Lieut.-Colonel commanding for some years; and his versatility has been very literally shown by his ability as a writer of verse. He married (1873) Cecilia, daughter of William Gerard Walmesley, of Westwood House, Wigan.

Burge, Father Thomas Anselm, O.S.B.—Born London 1846; educated at Woolhampton and Ampleforth; ordained 1874; at Woburn Park School 1877-1881; Secretary to Bishop Hedley 1881-84; mission work at Penarth 1884-85; Prior to Ampleforth 1885-98; in charge of St. Austin's, Grassendale, from 1899. Editor of *The Gospel of St. John* and *The Acts of the Apostles* in the "Scripture" Series for Catholic Schools; author of articles in *The Ampleforth Journal* and pamphlets on Gregorian chant; composer of ecclesiastical music; Chairman of Liverpool Ecclesiastical Music Commission; Professor of Ecclesiastical Chant at Upholland and Everton Colleges.

Burke, John Butler. Physicist and Biologist.—Born in Ireland 1873, son of John Burke, M. D.; educated at Trinity College, Dublin (gold medalist); graduated M.A. (1900) of Trinity College, Cambridge; sometime lecturer at Mason College, Birmingham, and a Berkeley Fellow of Owens College, Manchester. Since 1905 he has written and lectured on his experiments at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge, and his book *The Origin of Life* (published 1906) supplies new evidence to support the theory, as old as Aristotle, that the living can be produced from the non-living, a theory which is not, in Mr. Butler Burke's opinion, one that, if established, need offer to the straitest orthodoxy any apprehensions.

Camm, Dom Bede, O.S.B.—Born at Sunbury Park, Sunbury-on-Thames, 1864, son of John Brooke Maher Camm, sometime 12th Lancers, of Burnham Grange Bournemouth, and his wife Caroline Arden. Educated at Westminster School and Keble College, Oxford (B.A. with 2nd class Theological Honours 1887); studied at Cuddesdon for the Anglican Ministry; ordained by Bishop Thorold at Rochester 1888; curate of St. Agnes's, Kennington Park, till 1890; received into the Church at Maredsous Benedictine Abbey, Belgium, 1890; clothed with Benedictine habit at Maredsous 1890, and professed 1891; studied at St. Anselm's College, Rome, and ordained in the Lateran Basilica by Cardinal Parocchi, 1895; since stationed at Erdington. Author of *A Benedictine Martyr in England* (1897)—*In the Brave Days of Old* (1900)—*A Day in the Cloister* (1900)—*Blessed Sebastian Newdigate* (1900)—*Lives of the Blessed English Martyrs* (Vol. I 1904, Vol. II 1905)—*Tyburn Conferences* (1906)—*The Voyage of the Pax* (1907).

Carmichael, Montgomery.—Born 1857, youngest son of John Carmichael, of Corosal. Having completed his education at Bonn and at Munich, he began life in commerce, but subsequently entered the Consular Service, becoming British Vice-Consul at Leghorn in 1892. He married Maud, daughter of J. W. Parker, the eminent publisher. He is chief among English authorities on Franciscan lore, is a member of the Accademia Properziana of Assisi, a corresponding member of the Accademia Araldica of Italy, and F.S.A. of Scotland. In 1904 the College of St. Bonaventure at Quarracchi ceded to him the right of the English translation of the new critical edition of the writings of St. Francis of Assisi. He contributes to several magazines and to *The Saturday Review*, and among the books that have come from his pen are *In Tuscany*, *The Major-General* (*a Story of Modern Florence*), *The Lady Poverty* and *John William Walshe*, a romance put forth in the form of biography—in fact a personal presentment of temperament taking its place beside *The Sorrows of Werther* and *Contarini Fleming*. It stands alone among the histories of conversions, and if all roads lead to Rome, one of the roads remained unexplored until Mr. Carmichael's Walshe trod it with fate-led feet.

Chapman, Dom John H., O.S.B.—Born 1865, son of the Ven. F. R. Chapman, Canon of Ely; educated by private tutors and at Christ Church, Oxford (M.A.); in Anglican Orders; received into the Church; professed

O.S.B., at Maredsous, 1893; ordained 1895; Prior of Erdington 1901; contributor to *Revue Benedictine, Dublin Review, Journal of Theological Studies*, etc. Author of *Bishop Gore and the Catholic claims* (1905), and *The First Eight General Councils and Infallibility.* Dom Chapman's critical studies have been well rewarded. Harnack has accepted his conclusions as to the interpolation in St. Cyprian's *De Unitate*, and he has made himself the great authority on the Condemnation of Pope Honorius, and other subjects requiring for their elucidation not merely research, but also some measure of divination. As an intervener with sweet reasonableness in a *Tablet* controversy, Dom Chapman seemed to one onlooker to be fulfilling the law of the poets, and realizing for us the lines of Keats:

> Yet did I never breathe the pure serene
> Till I heard Chapman speak out clear and bold.

Cuthbert, Father, O.S.F.C—Born 1866, of German lineage; educated at Woolhampton and in the Capuchin Order; ordained 1889; writer of notable articles in the periodicals, and of papers for Catholic Conferences; especially a preacher of "personal service," and an apostle of social work for Franciscan Tertiaries. "No Catholic" (he says) "can afford to sleep out his vocation to-day." Father Cuthbert is the author of *St. Francis and You—The Friars and How they came to England—Catholic Ideals in Social Life* and *A Tuscant Penitent, being the Life and Legend of St. Margaret of Cortona.*

Downside, Abbot of (Right Rev. Edmund Cuthbert Butler, O.S.B., M.A. of London and Cambridge).—Born in Dublin, 1858, only son of Edward Butler and nephew of Sir Francis Cruise, M.D.; began his career of distinction at Downside in its school; entered the novitiate 1876; ordained 1884; taught for many years in the school, finally as headmaster; and in 1903 became head of Benet House Cambridge (founded for the University residence of candidates for the Order). In 1905 he returned to Downside, of which he was elected Abbot in 1906 in succession to Abbot Ford. The Abbot is the author of many papers in *The Dublin Review, Hibbert Journal* and *Journal of Theological Studies*; and he has edited the *Historia Lausiaca* of Palladius for the Cambridge "Texts and Studies" series of Biblical and patristic literature 1898.

Farnborough, Abbot of (Right Rev. Dom Fernand Cabrol, O.S.B.)—First Prior of the Benedictines at St. Michael's, Farnborough (founded by the Empress Eugenie 1896). Mitred 1903. Author of *Les Origines Liturgiques* and *Le Livre de la Prière Antique.* Editor of *Dictionnaire de l'Archéologie Chrétienne.* The community, which is an offshoot from St. Peter's Abbey, Solesmes, Sarthe, took the place of the Premonstratensian Canons at Farnboro, in 1896. The recent migrations of monks have moved more than one centre of literary activity from France to England, and these Fathers, like others, have found occasion for the production of liturgical and other valued works during their English domicile.

FINLAY, REV. THOMAS, S.J., M.A., Fellow of the Royal Univ. of Ireland.—Born 1848; received into the Church at an early age; educated at Cavan College, at Amiens, and at the Gregorian Univ., Rome; entered Irish province, S.J., 1866, and studied on the Continent till ordination in 1881; Rector of Belvedere College 1882; appointed Commissioner of Intermediate Education for Ireland 1900; Vice-President of Irish Agricultural Society; Professor of Political Economy at University College, Stephen's Green. Father Finlay, who has been a constant contributor to Catholic and other periodicals, started and edited in 1887 a review of his own—*The Lyceum.* He is the author of several works of fiction, of a *History of Philosophy* for a series of school manuals, and he once delighted the Union Society at Oxford by an address.

FLEMING, MOST REV. FATHER DAVID, O.F.M., S.T.L.,Consultor of the Holy Office.—Born at Killarney, 1851; entered Franciscan Order at Thielt, Belgium, 1869; ordained at Ghent, 1875; Lector of Philosophy for nine years; Definitor of the Province and Guardian of St. Anthony's, Forest Gate, 1884; *Custos Regiminis* on the separation of the Franciscans of England, 1887; first Provincial-Minister, English Province, O.F.M., 1891; appointed by Cardinal Vaughan member of the preliminary committee to collect evidence on Anglican Orders to be submitted to the Holy See, 1896; a representative of the Church in England on the Papal Commission on Anglican Orders; Definitor-General of the united Franciscan Order 1897; Vicar-General of the Order of Friars Minor 1901-03; Secretary to the Commission appointed by Leo XIII, 1897, on Biblical Studies.

FLETCHER, MISS MARGARET, the founder in 1905 and editor of *The Crucible*, a quarterly journal devoted the to interests of the Higher Education of Catholic women; President of the Catholic Women's League formed 1907, and on Council of Catholic College for Women at Cambridge. Author of *Light for New Times* (1902) and *The School of the Heart* (1904).

FORTESCUE, REV. ADRIAN, D.D., D. Ph.—Born 1874, son of Provost Fortescue, of Oxford and Perth: though a descendant of the Ven. Adrian Fortescue, he is a convert to the Church; educated at the Scots College, Rome, and Innsbruck University. Author of a work on *The Eastern Churches*, and of numerous learned articles on Orientalism mostly in German reviews; has made Oriental researches at Damascus.

GARDNER, EDMUND GARRATT, author.—Born 1869, eldest son of John Gardner of the Stock Exchange, and grandson of Samuel Garratt, the well-known Evangelical; educated at Beaumont and Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge (M.A.), Mr. Gardner is one of the best-known living authorities outside Italy, on Dante and other poets of that nation. His work has received the Apostolic Blessing of Leo XIII and Pius X. He has been much engaged in research in Italian archives, but is now abandoning history to devote himself to the study of mysticism. A writer of fine scholarship and literary quality, he wears his learning lightly in his delightful handbooks to cities of Italy. He is author also of *Dante's*

Ten Heavens—A Dante Primer—The Story of Florence--Dante and Giovanni del Virgilio (with the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed)—*Desiderio* (a novel of the Renaissance)—*Dukes and Poets in Ferrara—The King of Court Poets*—and *Saint Catherine of Siena.*

GASQUET, RIGHT REV. FRANCIS AIDAN, D. D., O. S. B. (Abbot President of the English Benedictines), historian—was born in London, 1846, son of Raymond Gasquet, M.D. He was educated at Downside, which he later ruled as Prior (1878-85), having been ordained in 1874. In 1896 he was appointed a member of Leo XIII's Commission on Anglican Orders, and in the following year he was the recipient of a Brief from that Pontiff (dated 17 March, 1897). As a writer Abbot Gasquet has won a generally conceded supremacy as the authority on Pre-Reformation Monasticism in England; and among the works which have gained him his pre-eminence as an historian are: *Monastic Life in England*, *Henry VIII and the English Monasteries*, *The Eve of the Reformation*, *The old English Bible*, *A Sketch of Monastic Constitutional History*, *The Last Abbot of Glastonbury* and *Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer* (in collaboration with Mr. Edmund Bishop). He is known also as the editor of Montalembert's *Monks of the West*, *Lord Acton's Letters*, and other works; and quite recently he has been appointed President of the Commission formed to examine the text of the Vulgate Bible and to collect material for amending it.

GERARD, FATHER JOHN, S. J.—Born 1849, eldest son of Colonel Archibald Gerard, J.P., D.L., of Rochsoles, N.B., and brother of the late General Sir Montague Gerard. Father Gerard has given an account of his parents' spiritual progress to Catholicism in Miss J. M. Stone's *Memoir of Eleanor Leslie.* Educated at Stonyhurst, where, later, he was Prefect of Studies (1879-93); Provincial English Province S. J. 1897-1900; twice held the editorship of *The Month*, to which he himself has been the most industrious and valued of contributors; Fellow of the Linnean Society. As a controversial champion, Father Gerard has wielded a forcible and a candid pen. To his fairness, indeed, Mr. Andrew Lang, a good specimen himself of men of letters in this particular, has publicly testified. Author of *Stonyhurst College: a Centenary Record—What was the Gunpowder Plot?—A Course of Religion for Catholic Youth—The Old Riddle and its Newest Answer*, and a vast number of slighter, but always salient, contributions to current religious and scientific discussions.

GERRARD, REV. THOMAS J —Born in Lancashire, 1871; destined for the law until his reception into the Church, at the age of twenty, turned his thoughts towards the priesthood and sent him to Oscott. He was ordained for Westminster, and his duty as Chaplain at New Hall Convent leaves him free time for sterling contrbutions to *The Dublin Review*, *The Homiletic Monthly*, *The New York Review*, *The American Catholic Quarterly*, *The Month* and *The Catholic World*. A close student of St. Thomas, Father Gerrard is not inimical to the progressive movement in Christian apologetics, and while sensitive to "the new and moving spirit" of moderns like Newman and others, has added from his own research and intuition a word here and a word there to the new statement which the new learning demands.

GIBSON, HON. WILLIAM, M.A., J.P. for Surrey.—Born 1868, eldest son of 1st Baron ASHBOURNE, sometime Lord Chancellor of Ireland; educated at Harrow, at Trinity College, Dublin, and at Merton College, Oxford; received into the Church while at Oxford; founder of the Roger Bacon Society 1898; Vice-President of the Irish Literary Society; married (1896) Marianne, daughter of Roger DE MONBRISON, a member of an eminent French Protestant family, who was received into the Catholic Church shortly after her marriage. Mr. Gibson was one of the strongest supporters of the Gaelic movement, and a reviver of the wearing of the Irish Kilt. He is known also as the author of *The Abbé de Lammenais and the Liberal Catholic Movement in France* (1896), and as a contributor to *The Dublin* and other reviews.

HOWLETT, MGR. MARTIN, D.D., Ph. D., LL.D., Adm. of Westminster Cathedral from 1905.—Born Co. Kilkenny; educated at Downside, at Pontifical Univ., and Noble Academy, Rome; ordained 1886; took an active interest in Mgr. Gilbert's Night Refuge; served sometime as Secretary to Cardinal Vaughan; attached to Cardinal Satolli's mission to the opening of the Washington Catholic University; named Private Chamberlain to Leo XIII 1890; had charge of the Kingsland mission 1893-1905. Mgr. Howlett is the editor of the admirable *Cathedral Record*.

HUMPHREY, REV. WILLIAM. S.J.—Born 1839, son of John Humphrey, of Pitmedden, N.B.; educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and at Edinburgh University; became an Advocate at Aberdeen 1860; ordained in the Scottish Episcopal Church, 1864, and became a Catholic four years later. After a sojourn with the Oblates of St. Charles, he entered the Society of Jesus, 1874, and came, by this transition, under a much discussed ban of Cardinal Manning as a preacher in London pulpits; is a Member of the General Council of Aberdeen University. Author of *The Divine Teacher, Mary Magnifying God, The Religious State, The Bible and Belief, Christian Marriage, The One Mediator, Elements of Religious Life, Conscience and Law, Recollections of Scottish Episcopalianism, His Divine Majesty, Urbs et Orbis*, and other works.

HUNTER-BLAIR, DOM SIR (DAVID) OSWALD, Bt., O.S.B.—Born 1853, eldest son of Sir Edward Hunter-Blair, 4th Baronet of Dunskey (created 1867, Gr. Britain), whom he succeeded as 5th Baronet in 1896; educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford (M.A.); formerly Captain Ayr and Wigtown, Militia; received into the Church in Rome, March, 25, 1875; Private Chamberlain of the Sword and Cloak to Pius IX and Leo XIII 1876-78; received the Benedictine habit 1878; professed 1880; ordained 1886; Rector of Fort Augustus Abbey School 1890-95; licensed Master of Hunter-Blair's Hall, Oxford (for University students belonging to the Benedictine Order) 1899. Dom Hunter-Blair among his other unresting activities in the Catholic cause, is the translator and editor of Bellesheim's *History of the Catholic Church in Scotland*, and of *The*

Rule of Our Most Holy Father St. Benedict; and is author of *A Royal and a Christian Soul, Jerusalem of To-day* and *Catholics at the National Universities*, besides many contributions and corrections to the newspaper press.

Kent, Rev. William Henry, O.S.C.—Born 1857, eldest son of Charles Kent, and great-grandson of Captain William Kent, R.N., discoverer of Kent's Islands. On his father's side he is a great-nephew of Bishop Baggs; and a great-great-nephew of Esmonde Kyan, one of the Wexford leaders executed in '98; and a kinsman (through the marriage of his grandmother's cousin, Maria Talbot, with "the good Earl of Shrewsbury") of that uncanonized saint, Gwendolen, Princess Borghese. From his parents Father Kent has inherited a literary talent turned to excellent account. Receiving his early education at St. Charles College, he began to contribute to *The Weekly Register* (then edited by his father) in 1875. A year later he joined the Oblates of St. Charles and was ordained by Cardinal Manning in 1881. Between 1882-98 he was engaged in teaching theology, and since 1899 has been occupied with parish work. His contributions to *The Dublin Review* (begun in 1889), to *The Tablet, The Ave Maria, Blackwood*, and *The American Quarterly* and *Ecclesiastical Reviews*, have shown him an expert in Biblical and Talmudic studies, Oriental languages, mediæval and modern philosophy and comparative philology. He has made many translations of hymns, etc., from the Syriac, Armenian and Coptic; and adds to his liguistic accomplishments a knowledge of Gaelic. Father Kent, thinker as well as writer (two capacities not always united), was entrusted in 1906 by the surviving executors of Cardinal Manning with the production of a new biography which should redress the balance of the old, a task to which Father Kent brings not merely the filial tenderness of a spiritual son, but an open understanding, a heart as warm as the intellect is keen, a dream of social regeneration, and an ultimate realization of the all but lapsed maxims of the Gospel with the daily life of men.

Kolbe, Rev. Frederick C., D.D., Editor of *The South African Catholic Magazine*.—Born 1852, son of a Minister of the Dutch Reformed Church; spent early years in South Africa and won a scholarship which enabled him to study at London University, where he obtained First Class Honours in Mathematics, Jurisprudence and Roman Law. Having been received into the Church, he entered the English College, Rome, 1877, gaining the gold medal for an essay on miracles, and was ordained for the English mission; instead, however, he returned to work among his own people in South Africa in 1882, lamented by Cardinal Manning; in Cape Town this devoted son and his father for some years occupied the same district, the one as a Priest, the other as a Protestant clergyman of the Rhenish Missionary Society. While editor of the *Catholic Magazine*, Dr. Kolbe has re-issued in book form some of his papers on ecclesiastical, literary and artistic subjects; also some of his verses. Long a leading figure on South African platforms, Dr. Kolbe, first and last a friend of the Boer, was once a chief speaker at Afrikander Congresses, held amid fierce political conditions now happily ended. A more recent appearance under entirely pacific circumstances was at the installation of the Prince of Wales as Chancellor of Capetown University in 1902, Dr. Kolbe, as one of the leading Capetown educationalists being selected to move the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor. Sir William Butler, in *From Naboth's Vineyard*, pays his tribute to Dr. Kolbe as "one of South Africa's greatest sons." He is the author of *The Art of Life, Minnie Caldwell* (a book of stories for girls), and other works, while his reputation as a botanist and geologist stands among the highest in South Africa.

LESCHER, REV. WILFRID, O.P., Preacher General.—Born at Hampstead, 1847, son of Joseph Sydney Lescher; served Dominican missions at Stroud, at Prudhoe Hall, Woodchester, Leicester, Haverstock Hill, and Hinckley; was Prior of Woodchester; Superior of Holy Cross, Leicester; Vicar of Stroud. Author of *The Rosary—Evolution of the Human Body—The Origin of Lourdes—St. Dominic and the Rosary* and many pamphlets and articles.

LILLY, WILLIAM SAMUEL, Man of Letters.—Born 1840, educated at Peterhouse, Cambridge (Hon. Fellow, M.A., and LL.M.); Barrister-at-Law; Under-Secretary of the Government of Madras, 1869; received into the Church; Secretary of the Catholic Union of Great Britain since 1873; J.P. for Middlesex and London; married (1907) ANNA MARIE, daughter of Monsieur Felix EMERY. Both by his volumes and by his "Apostolate of the Reviews," Mr. Lilly has made the outside public aware of himself as an authoritative Catholic writer, with a wide range of reading, a ripe intelligence, and a style in controversy that is trenchant without being truculent—"peremptory" is the word applied to it a little complainingly by Dr. Barry. His review articles have mostly done a double service, being republished in such works as *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought, Chapters in European History, A Century of Revolution, The Great Enigma, Renaissance Types*, and *Christianity and Modern Civilization*. For a more limited class he is the author also of (with Mr. Justice Wallis) a *Manual of the Law as it Specially affects Catholics*. "Mr. Lilly can be amusing and satirical," says Dr. Barry in an estimate of this author, his friend; "his tone is that of a man of the world; yet, by a singular combination of qualities, rare among Englishmen, he unites with this worldly wisdom a deference to the ideals, religious and even ascetic, which are held up to an unbelieving generation by the Catholic Church."

LIMERICK, BISHOP OF (Most Rev. EDWARD THOMAS O'DWYER, D.D.)—Born, 1842, only son of John Keatinge O'Dwyer; consecrated Bishop of the diocese 1886, in succession to Dr. Butler. As a publicist on occasion, as a controversialist on the Education question, and as a writer of letters not always pastoral, the Bishop holds an authority by no means confined to his own countrymen.

LONGUEVILLE, THOMAS.—Born 1844, eldest surviving son of Thomas Longueville, of Pen-y-llan, Shropshire, and Anne, daughter of Charles Thomas Jones; educated at Christ Church, Oxford; received into the Church, 1877. It was as the creator of the "Prig" series that Mr. Longueville first showed himself master of a witty and caustic pen, a pen turned also, with equal advantage to readers, in the direction of serious biography, and a tale of the Recusants, which is one of the most convincing of its kind. Mr. Longueville was a regular contrbutor for twenty years to *The Saturday Review*, when that paper belonged to the Beresford-Hopes. He is a magistrate for Shropshire, and married (1868) Mary, only daughter of Alexander Robertson, of Balgownie Lodge, Aberdeenshire. Author of *The Life of a Prig*, *The Prig in Search of a Religion*, *The Prigment*, *The Churgress*, *The Platitudes of a Pessimist*, *Pryings among Private Papers*, *A Romance of the Recusants*, *The Life of a Conspirator*, *A Life of Archbishop Laud*, *Riches or Ruin*, *The Life of Sir Kenelm Digby*, *Benvenuto Cellini, his Times and Contemporaries*, and other works.

Loyola, Mother Mary, of the Bar Convent, York.—The oldest convent in England, which, as a proof of its vitality has given us, in her works, a modern wealth of devotional writings for the lucky endowment of the rising generation of English-speaking Catholics all the world over. The list is long as well as inspiriting, and includes *The Child of God—Holy Communion—The Soldier of Christ—Confession and Communion—Hail, Full of Grace—Jesus of Nazareth—Welcome* and *Home for Good*, the happily chosen title of an affectionate conferring with girls on their leaving school. Of these works, with which the name of Father Thurston is associated as Editor, the words of a clerical reviewer may well be quoted:—"Priests and Religious, get Mother Loyola's books, all of them. They are like spring flowers with the scent of heaven that gives to us and our children the taste for the things above, the only true values on earth."

Lucas, Father Herbert, S. J.—Born at Croydon, 1852, son of Edward Lucas and Frances Everett, of Marlborough, Norfolk; nephew of Frederick Lucas, M.P., founder of *The Tablet*—these two brothers being the pioneer Victorian converts from Quakerism, a form of religion to which the Anglican polemics of the 17th century paid unconscious homage by describing it as the "Papist's younger brother." Father Lucas was educated at Baylis House and at Beaumont; graduated M.A. of London 1878; and entered the Society 1869. With a commanding pen, often exercised for the advantage of the readers of the weekly paper his uncle made famous, Father Lucas is known by the breadth and depth of his writings. The descendant of a long line of Puritans, he is a votary of religious art; and even to the various problems of modern education he brings what is so generally absent, an educated opinion. His work in the Society has lain in Stonyhurst, Mount St. Mary's, St. Beuno's College, at Rochampton, at Farm Street, and in Rome, and the books that stand to his name are *Fra Girolamo Savonarola—The Westminster Cathedraland the History of Ecclesiastical Architecture* and *In the Morning of Life: Considerations for Boys.*

McNabb, Father Vincent J., O. P.—A Dominican who has won a prominent and stable place among Catholic apologists, and whose course of sermons in the pulpit of Westminster Cathedral in May, 1907, recalled by their aptitude to existing needs the triumphs of the same Habit worn by Lacordaire in the metropolitan Cathedral of Paris. Father McNabb is the author of *Oxford Conferences on Faith—Oxford Conferences on Prayer—Where Believers May Doubt* and *Infallibility*, a paper read before the Society of St. Thomas of Canterbury under the presidency of the Rev. Spencer Jones, who contributed an introduction. He has also edited *The Decrees of the Vatican Council*

MAHER, FATHER MICHAEL, S. J., Superior of St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst, from 1903.—Born in Co. Carlow; educated at Tullamore, at Mount St. Mary's, and St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst; M. A. Lond. 1887; D.Lit. Lond. 1900; Professor of Mental Science at Stonyhurst College 1885-91: and again 1897-1903; ordained 1894. A student and teacher by vocation, Father Maher is one of those who decant old wine in new bottles that do not break. For the *thesis*, which gained his Doctorate of Literature, he took "Psychology" in an essay connecting the teaching of Aristotle and the Schoolmen were modern thought. He is an examiner for Diploma in teaching at the Roy. Univ. of Irel. from 1898, and was on the Commission of Enquiry into Methods of Moral Instruction and Training in Schools (1906). Author of *Psychology Empirical and Rational* (6th edition, 1905) and *Tatian's Diatessaron* (1893); essays in Cathcilo and other reviews.

MARSH, DR. GIDEON WILLIAM BARKER, L.M.S. (Lond.), L. S. A. (Lond.), F. R. Hist. S.—Born 1858, son of William Marsh, Solicitor, of Middleham, Yorks; educated at Darlington Grammar School and Ushaw College, received into the Church 1877; Honours in Chemistry at Dublin University; B.A. Lond. (1st class); Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine; Member of the Council of the Association of Physicians and Surgeons; Member of the British Medical Association. Author of *The Popes and the Early Church—The Resurrection of Christ—Miracles* and *The Philosophy of the Resurrection.*

MOYES, RIGHT REV. MGR. JAMES, D.D.—Born near Edinburgh; educated in Ireland, France and Rome; Professor at St. Bede's College, Manchester, 1876; Member of Manchester School Board and Canon Theologian of Salford 1891; came to London with Bishop Herbert Vaughan on his translation to Westminster 1892; Canon Theologian of Westminster 1895; sat on the Papal Commission at Rome on Anglican Orders 1896; Dom. Prel. 1897; Sub-delegate Apostolic for the Cause of the English Martyrs 1893; frequent contributor to *Dublin Review* (of which he was editor for thirteen years), and to *The Tablet*, of papers on the relations between the Holy See and Pre-Reformation England, and other studies in ecclesiastical history, some of which have been reissued in *Aspects of Anglicanism* (1907).

NEWPORT, BISHOP OF (Right Rev. JOHN CUTHBERT HEDLEY, O.S.B., D.D.)—Born at Morpeth 1837, son of Edward A. Hedley, M.D.; educated at Ampleforth: entered English Benedictine Order 1854; ordained 1862; consecrated by Cardinal Manning as Auxiliary to Bishop Browne, O.S.B., of Newport and Menevia, 1873, and succeeded as ruler of the

Diocese 1881; Chairman of the Universities Catholic Education Board. This "Bishop of the Flock" is indeed a shepherd of sheep far beyond the boundaries of his own Diocese. Round about him has centred much of the modern Catholic history of England. It was his voice that sounded the funeral panegyrics of two successive rulers of Westminster, while by his pastorals and sermons, by learned yet intelligible articles in the reviews, by a series of volumes of wide range and answeringly wide appeal, he has conferred on his generation of English-speaking Catholics a service never to be forgotten. As an author the Bishop has had the fortune to be throughout an instructor of others, and one whose learning and piety have had the attractive setting supplied by literary gifts. His books include *Our Divine Saviour—The Christian Inheritance—A Retreat—The Light of Life—A Bishop and his Flock—Lex Levitarum* and *The Holy Eucharist,*

O'RIORDAN, REV. MICHAEL, D.D., Ph. D., D.C.L., Rector of the Irish College, Rome.—Born in Co. Limerick, 1857; educated at St. Munchin's, Limerick, and at Propaganda and the Gregorian Univ., Rome; ordained 1883, spending subsequent four years on the English mission; successively Vice-Rector of the Irish College, Rome, Professor at St. Munchin's, and Parish Priest of St. Michael's, Limerick; Rector of Irish College, Rome, 1905, Author of a *Reply* to Dr. Starkie's criticisms of the Managers of Irish National Schools—*A Criticism of Draper's Conflict between Religion and Science* and other works, besides frequent contributions to periodicals, including *The Tablet.*

PETRE, MISS MAUDE D.—Born 1863, daughter of the Hon. Arthur Petre, of Coptfold Hall, Essex, by Lady Catherine Howard, daughter of Earl of Wicklow. Author of *The Temperament of Doubt—Where Saints have Trod—Devotional Essays*; also of *The Soul's Orbit* (in collaboration with Father Tyrrell). Besides her high literary achievements Miss Petre is known for her entire devotion to charitable works, her whole life having been ruled by that compassion for the weak which Nietzsche (for whom nevertheless she has a characteristic good word) explicitly condemns. She is a "founder" of Westminster Cathedral.

PHILLIMORE, PROFESSOR JOHN SWINNERTON.—Born 1873, son of Admiral Sir Augustus Phillimore; educated at Westminster School and Christ Church College, Oxford (Chancellor's Prize for Latin Verse, Hertford, Craven and Ireland scholarships), Lecturer at Christ Church 1895; Professor of Greek at Glasgow University 1899-1906 and subsequently Professor of Humanity; received into the Church 1905; is a Member of the Council of the Liberal League, and collaborated in *Essays in Liberalism by Six Oxford Men* (1897). Also author of *Poems* (1902), and translator of *Sophocles*, and has edited several Latin texts. The Professor is a contributor to *The Dublin Review*, and is on Council of proposed Catholic College for Women at Cambridge. He married (1899) a daughter of the Rev. S. C. SPENCER-SMITH.

POLLEN, FATHER JOHN HUNGERFORD, S.J.—Born 1858, eldest son of John Hungerford Pollen, M.A., and grandson, on his mother's side, of Manning's Lavington colleague and friend, Laprimaudaye; educated at the Oratory School, Edgbaston, and in the Society of Jesus; an expert in English history affecting the fortunes of the society, and a master of the documentary evidence made available through the records published in the *Rolls Series* and *The Calendar of State Papers*. It is in part thanks to Father Pollen that the present generation of Catholics can if it likes become well acquainted with the disastrous but glorious story of Catholics in England during the 16th century. Part editor of Dom Bede Camm's *English Martyrs*. Author of *Acts of English Martyrs* (1896)—*The Life and Letters of Father John Morris, S.J.* (1897)—edited for the Scottish History Society *Papal Negotiations with Mary, Queen of Scots*, in which he published 259 original documents chiefly from the Vatican archives (1901), and edited for the Catholic Record Society *Father Parsons' Memoirs* (1906-7) and *Documents Relative to the English Martyrs* (1908).

RAUPERT, J. GODFREY—Formerly an Anglican clergyman, having held Curacies at Leyton and at Beckenham, and an incumbency at Bath; received into the Church 1895; compiled (1901), under the title *Roads to Rome*, a collection of "short statements from the more recent converts as to the leading motives which prompted them to submit to the Catholic Church"; author also of *Ten Years in Anglican Orders—Modern Spiritism* (1904), and other works. Mr. Raupert's interest in social work has taken him on long journeys to Canada and elsewhere in behalf of London's outcast children.

RICKABY, FATHER JOSEPH, S.J., M.A., London, B. Sc. Oxon.—Born at Everingham, York, 1845; educated at Stonyhurst; ordained 1877; late of Clarke's Hall, Oxford, and deliverer of conferences to the Catholic undergraduates of Oxford and Cambridge. Father Rickaby's nobly produced version of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, published in 1905 under the title *Of God and His Creatures*, brought one of the less known works of St. Thomas within the reach of English readers. He is the author besides of *Aquinas Ethicus—Moral Philosophy* (in Stonyhurst "Manuals")—of *St. Matthew, St. John*, and *Notes on St. Paul* (in "Scripture Manuals for Cathoilc Schools")—*Oxford and Cambridge Conferences* (two volumes)—*Political and Moral Essays—Ye are Christ's—Four English Philosophers and Free Will—Waters that go Softly.*

RICKABY, FATHER JOHN, S.J.—Born 1847; educated at Stonyhurst; ordained 1878; teacher of Philosophy at Stonyhurst, and Theology at St. Beuno's, author of *First Principles of Knowledge—General Metaphysics*; contributor to *American Quarterly Review*, and other periodicals.

SALFORD, BISHOP OF (Right Rev. LOUIS CHARLES CASARTELLI).—Born in Manchester, 1852, son of Joseph Casartelli, of Como, Italy; graduated M.A. of London 1873 while at Ushaw College, whence he passed to Louvain University. Here he acquired a mastery of Eastern Languages, and took degree of Doctor of Oriental Literature. After ordination in 1876, he taught at St. Bede's College, Manchester, of which he became Rector 1891; President of Manchester Statistical Society 1898-

1900; Profesor of Zend and Pehlevi, Louvain, 1900-03; Secretary of many annual Conferences of Catholic Colleges; consecrated Bishop of Salford 1903; Chariman of the Salford Catholic Protection and Rescue Society; author of *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdeisme sous les Sassanides* (Louvain, 1884, and since translated into English by a Parsee priest) and of other publications in English and French dealing with subjects of Oriental study; edited *Illustrated Catholic Missions* 1889-1903; published in 1906 a volume of essays entitled *Sketches in History, Chiefly Ecclesiastical*; valued contributor to *The Tablet*, and other publications, and writer of a Preface for the popular edition of *The Cross in Japan*, published in 1905.

Scannell, Rev. Thomas B., D.D.—Born 1854; educated at St. Edmund's, Ware, and at the English College, Rome; ordained 1878; for some time Professor of Philosophy at St. Edmund's. Student and a book-lover all his life, he has yet been an indefatigable missioner, as Brighton, Norwood, Sheerness, Folkstone, and now Weybridge know. He sat on the Papal Commission on Anglican Orders (1896), and was for many years an Administrator of the Southwark Fund for Infirm Priests. Author of *The Priest's Studies* and (with Dr. Wilhelm) of *A Manual of Catholic Theology*; editor and reviser of the later editions of the invaluable *Catholic Dictionary.*

Sharpe, Rev. Alfred Bowyer, M.A.—Born 1851; educated at Westminster School and Christ Church, Oxford (M.A. 1877), successively Anglican Vicar of St. Agnes's, Newmarket, Rector of St. Clement's, Philadelphia, U.S.A., and Vicar of St. Peter's, Vauxhall; received into the Church 1898; one of the first students at the Beda College, Rome; ordained 1900; served missions at Horseferry Road and West Drayton; Chaplain to the Convent of Daughters of the Cross, Carshalton, since 1905; Westminster Diocesan Missionary. Author of *The Principles of Christianity—The Freedom of the Will—Evil, its Nature and Cause—Authority in Belief*, and articles in *Dublin* and *New York Reviews.*

Smith, Father Sydney Fenn, S.J.—Born 1843, eldest son of the Rev. Sydney Smith, Vicar of Worth, near Sandwich; educated privately; received into the Church 1864; entered the Society of Jesus 1866; philosophical course at Stonyhurst, and theology at St. Beuno's; Professor at Stonyhurst, Beaumont and St. Beuno's; attached to Writers' Staff, Farm Street, since 1891; author of many articles in *The Month* (of which he has been Editor), and publications by the C.T.S.; editor of *Scripture Manuals for Catholic Schools*, which have done so great a service for young students at school and at home.

Stone, Miss Jean Mary.—Educated at a Calvinist school in the Parc de Neuilly, Paris, and in Germany, where she was received into the Church by Bishop Ketteler of Mainz; her first book, *Faithful unto Death,* was published through the encouragement of Father Joseph Stevenson, S.J. (himself a convert through the study of history), with a preface by Father Morris, S.J. This was followed by a study of Franciscan history;

and (in 1897) by her memoir of the Scotch convert, *Eleanor Leslie.* Later her admirable monograph, *Queen Mary*, won high praise from *The Athenæum's* and other critics. Her *Reformation and Renaissance—Studies from Court and Cloister*—and *The Church in English History* (1907), establish her authority as a historian of the special periods she treats.

THURSTON, FATHER HERBERT, S.J.—Born 1856, son of G. H. Thurston, M.R.C.S.; educated at Stonyhurst and in the Society of Jesus; B.A. of London Univ.; Master at Beaumont College 1880-87; ordained 1890. Father Thurston is a writer of marvelous variety of range and research, from whose fiercest polemics the note of the special pleader, which has forfeited for so many controversial champions the respect of readers, is almost uniformly absent. The candour of his articles on the myths commonly associated with popular devotions such as the Rosary, has led to one or two of those controversies in which we hear a good deal about loss of faith, but see only loss of temper. His volumes include *The Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln—The Holy Year of Jubilee—Lent and Holy Week—The Stations of the Cross.* Together with Mgr. Ward he edits the "Westminster Library," and frequently contrbutes to the reviews.

VAUGHAN, RIGHT REV. MGR. JOHN S.—Born 1853, youngest son of Colonel Vaughan, of Courtfield; educated at Oscott and the Benedictine College, Monte Cassino; was for some time associated with his brother, Father Kenelm, at the House of Expiation, Chelsea; later he laboured at Sydney, where another brother was Archbishop; named Dom. Prel. to Leo XIII, 1896; Canon of Westminster 1898; organized series of "Evidence Lectures" by priests 1898; for several years devoted himself to pulpit work in London and the provinces; contributor to periodicals; editor of *The Young Priest* by his brother the Cardinal; the author of *Earth to Heaven—Faith and Folly—Thoughts for All Times—Life After Death* and other works.

WARD, WILFRID.—Born at Old Hall, Herts, in 1856, son of Dr. William George Ward, whom Tennyson (his friend and neighbour in the Isle of Wight) hailed in verse as the "most generous of Ultramontanes." From St. Edmund's and Ushaw, he passed to the Gregorian University, Rome, and graduated later at London University. In 1890 he was Lecturer in Philosophy at Ushaw, and held the post of Examiner in Mental and Moral Science at the Royal Univ. of Ireland 1891-92. In 1906 he assumed the editorship of *The Dublin Review*—an organ made justly famous, though on somewhat different tracks, by his father before him. Mr. Wilfrid Ward's programme is to "bring into combination the work of those Catholic thinkers and men of learning who know the intellectual language of the day, who accept what is true in modern research, science and criticism, while still reverencing the authority and ancient traditions of the Church—that is to pave the way for the synthesis between Faith and Learning which any age of intellectual activity of a new kind demands"—a programme worthy the requisite devotion of a lifetime for its fulfillment. As a controversialist on the philosophy of religion, Mr. Ward has taken a place among the publicists of his day. Since he entered the lists with *The Wish to Believe*, a volume published when he was only 28, Mr. Ward, as a writer, has spoken a language intelligible to his contemporaries because he has put himself in touch with actualities, and is aware of the advance of time. He is a ready contributor to the monthly reviews, and among his volumes are several biographies which well illustrate his gift of insight—those of his father, of Cardinal Wiseman, and of Aubrey de Vere. He has also published two volumes on questions of the day—*Witnesses to the Unseen* and *Problems and Persons*. In a French estimate ofMr. Ward, the Abbé Dimmet writes in *La Pensée Catholique dans l'Angleterre Contemporainc*: "It is Mr. Wilfrid Ward's distinction to be at once layman and theologian, and, as theologian, to be wide without being rash. . . .It it is a rare and happy circumstance for a layman to have been disciplined in theology without losing in consequence any of his activity and independence." Mr. Ward, who sat on the Royal Commission on Irish University Education (1901), married (1887) Miss JOSEPHINE HOPE-SCOTT.

WARD, MRS. WILFRID—JOSEPHINE MARY, daughter of James Robbert HOPE-SCOTT, Q.C., of Abbotsford, by his second wife, Lady Victoria Howard, daughter of Henry Granville, 14th Duke of Norfolk; on Executive Committee of Catholic College for Women at Cambridge (1907); married (1887) Mr. Wilfrid WARD, Author of *One Poor Scruple* (1899) *The Light Behind* (1903) and *Out of Due Time* (1906)—three serious studies of contemporary Catholic life, dealing with delicate problems, handled with honesty and insight. They will remain as milestones on the road over which the present generation makes, almost unawares, its great transition.

WARD, RIGHT REV. MGR. BERNARD.—Born 1857 at Old Hall, Herts., son of the famous convert Dr. William George Ward, of Northwood Park, Isle of Wight, whose "degradation" at Oxford early in the 'forties of the last century makes a landmark in "The Catholic Revival"; educated at St. Edmund's, Old Hall, and at Oscott; ordained 1882; Vice-President of St. Edmund's College 1890, and President 1893; Dom. Prel. to Leo XIII 1895; Canon of Westminster 1903. Established at Ware as "Old Hall Green Academy" in 1769, the College was reconstituted as St. Edmund's in 1793. Mgr. Ward is the author of *A History of St. Edmund's College—Commentary on St. Luke's Gospel—Life of St. Edmund of Canterbury* and *Catholic London a Century Ago*.

WILHELM, REV. JOSEPH.—Born 1845 at Montzen, near Aix-la-Chapelle; *Gradue-en-Lettres* of Liege Univ. 1864; Ph.D. 1867 and D.D. 1871 of Gregorian Univ. and German College, Rome; ordained 1870; on English mission from 1886; pastor at Shoreham 1886-99, and at Battle from 1900; contributor to *The Irish Tribune* 1885-86, and to *The Weekly Register* 1899-1901; articles in *Catholic Encyclopedia* 1907; editor of the "International Catholic Library"; collaborator with Dr. Scannell in *A Manual of dogmatic Theology*; translator of *The Catholic Manual* from the German of Father Pesch, S.J.; author of other works in English and German.

Williams, William John—"A man who" (in the words of *The Dublin Review*) "has lived a life of thought, kept company with thinkers of all schools, and kept a note-book wherein to set down his thoughts"; educated at Queen's College, Oxford (B.A.); received into the Church 1890, and spent some time in a French Seminary; sometime Secretary to Mr. Wilfrid Ward; author of *Newman—Pascal—Loisy and The Catholic Church* (1906)).

Windle, Dr. Bertram Coghill Alan, F.R.S.—Was born at Mayfield Vicarage, Staffs., in 1858, son of Rev. S. A. Windle. He was educated at Repton, and studied medicine at Dublin Univ. (M.A. and M.D.). He was Dean of the Medical Faculty of Birmingham University, where he held the Chair of Anatomy and Anthropology. In 1904 he became President of Queen's College, Cork. Dr. Windle, who became a Catholic in 1883, speaks with unrivaled authority on comparative anatomy, and on certain branches of archæology in such standard works as his *Manual of Surface Anatomy*, his *Proportions of the Human Body*, and his *Prehistoric Age*. In other fields he is the author of *The Wessex of Thomas Hardy*, and is a devotee of Mr. George Meredith. He is a contributor to *The Dublin Review* under the editorship of Mr. Wilfrid Ward. During his stay in the Midlands, he served on the old Birmingham School Board and as a member of the Consultative Board of Education. He has sat on many other educational and scientific bodies, is a Senator of the Royal Univ. of Ireland, and a Commissioner of Intermediate Education. He married (secondly) in 1901 Edith Mary Nazer.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Many Mansions: being Studies in Ancient Religions and Modern Thought—by WILLIAM SAMUEL LILLY, Honorary Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge. Benziger Bros., New York. Chapman and Hall, London. pp. 260.

Contrasts in Social Progress—by EDWARD PAYSON TENNEY, sometime President of Colorado College. Longmans, Green and Co. pp. 415.

I. It is nearly a quarter of a century ago since Mr. Lilly published his work on *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought*—a title, by the way, which suggested the sub-title of this Review. That work is long out of print—though some of it is to be found in *The Claims of Christianity*, and, the author says, in others of his volumes. Moreover, the study of religions has made much progress in twenty-five years, so that Mr. Lilly has been well advised in issuing a new collection of essays in this subject-matter instead of merely giving a new lease of life to the old ones.

The present book is constructed on a plan familiar to readers of Mr. Lilly's other works. It is a series of essays, written originally for magazines, and bearing more or less closely on one general topic. This plan has its obvious advantages and disadvantages. The essays, having been written originally at different times and as occasion arose, do not possess the logical sequence and completeness of the chapters of a book. Accordingly, they will not suit the needs of the man who is looking for detailed and orderly information. On the other hand, however, the more casual and haphazard reader will be beguiled into acquaintance with a number of interesting topics by the fact that each essay may be taken up separately, as mood dictates or time allows.

The volume comprises seven essays. The introductory essay treats "The Sacred Books of the East"—an interesting summary of the Scriptures of the great Oriental religions, taking Max Müller's famous series of translations as a basis. Two others: "The Message of Buddhism to the Western World," and "The Saints of Islam," are, as the titles indicate, directly concerned with two of these Eastern religions. Three chapters: "Kant and the Buddha," "Spinoza and Modern Thought," and "Modern Pessimism" are mainly philosophical in nature and treatment. That on Spinoza is a very interesting and noteworthy contribution to the history of philosophy. The final chapter, on "The Newest View of Christ," is a review of the rationalistic position as stated in Professor Pfleiderer's *Die Entwicklung des Christenthums.*

All are written in Mr. Lilly's best style—with a wealth of easily borne erudition and the remarkable power of varied and apposite quotation for which he is noted. His "Catholic wholeness" is indicated by the very title of the volume. He welcomes noble thoughts and high ideals wherever he finds them. But throughout there is never any difficulty in discovering his own position; in all the storm of opinion he keeps his prow firmly set towards the twin stars of God and Duty. The following passage gives a good example of both the largeness of his sympathies and the definiteness of his convictions.

> "Whether Mr. Hearn's prediction (of the development of a Western neo-Buddhism) will be accomplished, I do not know. But this I do know; that the teaching of the Buddha even in its most fantastic and corrupt form, is infinitely wiser, sweeter, and more ennobling than the doctrine of the school—unhappily the predominant school among us—which makes happiness, or agreeable feeling, the formal constituent of virtue, and seeks to deduce the laws of conduct from the laws of comfort; which insists that not the intention of the doer, but the result of the deed, is the test of the ethical value of an act; which, reducing the moral law to impotence by depriving it of its distinctive character, necessity, degrades it to a matter of latitude ad longitude, temperament and cuisine; which robs it of its essential sanction, the punishment inseparably bound up with its violation, and denies the organic instinct of conscience that retribution must follow upon evil doing."

And he concludes his final essay (originally published in the *Fortnightly Review*) with a fine profession of his faith and confidence in the Church.

> "When the canon of the new Scriptures was formed, it was accepted by the faithful on the word of the Church, as—to go no further—the well-known saying of St. Augustine, quoted by the Archbishop of Albi, sufficiently shows. The Saint believed in the Gospel because he was a Catholic; he did not become a Catholic because he believed in the Gospel.
>
> Such was, such is, such ever will be, the attitude of Catholics towards Holy Writ. They receive it from the Church to be treated with religious reverence because of its Divine authorship, for which the Church vouches. Any treatment of it lacking in such reverence, the Church condemns, especially in the case of her clergy, whose office it is to guide men in the narrow way of faith, not in the broad way of doubt. That the traditional thesis concerning it, which has come down from uncritical ages into this age of criticism, is in all respects, tenable, can any intelligent man candidly maintain? It is for the Church to amend that thesis, in her own good

time. Meanwhile, she does not discourage, nay, she welcomes loyal and temperate examination of it. Upon this Pius X., whom it is the fashion, in some quarters, to represent as the very type of obscurantism, has strongly insisted. While inculcating the duty of holding fast the faith, he blames those whose blind conservatism will endure no departure from medieval exegesis, he recognizes the necessity of reckoning with the results of modern research. In a letter addressed to the late Bishop of La Rochelle on January 11th, 1906, he writes: 'Eorum ratio non probanda qui, nulla in re, ausint ab usitata exegesi Scripturæ recedere, etiam quum, salva fide, id bona studiorum incrementa postulent.' '*Salva fide*': faith being safeguarded: they are most pregnant words. The faith of the ignorant and foolish—always the vast majority of the Christian family—was especially dear to Christ's Sacred Heart. It is always an object of anxious solicitude to the Catholic Church, in the discharge of her pastoral office. She never forgets the saying of her Divine Head concerning such as scandalise the little ones who believe in Him; and when occasion demands, she repeats His warning. Compared with the conservation and nutriment of their piety, the conjectures of criticism, higher or lower, are to her as the small dust of the balance. Can any man say that she is wrong?"

II. *Contrasts in Social Progress* is a bulky volume with a heavy-sounding title, which seems to indicate something in the line of economics and general sociology. But it is an easily readable treatise in aid of a study of the science of Comparative Religions. It is not a Philosophy of Religion, such as the work of Professor Ladd, reviewed in March-April, 1907. Neither does it purport to be a work of erudition and criticism, though it cannot be said to be wanting in these qualities. But it seems to be from secondary sources that most of the information concerning the great ethnic religions is drawn; and works of general history, studies of present-day social conditions, reports of travelers and missionaries, and tables of statistics are more in evidence than a firsthand study of sources and texts. This is not said in any spirit of adverse criticism, but simply to indicate the scope and method of the work. It is in its main lines an application of the argument "ex fructibus" to the great religions of the world to show the superiority of the one taught by Christ. The points on which comparison is instituted are: Civic Conditions (law, liberty, ideals of government); the Home (condition of family life, marriage, woman's rights, children); Education; Literature; Moral Thought (God, the question of evil, morality); Altruistic Service (industrial conditions, public and private charities, etc.); and Self-extending Power, i. e., missionary activity The religions examined are those which are held to-day in Arabia, Persia, India, Burmah, Tibet, China and Japan.

The author's standpoint is naturally that of an "Anglo-Saxon" American Protestant—but it is by no means so narrow as that combination might seem to threaten. Genial in his attitude towards human nature and broad in his view of religion, he can see an element of goodness even in the praying-wheel of a Chinese Buddhist. Nor is he one who believes that Christianity began in the year 1517. In fact, his attitude towards our faith is broad and kindly, at least in the main. A short appendix on "The Monks of Christendom" should not be overlooked by those who collect tributes to Catholic institutions from the pages of Protestant authors.

Waiting the time until we can develop scholarship enough and interest enough to produce in English treatises of our own on this subject, Professor Tenney's book will be of some service to teachers and students of apologetics. As a general rule, it must be acknowledged, the portions of our theological text books which treat of the comparison of religions reflect the warfare of the early Church Fathers with the Pagainsm of Greece and Rome. Their main deficiency is the inadequate treatment they give to the religions which are professed by large masses of mankind to-day. The present work will be found to be of service not only for its direct handling of such topics, but also for the references it gives to a large number of books, especially in English, bearing on the questions treated.

Francis P. Duffy.

History of Ireland from the earliest Times of the Present Day—by Rev. E. A. D'Alton, M. R. I. A. In three volumes. Vol. I: From the earliest times to 1547; Vol. II: 1547-1782. Benziger Bros.

Outlines of the History of Ireland—by P. W. Joyce, LL.D. Longmans.

Studies in Irish History, 1603-1649—edited by R. Barry O'Brien. Browne and Nolan, Dublin.

The subject matter of these volumes lies somewhat outside the scope of this periodical, but we are glad to call attention to them, as all three, in different ways, are splendid examples of the sort of work that is needed to throw light on the exceedingly complicated history of Ireland. Father D'Alton has seized on opportunity, since the works of Moore, Haverty, MacGeoghegan-Mitchel, Keating-O'Mahony, each and all leave something to be desired. Father D'Alton is well qualified for the task he has undertaken. He knows the Irish language and has at command a clear and fluent English style. He has evidently consulted original sources, which he handles with discernment. Above all he preserves a fairness and serenity of judgment, which one does not usually expect to find in writers on Irish topics—a fact which is the cause of little wonder to anyone who has ever felt the passion of indignation which is aroused by a narrative of the bare facts. Considering the work from the standpoint of the philosophy of history, one lesson seems to impress itself most strongly: that the best forces in Ireland have ever been religion and what we would now call democracy. If there exists in Ireland to-day a race which is Irish in feeling and Catholic in faith, the fact is due, under God, to the plain people. The aristocrats were in most instances willing to sell faith and country—"jura, altaria, Christum"—for their own selfish ends.

Dr. Joyce's name on the title-page is sufficient evidence of the learning and accuracy of a work on Ireland. His main difficulty in writing a sketch must have been that of not saying too much. He has succeeded in presenting the main facts of Irish history with singular brevity and lucidity.

Mr. Barry O'Brien has edited in this volume a series of lectures on the history of Ireland in the seventeenth century, which were originally delivered before the Irish Literary Society of London. They comprise five allied topics—"The Plantation of Ulster," by Rev. S. A. Cox; two on "Strafford," by Philip Wilson, M. A.; "1641," by Arthur Houston, LL.D.; "The Confederation of Kilkenny," by Dr. Donelan. They are, as studies of this nature should always be, well backed with references to original documents. We have commented above on the impartiality of the priest Father D'Alton in his handling of Irish annals. The same tribute is due to the Protestant clergyman, Rev. Mr. Cox, who opens his treatment of the religious side of the Plantation of Ulster, as follows: "I shall try to approach the subject with a dispassioned candour, and speak as an Irishman who loves his country, and as a churchman who longs to see the day when the Protestant Church in Ireland shall become converted to Irish ideas in politics." In his concluding remarks he says: "Now what has the introduction of the North Britons done for Ireland? It has added complications to the religious problems of the country, by adding a third element. To all who study the history of Ireland it tends to increase the sense of injustice and wrong to see how the North and its industries have always been pampered for the three centuries intervening. It has not tended to the consoidation of the Empire, for every Ulster so-called 'Loyalist' is a Home Ruler of a type of his own, for he approaches all Imperial problems from a local point of view ... Ulster is loyal as long as she gets her own way. Her good temper is very like what Sir Anthony Absolute says of himself: 'You know I am compliance itself—when I am not thwarted; no one more easily led—when I have my own way.' Her vices are worse than the traditional vices of the rest of the land. In morality the South and West of Ireland people are superior; while in temperance it may at least be said that they are not inferior. The virtues of Ulster are economy and industry and determination.... The crowning merit of James's work in Ulster is that there is one part of the country where landlord and tenant, squire and laborer, think very much alike in religion and politics, so that a good understanding should be looked for between the various parties. Had he left Tyrone and Tyrconnel and O'Dogherty with their vassals, the same result would have been arrived at, without all the unconstitutional things I have referred to. Unconstiutional! We have seen the beginning of the Stuart rule; we know how it ended."

F. P. D.

Ketteler, par Georges Goyau. Paris, Librairie Bloud & Cie.

This volume forms one of a series which Bloud & Cie of Paris, have for some time been publishing under the title of *La Pensée Chrétienne, Textes et Etudes.* Beginning with a volume on St. Irenaeus, the series has embraced several of the best known Christian thinkers, both ancient and modern, notably the volumes on Newman by Bremond which have attracted considerable attention of late, and now to the collection has been added this work by M. Goyau on the great Bishop of Mayence. Ketteler is well deserving of a place in such a series and M. Goyau had abundance of material to draw from in giving us the selections he has made to illustrate the thought of this great ecclesiastic on the important questions of his day. They are still the great and pressing questions of our day; if anything they have become only more pressing with the lapse of the thirty years since Ketteler's death, and in many quarters they seem as far off from a happy solution as they did then. The respective rights and duties of capital and labor, the true conception of liberty, the rightful function of the State, the province of authority in religion, the relations between Church and State—such are some of the great questions which occupied the mind and exercised the voice and pen of one of Germany's greatest Bishops and on all of them he has spoken words of wisdom which as well deserve perusal in our day as they did in the Germany of the middle nineteenth century.

The years of Ketteler's early manhood were spent in the service of the Prussian Government, but the priesthood claimed him for its own, and in 1843 he entered the Grand Seminary of Muenster. The beginning of his priesthood was coincident with the great revolutionary movement which swept through Europe in 1848. The young priest was no unmoved spectator of this great uprising. Social and political questions had already engaged his earnest attention and he had come to certain conclusions in regard to them which never varied throughout the course of his life. His service under the Prussian absolutist bureaucracy had inspired him with no love for absolutism, but he saw clearly enough that the systems substituted for bureaucracy in many parts of Europe as the result of the movement of 1848 were only absolutism under another form. He was as inflexibly opposed to the absolutism of parliamentary majorities as to that of an autocrat or of a close corporation of titled office-holders. "Le seul absolutisme qui ait le droit de regner ici-bas est celui de Dieu," is the doctrine which runs through all his speeches and writings on social and politial questions. His activities in a political direction did not mean that he forgot the ecclesiastic in the politician, but, both as priest and bishop he did not cease to be a patriot, and he considered that the ferment of social, political and religious theorries and doctrines out of which modern Germany was struggling into existence loudly called for guidance and direction on the part of Christian and especially Catholic thinkers if terrible disaster were not to result. The organization of the Catholic Center of Germany owes much to the wisdom of this great Bishop, and his utterances on all the burning questions which came up in connection with the socialistic propaganda are remarkable for their clear-sighted depth and sanity.

It must not be supposed that this book is wholly made up of such documents. There are many on subjects purely ecclesiastical and religious, many especially on the relations of Church and State which had come to be such a pressing question under the changed conditions of modern Europe, and on the question of Church authority and allied subjects which came to the front in connection with the calling of the Vatican Council of 1870. Ketteler attended this

Council and had to bear his share in setting forth the true bearing of its decree on Papal Infallibility against the many prevalent misrepresentations of that doctrine. He died in 1877 leaving a name forever memorable in the annals of Catholic Germany.

S. P. MACPHERSON.

Philosophers of the Smoking Room—Conversations on Some Matters of Moment—by FRANCIS AVELING, D. D. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo.

It is now a few decades since Dr. Holmes introduced to the English-speaking world the company assembled around the Boston breakfast table, who through the medium of their casual conversation over the coffee cups provided a means of ventilating the good Doctor's own opinions and theories on almost every conceivable subject, and that in a pleasant and entertaining fashion. It may have been the thought of the Breakfast Table series which suggested to Dr. Aveling the form in which he has given to us his present collection of essays (for such in effect they are), though here it is not over the coffee steam, but through the fumes of the fragrant weed that we discern the figures of the speakers. The *dramatis personæ* consist of a Catholic Priest, an agnostic young physician, a poet rather henpecked by a strenuous and woman's-rights kind of wife, and a Church of England Parson, amiable but rather ineffective, who is accompanied by a quite attractive young daughter. An Atlantic steamer bound for Quebec provides a meeting place for the party, and, in the intimacy so soon established on board ship, they quickly find themselves familiarly discussing all manner of things in heaven and earth. The main object of the book is to confound the materialism of the Doctor and, incidentally, to dispose of the Church of England's claim to any serious consideration as an authoritative religious teacher, and we may say that both aims are creditably realized. We should premise that, naturally, considering the *locale* of the conversations, the ladies do not figure largely as participants, though the scene does occasionally shift to other parts of the vessel where the weed is not in evidence. Before the rocky citadel of Quebec is sighted we feel that the Doctor has already got a good start on his way to the Catholic Church, not to mention the evident beginnings of something more than a friendship between himself and the fair daughter of the Parson. Love-making, however, plays but an unimportant part in this record of the voyage of the good ship *Carinthia*, and is introduced perhaps by way of foil and relief after the lofty topics which usually form the staple of our party's conversation. We cannot help feeling that the Priest, who does by far the most of the talking, is too much of a paragon, and too unreal: he is armed at all points, prepared for all comers; the others stand up to him only to be speedily put to silence under the fire of his relentless logic, and we feel, before we have known him many minutes, that the others are not going to have the ghost of a chance with him. This is something perhaps inseparable from the attempt to give us a polemic under the disguise of a record of casual conversation, but it will always interfere with the success of such a book in carrying conviction to readers who do not share the author's point of view. These will feel that the characters who represent *their* view of things are being merely put through a few preliminary paces leading up to the slaughter to which they are fore-doomed, their utterances being so arranged as to lead inevitably to their overthrow and confusion. Victory in such imaginary discussions is too easy to be of any convincing value. This apart, however, many of the conversations are full of interest, and may be read by many who would not study the subjects treated of in any other way.

SAMUEL P. MACPHERSON.

The Religious Persecution in France, 1900-1906—by J. NAPIER BRODHEAD, Author of "Slav and Moslem." Kegan Paul & Co., London; B. Herder, St. Louis.

The religious situation in France is not now in the acute stage in which it was a few months ago, but the situation as it exists and the causes which have led up to it can never be without interest to all who have at heart the interests of religion and, indeed, of human liberty. Hence a volume such as that before us will be sure of many readers, who, we may add, will find it very interesting reading. It is not a planned and thought-out history of the religious, or anti-religious war, but consists of a series of articles written throughout the years 1900-1906, by the author, then residing in France, and published in an American newspaper, the name of which is not given. It was matter of common complaint amongst Catholics, during the progress of these troubles, that the items of news appearing in the daily press of America on the subject, were almost invariably tinged with anti-Catholic bias and largely misrepresented the attitude and action of the Church and her rulers. The journal in which Mr. Brodhead's articles appeared must have been a signal exception to this, in so far, at all events, as the articles in question were concerned, for the title of his book is sufficient to indicate the point of view from which he regards the events that have so lately drawn the world's eyes upon France. It is a persecution which he relates, a persecution each step of which followed upon its predecessor, in obedience to a deliberate plan prepared from the start, and carefully held in view throughout the whole course of the subsequent events. Mr. Brodhead, like many who have written for our papers and magazines, feels impelled to give some explanation of how it was possible for a handful of men to persecute a religion still professed by such a larger proportion of the French people, but after all such explanations we are still left wondering and, to a large extent, in the dark. If we are not to believe that the vast majority of French Catholics are in a state of hopeless apathy, we can only conclude that there is a great gulf fixed between Gallic ideas of, and methods of dealing with, representative government and those prevailing among English-speaking peoples.

We must not look in this book for the style and method of a calmly thought-out treatise. Mr. Brodhead writes under the pressure of exciting events passing under his eyes or only lately passed, with the repetitions to be expected in a series of newspaper articles, and perhaps an occasional over indulgence in denunciation. Nevertheless the book will repay perusal and might open the eyes of many who apparently are still under the impression that the recent French Church legislation is an example of the principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity" so loudly vaunted by the authors of these laws.

SAMUEL P. MACPHERSON.

"**Handbook of Ceremonies**"—By JOHN BAPTIST MULLER, S. J. For Priests and Seminarians. Edited by W. H. W. Fanning, S. J. Professor of Canon Law and Liturgy, St. Louis University. B. Herder, St. Louis pp. 256.

The Professor of Canon Law and Liturgy in St. Louis University deserves our thanks for editing the present work. It is up-to-date, neat, handy, and reasonable in price. We find treated in four parts: The Mass; Evening Devotions; Functions during the Ecclesiastical Year; Administration of the Holy Sacraments and Sacramentals—

all in an exact and orderly manner. The authority of the work is unquestionable, as the compiler communicated in all cases of doubt with Rev. Fr. Schober, C. SS. R. of the Sacred Congregation of Rites.

It is worthy of note that all the details for the ceremony of Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament are perfectly in accord with the decisions on that ceremony given by the Sacred Congregation of Rites, Feb. 16th, 1906. It is also a pleasure to note that the Editor has appended in a footnote the form of Extreme Unction in case of urgency, as given by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office April 25th, 1906. A chapter of instructions for Master of Ceremonies, Thurifer and Acolytes, as given by the great masters like Van der Stappen and Martinucci, is desirable in the book. The author is mistaken on one point where he speaks on "Hearing of Confession", page 229. He says that in imparting absolution the raising of the hand and the turning of the palm towards the penitent is *not* demanded by Ritual. It is, however, being so ordered in the second chapter: "Ordo Ministrandi Sacramentum Pœnitentiæ", in the Roman Ritual.

J. F. C.

"Sermons to the Novices Regular"—by THOMAS A. KEMPIS. Translation from the text of MICHAEL JOSEPH POHL, Ph. D. by DOM VINCENT SCULLY, C. R. L. B. Herder, St. Louis, pp. 255.

The venerable author of the "Following of Christ" was twice elected sub-prior of the Monastery of Mt. St. Agnes of the Canons Regular. As sub-prior, he had to undertake the task of Novice Master. It was while filling this office that the present sermons were delivered. There are thirty of these sermons altogether. As the author believed that "examples move one's hearers more than words alone," we find one or two examples after each sermon; "taught" in this "by the example of blessed Gregory." The style of these sermons is as simple as the Imitation; even the most illiterate would scarcely fail to understand them. As we might expect, a great deal of ascetical food is contained in this work; coming as it does, from a master in the Spiritual life. Preachers of all times may well imitate him in the extensive and judicious use of Holy Scripture throughout each sermon.

J. F. C.

Political Economy: third edition—by Charles S Devas, M. A. Oxon. Longmans, Green and Co. 1907.

The Stonyhurst Philosophical Series, of which this volume is one, is a noteworthy attempt to make Catholic Philosophy available in English. This new edition of the Political Economy, revised shortly before the author's recent death, offers us a worthy, up-to-date, introductory text-book on Economics. The work, embracing about 700 pages, is divided into four parts treating respectively of production and consumption, exchange, distribution, and public finance; to which is added a brief epilogue on the scope, method, and history of economic science. We think the references, inserted in the text, would be more conveniently placed in foot-notes, while a bibliography at the end of each chapter would considerably enhance the value of the book. What gives this excellent work its peculiar merit is the view-point of Catholic morality which pervades it from beginning to end, more notably in such chapters as those on the theory and particulars of consumption, family life, rich and poor, apologia for the rich. The author regards Economics as a part of Ethics, repeatedly contending that the questions of how men are to get their living, and of how families and nations are to continue their existence are inseparably bound up with the moral and religious dispositions of the workers, of the parents, and of the citizens...that the social question is by pre-eminence a religious question, and that without the aid of religion, no solution of any avail is to be found.

Letture Scelte dal Nuovo Testamento—Testo Greco, Versione, Comento —By Giuseppe Bonaccorsi, M. S. C., Firenze, pp. XV., 425.

The object of this volume is stated by the author in his Preface. Hitherto there has been no elementary study of New Testament Greek in the Italian language. Hence Father Bonaccorsi has taken it upon himself to fill this gap—and shall we say it?—this long-felt want. And he is deserving of much praise for the attractive volume he has brought out. Briefly, it consists of selections from nearly all the books of the New Testament in Greek and Italian, and therefore it ought to serve as an excellent text-book for an elementary course in New Testament Greek. The Introduction, which treats of the language of the New Testament, is brief but sufficiently complete for those for whom it was written. But the most attractive part will be found in the copious notes of linguistics and exegesis, in which the book abounds. Lastly, there are two indices that ought to prove helpful for reference purposes. Anything that comes from the pen of Father Bonaccorsi always proves valuable, and the present volume is no exception, for it is a very practical book. There is only one thing more to say: It is hoped that Father Bonaccorsi will shortly see his way to edit the whole New Testament in as able and scholarly a way as he has done for these Selections.

John F. Morgan.

Contemplative Prayer—by Dom. B. Weld-Blundell, O. S. B. Washbourne, London. Benziger, New York. A new edition—partly abridged —of Father Baker's *Sancta Sophia,* with portrait and brief biography.

The Interior Castle of Saint Teresa. Thomas Baker, London. Translations of two works by the famous Spanish mystic: *The Interior Castle, or The Mansions*; and *Exclamations of the Soul to God,* by the Benedictines of Stanbrook, with an introduction and notes by Father Benedict Zimmerman, O. C. D.

Pauline Marie Jaricot—by M. J. Maurin. Benzigers. A translation by E. Sheppard of the interesting and edifying life of the holy foundress of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith.

The History of the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ—by J. Groenings, S. J. Herder. Devotional in character; of value for purposes of meditation and preaching. The author follows the biblical account and approved commentators. He "has thought it wise not to draw from private revelations no matter how venerable the names connected with them may be. Since it is difficult to distinguish between what is in reality revealed in these revelations and what is the result of pious meditation, the author judged it more in accordance with his very calling as teacher and interpreter of the Gospel to rely solely on the Gospel narratives and the interpretation by the Fathers and by men scientifically trained for that purpose." In this Father Groenings reflects the spirit of the Society to which he belongs. And it is precisely this fact which makes one feel secure, in picking up a devotional work with "S. J." on the title page, that it is going to be solid and Catholic. It is to be hoped that this book will drive out of the market a fearful example of how these matters should not be handled which was inflicted on the American Catholic public a year or two ago.

Father Gallwey—by Percy Fitzgerald. Burns and Oates. A sympathetic sketch of an admirable character written by an old pupil.

Delecta Biblica, by a Sister of Notre Dame. Longmans. Selections from the Vulgate, arranged for use in the study of Latin by the inductive method. With vocabulary.

The Sacramental Life of the Church—by Rev. Bernard Otten, S. J. Herder. A short treatise on the Seven Sacraments; instructive, popular, apologetical.

The Protestant Reformation—by Rev. Charles Coppens, S. J. Herder. A short history of the beginnings of Protestantism in the different European countries.

Christologie—par M. Lepin. Beauchesne, Paris. A brief but careful commentary on Propositions xxvii-xxxviii of the Decree "*Lamentabili sane*" of the Holy Office, by M. Lepin, of the Theological Faculty of Lyons.

The Fathers of the Desert. Two volumes. Burns and Oates. Translated from the German of the Countess Hahn-Hahn, by Emily F. Bowden. The introductory chapter on "The Spiritual Life of the first six Centuries," by Father Dalgairns of the Oratory supplies a useful apologia for what appears strange to the mind of our century in the lives and religious ideals of those holy men of old.

A Manual of Theology for the Laity—by Rev. P. Geiermann, C. SS. R. Benziger. Catholic dogma, morals, apologetics, practices—in 400 small pages. Short chapters; clear, succinct style. Directed to intellect rather than heart. Objections are handled briefly in Questions and Answer form at end of sections—sometimes very well done—sometimes too flippant.

A Review of Hamlet—by George Henry Miles, late Professor of Literature in Mt. St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland. Longmans, Green and Co. A new and most welcome edition of perhaps the most excellent and charming Essay ever written on any one of Shakespeare's Plays. Unfortunately the gentle-spirited and gifted author was taken off in the prime of his literary career. Had he lived to review, as he had intended to, several other of Shakespeare's principal Plays, his name would have been inseparably connected with that of the great poet and dramatist himself.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Prim und Complet des Roemischen Breviers, von Dr. Nikolaus Gihr. Herder.

Psallite Sapienter, von Dr. Maurus Wolter, O. S. B. V. Band, Ps. 121-150. Herder.

Kurzgefasstes Handbuch der Katholischen Religion, von W. Wilmers. Pustet.

Die Parabolen Des Herrn in Homilien Erklært, von Dr. Jacob Schaeffer. Herder.

De Sacramento Extremæ Unctionis Tractatus Dogmaticus, by J. Kern, S. J. Pustet.

Der Knecht Gottes in Isaias Kap. 40-55, von Dr. Franz Feldmann. Herder.

Manuale Juris Ecclesiastici, tom. II, Jus Regularium Speciale. Dom. Pruemmer, O. P. Herder.

Leçons de Théologie Dogmatique, par L. Labauche. Dogmatique Spéciale: l'Homme. Bloud, Paris.

Luther et Luthéranisme, par L. Christiani. Bloud et Cie. Paris.

Ancient Catholic Homes of Scotland, by Dom. Odo Blundell, O. S. B. Introduction by Hon. Mrs. Maxwell Scott, of Abbotsford.

The Story of Ellen, by Rosa Mulholland (Mrs. Gilbert). Benziger.

The Curé's Brother, by David Bearne, S. J. Benziger.

Christine and other Poems, by George Henry Miles. Longmans.

Thoughts and Fancies, by F. C. Kolbe, D. D. Benziger.

Bob Ingersoll's Egosophy and other Poems, by Rev. James McKernan. Pustet.

New Testament, published by Wilderman, New York.

The Book of the Children of Mary, by Rev. Elder Mullan, S. J. Kenedy.

The Writings of Marie Corelli, by S. Boswin, S. J. Herder.

De Evangeliorum Inspiratione; De Dogmatis Evolutione; De Arcani Disciplina, by Rev. R. M. Fei, O. P. Beauchesne, Paris.

La Notion de Vérité dans la "Philosophie Nouvelle," by J. de Tonquedec. Beauchesne, Paris.

L'éducation du Caractère, par R. P. Gillet, O. P. Desclée, De Brouwer.

Vers la Vie Divine, par P. Bernard Kuhn, O. P. Lethielleux, Paris.

Régime de la Proprieté, par L. Garriguet. Bloud, Paris.

Saint Athanase, par Ferdinand Cavallera. Bloud, Paris.

Del valore dell'esperimento in psicologia, Fra Agostino Gemelli, O. F. M. Artigianelli, Monza.

Catholicism and Independence, by M. D. Petre. Longmans.

A Modern Pilgrim's Progress. Benziger, N. Y. Burns and Oates, London.

Modernism: what it is and why it was condemned, by C. S. B. Sands and Co.

The Humanizing of the Brute, by H. Muckermann, S. J. Herder.

The Decrees of the Vatican Council, by Rev. Vincent McNabb, O. P. Benziger.

Free Will and Four English Philosophers, by Joseph Rickaby, S. J. Burns and Oates, London. Benziger, New York.

THE WESTMINSTER LECTURES. Sands and Co. Herder.

God and Human Suffering, by Joseph Egger, S. J.

Evil: Its Nature and Cause, by Rev. A. B. Sharpe, M. A.

Authority in Belief, by Rev. A. B. Sharpe, M. A.

The Church versus Science, by Rev. J. Gerard, S. J.

Revelation and Creeds, by V. Rev. J. M'Intyre, D. D.

Science and Faith, by Rev. Francis Aveling, D. D.

Socialism and Individualism, by V. Rev. A. Poock, D. D.